Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 13 - Shloka (Verse) 3

व्याख्या -- क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत -- सम्पूर्ण क्षेत्रों(शरीरों)में मैं हूँ -- ऐसा जो अहंभाव है? उसमें मैं तो क्षेत्र है (जिसको पूर्वश्लोकमें एतत् कहा है) और हूँ मैंपनका ज्ञाता क्षेत्रज्ञ है (जिसको पूर्वश्लोकमें वेत्ति पदसे जाननेवाला कहा है)। मैं का सम्बन्ध होनेसे ही हूँ है। अगर मैं का सम्बन्ध न रहे तो हूँ नहीं रहेगा? प्रत्युत है रहेगा। कारण कि है ही मैंके साथ सम्बन्ध होनेसे हूँ कहा जाता है। अतः वास्तवमें क्षेत्रज्ञ(हूँ) की परमात्मा(है) के साथ एकता है। इसी बातको भगवान् यहाँ कह रहे हैं कि सम्पूर्ण क्षेत्रोंमें मेरेको ही क्षेत्रज्ञ समझो।मनुष्य किसी विषयको जानता है? तो वह जाननेमें आनेवाला विषय ज्ञेय कहलाता है। उस ज्ञेयको वह किसी करणके द्वारा ही जानता है। करण दो तरहका होता है -- बहिःकरण और अन्तःकरण। मनुष्य विषयोंको बहिःकरण(श्रोत्र? नेत्र आदि) से जानता है और बहिःकरणको अन्तःकरण(मन? बुद्धि आदि) से जानता है। उस अन्तःकरणकी चार वृत्तियाँ हैं -- मन? बुद्धि? चित्त और अहंकार। इन चारोंमें भी अहंकार सबसे सूक्ष्म है? जो कि एकदेशीय है। यह अहंकार भी जिससे देखा जाता है? जाना जाता है? वह जाननेवाला प्रकाशस्वरूप क्षेत्रज्ञ है। उस अहंभावके भी ज्ञाता क्षेत्रज्ञको साक्षात् मेरा स्वरूप समझो। यहाँ विद्धि पद कहनेका तात्पर्य है कि हे अर्जुन जैसे तू अपनेको शरीरमें मानता है और शरीरको अपना मानता है? ऐसे ही तू अपनेको मेरेमें जान (मान) और मेरेको अपना मन। कारण कि तुमने शरीरके साथ जो एकता मान रखी है? उसको छोड़नेके लिये मेरे साथ एकता माननी बहुत आवश्यक है।जैसे यहाँ भगवान्ने क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि पदोंसे क्षेत्रज्ञकी अपने साथ एकता बतायी है? ऐसे ही गीतामें अन्य जगह भी एकता बतायी है जैसे -- दूसरे अध्यायके सत्रहवें श्लोकमें भगवान्ने शरीरी(क्षेत्रज्ञ)के लिये कहा कि जिससे यह सम्पूर्ण संसार व्याप्त है? उसको तुम अविनाशी समझो -- अविनाशि तु तद्विद्धि येन सर्वमिदं ततम् और नवें अध्यायके चौथे श्लोकमें अपने लिये कहा कि मेरेसे यह सम्पूर्ण संसार व्याप्त है -- मया ततमिदं सर्वं जगदव्यक्तमूर्तिना। यहाँ तो भगवान्ने क्षेत्रज्ञ(अंश) की अपने (अंशीके) साथ एकता बतायी है और आगे इसी अध्यायके चौंतीसवें श्लोकमें शरीरसंसार(कार्य) की प्रकृति(कारण) के साथ एकता बतायेंगे। तात्पर्य है कि शरीर तो प्रकृतिका अंश है? इसलिये तुम इससे सर्वथा विमुख हो जाओ और तुम मेरे अंश हो? इसलिये तुम मेरे सम्मुख हो जाओ।शरीरकी संसारके साथ स्वाभाविक एकता है। परन्तु यह जीव शरीरको संसारसे अलग मानकर उसके साथ ही अपनी एकता मान लेता है। परमात्माके साथ क्षेत्रज्ञकी स्वाभाविक एकता होते हुए भी शरीरके साथ माननेसे यह अपनेको परमात्मासे अलग मानता है। शरीरको संसारसे अलग मानना और अपनेको परमात्मासे अलग मानना -- ये दोनों ही गलत मान्यताएँ हैं। अतः भगवान् यहाँ विद्धि पदसे आज्ञा देते हैं कि क्षेत्रज्ञ मेरे साथ एक है? ऐसा समझो। तात्पर्य है कि तुमने जहाँ शरीरके साथ अपनी एकता मान रखी है? वहीं मेरे साथ अपनी एकता मान लो? जो कि वास्तवमें है।शास्त्रोंमें प्रकृति? जीव और परमात्मा -- इन तीनोंका अलगअलग वर्णन आता है परन्तु यहाँ अपि पदसे भगवान् एक विलक्षण भावकी ओर लक्ष्य कराते हैं कि शास्त्रोंमें परमात्माके जिस सर्वव्यापक स्वरूपका वर्णन हुआ है? वो तो मैं हूँ ही? इसके साथ ही सम्पूर्ण क्षेत्रोंमें क्षेत्रज्ञरूपसे पृथक्पृथक् दीखनेवाला भी मैं ही हूँ। अतः प्रस्तुत पदोंका यही भाव है कि क्षेत्रज्ञरूपसे परमात्मा ही है -- ऐसा जानकर साधक मेरे साथ अभिन्नताका अनुभव करे।स्वयं संसारसे भिन्न और परमात्मासे अभिन्न है। इसलिये यह नियम है कि संसारका ज्ञान तभी होता है? जब उससे सर्वथा भिन्नताका अनुभव किया जाय। तात्पर्य है कि संसारसे रागरहित होकर ही संसारके वास्तविक स्वरूपको जाना जा सकता है। परन्तु परमात्माका ज्ञान उनसे अभिन्न होनेसे ही होता है। इसलिये परमात्माका यथार्थ ज्ञान प्राप्त करानेके लिये भगवान् क्षेत्रज्ञके साथ अपनी अभिन्नता बता रहे हैं। इस अभिन्नताको यथार्थरूपसे जाननेपर परमात्माका वास्तविक ज्ञान हो जाता है।क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ज्ञानं यत्तज्ज्ञानं मतं मम -- क्षेत्र(शरीर) की सम्पूर्ण संसारके साथ एकता है और क्षेत्रज्ञ(जीवात्मा) की मेरे साथ एकता है -- ऐसा जो क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञका ज्ञान है? वही मेरे मतमें यथार्थ ज्ञान है।मतं मम कहनेका तात्पर्य है कि संसारमें अनेक विद्याओंका? अनेक भाषाओँका? अनेक लिपियोंका? अनेक कलाओंका? तीनों लोक और चौदह भुवनोंका जो ज्ञान है? वह वास्तविक ज्ञान नहीं है। कारण कि वह ज्ञान सांसारिक व्यवहारमें काममें आनेवाला होते हुए भी संसारमें फँसानेवाला होनेसे अज्ञान ही है। वास्तविक ज्ञान तो वही है? जिससे स्वयंका शरीरसे सम्बन्धविच्छेद हो जाय और फिर संसारमें जन्म न हो? संसारकी परतन्त्रता न हो। यही ज्ञान भगवान्के मतमें यथार्थ ज्ञान है।
सम्बन्ध -- पूर्वश्लोकमें क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञके ज्ञानको ही अपने मतमें ज्ञान बताकर अब भगवान् क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञके विभागको सुननेकी आज्ञा देते हैं।

इस प्रकार कहे हुए क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञ क्या इतने ज्ञानसे ही जाने जा सकते हैं इसपर कहते हैं कि नहीं --, तू समस्त क्षेत्रोंमें उपर्युक्त लक्षणोंसे युक्त क्षेत्रज्ञ भी मुझ असंसारी परमेश्वरको ही जान। अर्थात् समस्त शरीरोंमें जो ब्रह्मासे लेकर स्तम्बपर्यन्त अनेक शरीररूप उपाधियोंसे विभक्त हुआ क्षेत्रज्ञ है? उसको समस्त उपाधिभेदसे रहित एवं सत् और असत् आदि शब्दप्रतीतिसे जाननेमें न आनेवाला ही समझ। हे भारत जब कि क्षेत्र? क्षेत्रज्ञ और ईश्वरइनके यथार्थ स्वरूपसे अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई ज्ञानका विषय शेष नहीं रहता? इसलिये ज्ञेयस्वरूप क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञका जो ज्ञान है -- जिस ज्ञानसे क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञ प्रत्यक्ष किये,जाते हैं? वही ज्ञान यथार्थ ज्ञान है। मुझ ईश्वर -- विष्णुका यही मत -- अभिप्राय है। पू0 -- यदि समस्त शरीरोंमें एक ही ईश्वर है? उससे अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई भोक्ता नहीं है? ऐसा मानें? तो ईश्वरको संसारी मानना हुआ नहीं तो ईश्वरसे अतिरिक्त अन्य संसारीका अभाव होनेसे संसारके अभावका प्रसङ्ग आ जाता है। यह दोनों ही अनिष्ट हैं क्योंकि ऐसा मान लेनेपर बन्ध? मोक्ष और उनके कारणका प्रतिपादन करनेवाले शास्त्र व्यर्थ हो जाते हैं और प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणोंसे भी इस मान्यताका विरोध है। प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाणसे तो सुखदुःख और उनका कारणरूप यह संसार दीख ही रहा है। इसके सिवा जगत्की विचित्रताको देखकर पुण्यपापहेतुक संसारका होना अनुमानसे भी सिद्ध होता है? परंतु आत्मा और ईश्वरकी एकता मान लेनेपर ये सबकेसब अयुक्त ठहरते हैं। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि ज्ञान और अज्ञानका भेद होनेसे यह सब सम्भव है। ( श्रुतिमें भी कहा है कि ) प्रसिद्ध जो अविद्या और विद्या हैं वे अत्यन्त विपरीत और भिन्न समझी गयी हैं तथा ( उसी जगह ) उन विद्या और अविद्याका फल भी श्रेय और प्रेय इस प्रकार परस्परविरुद्ध दिखलाया गया है? इनमें विद्याका फल श्रेय ( मोक्ष ) और अविद्याका प्रेय ( इष्ट भोगोंकी प्राप्ति ) है। वैसे ही श्रीव्यासजीने भी कहा है कि यह दोनों ही मार्ग है इत्यादि तथा यह दो ही मार्ग हैं इत्यादि और यहाँ गीताशास्त्रमें भी दो निष्ठाएँ बतलायी गयी हैं। इसके सिवा श्रुति? स्मृति और न्यायसे भी यही सिद्ध होता है कि विद्याके द्वारा कार्यसहित अविद्याका नाश करना चाहिये। इस विषयमें ये श्रुतियाँ यहाँ यदि जान लिया तो बहुत ठीक है और यदि यहाँ नहीं जाना तो बड़ी भारी हानि है उसको इस प्रकार जाननेवाला यहाँ अमृत हो जाता है परमपदकी प्राप्तिके लिये ( विद्याके सिवा ) अन्य मार्ग नहीं है विद्वान् किसीसे भी भयभीत नहीं होता। किन्तु अज्ञानीके विषयमें ( कहा है कि ) उसको भय होता है जो कि अविद्याके बीचमें ही प़ड़े हुए हैं जो ब्रह्मको जानता है वह ब्रह्म ही हो जाता है यह देव अन्य है और मैं अन्य हूँ इस प्रकार जो समझता है वह आत्मतत्त्वको नहीं जानता जैसे ( मनुष्योंका पशु होता है वैसे ही वह देवताओंका पशु है किन्तु जो आत्मज्ञानी है ( उसविषयमें ) वह यह सब कुछ हो जाता है यदि आकाशको चमक समान लपेटा जा सके इत्यादि सहस्रों श्रुतियाँ हैं। तथा ये स्मृतियाँ भी हैं -- ज्ञान अज्ञानसे ढका हुआ है? इसलिये जीव मोहित हो रहे हैं जिनका चित्त समतामें स्थित है उन्होंने यहीं संसारको जीत लिया है सर्वत्र समानभावसे देखता हुआ इत्यादि। युक्तिसे भी यह बात सिद्ध है। जैसे कहा है कि सर्प? कुशकंण्टक और तालाबको जान लेनेपर मनुष्य उनसे बच जाते हैं? किन्तु बिना जाने कई एक उनमें गिर जाते हैं? इस न्यायसे ज्ञानका जो विशेष फल है उसको समझ। इस प्रकार उपर्युक्त प्रमाणोंसे यह ज्ञान होता है कि देहादिमें आत्मबुद्धि करनेवाला अज्ञानी रागद्वेषादि दोषोंसे प्रेरित होकर धर्मअधर्मरूप कर्मोंका अनुष्ठान करता हुआ जन्मता और मरता रहता है? किंतु देहादिसे अतिरिक्त आत्माका साक्षात् करनेवाले पुरुषोंके रागद्वेषादि दोष निवृत्त हो जाते हैं? इससे उनकी धर्माधर्मविषयक प्रवृत्ति शान्त हो जानेसे वे मुक्त हो जाते हैं। इस बातका कोई भी न्यायानुसार विरोध नहीं कर सकता।अतः यह सिद्ध हुआ कि जो वास्तवमें ईश्वर ही है उस क्षेत्रज्ञको अविद्याद्वारा आरोपित उपाधिके भेदसे संसारित्व प्राप्तसा हो जाता है? जैसे कि जीवको देहादिमें आत्मबुद्धि हो जाती है क्योंकि समस्त जीवोंका जो देहादि अनात्मपदार्थोंमें आत्मभाव प्रसिद्ध है? वह निःसंदेह अविद्याकृत ही है। जैसे स्तम्भमें मनुष्यबुद्धि हो जाती है? परंतु इतनेहीसे मनुष्यके धर्म स्तम्भमें और स्तम्भके धर्म मनुष्यमें नहीं आ जाते? वैसे ही चेतनके धर्म देहमें और देहके धर्म चेतनमें नहीं आ सकते। जरा और मृत्युके समान ही अविद्याके कार्य होनेसे सुखदुःख और अज्ञान आदि भी उन्हींकी भाँति आत्माके धर्म नहीं हो सकते। पू0 -- यदि ऐसा मानें कि विषम होनेके कारण यह दृष्टान्त ठीक नहीं है अर्थात् स्तम्भ और पुरुष दोनों ज्ञेय वस्तु हैं? उनमें अविद्यावश ज्ञाताद्वारा एकमें एकका अध्यास किया गया है परंतु देह और आत्मामें तो ज्ञेय और ज्ञाताका ही एक दूसरेमें अध्यास होता है? इसलिये यह दृष्टान्त सम नहीं है? अतः यह सिद्ध होता है कि देहका ज्ञेयरूप ( सुखदुःखादि ) धर्म भी ज्ञाता -- आत्मामें होता है। उ0 -- इसमें आत्माको जड़ मानने आदिका प्रसङ्ग आ जाता है? इसलिये ऐसा मानना ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि यदि ज्ञेयरूप शरीरादि -- क्षेत्रक सुख? दुःख? मोह और इच्छादि धर्म ज्ञाता ( आत्मा ) के भी होते हैं? तो यह बतलाना चाहिये कि ज्ञेयरूप क्षेत्रके अविद्याद्वारा आरोपित कुछ धर्म तो आत्मामें होते हैं और कुछ -- जरामरणादि नहीं होते? इस विशेषताका कारण क्या है बल्कि? ऐसा अनुमान तो किया जा सकता है कि जरा आदिके समान अविद्याद्वारा आरोपित और त्याज्य तथा ग्राह्य होनेके कारण ये सुखदुःखादि ( आत्माके धर्म ) नहीं हैं। ऐसा होनेसे यह सिद्ध हुआ कि कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरूप यह संसार ज्ञेय वस्तुमें स्थित हुआ ही अविद्याद्वारा ज्ञातामें अध्यारोपित है? अतः उससे ज्ञाताका कुछ भी नहीं बिगड़ता? जैसे कि मूर्खोंद्वारा अध्यारोपित तलमलिनतादिसे आकाशका ( कुछ भी नहीं बिगड़ता )। अतः सब शरीरोंमें रहते हुए भी भगवान्क्षेत्रज्ञ ईश्वरमें संसारीपनके गन्धमात्रकी भी शङ्का नहीं करनी चाहिये क्योंकि संसारमें कहीं भी अविद्याद्वारा आरोपित धर्मसे किसीका भी उपकार या अपकार होता नहीं देखा जाता। तुमने जो यह कहा था कि ( स्तम्भमें मनुष्यके भ्रमका ) दृष्टान्त सम नहीं है सो ( यह कहना ) भूल है। पू0 -- कैसे उ0अविद्याजन्य अध्यासमात्रमें ही दृष्टान्त और दार्ष्टान्तकी समानता विवक्षित है। उसमें कोई दोष नहीं आता। परंतु तुम जो यह मानते हो कि ज्ञातामें दृष्टान्त और दार्ष्टान्तकी विषमताका दोष आता है? तो उसका भी अपवाद? जरामृत्यु आदिके दृष्टान्तसे दिखला दिया गया है। पू0 -- यदि ऐसा कहें कि अविद्यायुक्त होनेसे क्षेत्रज्ञको ही संसारित्व प्राप्त हुआ? तो उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि अविद्या? तामस प्रत्यय है। तामस प्रत्यय? चाहे विपरीत ग्रहण करनेवाला,( विपर्यय ) हो? चाहे संशय उत्पन्न करनेवाला ( संशय ) हो और चाहे कुछ भी ग्रहण न करनेवाला हो? आवरणरूप होनेके कारण वह अविद्या ही है? क्योंकि विवेकरूप प्रकाशके होनेपर वह दूर हो जाता है तथा आवरणरूप तमोमय तिमिरादि दोषोंके रहते हुए ही अग्रहण आदिरूप तीन प्रकारकी अविद्याका अस्तित्व उपलब्ध होता है। पू0 -- यदि यह बात है तब तो अविद्या ज्ञाताका धर्म हुआ उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि तिमिररोगादिजन्य दोष चक्षु आदि करणोंमें ही देखे जाते हैं ( ज्ञाता आत्मामें नहीं )। जो तुम ऐसा मानते हो कि अविद्या ज्ञाताका धर्म है और अविद्यारूप धर्मसे युक्त होना ही उसका संसारित्व है? इसलिये यह कहना ठीक नहीं है कि ईश्वर ही क्षेत्रज्ञ है और वह संसारी नहीं है सो तुम्हारा ऐसा मानना युक्तियुक्त नहीं है क्योंकि नेत्ररूप करणमें विपरीत ग्राहकता आदि दोष देखे जाते हैं तो भी वे विपरीतादि ग्रहण या उनके कारणरूप तिमिरादि दोष ज्ञाताके नहीं हो जाते ( उसी प्रकार देहके धर्म भी आत्माके नहीं हो सकते )। तथा जैसे आँखका संस्कार करके तिमिरादि प्रतिबन्धको हटा देनेपर ग्रहीता पुरुषमें वे दोष नहीं देखे जाते? इसलिये वे ग्रहीता पुरुषके धर्म नहीं हैं? वैसे ही अग्रहण? विपरीतग्रहण और संशय आदि प्रत्यय तथा उनके कारणरूप तिमिरादि दोष भी सर्वत्र किसीनकिसी करणके ही हो सकते हैं -- ज्ञाता पुरुषके अर्थात् क्षेत्रज्ञके नहीं। इसके सिवा वे जाननेमें आनेवाले ( ज्ञानके विषय ) होनेसे भी दीपकके प्रकाशकी भाँति ज्ञाताके धर्म नहीं हो सकते क्योंकि वे ज्ञेय हैं? इसलिये अपनेसे अतिरिक्त किसी अन्यद्वारा जाननेमें आनेवाले हैं। सभी आत्मवादी समस्त करणोंसे आत्माका वियोग होनेके उपरान्त कैवल्य अवस्थामें आत्माको अविद्यादि दोषोंसे रहित मानते हैं? इससे भी ( उपर्युक्त सिद्धान्त ही सिद्ध होता है ) क्योंकि यदि अग्निकी उष्णताके समान ये ( सुखदुःखादि दोष ) क्षेत्रज्ञ आत्माके अपने धर्म हों तो उनसे उसका कभी वियोग नहीं हो सकेगा। इसके सिवा आकाशकी भाँति सर्वव्यापक? मूर्तिरहित? निर्विकार आत्माका किसीके साथ संयोगवियोग होना सम्भव नहीं है? इससे भी क्षेत्रज्ञकी नित्य ईश्वरता ही सिद्ध होती है। तथा अनादित्वान्िनर्गुणत्वात् इत्यादि भगवान्के वचनोंसे भी क्षेत्रज्ञका नित्य ईश्वरत्व हि सिद्ध होता है। पू0 -- ऐसा मान लेनेपर तो संसार और संसारित्वका अभाव हो जानेके कारण शास्त्रकी व्यर्थता आदि दोष उपस्थित होंगे उ0 -- नहीं क्योंकि यह दोष तो सभीने स्वीकार किया है। सभी आत्मवादियोंद्वारा स्वीकार किये हुए दोषका किसी एकके लिये ही परिहार करना आवश्यक नहीं है।, पू0 -- इसे सबने कैसे स्वीकार किया है उ0 -- सभी आत्मवादियोंने मुक्त आत्मामें संसार और संसारीपनके व्यवहारका अभाव माना है? परंतु ( इससे ) उनके मतमें शास्त्रकी अनर्थकता आदि दोषोंकी प्राप्ति नहीं मानी गयी। जैसे समस्त द्वैतवादियोंके मतसे बन्धावस्थामें ही शास्त्र आदिकी सार्थकता है मुक्तअवस्थामें नहीं? वैसे ही हमारे मतमें भी जीवोंकी ईश्वरके साथ एकता हो जानेपर यदि शास्त्रकी व्यर्थता होती हो तो हो? अविद्यावस्थामें तो उसकी सार्थकता है ही। पू0 -- हम सब द्वैतवादियोंके सिद्धान्तसे तो आत्माकी बन्धावस्था और मुक्तावस्था वास्तवमें ही सच्ची है। अतः वे हेय? उपादेय हैं और उनके सब साधन भी सत्य हैं। इस कारण शास्त्रकी सार्थकता हो सकती है। परंतु अद्वैतवादियोंके सिद्धान्तसे तो द्वैतभाव अविद्याजन्य और मिथ्या है? अतः आत्मामें बन्धावस्था भी वास्तवमें नहीं है? इसलिये शास्त्रका कोई विषय न रहनेके कारण शास्त्र आदिकी व्यर्थताका दोष आता है। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि आत्माके अवस्थाभेद सिद्ध नहीं हो सकते? यदि ( आत्मामें इनका होना ) मान भी लें तो आत्माकी ये बन्ध और मुक्त दोनों अवस्थाएँ एक साथ होनी चाहिये या क्रमसे स्थिति और गतिकी भाँति परस्परविरोध होनेके कारण दोनों अवस्थाएँ एक साथ तो एकमें हो नहीं सकतीं। यदि क्रमसे होना मानें तो बिना निमित्तके बन्धावस्थाका होना माननेसे तो उससे कभी छुटकारा न होनेका प्रसङ्ग आ जायगा और किसी निमित्तसे उसका होना मानें तो स्वतः न होनेके कारण वह मिथ्या ठहरती है। ऐसा होनेपर स्वीकार किया हुआ सिद्धान्त कट जाता है। इसके सिवा बन्धावस्था और मुक्तावस्थाका आगापीछा निरूपण किया जानेपर पहले बन्धावस्थाका होना माना जायगा तथा उसे आदिरहित और अन्तयुक्त मानना पड़ेगा सो यह प्रमाणविरुद्ध है? ऐसे ही मुक्तावस्थाको भी आदियुक्त और अन्तरहित प्रमाणविरुद्ध ही मानना पड़ेगा। तथा आत्माकी अवस्थावाला और एक अवस्थासे दूसरी अवस्थामें जानेवाला मानकर उसका नित्यत्व सिद्ध करना भी सम्भव नहीं है। जब कि आत्मामें अनित्यत्वके दोषका परिहार करनेके लिये बन्धावस्था और मुक्तावस्थाके भेदकी कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती। इसलिये द्वैतवादियोंके मतसे भी शास्त्रकी व्यर्थता आदि दोष अबाध्य ही हैं। इस प्रकार दोनोंके लिये समान होनेके कारण इस दोषका परिहार केवल अद्वैतवादियोंद्वारा ही किया जाना आवश्यक नहीं है। ( हमारे मतानुसार तो वास्तवमें ) शास्त्रकी व्यर्थता है भी नहीं क्योंकि शास्त्र लोकप्रसिद्ध अज्ञानीका ही विषय है। अज्ञानियोंका ही फल और हेतुरूप अनात्मवस्तुओंमें आत्मभाव होता है? विद्वानोंका नहीं। क्योंकि विद्वान्की बुद्धिमें फल और हेतुसे आत्माका पृथक्त्व प्रत्यक्ष है? इसलिये उसका उन (अनात्मपदार्थों ) में यह मैं हूँ ऐसा आत्मभाव नहीं हो सकता। अत्यन्त मूढ़ और उन्मत्त आदि भी जल और अग्निकी? या छाया और प्रकाशकी एकता नहीं मानते? फिर विवेकीकी तो बात ही क्या है सुतरां फल और हेतुसे आत्माको भिन्न समझ लेनेवाले ज्ञानीके लिये विधिनिषेधविषयक शास्त्र नहीं है। जैसे हे देवदत्त तू अमुक कार्य कर इस प्रकार किसी कर्ममें ( देवदत्तके ) नियुक्त किये जानेपर वहीं खड़ा हुआ विष्णुमित्र उस नियुक्तिको सुनकर भी? यह नहीं समझता कि मैं नियुक्त किया गया हूँ। हाँ? नियुक्तिविषयक विवेकका स्पष्ट ग्रहण न होनेसे तो ऐसा समझना ठीक हो सकता है? इसी प्रकार फल और,हेतुमें भी ( अज्ञानियोंकी आत्मबुद्धि हो सकती है )। पू0 -- फल और हेतुसे आत्माके पृथक्त्वका ज्ञान हो जानेपर भी? स्वाभाविक सम्बन्धकी अपेक्षासे शास्त्रविषयक इतना बोध होना तो युक्तियुक्त ही है कि मैं शास्त्रद्वारा अनुकूल फल और उसके हेतुमें तो प्रवृत्त किया गया हूँ और प्रतिकूल फल और उसके हेतुसे निवृत्त किया गया हूँ? जैसे कि पितापुत्र आदिका आपसमें एक दूसरेको भिन्न समझते हुए भी एक दूसरेके लिये किये हुए नियोग और प्रतिषेधको अपने लिये समझना देखा जाता है। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि आत्माके पृथक्त्वका ज्ञान होनेसे पहलेपहले ही फल और हेतुमें आत्माभिमान होना सिद्ध है। नियोग और प्रतिषेधके अभिप्रायको भली प्रकार जानकर ही मनुष्य फल और हेतुसे आत्माके पृथक्त्वको जान सकता है? उससे पहले नहीं। इससे सिद्ध हुआ कि विधिनिषेधरूप शास्त्रकेवल अज्ञानीके लिये ही है। पू0 -- (इस सिद्धान्तके अनुसार ) स्वर्गकी कामनावाला यज्ञ करे मांस भक्षण न करे इत्यादि विधिनिषेधबोधक शास्त्रवचनोंमें आत्माका पृथक्तव जाननेवालोंकी और केवल देहात्मवादियोंकी भी प्रवृत्ति न होनेसे कर्ताका अभाव हो जानेके कारण शास्त्रके व्यर्थ होनेका प्रसङ्ग आ जायगा उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि प्रवृत्ति और निवृत्तिका होना लोकप्रसिद्धिसे ही प्रत्यक्ष है। ईश्वर और जीवात्माकी एकता देखनेवाला ब्रह्मवेत्ता कर्मोंमें प्रवृत्त नहीं होता तथा आत्मसत्ताको न माननेवाला देहात्मवादी भी परलोक नहीं है ऐसा समझकर शास्त्रानुसार नहीं बर्तता यह ठीक है परंतु लोकप्रसिद्धिसे यह तो हम सबको प्रत्यक्ष है ही कि विधिनिषेधबोधक शास्त्रश्रवणकी दूसरी तरह उपपत्ति न होनेके कारण जिसने आत्माके अस्तित्वका अनुमान कर लिया है? एवं जो आत्माके असली तत्त्वका ज्ञाता नहीं है जिसकी कर्मोंके फलमें तृष्णा है? ऐसा मनुष्य श्रद्धालुताके कारण ( शास्त्रानुसार कर्मोंमें ) प्रवृत्त होता है। अतः शास्त्रकी व्यर्थता नहीं है। पू0 -- विवेकशील पुरुषोंकी प्रवृत्ति न देखनेसे उनका अनुकरण करनेवालोंकी भी ( शास्त्रविहित कर्मोंमें ) प्रवृत्ति नहीं होगी? अतः शास्त्रव्यर्थ हो जायगा। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि किसी एकको ही विवेकज्ञान प्राप्त होता है। अर्थात् अनेक प्राणियोंमेंसे कोई एक ही विवेकी होता है जैसा कि आजकल ( देखा जाता है )। इसके सिवा मूढ़लोग विवेकियोंका अनुकरण भी नहीं करते क्योंकि प्रवृत्ति रागादि दोषोंके अधीन हुआ करती है। ( प्रतिहिंसाके उद्देश्यसे किये जानेवाले जारणमारण आदि ) अभिचारोंमें भी लोगोंकी प्रवृत्ति देखी जाती है तथा प्रवृत्ति स्वाभाविक है। यह कहा भी है कि स्वभाव ही बर्तता है। सुतरां यह सिद्ध हुआ कि संसार अविद्यामात्र ही है और वह अज्ञानियोंका ही विषय है। केवलशुद्ध क्षेत्रज्ञमें अविद्या और उसके कार्य दोनों ही नहीं हैं। तथा मिथ्याज्ञान परमार्थवस्तुको दूषित करनेमें समर्थ भी नहीं है। क्योंकि जैसे ऊसर भूमिको मृगतृष्णिकाका जल अपनी आर्द्रतासे कीचड़युक्त नहीं कर सकता? वैसे ही अविद्या भी क्षेत्रज्ञका कुछ भी ( उपकार या अपकार ) करनेमें समर्थ नहीं है? इसीलिये क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि और अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानम् यह कहा है। पू0 -- तो फिर यह क्या बात है कि संसारी पुरुषोंकी भाँति पण्डितोंको भी मैं ऐसा हूँ यह वस्तु मेरी ही है ऐसी प्रतीत होती है। उ0 -- सुनो? यह पाण्डित्य बस इतना ही है जो कि क्षेत्रमें ही आत्माको देखना है परंतु यदि मनुष्य क्षेत्रज्ञको निर्विकारी समझ ले तो फिर मुझे अमुक भोग मिले या मैं अमुक कर्म करूँ ऐसी आकाङ्क्षा नहीं कर सकता? क्योंकि भोग और कर्म दोनों विकार ही तो हैं। सुतरां यह सिद्ध हुआ कि फलेच्छुक होनेके कारण अज्ञानी कर्मोंमें प्रवृत्त होता है परंतु विकाररहित आत्माका साक्षात् कर लेनेवाले ज्ञानीमें फलेच्छाका अभाव होनेके कारण? उसकी प्रवृत्ति सम्भव नहीं? अतः कार्यकरणसंघातके व्यापारकी निवृत्ति होनेपर उस ( ज्ञानी ) में निवृत्तिका उपचार किया जाता है। किसीकिसीके मतमें यह एक प्रकारकी विद्वत्ता और भी हो सकती है कि? क्षेत्रज्ञ तो ईश्वर ही है और उस क्षेत्रज्ञके ज्ञानका विषय क्षेत्र उससे अलग है तथा मैं तो ( उन दोनोंसे भिन्न ) संसारी और सुखीदुःखी भी हूँ। मुझे क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञके ज्ञान और ध्यानद्वारा ईश्वररूप क्षेत्रज्ञका साक्षात् करके उसके स्वरूपमें स्थित होनारूप साधनसे संसारकी निवृत्ति करनी चाहिये। जो ऐसा समझता है या दूसरेको ऐसा समझाता है कि वह ( जीव ) क्षेत्रज्ञ ( ब्रह्म ) नहीं है तथा जो यह मानता है कि मैं ( इस प्रकारके सिद्धान्तसे ) संसार? मोक्ष और शास्त्रकी सार्थकता सिद्ध करूँगा? वह पण्डितोंमें अधम है। तथा वह आत्महत्यारा? शास्त्रके अर्थकी सम्प्रदायपरम्परासे रहित होनेके कारण? श्रुतिविहित अर्थका त्याग और वेदविरुद्ध अर्थकी कल्पना करके स्वयं मोहित हो रहा है और दूसरोंको भी मोहित करता है। सुतरां जो शास्त्रार्थकी परम्पराको जाननेवाला नहीं है? वह समस्त शास्त्रोंका ज्ञाता भी हो तो भी मूर्खोंके समान उपेक्षणीय ही है। और जो यह कहा था कि ईश्वरकी क्षेत्रज्ञके साथ एकता माननेसे तो ईश्वरमें संसारीपन आ जाता है और क्षेत्रज्ञोंकी ईश्वरके साथ एकता माननेसे कोई संसारी न रहनेके कारण संसारके अभावका प्रसङ्ग आ जाता है? सो विद्या और अविद्याकी विलक्षणताके प्रतिपादनसे इन दोनों दोषोंका ही परिहार कर दिया गया। पू -- कैसे उ0 -- अविद्याद्वारा कल्पित किये हुए दोषसे तद्विषयक पारमार्थिक ( असली ) वस्तु दूषित नहीं होती? इस कथनसे पहली शङ्काका निराकरण किया गया और वैसे ही यह दृष्टान्त भी दिखलाया कि मृगतृष्णिकाके जलसे ऊसर भूमि पङ्कयुक्त नहीं की जा सकती। तथा संसारीका अभाव होनेसे संसारके अभावके प्रसङ्गका जो दोष बतलाया था? उसका भी संसार संसारित्वकी अविद्याकल्पित उपपत्तिको स्वीकार करके निराकरण कर दिया गया। पू0 -- क्षेत्रज्ञका अविद्यायुक्त होना ही तो संसारित्वरूप दोष है? क्योंकि उससे होनेवाले दुःखित्व आदि दोष प्रत्यक्ष देखे जाते हैं। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं? क्योंकि जो कुछ ज्ञेय है -- जाननेमें आता है? वह सब क्षेत्रका ही धर्म है? इसलिये,उसके किये हुए दोष ज्ञाता क्षेत्रज्ञके नहीं हो सकते। तू क्षेत्रज्ञपर वास्तवमें बिना हुए ही जो कुछ भी दोष लाद रहा है? वे सब ज्ञेय होनेके कारण क्षेत्रके ही धर्म हैं? क्षेत्रज्ञके नहीं। उनसे क्षेत्रज्ञ ( आत्मा ) दूषित नहीं हो सकता? क्योंकि ज्ञेयके साथ ज्ञाताका संसर्ग नहीं हो सकता। यदि उनका संसर्ग मान लिया जाय तो (ज्ञेयका) ज्ञेयत्व ही सिद्ध नहीं हो सकता। अभिप्राय यह है कि यदि अविद्यायुक्त होना और दुखी होना आदि आत्माके धर्म हैं तो वे प्रत्यक्ष कैसे दीखते हैं और वे क्षेत्रज्ञके धर्म हो भी कैसे सकते हैं क्योंकि जो कुछ भी ज्ञेय वस्तु है वह सब क्षेत्र है और क्षेत्रज्ञ ज्ञाता है? ऐसा सिद्धान्त स्थापित किये जानेपर फिर अविद्यायुक्त होना और दुखी होना आदि दोषोंको क्षेत्रज्ञके धर्म बतलाना और उनकी प्रत्यक्ष उपलब्धि भी मानना? यह सब अज्ञानमात्रके आश्रयसे केवल विरुद्ध प्रलाप करना है। पू0 -- वह अविद्या किसमें है उ0 -- जिसमें दीखती है उसीमें। पू0 -- किसमें दीखती है उ0 -- अविद्या किसमें दीखती है -- यह प्रश्न ही निरर्थक है। पू0 -- किस प्रकार उ0 -- यदि अविद्या दीखती है तो उससे जो युक्त है उसको भी तू अवश्य देखता ही होगा फिर अविद्यावान्की उपलब्धि हो जानेपर वह अविद्या किसमें है? यह पूछना ठीक नहीं है। क्योंकि गौवालेको देख लेनेपर यह गौ किसकी है यह पूछना सार्थक नहीं हो सकता। पू0 -- तुम्हारा यह दृष्टान्त विषय है। गौ और उसका स्वामी तो प्रत्यक्ष होनेके कारण उनका सम्बन्ध भी प्रत्यक्ष है इसलिये ( उनके सम्बन्धके विषयमें ) प्रश्न निरर्थक है? परंतु उनकी भाँति अविद्यावान् और अविद्या तो प्रत्यक्ष नहीं हैं? जिससे कि यह प्रश्न निरर्थक माना जाय उ0 -- अप्रत्यक्ष अविद्यावान्के साथ अविद्याका सम्बन्ध जान लेनेसे तुम्हें क्या मिलेगा पू0 -- अविद्या अनर्थकी हेतु है? इसलिये उसका त्याग किया जा सकेगा। उ0 -- जिसमें अविद्या है? वह उसका स्वयं त्याग कर देगा। पू0 -- मुझमें ही तो अविद्या है। उ0 -- तब तो तू अविद्या और उससे युक्त अपने आपको जानता है। पू0 -- जानता तो हूँ परंतु प्रत्यक्षरूपसे नहीं। उ0 -- यदि अनुमानसे जानता है तो ( तुझ ज्ञाता और अविद्याके ) सम्बन्धका ग्रहण कैसे हुआ क्योंकि उस,समय ( अविद्याको अनुमानसे जाननेके कालमें ) तुझ ज्ञाताका ज्ञेयरूप अविद्याके साथ सम्बन्ध ग्रहण नहीं किया जा सकता? कारण यह है कि ज्ञाताका विषय मानकर ही अविद्याका उपयोग किया गया है। तथा ज्ञाता और अविद्याके सम्बन्धको जो ग्रहण करनेवाला है वह तथा उस ( अविद्या और ज्ञाताके सम्बन्ध ) को विषय करनेवाला कोई दूसरा ज्ञान ये दोनों ही सम्भव नहीं हैं। क्योंकि ऐसा होनेसे अनवस्थादोष प्राप्त होता है अर्थात् यदि ज्ञाता और ज्ञेयज्ञाताका सम्बन्ध ये भी ( किसीके द्वारा ) जाने जाते हैं? ऐसा माना जाय तो उसका ज्ञाता किसी औरको मानना होगा। फिर उसका भी दूसरा और उसका भी दूसरा ज्ञाता मानना होगा? इस प्रकार यह अनवस्था अनिवार्य हो जायगी। पंरतु ज्ञेय चाहे अविद्या हो अथवा और कुछ हो? ज्ञेय ज्ञेय ही रहेगा ( ज्ञाता नहीं हो सकता ) वैसे ही ज्ञाता भी ज्ञाता ही रहेगा? ज्ञेय नहीं हो सकता? जब कि ऐसा है तो अविद्या या दुःखित्व आदि दोषोंसे ज्ञाता -- क्षेत्रज्ञका कुछ भी दूषित नहीं हो सकता। पू0 -- यही उसका दोष है जो कि वह दोषयुक्त क्षेत्रका ज्ञाता है। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि आत्मा विज्ञानस्वरूप और अविक्रिय है? उसमें ( इस ) ज्ञातापनका उपचारमात्र किया जाता है? जैसे कि उष्णतामात्र स्वभाव होनेसे अग्निमें तपानेकी क्रियाका उपचार किया जाता है। जैसे भगवान्ने यहाँ ( इस प्रकरणमें ) यह दिखाया है कि आत्मामें स्वभावसे ही क्रिया? कारक और फलात्मत्वका अभाव है? केवल अविद्याद्वारा अध्यारोपित होनेके कारण क्रिया? कारक आदि आत्मामें उपचरित होते हैं? वैसे ही? जो इसे मारनेवाला जानता है प्रकृतिके गुणोंद्वारा ही सब कर्म किये जाते हैं ( वह विभु ) किसीके पापपुण्यको ग्रहण नहीं करता इत्यादि प्रकरणोंमें जगहजगह दिखाया गया है और इसी प्रकार हमने व्याख्या भी की है? तथा आगेके प्रकरणोंमें भी हम दिखलायेंगे। पू0 -- तब तो आत्मामें स्वभावसे क्रिया? कारक और फलात्मत्वका अभाव सिद्ध होनेसे तथा ये सब अविद्याद्वारा अध्यारोपित सिद्ध होनेसे यही निश्चय हुआ कि कर्म अविद्वान्को ही कर्तव्य है? विद्वान्को नहीं। उ0 -- ठीक यही सिद्ध हुआ। इसी बातको हम न हि देहभृता शक्यम् इस प्रकरणमें और सारे गीताशास्त्रके उपसंहारप्रकरणमें दिखलायेंगे। तथा सामसेनैव कौन्तेय निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा इस श्लोकके अर्थमें विशेषरूपसे दिखायेंगे। बस? यहाँ अब और अधिक विस्तारकी आवश्यकता नहीं है? इसलिये उपसंहार किया जाता है।

Having explained the two verses thus, he introduces the next verse - with 'Idam' (This). Where is the summary statement useful - on this he says - in the matter 'of what is intended to be explained'. That is, the summary statement is meaningful for the easy comprehension (of the topic).

Having in view the promise of the elaboration of the means to the meaning of the aphoristic statement, for the composure of the listener's mind regarding the forthcoming subject matter, he says - regarding 'that which is indicated'. He refers to that body which is indicated by 'Idaṃ śarīram' (This body) with the word 'Tat' (That), because it is the subject matter at hand - this is the construction. 'Tat kṣetraṃ jñātavyam' (That Kṣetra is to be known) - this is the implied term. And with 'Yat' (Which) - the same Kṣetra is qualified as being possessed of form by which form. As a consequence of the Kṣetra being qualified by its own characteristics such as birth etc., its jñeyatva (knowability) results in its heyatva (renounceability).

He states the meaning of the mutual accumulation of the five 'Ca' (and) words - with 'Ca śabdaḥ' (the word 'Ca'). He indicates heyatva also by being subject to modification - with 'Yadvikāri' (which is subject to modification). That which is an effect, is to be known because it is the cause from which everything is produced - he says this - with 'Yataḥ' (from which).

He shows that the Kṣetrajña is also to be known like the Kṣetra - with 'Sa ca' (And he). The connection is 'Sa jñātavyaḥ' (He is to be known). He indicates his jñātavyatva (knowability) by the power of sight etc. produced by adjuncts such as the eye etc. - with 'Yatprabhāvaḥ' (whose power is). The rest is that his jñātavyatā (knowability) is due to the said power. How is the Kṣetra or the Kṣetrajña, as qualified, capable of being known - having such an apprehension, he says - from the word of Bhagavān - with 'Tat' (That).

Now he states the connection of the thirteenth chapter—with 'Evam' (Thus). Thus, by the first and second hexads, the nature of Prakriti and Purusha, the nature of the Supreme Self, and the pervasion of both by the Supreme Self are stated. Now, having previously discriminated the nature, difference, and reality of Prakriti, Purusha, and their association, the reality of the Supreme Self who pervades both is being distinctly purified/clarified. This is the meaning: The discrimination between body and self, and the discrimination between Pradhana (Prakriti) and Purusha were indeed spoken before; therefore, one should not think that they should not be spoken of here (again), because here the nature, cause, and modification of the body designated by the word 'Kshetra' (Field), and the nature and power of the Inner Self designated by the word 'Kshetrajna' (Knower of the Field), are distinguished in detail. The mode of their association and its cause, 'beginninglessness', are expanded upon. And their dependence on the Lord is clearly stated. And the causes of bondage and liberation, 'association with Gunas' and 'cessation of that', are spoken of in detail. And thus, the detailed exposition of what was spoken briefly is done here—thus.

(Objection) Now, in the absence of the question "Prakritim purusham chaiva" (Prakriti and Purusha indeed) here, how is this ("Idam shariram..." etc.) proper? (Answer) No. Because the question is seen in some manuscript collections. But the author of the Bhashya (Ramanuja) considered it non-authoritative (Anarsha) and did not count it even in the hundred-and-four verses (of the Gita). Even in the absence of the question, the answer is not contradictory, as the meaning is established by the desire to know the distinctions mentioned before.

There, he states the meaning of the verse "This body, O Kaunteya, is called the Field" (13.2)—"This is the aggregate of gods, humans, etc." The indication "Idam" (This) here is because it is directly perceivable. Intending this very thing, "Samsthanam" (Aggregate/Conformation) is said. 'Kshetram' (Field) is so because it is the field of enjoyment (Bhoga) and the field of action (Karma). For lexicographers say "Kshetra is used for seed germination, holy place, and field (kedara)."

And thus, like that (a field), the word 'Kshetra' is famous in this sense because it is the ground for the germination of the seed of the fruits of actions. As stated in Vishnu Purana: "They perform those actions, sinful and others. There and there they enjoy the fruit along with all beings. Action is joined in this Field of pleasure and pain; having attained human plowing (cultivation), he is not born again."

Similarly, it is 'Kshetra' because it is helpful like a field, by being the instrument of enjoyment for the enjoyer. Or, 'Kshetram' because it protects from injury (Kshatat trayate). Therefore indeed it is called 'Shariram' (Body).

He states its meaning through the derivation of the word 'Kshetrajna' (Knower of the Field)—"He who knows this" (Etat yo vetti). Knowing here refers to the state of having natural knowledge; by the force of that, he controls the body and engages it in its respective functions; this is the meaning. By 'He who knows', his distinction from the inert Field, and his being the subject of the 'I-cognition' which grasps the Self, are stated.

'Tadvidah' (Knowers of That)—they who know those two, the Field and the Knower of the Field, are 'Tadvidah'. Meaning, knowers of the mode of distinction (Viveki) to be described later. Meaning, knowers of the Self distinct from the body. By that, it is indicated that the relationship is one of Pervaded and Pervader (Vyapya-vyapaka-bhava) like clay and pot, not a relationship of attribute and possessor of attribute (Dharma-dharmi-bhava) like quality in a substance.

Regarding 'Kshetrajna' (Knower of the Field), etc.

Know that Kṣetrajña, which has such characteristics and is extracted from the limiting adjunct (Upādhi), and also the Kṣetra, to be Myself, the Supreme Lord, existing in both forms. This is by the scriptures: 'Tat Tvam Asi' (That Thou Art), 'Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi' (I am Brahman), 'Brahmaivedaṃ Sarvam' (All this is Brahman indeed), 'Sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ Brahma' (All this is verily Brahman).

Since I am the Self of both, the knowledge of Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña - that knowledge which is the ascertainment of the truth through direct perception (Āparokṣyeṇa), by Kṣetra being sublatable (subject to invalidation) and Kṣetrajña being the limit for all sublations - is My own right knowledge (Samyagjñāna). The knowledge of these two alone is the knowledge of Brahman - this is the settled opinion of the knowers of Brahman, because Kṣetra is sublated by the śruti 'Neha nānāsti kiṃcana' (There is no plurality here at all), and because any other seer besides Kṣetrajña is negated by the śruti 'Nānyo'to'sti draṣṭā' (There is no other seer than this).

Although everything is non-different from Brahman, whatever knowledge there is, it is all related to Brahman. Nevertheless, one who sees a rope as a snake has neither right knowledge regarding the rope nor regarding the snake. Nor is there any real other object of that knowledge apart from the rope. But when he understands the truth of the rope by the sublation of the snake, then alone does he rightly know the snake as false and the rope (as it is). Similarly, here too, the knower of both (Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña) is the right knower - this is the meaning.

For, by the knowledge of the truth of one of the two, the goal is not attained. It is not proper to say that Sāṃkhya, who knows the unqualified self but does not sublate the world (Prapañca), or the Śūnyavādin (nihilist), who sees the world as insignificant but says that the substratum Brahman does not exist, has attained the goal. Therefore, the truth of both must be known.

That Kṣetra, which is what (Yat), and which substance it is, and what kind (Yādṛk) it is, i.e., of whom it is the support, and which is subject to modification (Yadvikāri), and which are its modifications,

and from which (Yataśca), i.e., from what cause this has arisen, for what purpose it has arisen - this is the meaning.

Whatsoever nature (Yat yatsvarūpaṃ) this is, and that (Saśca) Kṣetrajña, who he is (Yaḥ), what his nature is (Yatsvarūpaḥ), and what his power is (Yatprabhāvaśca), and which are his powers

• all that, in brief (Samāsena), hear from Me (Me Mattaḥ).

Thus the nature of the embodied soul (Samsarin) is stated; now He states the supreme reality, the non-transmigratory nature of that very soul—with 'Kshetrajnam' (The Knower of the Field). And that Kshetrajna, the embodied soul (Samsarin), know him in reality as Me alone, the one pervading all fields; because My form is stated by the sentient part (Chid-amsha) which is indicated by the Shruti 'Tat-tvam-asi' (That thou art).

For the sake of reverence, He praises that knowledge. The knowledge of Kshetra and Kshetrajna by their distinction (Vailakshyenena) alone is considered My knowledge due to being the cause of liberation (Moksha-hetutvat); but other (knowledge) is useless scholarship (Vritha pandityam). Because it is the cause of bondage; this is the meaning.

That is stated: 'That is action which is not for bondage, that is knowledge which is for liberation. Other action is for trouble/effort, and other knowledge is mere skill in craft'—thus.

Now, thus, in both the Field (Kshetra) and the Knower of the Field (Kshetrajna)—which were described as having forms mutually exclusive of each other—for the purpose of establishing the distinction of the Supreme Self from them, having taught the 'subservience to Him' (taccheshatva) inherent in both, He praises [this knowledge] with the verse 'Know the Knower of the Field also...' with the intention that 'knowledge of the Field and Knower of the Field as they really are is My opinion'. Here, by the term 'Knower of the Field', the bound self distinct from the body is grasped. He is the embodied one relative to his own field, [but] is the body relative to Me—this is the purport of the co-ordinate instruction, as he says 'gods, humans, etc.'. To show that unity of species is intended by the singular 'Knower of the Field', it is said 'having the sole form of knower in all fields'.

He states the result -- 'Know [him] as ensouled by Me'. The word 'api' (also) is for the inclusion of what is unsaid; otherwise, there would be a contingency of meaninglessness—with this intention, he says 'from the word api in kshetrajnam chapi'. Collecting what is explicitly stated, what comes from inclusion, and what is implied, he says 'just as the field', etc. To make known that the very cause which exists for the co-ordinate predication of the Jiva with its body exists here also, and [thus] the co-ordinate predication is indeed primary, the mention of inseparability (aprthak-siddhi) [is made].

As for the doubt, 'The attributiveness of the Knower of the Field is accepted because it is established by perception, but the attributiveness of the Field and the Knower of the Field towards the Supreme Self is not perceived; rather, the Knower of the Field, the pot, the cloth, etc., are perceived as independent. Therefore, the co-ordinate predication is not primary'—[the author] states, with the intention that the lack of comprehension of attributiveness by those who have not heard the Vedanta is due to the non-perception of the Substance (Vishēṣya) -- 'of the aggregate form consisting of earth, etc.'. Since the state of being the body of the Supreme Self is stated concerning earth, etc., the state of being the body is implicitly stated regarding the aggregate form, such as the body of gods and humans, etc. And since the physical elements are separately designated as the body of the Supreme Self, the state of being the body of their community is also stated—with this intention, 'of the aggregate form consisting of earth, etc.' is stated.

To make known that the state of being the body of the Supreme Self for these two entities is not based on a difference in state, just as the Field is for the Jiva, it is said 'as having the sole nature of being the body of the Lord (Bhagavan)'. The purport is that just as the state of being the body of the Supreme Self must be accepted for earth, etc., even though it is not famous as a body in the world, so too must it be accepted for the Jiva, even though he is the embodied one (śarīrī) relative to his own field. Thus, when the difference in nature and the state of being the Inner Controller are established, the co-ordinate predication in the Śrutis is based upon that, and the amplification of that is found in this Smṛti and in other Smṛtis. Moreover, in this Vibhūti Adhyāya (chapter on glories), having stated the Inner Controller-ship both before and after, the co-ordinate instruction is given in the middle; [thus] the amplification of Śruti is accomplished by showing that abiding as the Self is the cause of the co-ordinate predication. With the intention that the meaning is the same in this co-ordinate predication as well, similar to that [Śruti], he says 'this very thing'.

He explains the latter half [of the verse]—'If this is what...'. Indeed, here, the reference is only to the Field and Knower of the Field, specified by the mutually distinct characteristics that were introduced; for the knowledge of illusory forms, like that of a heated iron ball, is common to animals, etc., and the praise of that knowledge is not appropriate here—with this intention, the reference to being the subject of distinction (vivēka) is made. Knowledge, merely as knowledge, cannot be enjoined, due to the contingency of repetition, etc. Nor is the intention to negate the knowledge-ness of other knowledges, due to contradiction. Nor is it the case that 'knowledge' is restated and only the characteristic of being 'opinion' is enjoined here, due to the pointlessness of repeating the word 'knowledge'. Therefore, the enjoining of 'knowledge' itself as 'knowledge' here is meant for praise, indicating that it ought to be accepted—with this intention, he says 'that alone is the knowledge to be accepted'.

'My opinion'—the purport is that this alone is considered acceptable by Me, the friend of all beings, since it is beneficial to all, owing to its utility for the meaning of all Śāstras. Thus, having stated the meaning of this verse in accordance with other Śrutis and Smṛtis, and its connection with the preceding and succeeding context, he paraphrases the view of flawed doctrines in order to refute them, saying 'Some people...', etc.

'Some people'—this implies the appearance of being investigators (but not true ones). The plural number [suggests] the misleading of the world and denotes the succession of bad doctrines held by the authors of those texts. 'Unity is understood through co-ordinate predication.' The purport is that the definition of co-ordinate predication is indeed 'the application of words having different grounds of meaning (pravṛtti-nimitta) to a single object.' When one entity possesses contradictory attributes like omniscience and ignorance, how can unity be understood? To this, he says 'and consequently'. The meaning is, 'by implication, because what is heard cannot be discarded.' The word 'eva' (alone) suggests the fear of contradiction. Since Saṃsāra (cycle of birth and death) is accepted by all as being conditional (aupādhika), the possibility of being the Knower of the Field exists due to a defect, even though it is not inherent—with this intention, 'due to ignorance' is stated. If one objects, 'But the contradiction is not possible even due to a defect? For it is not possible for a defect to cause light to become darkness, nor can a piece of stone initiate a sprout even when associated with earth and water, etc.,' he replies—'Just like the state of Knower of the Field'.

The existence of contradictory characteristics is indeed impossible; but the superimposition of them is justifiable, like the snake superimposed on a rope—this is the purport. 'Must be accepted'—the purport is that no other alternative is seen. If the state of having Saṃsāra does not truly exist, why is instruction, etc., given for the removal of Saṃsāra? For medical treatment is not appropriate for the removal of a disease if the disease does not truly exist—to this, he replies, 'for the removal of that', meaning, for the removal of the illusion of being the Knower of the Field. The purport is that this instruction regarding unity does not appear to be subsidiary to something else, like injunctions regarding Dṛṣṭi-Vidhi (mental contemplation), but is meant for the knowledge of the true nature of the Self, which is accepted even by you—with this intention, 'this' is stated. The purport is that it is like the instruction of unity that dispels the illusion of difference in the moon. When difference is firmly perceived through uncontradicted direct perception, how can it be sublated by an indirect instruction that depends on it [perception] and has a possible alternative interpretation? To this, he replies 'And by this'. Dependency in the form of generality does not contradict the status of sublation; otherwise, the unity of the flame could not be sublated by the inference of difference. Therefore, being indirect also is not the cause of weakness. Only faultlessness is the cause of strength. And the faults of a statement are the speaker's delusion (bhrama), deception (vipralambha), negligence (pramāda), or incapacity (aśakti). Here, since the speaker Vāsudeva is the most trustworthy (āptatama), there is no trace of deception; and since he is Bhagavān, delusion, negligence, and incapacity are impossible. Therefore, the sublation of the perceived illusion of being the Knower of the Field by His instruction is justified—this is the purport.

He begins to refute the view thus paraphrased by saying, 'They must be questioned'. The purport is that the refutation must be stated after purifying the intention [of the opponent], asking what is meant by those who speak confusedly that Īśvara, though omniscient, suffers the illusion of being the Knower of the Field due to ignorance, and that this same Īśvara instructs the Knower of the Field. 'This one'—the purport is that He, who instructs Himself as separate in the introductory verse, 'Never was there a time when I was not, nor you, nor these rulers of men [2.12],' and who will later state His nature as distinct from Kṣara (perishable) and Akṣara (imperishable) Puruṣas, is supreme for the purposes of the Jīvas in perfected contexts. 'The instructor'—the purport is that if He were also ignorant, then it would be appropriate for Him to be a disciple like Arjuna, not an instructor. 'Bhagavān'—the intention is that He instructs solely for the removal of others' ignorance, because He knows the truth Himself. 'Vāsudeva'—the purport is that if the state of Inner Controller, etc., is intended here, then difference is explicitly stated in 'He dwells everywhere, and the totality dwells in Him' [Vi.Pu. 1.2.12]. If the state of being the son of Vasudeva is not intended, then He himself is the one who has descended. The word 'Supreme Lord' (Parameśvara) is used with the intention that He, who regards Himself as the Lord in verses like 'The great Lord of all worlds [5.29],' 'The imperishable Lord sustains [15.17],' and 'Since I transcend the perishable [15.18],' instructs the total distinction from the Jīvas.

It is impossible for them to say that the ignorance which causes illusion for Īśvara never exists. If that were the case, since the manifestation of objects to be controlled would be absent, the very state of Īśvara would become impossible. Furthermore, without ignorance, the manifestation of illusory difference is not possible. However, the manifestation of an illusory object, which is characterized by being an object of another's intellect, is dependent on the existence of that 'other', which is not accepted by them. Therefore, it must be accepted that Īśvara also has ignorance formerly, and that this is later removed by knowledge. With the intention of asking whether that ignorance was removed at the time of instruction due to a specific cause accepted by you or not, he presents an alternative, saying 'Whether...', etc.

He repeats the first limb [of the alternative] in order to refute it, saying, 'If the ignorance is removed'. The purport is that if the cause is absent, the effect is absent, as suggested by 'the non-distinguished consciousness', etc. Superimposition is impossible solely due to the nature of the accepted substratum (adhiṣṭhāna), let alone when the defect is also removed—with this intention, the reference to the nature of non-distinguished mere consciousness (cin-mātratva) is made. For instance, in an entity possessing characteristics, when some non-common characteristic is concealed, the superimposition of another contradictory characteristic occurs. And the knower may know some object otherwise, but not mere cognition (jñapti-mātra). By the word 'etc.' in 'O son of Kuntī, etc.', the Dhārtarāṣṭras desired to be killed, etc., are grasped. By the word 'etc.' in 'instruction, etc.', the role of charioteer, etc., is also included.

He paraphrases the second limb, saying 'But if'. The purport is due to the absence of the direct experience (sākṣātkāra) that removes [ignorance]. 'Then not'—The purport is that generating knowledge in others is not possible even if one is ignorant, like the senses, inference, or words, etc., because the application of instructional sentences must necessarily be preceded by knowledge; otherwise, in instructing what is not known (apramita), one incurs the fault of untrustworthiness (anāptatva). He cites the statement of one who has the direct experience of truth regarding the state of being an instructor of the spiritual Self: 'They shall instruct'.

Thus, he extends the fault stated in Śaṅkara's position to Bhāskara's position, etc., saying 'Therefore'. In Śaṅkara’s view, the Śrutis regarding difference, the Śrutis regarding qualities (saguṇa), the Śrutis regarding the Inner Controller (antaryāmin), the Śrutis regarding the eternality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and similar Smṛtis, are indeed contradicted. And the Śrutis regarding non-difference, etc., are also contradicted in the form of conveying their primary meaning, since they are accepted by them [the Advaitins] as indirectly indicating the non-distinguished [Brahman] by abandoning the primary meaning. Since contradiction can be avoided by establishing differences in subject matter, etc., the acceptance of sublater/sublated status leads to contradiction with logic (Nyāya). The contradiction with their own statements occurs because the necessary connection between the reason (hetu) and the characteristic of the resultant (sādhya) must exist in the proposition 'Brahman is non-distinguished, because it is so-and-so'. Similarly, the necessity of accepting that Anubhūti (experience) is expressed by the word 'Anubhūti' must exist in the statement 'Anubhūti is unknowable'. The same must be considered for 'Brahman is not expressed by words,' etc.

In Bhāskara’s position, however, contradiction must be stated by those [Śrutis, etc.] dealing with difference, which cannot tolerate the non-difference that contradicts them. Because of the acceptance of the identity of insentient matter (acit) with the nature of Brahman, there is contradiction with those texts that state non-mutability (nirvikāratva). Since the Jīva is Brahman itself conditioned [by adjuncts], there is contradiction with the Śrutis that state flawlessness (nirdoṣa). Even the Śrutis of non-difference are mostly not primary. In the co-ordinate predication of Jīva and Īśvara, unity is not established in the form designated, like 'the pot-space is the great space'. Similarly, there is no natural appropriateness of co-ordinate predication between insentient matter (acit) and Īśvara either. If Brahman, characterized by a host of qualities like omniscience, has identity with everything, there would be a contingency of experiencing all suffering, leading to contradiction with logic due to the lack of reconciliation with Śrutis regarding flawlessness, etc.

In Yādava Prakāśa’s position, however, the acceptance of all Jīvas as inherently different and non-different is excessive. And there is contradiction with Śrutis regarding invisibility, etc., due to the acceptance of Brahman as mere Existence (san-mātra) common to everything. Defects like the contingency of Brahman being a universal (jāti-rūpa) must be seen, since existence (sattā) is perceived as an attribute of pots, etc. The contradiction with their own statements for these two [Bhāskara and Yādava] is clear, like that of the proponents of Sapta-bhaṅgī (Jaina doctrine of seven-fold predication), due to the acceptance of difference and non-difference, and the co-ordinate predication of flawlessness and faultiness rooted in that. The statement 'they were initiated to delude the world' is not made with the intention that they [the proponents] intended it, since 'by the ignorant' is stated, but rather it is said that the doctrine of them or others happened by chance to delude the world.

If you object: 'Contradiction with Śruti, etc., is equally a fault in your position as well. For instance, if absolute difference between the world and Brahman is accepted, then there is contradiction with the Śruti "That one manifested itself by name and form [Br.U. 1.4.7]" which states that the cause, Brahman, itself assumes the names and forms of the effect. There is contradiction with the promise of knowing everything by knowing one. For by knowing the pot, it is impossible to know the cloth which is absolutely different from it. Co-ordinate predication between the world and Brahman, which are absolutely different, is also impossible. If the reconciliation is through secondary signification (lakṣaṇā), as in the case of a pot and a cloth, what aversion do you have towards the opponent's position? The causal nature of Brahman (Brahma-upādānatva) for the world is also not established, because you do not accept the world and Brahman as a single substance, like clay and a pot, otherwise, there would be contradiction with the doctrine of Satkārya-vāda (pre-existence of the effect in the cause). If the world originates from Prakṛti, Puruṣa, and Īśvara, who are all different, do they initiate the effect by becoming unified, or do they remain in separation? In the former case, there is a contingency of mixture of natures, like in the opponent's position. In the latter case, are they producing separate effects, or not? If they are not producing separate effects, the accepted causality of Brahman for everything disappears. If they produce a single effect, the mixture of natures remains in the state of effect. If Brahman is non-mutable (nirvikāra) by nature, then there is contradiction with Śrutis that state its nature to be the effect. If, however, the state of having modifications (savikāratva) is accepted, then the contradiction with the non-mutable Śrutis, which is contingent in the opponent's position, remains. If Brahman is always characterized by a host of qualities like omniscience, then there is contradiction with the Śrutis of non-qualification (nirguṇa) and the Śrutis of mere consciousness (jñāna-mātra). And if absolute difference is always accepted, then there is contradiction with the Śrutis that negate difference, and contradiction with logic (Nyāya), because you do not accept the relationship of sublated and sublater, like in the case of Apaccheda-Nyāya (maxim of subsequent ruling), due to the posteriority obtained by the natural meaning of injunctions and negations. There is also contradiction with their own statements, because they accept Brahman as the Self of all and also as distinct from all.' Therefore, having resolved the objection 'If the faults are equal, whose doctrine is the truth?', which is initiated by the opponents due to ignorance of our intention, like the conflict between a dog and a pig, and in order to establish that this Śāstra is dedicated to stating the essence of all Vedāntas supported by sound Sārīraka-Nyāya (Mīmāṃsā of the body/Self), he says, 'Herein is the truth'.

'Herein is the truth'.

'Herein' means in the search for meanings not contradicted by Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa, etc., or 'in the Śrutis, etc.' 'This' means what will be stated according to proof, not what is stated by Śaṅkara, etc. 'Truth' means what is authoritative. In order to refute the suspected faults, he first establishes his own position by proof, starting with 'Of the insentient substance...' and ending with '...became the true'. 'The state of being enjoyed', etc., are in order. 'As the enjoyed, as the enjoyer, and as the controller' is an indication of other distinguishing characteristics established by the Śrutis that will be quoted. Or, their inclusion is by the word 'ca' (and) which denotes the inclusion of what is unsaid. 'Distinction of natures' means the difference in the natures [of the three]. The word 'distinction' (vivēka) indicates the removal of illusion. The phrase 'some Śrutis' is stated with the intention that if the differentiating Śrutis possess the authority of Śruti, the 'death of the snake' [the analogy used by opponents to deny difference] does not occur. The plural number [some Śrutis] indicates that the maxim of the majority is also not contradicted. Differentiating Śrutis are cited first to establish the meaning of co-ordinate predication Śrutis without contradicting the differentiating Śrutis.

By 'from this', the state of being the direct locus of modification (vikāra) for the insentient substance is established. The babble that the Jīva-state belongs only to Brahman conditioned by adjuncts, based on 'the other is confined by Māyā [Śve.U. 4.9]', is baseless. For here, being 'other' is not stated because of confinement by Māyā, but rather, the 'other' entity, though existing, is confined by Māyā. 'Confined' means devoid of the manifestation of natural omniscience, supreme bliss, etc. To show that the meaning of the word Māyā, as accepted by the opponent, is contradicted by Śruti itself, he says 'But Māyā...'. To refute another interpretation created by flawed doctrines, based on the application of the word 'Hara' (remover) to the subsequent phrase in 'Kṣaraṁ' (perishable), etc., he says, 'The Enjoyer is designated as Amṛtākṣaraṁ Haraḥ (the immortal, imperishable Remover)'. Regarding the objection of how 'Hara,' which is fixed as Rudra by conventional usage, can be generic to the mere enjoyer, he replies 'Pradhāna' (Primal Matter). 'Haraḥ is one who removes'—this is the sole derivation. The rest is a statement of what is established by implication. The intention is this: If the word 'Haraḥ' is construed with 'deva ēkaḥ' (the one God), then 'amṛtākṣaraṁ' (the immortal, imperishable) would not be the predicate. If, however, 'amṛtākṣaraṁ' were to be taken as a compound word without case ending, denoting the subject (uddeśya) and predicate (upādeya), then there would be the hardship of dropping the case ending and the inverted instruction of the subject and predicate. Nor is the word 'amṛta' (immortal) here the subject, as in 'Kṣaram is indeed ignorance, and Amṛta is knowledge [Śve.U. 5.1]', because Kṣara and Akṣara terms are counterparts to each other. In the Ṛc verses, the establishment of meaning based on the division of pādas (feet) must not be discarded if possible. Thus, the style of another verse, 'Kṣaram is indeed ignorance, and Amṛta is knowledge, and He who rules over knowledge and ignorance is other,' would also be followed. Otherwise, there would be a construction with interpolated words. There is no desire for specificity (Viśeṣa-ākāṅkṣā) in 'deva ēkaḥ'. By that much, the greatness is immensely expressed. The reference back to 'Kṣarātmānau' (Kṣara and Ātman), which are masculine terms, naturally refers to the objects indicated by those genders. The repetition using a different word is equal in both positions. In our position, however, it is purposeful, intending to make known that the word 'Hara' is the subject of the class of selves (ātma-jāti). The use of the specified term 'amṛtākṣaram' is also meaningful by conveying a specific characteristic of its nature. Thus, since the word 'Hara' must necessarily refer to the principle of Puruṣa associated with Pradhāna here, and secondary signification (lakṣaṇā), etc., are impossible, the acceptance of its derivative meaning, disregarding the conventional meaning contradicted by other Śrutis and its own context, must be adopted according to the principle of Aindrī (the case of the word 'Aindrī' meaning Ṛk verses).

He cites the Śruti which states the difference between the Knower of the Field and Īśvara in terms of omniscience, limited knowledge, controllership, and controlled state, as well as the unborn nature (ajatva) of both, through the dual number: 'The two knowers and non-knowers'. In deep sleep, death, fainting, and cosmic dissolution (pralaya), the Knower of the Field is absolutely ignorant. Even in the waking and dream states, his knowledge concerns only a few objects, while his ignorance has infinite scope. The eternality of the Jīvas, who are separate from Īśvara, their multiplicity, the state of Jīva and Īśvara as the substrate of consciousness, the non-duality of Īśvara, and His state as the bestower of all fruits are established by the Śruti 'The eternal of the eternals'. He cites the Śruti which speaks of difference being known by its own word (sva-śabda), and which teaches liberation as the attainment of the Supreme Self preceded by the knowledge of difference: 'Separate'. He cites the passage that pertains to the contradictory attributes of the Jīva and Īśvara—who have entered into a single body—as the enjoyer and non-enjoyer of the fruits of action: 'One of the two'. 'One of the two' means one of them. The example of enjoying sweet fruit is illustrative of the fruit of merit. 'Abhicākaśīti' means shines brightly all around. It is stated that at that time [of enjoyment], only the excellence characterized by the controllership of such a Jīva is established, and not the contraction of knowledge, etc.

He indicates the unborn nature (ajatva) of Prakṛti, consisting of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, and of Puruṣa; the absence of the contingency of superimposition in Prakṛti due to its undergoing specific modifications corresponding to the actions of Puruṣa; the state of being bound and liberated; and the mere separation from Prakṛti even in the liberated state—by 'Unborn (ajā)'. To amplify the aforementioned Śruti, he shows the eternal difference between Prakṛti, Puruṣa, and Īśvara stated in this very text: 'Here, too, egotism, etc.'. From the non-co-ordinate instruction 'My Prakṛti', the difference of Prakṛti and Puruṣa from Īśvara is established. By 'But another', the difference of Puruṣa from Pradhāna is established.

To preclude the notions that creation and dissolution are merely superimposition and its cessation, He states that they are separation and non-separation from Prakṛti, which is the body of the Supreme Self: 'All beings'. Here, too, difference is clear by 'My own', etc. To preclude the notion that the attainment of the states of moving and non-moving objects by Pradhāna and Puruṣa is rooted in the illusion of the Supreme Self, He states that it is rooted in His control: 'By Me'. To preclude the notion that the existence of Jīvas is dependent on superimposition, He shows the beginninglessness of Prakṛti and Puruṣa without distinction: 'Prakṛti and Puruṣa'. He cites the direct state of Prakṛti as the locus of modification, the dependence of the specific conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa conducive to creation on the resolve of the Supreme Self, the creation of the world from that, and the mutual difference of the three in this manner: 'My womb'. 'The womb' means the causal basis relative to the world. The connection of the Creator of the world is that of the controller. He states this by 'The womb of the world'. Since the instruction 'My' is non-co-ordinate with the primary Brahman, and by the import of the term 'womb', He states what is metaphorically called 'Brahman': 'named Prakṛti'. The meaning of the word 'garbha' (seed), established by being the cause of the creation mixed with consciousness (cit) and by being located in Prakṛti, He states as 'named consciousness'. 'I place' means deposition is intended, so He says, 'I join'. The elaboration will be found in its proper place. The purport is that thus, in many passages dealing with Prakṛti, Puruṣa, the creation of the world, etc., nothing suggestive of the superimposition of the Jīva or the falsity of the world is seen.

Since the difference in nature of the sentient, insentient, and Īśvara is accepted by Kâṇāda, etc., He states the unique characteristic that distinguishes them from those views—the relation of body and Self, established by combining Śrutis—for the purpose of establishing the primary nature of co-ordinate predication: 'Thus'. 'The enjoyer'—To make known that the state of being the body is established even in the state of unification by passages like 'whose body is darkness [Br.U. 3.7.13]' and 'whose body is death [Subālopaniṣad 7]', it is said 'of both existing in all states'. The purport is that the body-Self relationship between the world and Brahman, which is not grasped by perception, etc., is established by numerous Śrutis dedicated to instructing the truth, so its rejection should not be feared. The definition of the body must be investigated in accordance with this.

He shows the state of being the body of the Supreme Self for Prakṛti and Puruṣa in all states without distinction, in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa: 'He who in the earth'. He clarifies this same meaning, slightly modified by insertion and deletion, by the Subālopaniṣad, which elaborates on the presence of qualities like sinlessness (apahata-pāpmatva), non-duality, and the state of being Nārāyaṇa, mentioned in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa: 'He who in the earth'. Regarding the word 'mṛtyu' (death) here, he states its subject matter to be the Primal Matter (mūla-prakṛti) fallen into an extremely subtle state, based on the context: 'Here'. 'Here' means in the paragraph immediately following the paragraph on Akṣara (imperishable). To preclude darkness which contradicts light, 'insentient substance in a subtle state' is stated. By 'in this very one', quick recognition is suggested. He cites the Taittirīyaka passage which shows the state of being the Self (ātmatva) following the definition of the Self: 'Having entered within'. The state of being the embodied one (śarīritva) is established by the internal entry and control, which distinguish Him from the king and the sky.

He states the primary meaning of the co-ordinate predication Śrutis, in accordance with the combining Śrutis mentioned in the differentiating Śrutis: 'Thus, in all states'. The meaning is that the co-ordinate predication Śrutis intend the unity of substance characterized by the Supreme Person in both states. 'To make known this meaning'—the meaning is not to make known something contradicted by other Śrutis, its own context, its own statements, perception, etc. He shows that, just as in the Chāndogya [Upanishad], co-ordinate predication and its being preceded by entry even into the conscious part is found in the Taittirīyaka: 'Likewise'. 'He performed austerity' means He deliberated. This is based on the explanation in the context 'Brahman expands by austerity' that 'whose austerity consists of knowledge [Muṇ.U. 1.1.8-9]'.

Not only is there no contradiction between the Śrutis of difference and non-difference through combining passages found in other contexts, but also through those found in their own context—he says 'Here too'. This refers to the contexts of Chāndogya and Taittirīyaka, which contain co-ordinate instructions. 'By the living Self' means 'by Me, the Jīva'. It is like: 'Having become a lion, many were consumed by me; having become a tiger, many were consumed by me. Likewise, many were consumed by me in other forms; and I, too, was consumed by many in the same way.' [Vi.Dh. 98.17]. The entry into the insentient is clear in 'These three deities, having entered with this living Self'. But the co-ordinate predication with the Jīva alone is caused by that entry, which is clear in the Taittirīyaka—with this intention, he says 'Having created that'.

Thus, the manifestation of name and form due to the entry of the Supreme Self, whose body is the Jīva, and the ultimate reference of names to the Supreme Person, and consequently the primary nature of co-ordinate predication, are established. Due to this consistency, and by the rule of Sarva-śākhā-pratyaya-Nyāya (maxim of knowledge acquired through all branches), the statement of the manifestation of name and form in other contexts, even those lacking the mention of entry into the sentient and insentient, is also preceded by the intention of entry of this nature—he says 'It is like this'. Starting from here, the previously stated objections are resolved sequentially. For instance, the knowing of the effect through the knowledge of the cause means that the substance designated by the word 'effect' is made the object of knowledge through the knowledge of the cause. For one indeed says, 'That one was seen before,' having seen Devadatta sitting before and then seeing the same person walking. Therefore, it is the effect-state.

It is also intended that this is much more illogical in the opponent's position. For instance—the knowing of everything through the knowledge of one non-distinguished entity is not fitting here, because there is no entity referred to by the word 'all' that is to be known, and due to the contingency of the identity of true and false entities, etc. If the interpretation is that everything is known as false, there is the fault of ellipsis (adhyāhāra), etc. If the intention is that the knowledge of the world, which is the effect of Brahman conditioned by a single ignorance, is attained by knowing that conditioned Brahman, it leads indirectly to the acceptance of our position, but the disruption of all valid means of knowledge is greater. Similarly, in the other two positions as well, since the characteristic of being endowed with subtle insentient power is difficult to reject, the reconciliation must be through the knowledge of the unity of the characterized entity and the knowledge of its effect. And thus, our position, which is not contradicted by Śrutis regarding non-mutability and flawlessness, is much more logical—such is the conclusion.

Since the conventional (lākṣaṇika) nature of co-ordinate predication in the opponent's position is accepted by them, there is nothing to be said there. Assuming this, he establishes the primary nature of co-ordinate predication in his own position: 'I these'. Assuming the compilation of principles read in other contexts, by the rule of other Śākhās (branches), even in contexts that have a contracted statement, he says: 'The three deities', referring to all insentient substances. He says that the causal nature of Brahman for the world is justified because, even though the world and Brahman are absolutely different in nature, the status of cause and effect as a single substance is established in the characterized form: 'Therefore, the gross...'. The meaning is that the designation of co-ordinate predication is primary. The purport is that non-contradiction with Satkārya-vāda is also established.

He refutes the contingency of the mixture of natures (sva-bhāva-saṅkara) which would arise from the attainment of unity in the causal state: 'Subtle...'. The purport is that just as there is no mixture of natures for the body of a child and the conscious entity proud of it when the child reaches youth, so too is the case here—with this intention, 'as the aggregate being the material cause (upādānatva)' is stated.

He negates the mixture [of natures] contingent in the effect-state due to origin from a single cause: 'Just as white...'. If it is objected, 'The co-ordinate predication of the cloth, which is made of white, black, and red threads, is not specifically seen with any particular thread—white, black, or red—though one might somehow say, "Threads are the cloth." Therefore, here too, the world, which is made of the aggregate form of Prakṛti, Puruṣa, and Īśvara, should not have specific co-ordinate predication with Īśvara,' he replies, 'Of the threads'. The intention is this: The example of thread and cloth is not cited with the intention of full similarity in every respect, but only to illustrate the non-mixture of natures, even in the state of effect, for entities that are absolutely different in nature. The specific difference is that co-ordinate predication would exist where there is the relationship of attribute (prakāra) and substance (prakārin), which causes the words to ultimately refer to a single substance, and not elsewhere. What, then, is the specific difference? To this, he states the essential element upon which the analogy relies: 'Nature, etc.'.

He states the non-contradiction with Śrutis regarding non-mutability, even when there is the state of effect due to being the material cause: 'And this being so'. The meaning is that this is due to the characterized entity being the material cause and its nature being eternally unmixed. The Śruti regarding non-mutability concerns the essential nature [of Brahman], while the Śruti regarding material causality and the state of effect concerns the characterized entity, so there is no mutual contradiction between them. The purport is that in the position of modification of essential nature, there is no subject matter at all for the Śruti regarding non-mutability. With the intention that 'we do not speak of modification even in a part of the essential nature', it is said 'much more logical'.

He states the manner in which the non-modified entity becomes the effect: 'Of the gross state'. 'Abiding as the Self'—the state of being the effect is indeed a specific state characterized by the control and sustenance of those respective entities at that time. The purport is that the word 'effect' here extends to the Inner Controller, based on the Śruti stating that the manifestation of name and form extends to the Inner Controller; hence its primary nature. He refutes the objection that, based on the distinction between what is attained and what is not attained, only the attribute is the effect: 'Of the state...'. The purport is that when the attributes attain another state, the substance (viśeṣya) also attains another state, characterized by being specified by the control of those entities in that state.

He establishes the subject matter of the non-qualification (nirguṇa) statements in order to maintain non-contradiction with the qualification (saguṇa) statements, based on the maxim of Utsarga-Apavāda (general rule and exception): 'And the statements of non-qualification'. He states that Śruti itself shows this distinction in subject matter, established thus, in a single sentence: 'Sinless (apahata)...'. The certainty suggested by the word 'eva' (alone) indicates independence from logical reasoning. He refutes the negation of inherent qualities: 'Whose nature is knowledge'. 'Omniscient, omnipotent', etc., is stated for non-contradiction with what is established in other Śrutis. 'To be defined solely by knowledge'—the purport is that words denoting characteristics that define the essential nature also convey the possessor of the characteristic through the medium of the characteristic. This is also stated in the Sūtra: 'But the designation of that (Self) is due to the predominance of those qualities, like the wise one [Brahma Sūtra 2.3.29],' and 'And because of its abiding as the Self, there is no fault, as seen from the text [Brahma Sūtra 2.3.30].' Assuming another mode of existence, suggested by the word 'ca' (and) in the Sūtra, which includes what is unsaid, he says: 'And whose nature is knowledge due to self-luminosity'. The purport is that the fitness for the ground of meaning of the word 'knowledge' also exists, like the attributive knowledge (dharma-bhūta-jñāna). The proponents of the non-distinguished [Brahman] abandon knowership (jñātṛtva), while Vaiśeṣikas, etc., abandon knowledge-ness (jñānatva). Assuming that both positions contradict Śruti, he states the consistency in his own position: 'He who is omniscient'.

He states the subject matter of the difference-negating statements, which does not contradict the difference-enjoining statements: 'He desired'. The purport is that since the difference in the form of the qualities and glories of Brahman is enjoined, its negation is impossible. He rejects the opponent's accepted [interpretation] due to its contradiction with Śruti: 'Not again'. He says that the purport of 'But where for him...', etc., is the negation of multiplicity not inherent in Brahman, which is stated by Śruti itself: 'At the commencement of the negative sentence'. The purport is that otherwise there would be contradiction with the introductory statement. 'That is established'—means established by other Śrutis like 'May I become many', and established in a state where contradiction has not arisen, as it is not touched by the negations that will be mentioned.

Now, stating concisely the non-contradiction of all kinds in his own position and the contradiction of all kinds in the opponent's positions, characterized by abandonment of what is heard and imagination of what is not heard, he concludes: 'Thus'. 'By Śrutis alone'—the purport is that there is no extreme need for logic (Nyāya) either, for the meaning which is extremely clear. 'Of the other also'—this includes interpretations accepted by Yādava Prakāśa, Naiyāyikas, etc. Both 'rooted in false logic' and 'contradicted by all Śrutis' must be applied to all proponents of the ignorance of Brahman.

पूर्व श्लोक में यह कहा गया है कि जड़ उपाधियाँ क्षेत्र हैं और इनका अधिष्ठान चैतन्य स्वरूप आत्मा क्षेत्रज्ञ है। यहाँ सबको चकित कर देने वाला कथन है कि समस्त क्षेत्रों में क्षेत्रज्ञ मुझे ही जानो। यदि? सब क्षेत्रों में ज्ञाता एक ही है ? तो इसका अर्थ यह हुआ कि बहुलता और विविधता केवल जड़ उपाधियों में ही है और उनमें व्यक्त चैतन्य सर्वत्र एक ही है। इस सर्वश्रेष्ठ? सर्वातीत एक सत्य को यहाँ उत्तम पुरुष एक वचन के रूप में निर्देशित किया गया है? क्षेत्रज्ञ मैं हूँ? क्योंकि सभी साधकों को यह इसी रूप में अनुभव करना है कि? वह मैं हूँ? (सोऽहम्)।हम पहले भी इंगित कर चुके हैं कि भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण गीता का उपदेश योगारूढ़ की स्थिति के विरले क्षणों में कर रहे हैं। वे सर्वव्यापी आत्मस्वरूप से तादात्म्य किये हुये हैं। इस श्लोक का उनका कथन विद्युत् के इस कथन के समान है कि? मैं ही विश्वभर के बल्बों में प्रकाशित हो रही ऊर्जा हूँ।इस सम्पूर्ण विविध नामरूपमय सृष्टि के पीछे विद्यमान एकमेव सत्य का निर्देश करने के पश्चात् भगवान् अपना मत बताते हुये कहते हैं कि क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञ का विवेकजनित ज्ञान ही वास्तविक ज्ञान कहलाने योग्य है? क्योंकि यही ज्ञान हमें अपने सांसारिक बन्धनों से मुक्त कराने में समर्थ है। इस ज्ञान के अभाव में ही हम जीव भाव के समस्त दुखों को भोग रहे हैं।ज्ञानमार्ग के निष्ठावान् साधकों के लिए यह क्षेत्र और क्षेत्रज्ञ का ज्ञान उपयोगी और आवश्यक होने के कारण उन्हें उसका विस्तृत अध्ययन करना होगा।

Somewhere in the Sruti, it is heard that 'The Knower of the Field is to be worshipped'. And is he the Self? Or the Lord? Or indeed some third other? In the doubt arising from this question -- Sri Bhagavan commands -- 'This' etc., 'Knower of the Field' etc.

For transmigratory beings, the body is the 'Field', where the seed of karma sprouts. Therefore, their Self, stained by adventitious impurity, is called 'Knower of the Field'. For the awakened ones, that very thing is the Field. But the etymological distinction is thus -- it destroys (kshinoti) the bondage of karma through enjoyment, and it saves (trayate) from the fear of birth and death. And towards them, the Supreme Self Vasudeva is the Knower of the Field.

Who knows (veda) this field? 'Vedayati' (causes to know/enlivens) -- here the root 'vid' has the causal meaning included. Therefore, by whose grace this non-sentient attains the state of sentience, he alone is the Knower of the Field, not anyone else.

The distinction, however, is: relying on a form with limited pervasion, he is called 'Self' (Atma); by unlimited pervasion of all fields, [he is] the Supreme Self, Lord Vasudeva. 'My' (mama) -- this is the genitive case in the sense of the object; I am to be known by this knowledge, this is the meaning.

'The Knower of the Field' etc.

Thus, having described the self-luminous Knower of the Field as distinct from the body, senses, etc., taking his ultimate form, He states the unity with the Supreme Self -- 'Knower of the Field' etc. The one Knower of the Field in all fields, who is self-luminous, of the nature of consciousness, eternal, and all-pervading -- know him, by abandoning the form consisting of Avidya which possesses superimposed transmigratory attributes like doership and enjoyership, as Me, the Lord, the non-transmigratory, of the form of secondless Brahman-Bliss; know (this).

O Bharata, and thus the Field is Maya-imagined and false; and the Knower of the Field is ultimately real and the substratum of that illusion -- thus, the knowledge of the Field and Knower of the Field, that alone is 'Knowledge' because it is the means to liberation, being opposed to Avidya and of the nature of light, is 'My opinion'; but other is ignorance indeed because it is not opposed to that, this is the intention.

Here, the difference between Jiva and Ishvara is due to Avidya, but the non-difference is ultimate -- arguments regarding this have been described by the Commentator (Shankaracharya). But by us, due to fear of expanding the book and because it has been stated in many ways earlier, they are not set forth.

Now, for the knowledge of Arjuna, He speaks of His nature as it is in His own view -- 'Knower of the Field' etc. 'Knower of the Field' (means) the seed. By the word 'api' (also) -- know Me, who am even of atomic form, My part, situated in all fields for the purpose of experiencing Rasa (taste/bliss), and by the 'cha' (and) situated in My forms; know (this).

The address 'Bharata' is for trust.

The knowledge of the Field and Knower of the Field as being My parts and for the purpose of Lila (play), that is 'My opinion', meaning approved, this is the meaning.

Opposite to this, the body etc. being generated by karma etc., and possessing knowledge of that, and the Jiva being the Knower of the Field (independently) -- is unconnected (incorrect), this meaning is made known by the statement of 'My opinion'.

The field-knower (Kshetrajna), characterized as stated, know him also to be Me, the Supreme Lord, the non-transmigrator. The intention is: The Kshetrajna who is divided by the adjuncts of many fields (Kshetra-upadhi)—from Brahma down to a blade of grass—who is pervading all fields; know him to be Me, free from all differences caused by adjuncts, and beyond the reach of words and cognitions like 'existence' and 'non-existence'. O Bharata? Since nothing else remains within the reach of knowledge apart from the reality of the Field, the Knower of the Field, and the Lord; therefore, the knowledge of the Field and the Knower of the Field—which are the knowable entities—the knowledge by which the Field and the Knower of the Field are made objects of cognition; that knowledge is considered 'Samyagjnanam' (Right Knowledge)—this is the intention of Me, the Lord, Vishnu.

(Objection) Now, if there is one Lord alone in all fields, and no other distinct enjoyer exists; then the Lord's transmigratory nature (Samsaritvam) is obtained. Or, due to the absence of any other transmigrator apart from the Lord, there is the contingency of the non-existence of transmigration (Samsara-abhava). And both these (contingencies) are undesirable, due to the contingency of the futility of scriptures regarding bondage, liberation, and their means, and due to contradiction with direct perception (Pratyaksha) and other proofs. By direct perception, the transmigratory world, characterized by pleasure, pain, and their causes, is experienced; and from the experience of the world's variety, transmigration caused by Dharma and Adharma is inferred. All this is inconsistent if there is identity between the Self and the Lord.

(Answer) Not so, because of the distinctness of Knowledge (Vidya) and Ignorance (Avidya)—"Far, mutually contradictory, and moving in different directions are Vidya and Avidya, so known" (Katha 1.2.4). And thus, a contradictory difference in fruit is also designated for the subjects of Vidya and Avidya—the subject of Vidya is 'Shreyah' (the good), and the effect of Avidya is 'Preyah' (the pleasant). And thus Vyasa: "These two paths indeed..." etc., and "These two paths" etc. also. And here two paths (Nishthas) are stated. And Avidya, along with its effect, is to be abandoned—this is understood from Shrutis, Smritis, and Nyaya (logic). The Shrutis, for instance: "If one has known it here, then there is truth; if one has not known it here, there is great destruction" (Kena 2.5); "Knowing Him thus, one becomes immortal here" (Nrisimha Purva Tapaniya 6); "There is no other path for going" (Svetasvatara 3.8); "The knower does not fear anything" (Taittiriya 2.4). But of the ignorant: "Then fear comes to him" (Taittiriya 2.7); "Abiding in the midst of ignorance" (Katha 1.2.5); "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman" (Mundaka 3.2.9); "He does not know 'That one is other and I am other,' just as an animal he is to the gods" (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10); "The Self-knower becomes all this" (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10); "When they will wrap the sky like leather" (Svetasvatara 6.20)—and thousands of others. And Smritis: "Knowledge is covered by ignorance, thereby creatures are deluded" (Gita 5.15); "By them is the world conquered here, whose mind is fixed in equanimity" (Gita 5.19); "Seeing equally everywhere" (Gita 13.28)—etc.

And by logic: "Knowing the snakes, the kusha grass tips, and the well, men avoid them. Some fall there due to ignorance; see the fruit in knowledge as specific" (Mahabharata, Santiparva 201.16). And thus: The ignorant, having the idea of Self in the body etc., spurred by attachment and hatred, performs Dharma and Adharma, is born and dies—this is understood; and that those who see the Self as distinct from the body etc. are liberated due to the cessation of activity of Dharma and Adharma prompted by the abandonment of attachment and hatred—this cannot be refuted by anyone by any logic. That being so, the transmigratory nature appears as if belonging to the Kshetrajna, who is none other than Ishvara, due to the adjunct difference created by Avidya, just as self-hood appears in the body etc. The idea of Self in non-Self is established among all creatures as created by Avidya, like the determination of a man in a pillar; and yet, the characteristics of the man do not pass to the pillar, nor vice versa, because pain, pleasure, delusion, etc., which are characteristics of the body and mind (non-Self), are not characteristics of the Self, due to the non-difference in being created by Avidya, like old age and death. (The text continues to elaborate on the Advaita view of superimposition and the refutation of the Dvaita view, justifying the identity of Jiva and Ishvara despite apparent differences, and maintaining the sole reality of Brahman.)

And of whom it (the field) belongs, he is the Knower of the Field, here attained to My nature -- thus He says 'Know the Knower of the Field also as Me', etc.

For the Jiva, associated by the state of being the owner of the field, does not know the field as distinct from himself. Whoever knows (it), know him as Me; because of being My part, know him as the Purusha of My form; because of the manifestation of Bhagavan's qualities, 'But the designation is on account of that quality being dominant, like the intelligent one' (Brahma Sutra 2.3.29), because it is sutured thus.

For the sake of respect, He praises this knowledge: 'The knowledge of the Field and Knower of the Field which is that, that knowledge is My opinion', meaning approved by My will, (it) should protect.

क्षेत्रज्ञम् the knower of the field? च and? अपि also? माम् Me? विद्धि know? सर्वक्षेत्रेषु in all fields? भारत O descendant of Bharata (Arjuna)? क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः of the field and of the knower of the field? ज्ञानम्,knowledge? यत् which? तत् that? ज्ञानम् knowledge? मतम् is considered to be? मम My.Commentary The fields are different but the knower of the field is one. The individual souls (Jivatmas) are different but the Supreme Soul (Paramatma) is one. Wherever there is mind? there are lifreath? egoism and the individual consciousness or reflected intelligence side by side. He who has the sense of duality will take birth again and again. This delusion of dulaity can only be removed by knowledge of the identity of the individual soul and the Absolute. I am happy? I am miserable? I am the doer of this action? and I am the enjoyer of this experience -- these are the experiences of all human beings. Therefore the individual soul is bound to Samsara and is subject to pleasure and pain? and the individual souls are in different bodies. But? the Supreme Soul is free from pleasure and pain. It is not bound to Samsara. It is eternally free. It is one without a second.If there is only one individual soul in all bodies? all should have the same experience at the same time. If Rama suffers from abdominal colic? Krishna also should experience the pain at the same time. If John experiences joy? Jacob also should have a similar experience. If Choudhury is stung by a scorpion? Banerjee also should suffer from the pain. But this is not the case. When Rama suffers? Krishna rejoices. When John is jubilan? Jacob is depressed. When Choudhury suffers from the sting of a scorpion? Banerjee is enjoying his breakfast. Fields are different? bodies are different? minds are different and the individual souls are different from each other. But the knower in all these fields is one. Pleasure and pain are the Dharmas (functions) of the mind only. The individual soul is in essence identical with the Supreme Soul.The knower of the field or the Self is not affected by pleasure and pain? virtue and vice. He is the silent witness only. Pleasure and pain are the functions of the mind. They are ascribed to the Self through ignorance. The ignorant man regards the physical body as the Self. He is swayed by the two currents of likes and dislikes? he does virtuous and vicious actions and reaps the fruits of these actions? viz.? pleasure and pain? and takes birth again and again. But the sage who knows that the Kshetrajna or the knower of the field or the Self is distinct from the body is not swayed by likes and dislikes. He identifies himself with the pure? eternal? Absolute or the Supreme Self and is always happy and actionless? though he performs actions for the welfare of humanity.The disease of Timira (partial blindness) which causes perception of what is contrary to truth pertains to the eye but not to the man who perceives. If the disease is removed by proper treatment he perceives things in their true light. Even so ignorance? doubt? pleasure and pain? virtue and vice? likes and dislikes? false perceptions as well as their cause belong to the instrument (the mind) but not to the silent witness? the knower of the field? the Self.In the state of liberation wherein there is annihilation of the mind? there is no ignorance and the play of the two currents of likes and dislikes does not exist there. If false perception? ignorance? pleasure and pain? doubt? bondage? delusion? sorrow? etc.? were the essential properties of the Self? just as heat is the essential property of fire? they could not be got rid of at any time. But there have been sages of Selfrealisation in the past like Sankara? Dattatreya? Jada Bharata and Yajnavalkya who possessed extraordinary supersensual or intuitional knowledge? who were free from false perception? doubt? fear? delusion? sorrow? etc. They were not conscious of Samsara but they had perfect awareness of the Self. Therefore? we will have to conclude that the Self is ever free? pure? perfect? eternal and that ignorance inheres in the instrument (the mind) and not in the Self.Ignorance born of Tamas acts as a veil and prevents man from knowing his essential nature as,the ExistenceKnowledgeBliss Absolute. It causes perception of what is ite the contrary of truth and causes doubt or nonperception of truth. As soon as knowledge of the Self dawns these three forms of ignorance vanish in toto. Therefore these three forms of ignorance are not the attributes of the Self. They belong to the mind? the organ or the instrument. Mind is only an effect or a product of ignorance.The wheel of Samsara or the worldprocess rotates on account of ignorance. It exists only for the ignorant man who perceives the world as it appears to him.There is no Samsara for a liberated sage. Any disease of the eye cannot in any way effect the sun (the dity presiding over the eye). The breaking of the pot will not in any way affect the ether or space in the pot. The water of the mirage cannot render the earth moist. Even so ignorance and its effecs cannot in the least affect the pure? subtle? attributeless? formless? limbless? partless and selfluminous Kshetrajna or the Self. Ignorance does not touch the Self. (Cf.X.20XIII.32XVIII.61)

Ca api, and; viddhi, understand; mam, Me, the supreme God who is transcendental; to be the ksetrajnam, 'Knower of the field' with the characterisitics noted above; sarva-ksetresu, in all the fields. The idea is this: Know the 'Knower of the field'- who has become diversified by limiting adjuncts in the form of numerous 'fields' ranging from Brahma to a clump of grass-as free from differentiations resulting from all the limiting adjuncts, and as beyond the range of such words and ideas as existece, nonexistence, etc.
O scion of the Bharata dynasty, since there remains nothing to be known apart from the true nature of the field, the knower of the field and God, therefore; tat, that; is jnanam, Knowledge, right knowledge; yat, which; is the jnanam, knowledge; ksetra-ksetrajnayoh, of the field and the knower of the field-which are the two knowables-, and by which Knowledge the field and the knower of the field are made objects of knowledge. This is mama, My, God Vishu's; matam, opinion.
Objection: Well, if it be that in all the field there exists God alone, and none else other than Him, as the enjoyer, then God will become a mundane being; or, due to the absence of any mundane creature other than God, there will arise the contingency of the negation of mundance existence. And both these are undesirable, since the scriptures dealing with bondage, Liberation and their causes will become useless, and also becuase they contradict such valid means of knowledge as direct perception.
In the first place, mundane existence which is characterized by happiness, sorrow and their cause is apprehended through direct perception. Besides, from the perception of variety in the world it can be inferred that mundane existence results from virtue and vice. All this becomes illogical if God and the individual soul be one.
Reply: No, because this becomes justifiable owing to the difference between Knowledge and ignorance. 'These two, viz that which is know as Knowledge and that which is known as ignorance are widely contradictory, and they follow divergent courses' (Ka. 1.2.4.); and similarly, the different results, viz Liberation and enjoyment, belonging (respectively) to those Knowledge and ignorance, have also been pointed out to be contrary by saying that Liberation is the goal of Knowledge, and enjoyment is the result of ignorance (see Ka. 1.2.2). Vyasa, also has said so: 'Now, there are these two paths' (Mbh Sa. 241.6) etc. and, 'There are only these two paths,' etc. Here (in the Gita) also, two kinds of steadfastness have been stated. And it is understood from the Vedas, the Smrtis and reason that ignorance together with its effects has to be destroyed by Knowledge.
As for the Vedic texts, they are:
'If one has realized here, then there is truth;
if he has not realized here, then there is great destruction' (Ke. 2.5);
'Knowing Him in this way, one becomes Immortal here' (Nr. Pu. 6);
'There is no other path to go by' (Sv. 3.8);
'The enlightened man is not afraid of anything' (Tai. 2.9.1).
On the other hand, (the texts) with regard to the unenlightened person are:
'Then, he is smitten with fear' (Tai. 2.7.1);
'Living in the midst of ognorance' (Ka. 1.2.5);
One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indeed. In his line is not born anyone who does not know Brahman' (Mu. 3.2.9);
'(While he who worships another god thinking,)
"He is one, and I am another," does not know.
He is like an animal to the gods' (Br. 1.4.10).
He who is a knower of the Self, 'He becomes all this (Universe)' (Br. 1.4.10); 'When men will fold up space like (folding) leather, (then) there will be cessation of sorrow, without knowing the Deity' (Sv. 6.9). There are thousands of texts like these.
And the Smrti texts (from the Gita) are:
'Knowledge remains covered by ignorance.
Thery the creatures become deluded' (5.15);
'Here itself is rirth conered by them whose minds are established on sameness' (5.19);
'Since by seeing eally the God who is present alike everywhere (he does not injure the Self by the Self, therefore he attains the supreme Goal)' (13.28), etc.
And as for reason, there is the text, 'Men avoid snakes, tips of kusa-grass as also well when they are aware of them. Some fall into them owing to ignorance. Thus, see the special result arising from knowledge' (Mbh. Sa. 201.17).
Similarly, it is known that an unelightened person, who identifies himself with the body etc. and who practises righteousness and unrighteousness under the impulsion of attachment and aversion, takes birth and dies. It cannot be reasonably denied by anyone that, those who see the Self as different from the body etc. become liberated as a result of the cessation of righteous and unrighteous conduct, which depends on the destruction of attachment and aversion.
The being so, the Knower of the field, who is reality is God Himself, appears to have become a mundane soul owing to the various adjuncts which are products of ignorance; as for instance the individual soul becomes identified with the body etc. For it is a well-known fact in the case of all creatures that their self-identify with the body etc. which are not-Self is definitely caused by ignorance. Just as, when a stump, of a tree is firmly regarded as a man, the alities of a man do not thery come to exist in the stump, nor do the alities of the stump come to the person, similarly the property ofconsciousness does not come to the body, nor those of the body to consciousness. It is not proper that the Self should be identified with happiness, sorrow, delusion, etc., since they, like decrepitude and death, are eally the products of ignorance.
Objection: May it not be said that this is not so, becuase of dissimilarity? The stump and the man, which are verily objects of perception, are superimposed on each other through ignorance by their perceiver. On the other hand, in the case of the body and the Self,, the mutual superimposition occurs verily between a knower and an object of perception. Thus, the illustration is not eally applicable. Therefore, may it not be that the properties of the body, though objects of knowledge, belong to the Self which is the knower?
Reply: No, since there arises the contingency of (the Self) becoming devoid of consciousness! If alities such as happiness, sorrow, delusion, desire, etc. of the body etc., which are the field and are objects of knowledge, indeed belong to the knower, then it will be necessary to explain the particular reason why some of the alities of the object of knowledge-the field-superimposed through ignorance belong to the Self, while decrepitude, death, etc. do not. (On the contrary) it is possible to infer that they (happiness etc.) do not pertain to the Self, since, like decrepitude etc., they are superimposed on the Self through ignorance, and because they are either avoidable or acceptable.
This being so, the mundane state, consisting of agentship and enjoyership pertaining to the objects of knowledge, is superimposed on the knower through ignorance. Hence, nothing of the knower is affected thery-in the same way as nothing of the sky is affected by the superimposition of surface, diret, etc. (on it) by fools. Such being the case, not the least touch of the mundane state is to be apprehended with regard to the almighty [see footnote on p.5, and p.168.] God, the Knower of the field, even though He exists in all the fields. For it is nowhere seen in the world that anybody is benefitted or harmed by a ality attributed to him through ignorance.
As for the statement that the illustration is not eally applicable-that is wrong.
Objection: How?
Reply: Because what is intended as common between the illustration and the thing illustrated is merely the superimposition through ignorance. There is no disagreement as to that. However, as for your contention that the illustration fails with regard to the Knower, that too has been shown to be inapt by citing the example of decrepitude etc. [If it be held that objects of experience may be superimposed on one another, but they cannot be superimposed on the experiencer, the answer is that this cannot be a universal proposition. For decrepitude and death, which are matters of experience, are superimposed on the Self, the experiencer.]
Objection: May it not be that the Knower of the field becomes a mundane being owing to his having ignorance?
Reply: No, because ignorance is of the nature of tamas. Since ignorance has the nature of covering, it is indeed a notion born of tamas; it makes one perceive contrarily, or it arouses doubt, or it leads to non-perception. For it disappears with the dawn of discrimination. And the three kind of ignorance, viz non-perception etc. [Etc: false perception and doubt.], are experienced when there are such defects as blindness etc. which are forms of tamas and have the nature of veiling. [It is known through the process of agreement and difference that false perception etc. arise from some defects,and they are not the alities of the Self.]
Objection: Here it is asserted that if this be the case, then ignorance is a ality of the knower?
Reply: No, for the defects such as blindness are seen to belong to the eye which is an organ. As for your notion that 'ignorance is a ality of the experiencer, and the very fact of being possessed of the ality of ignorance is what constitutes the mundane state of the Knower of the field; the assertion which was made (by the Vedantin) in that connection, "that the Knower of th field is God Himself and not a mundane being, " is improper,'-this is not so. As for example: Since such defects as false perception etc. are seen to belong to the organ eye, therefore false perception etc. or their causes, viz defects like blindness etc., do not belong to the perceiver. Just as blindness of the eyes does not pertain to the perceiver since on being curved through treatment it is not seen in the perceiver, similarly notions like non-perception, false perception, doubt, and their causes should, in all cases, pertain to some organ; not to the perceiver, the Knower of the field. And since they are objects of perception, they are not alities of the Knower in the same way that light is of a lamp. Just because they are objects of perception, they are cognized as different from one's own Self.
Besides, it is denied by all schools of thought that in Liberation, when all the organs depart, there is any association with such defects as ignorance etc. If they (the defects) be the alities of the Self Itself, the Knower of the field, as heat is of fire, then there can never be a dissociation from them. Again, since there can be no association with or dissociation from anything for the immutable, formless Self which is all-pervading like space, therefore it is established that the Knower of the field is ever identical with God. This follows alos from the utternance of the Lord, 'Being without beginning and without alities' (31), etc.
Objection: Well, if this be so, then, owing to the nonexistence of the world and the mundane creatures, there will arise the defect of the uselessness of the scriptures, etc.
Reply: No, since this (defect) is admitted by all. A defect that is admitted by all who believe in the Self is not to be explained by one alone!
Objection: How has this been admitted by all?
Reply: People of all schools of thought who believe in the Self admit that there is no worldly behaviour or the behaviour of a worldling in the liberated ones. Yet, in their case (i.e. in those various schools), it is not admitted that there is any possibility of such a defect as the scriptures becoming useless, etc. Similarly, in our case let the scriptures be useless when the knowers of the field become identified with God; and purposeful within the sphere of ignorance. This is just as in the case of all the dualists, where it is admitted that the scriptures etc. become useful in the state of bondage, not in the state of Liberation.
Objection: Well, for us all dualists, bondage and Liberation of the Self are real in the truest sense. So, when things to be renounced or accepted as also the means thereto are real, the scriptures etc. become meaningful. On the other hand, may it not be that for the non-dualists, since duality deos not exist in truest sense, it being the creation of ignorance, therefore the state of bondage of the Self is not ultimately real, and hence the scriptures etc. become purposeless as they remain shorn of a subject-matter?
Reply: No, since it is not logical that the Self should have different states. If this were possible at all, then the states of bondage and freedom of the Self should be simultaneous, or successive. As to that, they cannot occur simultaneously, since they are contradictory-like rest and motion in the same object. Should they occur successively and without being caused, then there will arise the contingency of there being no Liberation; if they occur through some cause, then, since they do not exist inherently, there arises the contingency of their being ultimately unreal. In this case also the assumption becomes falsified.
Moreover, when ascertaining the precedence and succession of the states of bondage and Liberation, the state of bondage will have to be considered as being the earlier and having no beginning, but an end. And that is contrary to valid means of knowledge. Similarly it will have to be admitted that the state of Liberation has a beginning, but no end- which is certainly opposed to valid means of knowledge. And it is not possible to established eternality for something that has states nd undergoes a change from one state to another. On the other hand, if for avoiding the defect of non-eternality the different states of bondage and Liberation be not assumed, then, even for the dualists such defects as the purposelessness of the scriptures become certainly unavoidable. Thus, the situation being similar (for both), it is not for the Advaitin (alone) to refute the objection.
Nor do the scriptures become purposeless, because the scriptures are applicable to the commonly known unenlightened person. It is indeed in the case of the ignorant person-not in the case of the enlightened one-that there occurs the perception of identity of the Self with the effect (i.e. enjoyership) and the cause (i.e. agentship) which are not-Self. For, in the case of the enlightened persons, it is impossible that, after the dawn of the realization of non-identity of the Self with effect and cause, they can have Self identification with these as 'I'. Surely, not even a downright fool, or a lunatic and such others, see water and fire or shade and light as identical; what to speak of a discriminating person!
Therefore, such being the case, the scriptures dealing with injunction and prohibition do not concern a person who sees the distinction of the Self from effect and cause. For, when Devadatta is ordered to do som work with the words, 'You do this,' Visnumitra who happens to be there does not, even on hearing the ?nd, conclude, 'I have been ordered.' But this conclusion is reasonable when the person for whom the order is meant is not understood. So also with regard to cause and effect.
Objection: Can it not be that, even after having realized the Self as different from effect and cuase, it is ite reasonable from the standpoint of natural relationship, [Natural relationship-Self-identification with the body through ignorance.] that with regard to the scriptures one should have the understanding, 'I am enjoined to adotp the means that yields a desired result, and am porhibited from adopting the means that leads to an undesirable result'? As for instance, in the case of a father and son, or between others, even though there exists the awareness of the distinction between each other, still there is the comprehension of the implication of the injunctions and prohibitions meant for one as being also meant for the other. [In the (Br. (1.5.17) we read, 'Now therefore the entrusting: When a man thinks he will die, he says to his son, "You are Brahman, you are the sacrifice, and you are the world,"' etc. It has been enjoined here in this manner that the son should accept as his own all the duties thus entrusted to him by the father. Similarly, it is understood that when a son in unable to perform his own duties, the father has to accept them. So also in the case of brothers and others.
Thus, in the case of the enlightened person also, though there is a comprehension of his own distinction from effect and cause, still, owing to his earlier relationship with ignorance, body, etc., there is no contradiction in his understanding that the injunctions and prohibitions are meant for him.]
Reply: No, since identification of the Self with effect and cause is possible only before attaining the knowledge of the Self as distinct (from them). It is only after one has followed (or eschewed) what is enjoined or prohibited by the scriptures that he comprehends his own distinction from the effect and cause; not before. [In B.S. (3.4.26-7) it is said that the merit earned by the performance of scriptural duties helps to generate knowledge of Brahman. Therefore these duties are not meant for the enlightened. (By following what is enjoined, and avoiding what is prohibited, one's mind becomes purified, and then only one understands he is different from cause and effect-agentship and enjoyership.-Tr.)] Therefore it is established that the scriptures dealing with injunctions and prohibitions are meant for the ignorant.
Objection: Well, if (injunctions and prohibitions) such as, 'One who desires heaven shall perform sacrifices', 'One should not eat poisoned meat,' etc. be not observed by those who have realized the Self as distinct and by those who view only the body as the Self, then, from the absence of any observer of those (injunctions etc.) there would follow the uselessness of the scriptures.
Reply: No, because engagement in or abstention from actions follows from what is ordained by the scriptures. As for one who has realized the identity of the Lord and the knower of the field, one who has realized Brahman-he does not engage in action. Similarly, even the person who does not believe in the Self does not engage in action, under the idea that the other world does not exist. However, one who has inferred the existence of the Self on the ground of the wellknown fact that study of the scriptures dealing with injunctions and prohibitions becomes otherwise purposeless, who has no knowledge of the essential nature of the Self, and in whom has arisen hankering for the results of actions-he faithfully engages in action. This is a matter of direct perception to all to us. Hence, the scriptures are not purposeless.
Objection: May it not be that the scriptures will become meaningless when, by noticing abstention from action in the case of men with discrimination, their followers too will abstain?
Reply: No, because discrimination arises in some rare person only. For, as at present, some rare one among many people comes to possess discrimination. Besides, fools do not follow one who has discrimination, because (their) engagement in action is impelled by defects such as attachment etc. And they are seen to get engaged in such acts as black magic. Moreover, engagement in action is natural. Verily has it been said (by the Lord), 'But it is Nature that acts' (5.14).
Therefore, the mundane state consists of nothing but ignorance, and is an object of perception (to the ignorant man who sees it) just as it appears to him. Ignorance and its effects do not belong to the Knower of the feild, the Absolute. Moreover, false knowledge cannot taint the supreme Reality. For, water in a mirage cannot taint the supreme Reality. For, water in a mirage cannot make a desert muddy with its moisture. Similarly, ignorance cannot act in any way on the Knower of the field. Hence has this been said, 'And understand Me to be knower of the field,' as also, 'Knowledge remains covered by ignorance' (5.15).
Objection: Then, what is this that even the learned say like the worldly people, 'Thus [Possessed of aristorcracy etc.] am I,' 'This [Body, wife, etc.] verily belongs to Me'?
Reply: Listen. This is that learnedness which consists in seeing the field as the Self! On the contrary, should they realize the unchanging Knower of the field, then they will not crave for enjoyment or action with the idea, 'May this be mine.' Enjoyment and action are mere perversions. This being so, the ignorant man engages in action owing to his desire for results. On the other hand, in the case of an enlightened person who has realized the changeless Self, engagement in aciton in impossible because of the absence of desire for results. Hence, when the activities of the aggregate of body and organs cease, his withdrawal from action is spoken of in a figurative sense.
Some may have this other kind of learnedness: 'The Knower of the field is God Himself; and the field is something different and an object of knowledge to the Knower of the field. But I am a mundane being, happy and sorrowful. And it is my duty to bring about the cessation of worldly existence through the knowledge of the field and the Knower of the field, and by continuing to dwell in His true nature after directly perceiving through meditation God, the Knower of the field,' and he who, understands thus, and he who teaches that 'he (the taught) is not the Knower of the field,' and he who, being under such an idea, thinks, 'I shall render meaningful the scriptures dealing with the worldly state and Liberation'-is the meanest among the learned. That Self-immolator, being devoid of any link with the traditional interpreters of the purport of the scriptures, misinterprets what is enjoined in the scriptures and imagines what is not spoken there, and thery himself becoming deluded, befools others too. Hence, one who is not a knower of the traditional interpretation is to be ignored like a fool, though he may be versed in all the scriptures.
As for the objection that, if God be one with the knower of the field, He will then become a mundane being, and that, if the knowers of the fields are one with God, then from the nonexistence of mundane beings will follow the absence of the mundane state, -these two objections have been refuted by admitting Knowledge and ignorance as having different characteristics.
Objection: How?
Reply: By saying that any defect imagined through ignorance does not affect the supreme Reality which is the substratum of that (imagination). In accordance with this an illustration was cited that a desert is not made muddy by water in a mirage. Even the defect of the possibility of nonexistence of the mundange state, conseent on the nonexistence of individual souls, stands refuted by the explanation that the mundane state and the individual souls are imagined through ignorance.
Objection: The defect of mundane existence in the knower of the field consists in his being possessed of ignorance. And sorrowfulness etc. which are its products are matters of direct experience.
Reply: No, since whatever is known is an attribute of the field, therefore the knower-the knower of the field-cannot reasonably be tainted by the defects arising from it. Whatsoever blemish-not existing in the knower of the field-you attribute to It is logically an object of experience, and hence it is verily a ality of the field; not the ality of the knower of the field. Nor does the knower of the field become tainted thery, because of knower cannot possibly have any conjunction with an object of knowledge. Should there be a conjunction, then there will be no possibility at all of its (the latter's) becoming a knowable. Oh! Sir, if being ignorant, sorrowful, etc. be alities of the Self, how is it that they are directly perceived? Or how can they be alities of the Knower of the field? If the conclusion be that all that is known consititutes the field, and that the one who knows is verily the knower of the field, then, to say that being ignorant, sorrowful, etc.are the alities of the knower of the field and that they are directly perceived is a contradictory statement having only ignorance as its basis.
Here, (the opponent) asks: To whom does ignorance belong?
(The answer is that) it belongs verily to him by whom it is experienced!
Objection: In whom is it perceived?
Reply: Here the answer is: It is pointless to ask, 'In whom is ignorance experienced?'
Objection: How?
Reply: If ignorance be perceived (by you), then you perceive its possessor as well. Moreover, when that possessor of ignorance is perceived it is not reasonable to ask, 'In whom is it perceived?' For, when an owner of cattle is seen, the estion, 'To whom do the cattle belong', does not become meaningful.
Objection: Well, is not the illustration dissimilar? Since, the cattle and their owner are directly perceived, their relation also is directly perceived. Hence the estion is meaningless. Ignorance and its possessor are not directly perceived in that manner, in which case the estion would have been meaningless.
Reply: What will it matter to you if you know the relation of ignorance with a person who is not directly perceived as possessed of ignorance?
Opponent: Since ignorance is a source of evil, therefore it should be got rid of.
Reply: He to whom ignorance belongs will get rid of it!
Opponent: Indeed, ignorance belongs to myself.
Reply: In that case, you know ignorance as also yourself who possess it?

Opponent: I know, but not through direct perception.
Reply: If you know through inference, then how is the connection (between yourself and ignorance) known? Surely it is not possible for you the knower to have at that time ['When you are knowing your own ignorance.'] the knowledge of the relation (of the Self) with ignorance which is an object of knowledge; ['After having perceived ignorance as an object of your knowledge, how can you who continue to be the knower cognize yourself as the knower of that ignorance? For this would lead to the contradiction of the same person becoming the subject and the object of cognition.'] because the cognizer is then engaged in cognizing ignorance as an object. Besides, there cannot be someone who is a (separate) cognizer of the relation between the knower and ignorance, and a separate cognition of that (relation), for this would lead to infinite regress. If the knower and the relation between the knower and the thing known be cognizable, then a separate cognizer has to be imagined. Of him, again, another knower has to be imagined; of him again a separate cognizer would have to be imagined! Thus, an infinite regress be comes unavoidable.
Again, whether the knowable be ignorance or anything else, a knowable is verily a knowable; similarly, even a knower is surely a knower; he does not become a knowable. And when this is so, [Since the knower cannot be known, therefore his relation with ignorance also cannot be known by himself or by anybody else] nothing of the cognizer-the knower of the field-is tainted by such defects as ignorance, sorrowfulness, etc.
Objection: May it not be said that the (Self's) defect is surely this, that the field, which is full of defects, is cognized (by It)?
Reply: No, because it is the Immutable, which is consciousness, by nature, that is figuratively spoken of as the cognizer. It is just like figuratively attributing the act of heating to fire merely because of its (natural) heat. Just as it has been shown here by the Lord Himself that identification with action, cause and effect are absent in the Self, and that action, cause, etc. are figuratively attributed to the Self owing to their having been superimposed (on It) through ignorance, so has it been shown by Him in various places: 'He who thinks of this One as the killer৷৷.' (2.19), 'While actions are being done in ever way by the gunas of Nature' (3.27), 'The Omnipresent neither accepts anybody's sin৷৷.' (5.15), etc. It has been explained by us, too, in that very way, and in the following contexts also we shall explain accordingly.
Objection: Well, in that case, if identification with action, cause and effect be naturally absent in the Self, and it they be superimpositions through ignorance, then it amounts to this that actions are meant for being undertaken only by the ignorant, not by the enlightened.

Reply: It is true that is comes to this. This very fact we shall explain under the verse, 'Since it is not possible for one who holds on to a body৷৷.' (18.11). And, in the context dealing with the conclusion of the purport of the whole Scripture, we shall explain this elaborately under the verse, '৷৷.in brief indeed, O son of Kunti,৷৷.which is the supreme consummation of Knowledge' (ibid. 50) It is needless here to expatiate further, Hence we conclude.
The next verse, '(Hear about)৷৷.what that field is,' etc., summarizing the purport of the chapter dealing with the 'field' taught in the verses begining from 'This body৷৷.'etc., is being presented. For it is proper to introduce briefly the subject-matter that is sought to be explained.

Know as Myself the Field-knower also who is the only form of the Knower in all the bodies like divinities, men etc., i.e., know them as ensouled by Me. By the expression 'also' (Api) in, 'Know Me also (Api) as the Field-Knower,' it is inferable that 'Know Me as the Field-Knower in all Fields' has also been taught by implication. Just as the body, on account of its being the attribute of the knower, cannot exist separately, and is conseently denoted by way of co-ordinate predication (Samanadhikarnya) with it, in the same manner both the Field and the Field-Knower, on account of their being My attributes, cannot exist as entities separate from Me, and hence can be denoted as 'one with Me' by way of co-ordinate predication.
Both the Ksetra (Field) which is an aggregate of earth etc., and the Ksetrajna (the Jiva) have the Lord for their Self, because of their being of the nature of the body of the Lord. Such is the teaching of the Sruti passages beginning from 'He who dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth from within - He is your inner Controller and immortal Self' (Br. U., 3.7.3), and ending with 'He who, dwelling in the individual self as the self within, whom the self does not know, whose body the self is, who controls the self from within - He is your inner Controller and immortal Self' (Br. U. Madh., 3.7.22). It is the dwelling in of the Lord as the Self of all the knowers of the bodies (Field-Knowers or the Jivas) on account of His being the inner Controller, that is the justification for describing Him as in co-ordinate predication (Samanadhikaranya) with them.
In the beginning and later on, it was taught to the effect, 'I am the self, O Arjuna, dwelling in the hearts of all beings' (10.20), and 'Nothing that moves or does not move exists without Me' (10.39) and 'I, with a single aspect of Myself, am sustaining the whole universe' (10.42). In the middle He describes Himself by way of co-ordinate predication as, 'Of Adityas, I am Visnu' etc. In the teachings concerning the difference between the body and its knower and concerning both of them as having Me for their Self - this knowledge of unity by co-ordinate predication alone is taught as 'My view.'
Some (the followers of Advaita and Bhedabheda) say: The sentence 'And know Me as the Knower' should be understood as co-ordinate predication expressing identity between the individual self and the Supreme Self. Thus according to their view, the Lord (Isvara), who is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute must be admitted to have become the individual self, as it were, through nescience (Ajnana). According to their docrine the teaching of identity given here in the Text seeks to sublate that nescience. Just as teaching by a reliable person to the effect, 'This is a rope, and not a snake,' sublates the erroneous notion of a snake, the teaching of the Lord, who is most reliable, sublates the erroneous notion of the individual self (Ksetrjna) being different from Him.
Such interpreters are to be estioned thus: Is this Teacher, Bhagavan Vasudeva, the Supreme Ruler, one whose nescience has been sublated by the exact knowledge of the Self or not? If His nescience has been sublated, then the perception of duality like Arjuna as the taught, and of actions like teaching, becomes impossible, because of the impossibility of superimposing a flase form on the Self which is in reality mere undifferentiated Consciousness. If, however, His nescience has not been sublated on account of His not having realised the Self, then, because of His ignorance, it is utterly impossible for Him to teach the knowledge of the Self. Elsewhere it has been stated: 'The wise, who have realised the truth, will instruct you in knowledge' (4.34). Thus, the polemics of this nature are to be ignored as having been set forth to misguide the world by these ignorant daters whose arguments are contradicted by all Vedas, Smrtis, Itihasas, the Puranas, logic and their own words.
The truth is this: Some of the Sruti texts declare that non-conscient matter, the conscient entity (the individual self) and the Supreme Brahman are different in nature from one another in the relation of object of enjoyment, the enjoyer (subject) and the Supreme Ruler as follows: 'From Prakrti, the Possessor of Maya projects this world, in which another (i.e. the individual self) is confined by Maya (Sve. U., 4.9); 'Know then Maya to be the Prakrti and the Possessor of Maya to be the Great Lord' (Sve. U., 4.10); 'The perishable is Prakrti; the immortal and imperishable is Hara (the individual self); and the Lord alone rules over both the perishable Prakrti and the imperishable individual self' (Sve. U., 1.10). Here, the expression, 'The immortal and the imperishable is Hara,' points out the enjoyer (i.e., individual self); It is called Hara because the individual self siezes matter as an object of It own experience.
Again, 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of senses' (Ibid., 6.9); 'He has no progenitor and no Lord' (Ibid., 6.9); 'He is the ruler of Prakrti, of the individual self, and the Lord of alities' (Ibid., 6.16); 'He is the Lord of the Universe, the Ruler of individual selves, the eternal, the auspicious and the unchanging' (Ma. Na., 13.3); 'The two unborn - the knowing Lord and the unknowing individual self, the omnipotent and the impotent' (Sve. U.,1.9); 'The Constant among inconstants, the Intelligent among the intelligents, the one who grants the desires of the many' (Ibid., 6.13. & Ka. U., 5.13); 'When one knows the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and Actuater ৷৷.' (Sve. U., 1.12); 'Regarding the individual self and the Actuater to be different, and blessed by Him, It attains immortality' (Ibid., 1.6), and 'Ot these two, the one eats the sweet Pippala fruit, the other shines in his splendour without eating' (Ibid., 4.6 and Mun. U., 3.1.1).
Further, 'There is one unborn female, red, white and black, who produces many creatures like herself; there is another unborn being who loves her and is close to her; there is yet another male unborn who after having enjoyed here, gives her up' (Ibid., 4.5); 'The cow (i.e. Prakrti) that has no beginning or end, is the mother and source of all beings' (Cha. U., 4.5) and 'On the self-same tree, the individual self sits sunken in grief, and being ignorant and impotent, It grieves. When It sees the other, the gracious Lord and His glory, It attains freedom from grief (Sve. U., 4.7).
The following passages of the Gita are alos to the point: 'This Prakrti, thus divided eightfold, composed of Ahankara etc., is Mine.' 'This is My lower Prakrti. Know My higher Prakrti to be distinct from this - the Life Principle, by which the universe is sustained (7.4-5); 'All beings, O Arjuna, enter into My Nature at the end of a cycle. These I send forth again at the beginning of a cycle. Resorting to Prakrti, which is My own, I send forth again and again all this multitude of beings, helpless under the sway of Prakrti' (9.7-8); 'Under my control, Prakrti gives birth to all that moves, and that which does not move. And because of this, O Arjuna, does the world spin' (9.10); 'Know that Prakrti and the individual self are without beginning' (13.19) 'The great Brahman (or Prakrti) is My womb; in that I lay the germ; from it, O Arjuna, is the birth of all beings' (14.3). The great Brahman of Mine, which is the womb of this world, called Prakti, non-conscient matter, consisting of elements in a subtle state - in it I lay the germ called conscient entity. From that, namely, from the compound between conscient and unconscient entities, which is willed by Me, are born all these beings beginning with the gods and ending with the immobile things mixed up with the unconscient matter. Such is the meaning. In the Sruti also, the subtle original state of material elements is signified as Brahman: 'From Him are produced Brahman as also the world of matter and soul (Anna) having name and form' (Mun. U., 1.1.9).
Likewise, Sruti Texts declare that the Supreme Person constitutes the Self of all, and the conscient and non-conscient entities are inseparable from Him; for, those conscient and unconscient entities, which abide in the form of the experiencer and the experienced abiding in all states, form the body of the Supreme Person; conseently they are under His control. These Texts are as follows: 'He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who is the Inner Ruler of the earth' and ending with, 'He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body the self is and who is the Inner Controller of the self' (Br. U. Madh., 3.7.3-22). Likewise another passage declares: 'He who is moving withing the earth, to whom the earth is the body, whom the earth does not know ৷৷. he who is moving within the Mrtyu (Nature), to whom Mrtyu is the body, whom Mrtyu does not know ৷৷. He is the Inner Self of all beings, sinless; He is the divine Lord, He is of the one Narayana' (Sub. U., 7). Here the term Mrtyu denotes the subtle state of non-conscient entity which is expressed by the term Tamas, because in the same Upanisad, it is declared, 'The unmanifest (Avyakta) merges into Aksara (the imperishable), and the Aksara merges into Tamas (Ibid., 2). Elsewhere it is stated thus: 'Entering within, is the Ruler of all creatures, the self of all (Tai. A., 3.21).
Therefore, the Supreme Person, who posseses conscient and non-conscient entities abiding in all states as His body, is in the form of the world, whether in the state of cause or of effect. So, with the purpose of making this explicit, some Srutis declare that the world in its states as cause and effect, is He Himself. They begin with, 'This Existence (Sat) alone was in the beginning, one only without a second ৷৷. It thought, "May I become many, may I multiply". It creates Tejas' (Cha. U., 6.2.1.2), and ends with 'All creatures here, my dear, have their root in the Sat (Being), have their home in the Sat, have Sat as their support. All this has Sat for its self. That is Existence. He is the Self. That you are, O Svetaketu' (Cha. U., 6.8.4.6-7). Elsewhere is the following text beginning with, 'He desired, "May I become many"; He performed austerity; having performed austerity, He created all this,' and concluding with, 'He became both the Satya (individual self) and Anrta (matter), He has remained true to His nature' (Tai. U., 2.6.1).
The difference in nature between conscient and unconscient entities and the Supreme Person, established in the other Sruti passages, is asserted here also: 'Lo! Entering into these three divinities (i.e. the Tejas, water and earth) in the form of living self (individual self), which is Myself, I distinguish name and form? (Cha. U., 6.3.2) and also in the text, 'Having created it, He entered into it. Having entered it, He became Sat and Tyat ৷৷. He became both conscious and unconscious, both the Satya (individual self) and Anrta (matter). He has remained true to His own nature' (Tai. U., 2.6.1). It is in this way that all the distinctions of names and forms are brought about: The Sruti also declares, 'Then, this was undifferentiated. Now, it has been differentiated by names and forms' (Br. U., 1.4.7).
Therefore, He who exists in the states of effect and cause, and who has the conscient and unconscient entities in their gross and subtle states as His body, is the Supreme Person. Because the effect is not other than the cause, the effect becomes known when the cause is known, when the One becomes known, everything is known - thus what is posited by the Srutis stands explained. In the text, 'Entering into these three divinities by way of living self (individual self) which is My self, I distinguish name and form' (Cha. U., 6.3.2) - all the non-conscient entities are pointed out by the expression, 'the three divinities', and then the distinguishing of names and forms arises on account of the individual selves having Him for Their Self, entering into those entities. Thus all expressive terms signify the Supreme Self who is alified by the individual selves and non-conscient matter. Therefore, co-ordinate predication (Samanadhikaranya) of a term denoting an effect with a term denoting the Supreme Self as cause, is ite appropriate.
Thus the Supreme Brahman, who has conscient and non-conscient entities in their gross and subtle conditions as His modes, is Himself the effect and the cause; so Brahman is the material cause of the world. Brahman Himself constitutes the material cause of the world, because Brahman, who has the conscient and unconscient entities in their subtle state as His body, forms the cause of all. Still as that material cause is a composite entity (i.e., of individual selves, Prakrti aand Isvara), there is no mixing up of the natures of Brahman, conscient entities and non-conscient entities. This is perfectly tenable.
Thus, for example, although the material cause of a multi-coloured cloth is a combination of white, black and red threads, the connection of whiteness etc., with the cloth is to be found only in the place where a particular kind of thread is woven in it; in the state of effect also, there is no mixing up of the colours everywhere. Similarly, although the world has for its material cause a combination of the Lord, conscient and non-conscient entities, still in its condition as an effect also, there is no mixing up of the respective alities of experiencer (subject), the experienced (object) and the Controller (God). Though these threads can exist separately they are brought together at a time by man's will and acire the character and effect as a conseence. But in the case of the world manifestation, there is a unieness. It consists in that the intelligent and insentient entities in both causal and effect conditions derive their existential nature only from, and as, modes of the Supreme Person, by forming His body. Thus the Supreme Person having those entities as His body, is always signified by all these terms indicating them. As for the differences in nature, their respective speciality of character holds good here (i.e., in the production of world as of the coloured cloth).
Such being the case, though the Supreme Brahman enters the effect, owing to absence of transformation of His nature, the unchangeability is well established. To signify Brahman as effect is also very appropriate, because He is the Self sustaining the conscient and non-conscient entities from within their gross condition when they are differentiated by name and form: What is called effect is nothing other than the cause passing into another state of existence.
The various scriptural statements that the Supreme Brahman is without attributes are also tenable in the sense that He is not associated with evil attributes, as the Sruti text, 'He is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless' eliminates all evil attributes, and then says that He is full of auspicious attributes: 'Whose desire is real, whose will is real' (Cha. U., 8.7.1). This Sruti text itself settles here what was generally declared elsewhere that negation of attributes (Guna-nisedha) pertains to evil attributes in Brahman.
The doctrine that Brahman is of the nature of knowledge is also ite appropriate, because it amounts to saying that the true nature of Brahman, who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is antagonistic to all that is evil, and who is the mine of all auspicious attributes, can be adeately defined only as Knowledge, as one whose nature is Knowledge, since He possesses self-luminosity. The following texts teach that Brahman is the Knower: 'He who is all-knowing, all wise' (Mun. U., 1.1.9); 'His high power is revealed, indeed, as various and natural, as consisting of knowledge, strength and activity' (Sve.U., 6.8); 'My dear, by what means has one to understand the Knower?' (Br. U., 2.4.14); and the text, 'Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity' (Tai. U., 2.1.1). All these teach that Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge in as much as He can be defined only as Knowledge, and because also He is self-luminous.
In the texts 'He desired, "May I become many" ' (Tai. U., 2.6.1), 'It thought, "May I become many" ' (Cha. U., 6.2.3), 'It became differentiated by names and forms' - it is affirmed that Brahman thus exists of His own Will in a wonderful plurality of modes on account of His having the immovable and movable entities as His body. Conseently it is false to affirm the opposite view that the manifold entities do not have Brahman as their self in a real sense.
Thus, it is the unreality of manifold existence (i.e., of entities without Brahman for the Self) that is denied in the following texts: 'He obtains death after death who sees difference here' (Ka. U., 2.4.10), 'There is nothing here that is manifold' (Ka. U., 2.4.11), 'But where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another ৷৷. but where everything has become the self ৷৷. there, by what can one see what ৷৷. who shall know which by what?' (Br. U., 4.5.15). There is also no denial of the manifoldness of modes of the Brahman resulting from His assumption of various names and forms by His will. This is established in Sruti texts such as, 'May I become manifold' (Tai. U., 2.6.1 and Cha. U., 6.2.3) etc. This manifold modality is proved to be existent in the commencement of even that passage which negates multiplicity by asserting. 'But where everything has become the self' (Br. U., 4.5.15). 'Everything deserts Him who knows everything to be apart from Him' (Br. U., 4.5.7), and 'Lo, verily, from this great Being has been breathed forth that which is Rg veda' (Ibid., 2.4.10).
Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever among the Srutis which assert difference in essence and in nature between the conscient self, non-conscient matter and the Lord, whose body the former entities are. There is no contradiction also in the scriptural statement that they are identical. The relation of the body and the self exists at all times between the Lord and the conscient and non-conscient entities. The Sruti texts themselves establish that those entities, which constitute the body (of the Lord), acire in causal condition, a subtle state, in which they cannot be differentiated. In the effect condition they are in a gross state with names and forms, and are capable of differentiation into a multiplicity of entities as modes of the Supreme.
Thus there is no room whatsoever for entertaining such doctrines which ascribe nescience to Brahman (as in Advaita), for describing the differences in Brahman as due to limiting adjuncts (as in Bhedabheda) and other tenets (Yadavaprakasa's). All these proceed from unsound logic and are in viloation of all Srutis. Let this over-long polemic be terminated here.
The object of this long polemical passage is to refute the Advaitic interpretation of the statement Know the Field-Knower in all bodies as Myself' as one of absolute identity between the Jiva and Isvara. The thesis of the author of the commentary is that the relation is not oneof absolute identity but only one of identity of reference of several inseparable entities to a comon substratum known technically as Samandadhikaranya or co-ordinate predication, also translated sometimes as grammatical co-ordination. The literal meaning of the expression is 'the relation of abiding in a common substratum.' The relation of the Jiva and Prakrti to Isvara is as of body and soul or as a mode (Prakara) and its substratum (Prakari). The relation between the body and soul of an ordinary being is, however, separable at death. But it is inseparable in the case of Isvara and this Jiva-cum-Prakrti body. In this sense Isvara is the Field-knower (Ksetrajna) of the Field (Ksetra) constituted of all individual entities conscient and inconscient, just as in each individual personality the Jiva and the body are the field-knower and the field respectively. [Being in co-ordinate predication (Samanadhikaranya), Brahman is an inseparable but mutually distinct complex of Prakrti, Jiva and Isvara. The cosmic mode of body constituted of Prakrti and Purusa is at intervals in alternate states of latency and patency (Pralaya and Srsti or dissolution and manifestation). As the soul of a complex whole, He can be denoed by any of the terms entering into it - Isvara, Prakrti or Jiva. Brahan is sometimes mentioned in the Srutis as Asat when everything is in latency in Pralaya, and as Sat when all entities are in manifestations (Srsti). All these expressions denote Him only. He is described in some texts as attributeless. It means only that He is without any undesriable evil alities. He is on the other hand endowed with countless auspicious attributes.
All these contentions are supported by numerous Vedic passages, which are oted in the commentary.]