Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 18 - Shloka (Verse) 7

[तीन तरहके त्यागका वर्णन भगवान् इसलिये करते हैं कि अर्जुन कर्मोंका स्वरूपसे त्याग करना चाहते थे -- श्रेयो भोक्तुं भैक्ष्यमपीह लोके (गीता 2। 5) अतः त्रिविध त्याग बताकर अर्जुनको चेत कराना था? और आगेके लिये मनुष्यमात्रको यह बताना था कि नियत कर्मोंका स्वरूपसे त्याग करना भगवान्को मान्य (अभीष्ट) नहीं है। भगवान् तो सात्त्विक त्यागको ही वास्तवमें त्याग मानते हैं। सात्त्विक त्यागसे संसारके सम्बन्धका सर्वथा विच्छेद हो जाता है।दूसरी बात? सत्रहवें अध्यायमें भी भगवान् गुणोंके अनुसार श्रद्धा? आहार आदिके तीनतीन भेद कहकर आये हैं? इसलिये यहाँ भी अर्जुनद्वारा त्यागका तत्त्व पूछनेपर भगवान्ने त्यागके तीन भेद कहे हैं।]नियतस्य तु संन्यासः कर्मणो नोपपद्यते -- पूर्वश्लोकमें भगवान्ने त्यागके विषयमें अपना जो निश्चित उत्तम मत बताया है? उससे यह तामस त्याग बिलकुल ही विपरीत है और सर्वथा निकृष्ट है? यह बतानेके लिये यहाँ तु पद आया है।नियत कर्मोंका त्याग करना कभी भी उचित नहीं है क्योंकि वे तो अवश्यकर्तव्य हैं। बलिवैश्वदेव आदि यज्ञ करना? कोई अतिथि आ जाय तो गृहस्थधर्मके अनुसार उसको अन्न? जल आदि देना? विशेष पर्वमें या श्राद्धतर्पणके दिन ब्राह्मणोंको भोजन कराना और दक्षिणा देना? अपने वर्णआश्रमके अनुसार प्रातः और सांयकालमें सन्ध्या करना आदि कर्मोंको न मानना और न करना ही नियत कर्मोंका त्याग है।मोहात्तस्य परित्यागस्तामसः परिकीर्तितः -- ऐसे नियत कर्मोंको मूढ़तासे अर्थात् बिना विवेकविचारके छोड़ देना तामस त्याग कहा जाता है। सत्सङ्ग? सभा? समिति आदिमें जाना आवश्यक था? पर आलस्यमें पड़े रहे? आराम करने लग गये अथवा सो गये घरमें मातापिता बीमार हैं? उनके लिये वैद्यको बुलाने या औषधि लानेके लिये जा रहे थे? रास्तेमें कहींपर लोग ताशचौपड़ आदि खेल रहे थे? उनको देखकर खुद भी खेलमें लग गये और वैद्यको बुलाना या ओषधि लाना भूल गये कोर्टमें मुकदमा चल रहा है? उसमें हाजिर होनेके समय हँसीदिल्लगी? खेलतमाशा आदिमें लग गये और समय बीत गया शरीरके लिये शौचस्नान आदि जो आवश्यक कर्तव्य हैं? उनको आलस्य और प्रमादके कारण छोड़ दिया -- यह सब तामस त्यागके उदाहरण हैं।विहित कर्म और नियत कर्ममें क्या अन्तर है शास्त्रोंने जिन कर्मोंको करनेकी आज्ञा दी है? वे सभी विहित कर्म कहलाते हैं। उन सम्पूर्ण विहित कर्मोंका पालन एक व्यक्ति कर ही नहीं सकता क्योंकि शास्त्रोंमें सम्पूर्ण वारों तथा तिथियोंके व्रतका विधान आता है। यदि एक ही मनुष्य सब वारोंमें या सब तिथियोंमें व्रत करेगा तो फिर वह भोजन कब करेगा इससे यह सिद्ध हुआ कि मनुष्यके लिये सभी विहित कर्म लागू नहीं होते। परन्तु उन विहित कर्मोंमें भी वर्ण? आश्रम और परिस्थितिके अनुसार जिसके लिये जो कर्तव्य आवश्यक होता है? उसके लिये वह नियत कर्म कहलाता है। जैसे ब्राह्मण? क्षत्रिय? वैश्य और शूद्र -- चारों वार्णोंमें जिसजिस वर्णके लिये जीविका और शरीरनिर्वाहसम्बन्धी जितने भी नियम हैं? उसउस वर्णके लिये वे सभी नियत कर्म हैं।नियत कर्मोंका मोहपूर्वक त्याग करनेसे वह त्याग तामस हो जाता है तथा सुख और आरामके लिये त्याग,करनेसे वह त्याग राजस हो जाता है। सुखेच्छा? फलेच्छा तथा आसक्तिका त्याग करके नियत कर्मोंको करनेसे वह त्याग सात्त्विक हो जाता है। तात्पर्य यह है कि मोहमें उलझ जाना तामस पुरुषका स्वभाव है? सुखआराममें उलझ जाना राजस पुरुषका स्वभाव है और इन दोनोंसे रहित होकर सावधानीपूर्वक निष्कामभावसे कर्तव्यकर्म करना सात्त्विक पुरुषका स्वभाव है। इस सात्त्विक स्वभाव अथवा सात्त्विक त्यागसे ही कर्म और कर्मफलसे सम्बन्धविच्छेद होता है। राजस और तामस त्यागसे नहीं क्योंकि राजस और तामस त्याग वास्तवमें त्याग है ही नहीं।लोग सामान्य रीतिसे स्वरूपसे कर्मोंको छोड़ देनेको ही त्याग मानते हैं क्योंकि उन्हें प्रत्यक्षमें वही त्याग दीखता है। कौन व्यक्ति कौनसा काम किस भावसे कर रहा है? इसका उन्हें पता नहीं लगता। परन्तु भगवान् भीतरकी कामनाममताआसक्तिके त्यागको ही त्याग मानते हैं क्योंकि ये ही जन्ममरणके कारण हैं (गीता 13। 21)।यदि बाहरके त्यागको ही असली त्याग माना जाय तो सभी मरनेवालोंका कल्याण हो जाना चाहिये क्योंकि उनकी तो सम्पूर्ण वस्तुएँ छूट जाती हैं और तो क्या? अपना कहलानेवाला शरीर भी छूट जाता है और उनको वे वस्तुएँ प्रायः यादतक नहीं रहतीं अतः भीतरका त्याग ही असली त्याग है। भीतरका त्याग होनेसे बाहरसे वस्तुएँ अपने पास रहें या न रहें? मनुष्य उनसे बँधता नहीं।

अतः आत्मज्ञानरहित कर्माधिकारी मुमुक्षुके लिये --, विहित -- नित्यकर्मोंका संन्यास यानी परित्याग करना नहीं बन सकता? क्योंकि अज्ञानीके लिये नित्यकर्म शुद्धिके हेतु माने गये हैं। अतः मोहसे अज्ञानपूर्वक ( किया हुआ ) उन नित्यकर्मोंका परित्याग ( तामस कहा गया है )। नियत अवश्य कर्तव्यको कहते हैं? फिर उसका त्याग किया जाना अत्यन्त विरुद्ध है? अतः यह मोहनिमित्तक त्याग तामस कहा गया है। मोह ही तम है? यह प्रसिद्ध है।

Relying on the stated necessary duty of Nitya actions, fulfilling the expectation, he introduces the subsequent verse — 'Tasmāt' etc.

Objection: Someone is found abandoning even prescribed action? To that he says — 'Mohāt'.

Ignorance means non-knowledge of purifying nature.

He establishes that abandonment of Nitya action by the ignorant is out of delusion — 'Niyatam ca'.

If abandonment of Nitya action is caused by delusion, whence is it Tamasic? Doubting thus, he says — 'Mohaśca'.

Having stated His determination, He begins to show the threefold nature of Tyaga.

'Niyatasya' — of the Nitya action 'tu' — by the ignorant seeker of liberation qualified for action, 'sannyāsaḥ' — abandonment — 'na upapadyate' — is not proper; because 'prescribed — necessarily to be done — is abandoned', being thus contradictory.

'Mohāt' — from delusion, from non-knowledge of purifying nature — the abandonment of that prescribed action enjoined by Veda as necessarily to be done is 'tāmasaḥ parikīrtitaḥ' — proclaimed as Tamasic. And delusion is Tamas, because it is caused by that, this is the meaning.

He states the threefold nature of Tyaga promised earlier — 'Niyatasya' etc. The word 'tu' is for the purpose of distinction from the two views mentioned before.

Because 'sannyāsaḥ' — abandonment in nature — of 'niyata' — necessarily performable action — by the qualified seeker of liberation 'na upapadyate' — is not proper. Because the ignorant needs purification.

This being so, the abandonment of that prescribed action 'mohāt' — out of delusion/ignorance — is 'tāmasaḥ parikīrtitaḥ'. Because of the contradiction that 'it is necessary and it is abandoned'.

'Sannyasah' (Renunciation) -- abandonment -- of the 'Niyata' (obligatory) action -- Nitya (daily) and Naimittika (occasional) like Mahayajna etc. -- is not proper. 'Even the maintenance of the body would not be possible for you by inaction' (Gita 3.8) -- thus because the maintenance of the body itself would not be accomplished. For the maintenance of the body, being accomplished by eating the remnants of sacrifice, becomes capable of (leading to) right knowledge. Otherwise, 'But they eat sin, those sinners...' (Gita 3.13) -- thus the nourishment by eating food which is not the remnant of sacrifice and is of the nature of sin, leads to contrary knowledge of the mind.

'For the mind, O Somya, consists of food' (Chandogya 6.5.4) -- thus indeed the mind is nourished by food. 'When food is pure, the Sattva (mind) becomes pure; when Sattva is pure, memory becomes firm; when memory is obtained, there is release of all knots' (Chandogya 7.26.2) -- thus it is heard in Shruti that knowledge in the form of direct realization of Brahman depends on the purity of food. Therefore, Mahayajna etc., the Nitya and Naimittika Karma, are to be adopted for the sake of Brahman-knowledge alone until death; therefore, its abandonment is not proper.

Thus, the abandonment of action which generates knowledge, due to the delusion of 'binding nature', is 'Tamasah parikirtitah' (proclaimed as Tamasic). Tamasic abandonment is that rooted in Tamas; the rootedness in Tamas of the abandonment is due to being rooted in ignorance which is the effect of Tamas. For Tamas is the root of ignorance -- 'Inadvertence and delusion arise from Tamas, and also ignorance' (Gita 14.17) -- thus it was stated here. And ignorance is contrary knowledge opposed to knowledge. And so it will be stated -- 'That which thinks Adharma to be Dharma, covered by Tamas; and all things as contrary, that intellect, O Partha, is Tamasic' (Gita 18.32). Therefore, the abandonment of Nitya and Naimittika actions etc. is indeed rooted in contrary knowledge; this is the meaning.

Now He shows the promised threefold nature of Tyaga — by the three [verses] starting 'Niyatasya'.

Since Kamya action is binding, renunciation is proper. But of 'niyata' — Nitya action again — 'sannyāsaḥ' — abandonment — 'na upapadyate' (is not proper); because it is the cause of liberation through purification of mind.

Therefore its abandonment can happen only from 'mohāt' — delusion — characterized by 'it is to be abandoned even though it is to be accepted'. And that is 'tāmasaḥ parikīrititaḥ' because delusion is Tamasic.

Now by 'Niyatasya' etc., the inferiority of other views and the superiority of His own view is elaborated. Being difficult to abandon due to being applicable to Varna and Ashrama is intended by the word 'niyata', he says — 'Nityanaimittikasya'.

The word Sannyasa along with the word 'tu' here restates the abandonment of nature [of action] in 'Tyājyam doṣavat' [18.3]; that very thing is censured by the second half 'Mohāt tasya parityāgaḥ', with this intention it is said 'Sannyāsaḥ tyāgaḥ'.

When obligatory duty is taught due to purifying nature, abandonment is not proper — this instruction is to remind of the seen and unseen unjustifiability elaborated before, with this intention he explains the unjustifiability — 'Śarīrayātrāpi'. Even by mere eating etc. the worldly bodily journey would be accomplished, to this he says — 'Śarīrayātrā hi'.

By the Smriti 'The body made of five elements is nourished by enjoyments made of five elements', how is there nourishment of mind by food? To this he says — 'Annamayam hi'. Since the effect of Sattvic ego (mind) cannot be a modification of food, it is a statement of nourishment [figuratively].

When memory is obtained 'Release of all knots' [Chhandogya 7.26.2] — this should be qualified by the word 'vision' (Darshana) through the synonymous Shruti 'The knot of heart is broken' [Mundaka 2.2.8] etc., with this intention it is said 'Brahmasākṣātkārarūpam'. Being most clear, the statement of 'direct realization' is to be contemplated here.

Refuting the doubt that what is performed once is helpful to knowledge, he concludes — 'Tasmāt'. 'Na upapadyate' — the idea is 'how can there be an effect in the absence of a cause'. It is restated that it has the rule of non-abandonment in the said manner, with this intention he says — 'Evam jñānotpādinaḥ'.

This is the refutation of the view restated by 'Tyājyam doṣavat' [18.3], with this intention he says — 'Bandhakatvamohāt'. He derives the word 'Tāmasa' by the suffix 'aṇ' in the sense of 'born there' [Ashta. 4.3.53] — 'Tamomūla'. Even in the sense of mere relation in Taddhita, this is the specific resultant meaning.

He explains the root in Tamas through the medium of being rooted in Tamasic intellect — 'Tamaḥkārya'. Objection: Since being rooted in Tamas is to be shown here by being rooted in 'Moha' which is mentioned together, what is the purpose of saying being rooted in 'Ajñāna' (ignorance) which is the effect of Tamas? It is for that purpose only. Is there no purpose in expressing the same thing again by another word? Teaching something more is proper? And not contradictory.

Objection: In the verse 'Inadvertence and delusion arise from Tamas and ignorance indeed' [14.17], since false knowledge is stated separately by the word 'Moha', it is explained that by the word 'Ajñāna' absence of knowledge is stated; here again how is it said 'Ajñāna is false knowledge opposed to knowledge'? Thus — to show that even absence of knowledge is the cause of modification (Vritti) through false knowledge; or due to intention of another purpose for the word 'Moha' in the verse; or to make known that the word 'Ajñāna' in the verse has 'Moha' as its object.

He reveals the cause of abandonment of action in Tamasic intellect by what will be said — 'Tathā ca'. Knowers of Truth do not abandon — with this intention he concludes the resultant of Tamasic designation — 'Ataḥ'. In 'Nityanaimittikādeḥ', by the word 'adi', Kamyas devoid of desire for fruit which will be spoken of are also included. By 'Viparītajñāna', the distinction from Rajasic Tyaga rooted in incorrect knowledge is shown. For Rajasic intellect will be spoken of as 'Ayathāvat' [18.31].

नियत अर्थात् कर्तव्य कर्मों का त्याग अत्यन्त निम्नस्तर का तामस त्याग माना गया है। नित्य और नैमित्तक कर्मों के सम्मिलित रूप को ही नियत कर्म कहते हैं। जब तक मनुष्य अपने समाज के एक सदस्य के रूप में जीवन यापन करता है? तब तक उसे वह समाज? सुरक्षा तथा उन्नति का लाभ भी प्रदान करता है। अत हिन्दू नीति के अनुसार? मनुष्य को अपने कर्तव्यों को त्यागने का कोई अधिकार नहीं है।यदि कोई व्यक्ति अज्ञानवश अपने नैतिक कर्तव्यों का त्याग करता है तब भी वह क्षम्य नहीं है। जैसे? संविधान के और भौतिक जगत् के प्राकृतिक नियमों के पालन के संबंध में नियम का अज्ञान क्षम्य नहीं माना जाता? वैसे ही आध्यात्मिक क्षेत्र में भी यही नियम लागू होता है। अज्ञान और अविवेक के कारण यदि कोई व्यक्ति अपने कर्तव्य पालन के द्वारा समाज सेवा नहीं करता है? तो उसका यह त्याग मूढ़ अर्थात् तामसिक त्याग है।

So right here, to decide the specific [truth], He presents the views — 'Tyājyam' etc. 'Doshavat' — possessing sin due to having violence etc. 'Tat' action is to be abandoned; not all [action] which has good fruit — thus some think there is a distinction in Tyaga, like those holding Sankhya views.

Others, entered into the garb of Mimamsakas... 'For the purpose of sacrifice [violence] is understood from scripture'. And by the logic 'Therefore that which is Vedic violence...' etc., violence which is part of the procedure is not violence at all. Because the general scripture 'Do not kill' is annulled there, Syena etc. only is violence. 'And the affix of the bhāvanā is compliant in the part of the fruit'. Therefore one should not abandon others even if connected with violence etc. Those who take refuge solely in scripture for division of what is to be done and not done think they are 'Pandits'. ||3||

From 'Niścayam' etc. up to 'Abhidhīyate'. But there, this is the determination — due to the variety of nature of Gunas defined before, of Tyaga itself being done by mental modification made of Sattva, Rajas, Tamas, appearing with that specific nature... in reality, Tyaga is the performance of actions by knowers of Supreme Brahman with equanimity in success and failure etc., by avoiding attachment and aversion, by lack of desire for fruit.

Therefore He says — having done Rajasic and Tamasic Tyaga, there is no connection with fruit [of Tyaga]. But from Sattvic Tyaga, the fruit is the protection of the meaning of scripture. Again, for the sage who has abandoned the grasp of the collection of Gunas, the statement of 'Tyaga' in truth is reasonable.

Thus, the view 'Action of sacrifice, charity, and austerity is not to be abandoned' and 'others' -- this own view (Siddhanta) has been established. Now, 'Some wise men say action is to be abandoned like a defect' -- thus he begins the refutation of the opponent's view through the explanation of the aforementioned threefold nature of renunciation -- with 'Niyatasya tu' (But of the obligatory...). Since desire-prompted (Kamya) action is not the cause of purification of the internal organ and is the cause of bondage, being of the nature of a defect, the abandonment performed by one desiring the knowledge which is the cause of cessation of bondage is indeed proper. But regarding the 'Niyata' -- obligatory -- action, since it is the cause of purification and thus faultless, its 'Sannyasa' or abandonment by the Mumukshu -- one desiring purification of the internal organ -- is not proper; because by scripture and logic it is to be necessarily performed for the purification of the internal organ. And so it was stated before -- 'For the Muni desiring to ascend, action is said to be the means'.

Objection: Defectiveness is asserted by Sankhyas even for the obligatory rites like Darshapurnamasa, Jyotishtoma etc., just like desire-prompted ones, because of being mixed with violence to grains, animals etc. And it is not correct to say that since the violence which is a limb of the sacrifice is the object of special injunctions like 'Threshes the grains', 'Sacrifice the animal for Agni-Soma', the general prohibition 'Do not harm any being' refers to other than that (sacrificial violence). Because, being of different subjects, the coexistence of injunction and prohibition is possible without contradiction. For by the prohibition, it is stated that violence is the cause of evil for the person; not that 'it is not for the sake of sacrifice'. By the injunction, it is stated that 'it is for the sake of sacrifice'; not that 'it is not a cause of evil'. And thus, since being helpful to the sacrifice and being the cause of evil for the person are possible in one place, even the violence for the sake of sacrifice is indeed prohibited; therefore, Darshapurnamasa, Jyotishtoma etc. mixed with violence are all indeed defective.

Being enjoined and yet being prohibited is indeed possible like in the Syena sacrifice etc. For thus -- Even Syena etc. which are enjoined by the injunction for black magic like 'One performing black magic should sacrifice with Syena', being the object of the prohibition 'Do not harm any being', are indeed causes of evil; and only one who can tolerate that defect and is overcome by attachment and aversion etc. has eligibility there; similarly in Jyotishtoma etc. also. And so it is said in Mahabharata -- 'Japa is said to be the supreme Dharma among all Dharmas. For Japa-Yajna proceeds through non-violence to beings'. By Manu also -- 'A Brahmin may attain perfection by Japa alone, there is no doubt here. Whether he does anything else or not, the Brahmin is called Maitra (friendly)' -- saying thus, praising Maitri or Ahimsa, the defectiveness of violence alone is propounded. And purification of the internal organ will be accomplished even more easily by such Gayatri-Japa etc.; therefore, obligatory action like Jyotishtoma contaminated by defects like violence should be abandoned even by the one qualified for action who cannot tolerate the defect, just like Syena etc. -- this (view) being obtained, We say (Siddhanta):

Violence for the sake of sacrifice is not a cause of evil; because there is no room for prohibition in what is touched by injunction. For thus -- the injunction, producing the 'urge' (pravartana) which is the understanding of instrumentality to the object of strong desire; since that (urge) is inappropriate in a means to evil, the absence of being a means to evil of its own subject which is the object of the urge, is also implied by force; thereby, it is logical that the subject of injunction is not a cause of evil. Being for the sake of sacrifice is not the direct meaning of the injunction so that there would be no contradiction; but rather through the 'urge' itself (there is contradiction to being a cause of evil). The activity of the person which is the object of the urge, having the human goal alone as its object, sometimes makes even the sacrifice its object as a means to the human goal, having attained the nature of a human goal; this is different. And the person's activity, arising in the state of presence of strong desire, neither implies the instrumentality to good of the result (bhavya) nor refutes its instrumentality to evil; but relies on it as it is. Because in the object of strong desire, activity is spontaneous, not requiring injunction regarding Heaven etc. Therefore indeed, even for the fruit of the enjoined Syena -- which is black magic in the form of killing the enemy -- being a cause of evil is indeed proper; because the fruit is not the object of activity generated by injunction. But the urge relies on the 'meaning of the root' (action) which is the instrument (karana) and the object of activity generated by injunction; and that (urge) does not make a cause of evil its object; therefore the general prohibition sentence obstructed by the special injunction refers to worldly violence not for the sake of sacrifice, rooted in attachment and aversion etc.; thereby, due to the difference between Syena and Agnishomiya, the faultlessness (of the latter) is established. If Jyotishtoma etc., though touched by injunction, were objects of prohibition, then even the taking of the Sodashi vessel would be a cause of evil; because of the prohibition 'Does not take the Sodashi in the Atiratra'. Therefore, this (Sankhya view) is nothing; this is the Bhatta view.

The Prabhakara view is -- since activity is established from desire alone regarding the means to fruit, the 'Niyoga' (command/Apruva) is not the impeller; therefore, since Syena is the object of activity generated by desire, due to the indifference of the injunction, its being a cause of evil is not refuted by the injunction. But in Agnishomiya violence, being a limb of the sacrifice, in the absence of being a means to fruit (directly) and thus absence of desire, the injunction alone is the impeller. And that (injunction) refutes the causality of evil of its own subject; therefore, the violence which is primary (the fruit, killing) generates evil, not the one for the sake of sacrifice; so there is no defectiveness of Jyotishtoma etc. due to being mixed with violence; this is same (as Bhatta). Only in this much is the difference -- In 'Dharma is the object characterized by injunction' (Chodana), since Syena etc. are to be excluded by the word 'Artha' (good/object), they are Adharma in Prabhakara's view. But in Bhatta's view, since the fruit of Syena itself, i.e., black magic, is the cause of evil, it is Adharma; but Syena, being enjoined and a means to the desired, is indeed Dharma; exclusion by the word 'Artha' applies only to prohibited acts like eating poisoned meat (Kalanja). But practically, due to being a cause of evil in result, there is no usage of Dharma regarding Syena etc. among the disciplined. That has been said -- 'Even in result, the action which is not followed by evil; being the cause of pure pleasure, that is called Dharma'. The view of the Tarkikas (Logicians) is -- 'Being accomplishable by effort', 'Being a means to good', and 'Being a non-means to evil' -- this triad is the meaning of injunction. There, regarding violence for the sake of sacrifice, due to the absence of direct prohibition and absence of instruction for expiation, 'being a non-means to evil' is also taught by the injunction like 'being accomplishable by effort' and 'being a means to good'; so it is not a cause of evil. But for Syena etc., since black magic is directly prohibited and expiation is instructed, its being a cause of evil is understood, so that much alone is not taught by the injunction there; thus the distinction between Syena and Agnishoma is established. The Aupanishadas (Vedantins) have mostly relied on the Bhatta view in practice. And so is the Sutra composed by Lord Badarayana -- 'If it be said (rites are) impure, (we say) no, because of the word (scripture)' [Brahma Sutra 3.1.25]; if you say Jyotishtoma etc. are defective because of being mixed with Agnishomiya violence etc.; No. Because of the scriptural word (injunction) like 'Sacrifice the animal for Agni-Soma'; this is the literal meaning. The sentence praising Japa does not teach the unrighteousness of violence for the sake of sacrifice; because it has no purport there. And so, the Sankhyas' knowledge of prohibitedness in what is enjoined, knowledge of cause of evil in what is not a cause of evil, knowledge of Adharma in Dharma, and knowledge of 'not to be performed' in what is to be performed -- is 'Moha' (delusion) of the form of error. Therefore, the abandonment of obligatory action out of delusion is proclaimed as Tamasic. For Moha is Tamas.

Having thus stated the determined meaning, He states the aforementioned threefold nature — by the three [verses] starting with 'Niyatasya'. 'Niyatasya tu' — of the prescribed action, which has been spoken of as an auxiliary to devotion, again 'sannyāsaḥ' — abandonment — 'na upapadyate' — does not go near the Lord — this is the meaning.

Therefore, thinking that abandonment of such action alone leads to liberation — out of 'mohāt' — delusion, the abandonment of that action is proclaimed as Tamasic — of the nature of ignorance.

'Of the prescribed' (obligatory) action 'tu' (however) 'renunciation' — abandonment — 'is not proper'; because purity [through action] is desired for the ignorant.

'From delusion' — from ignorance — the abandonment of that prescribed action [occurs] — it is prescribed (necessarily to be done) and it is abandoned — this is contradictory;

therefore abandonment caused by delusion is 'proclaimed as Tamasic', and delusion is 'Tamas'.

He refutes the view of the wise (Kavis) — 'Niyatasya' etc. Even with connection to desire, of the action controlled by Veda — enjoined by rule — the abandonment by nature — 'Sannyasa' — should be done, thus stated by the wise, that 'is not proper'; because for the Vedic expounders of Brahman, there is no abandonment of what is spoken in the Veda in any part.

If 'from delusion' — from ignorance, from Tamasic state — the abandonment of that Vedic action were done by a follower of Shruti, then being caused by delusion, that abandonment is 'proclaimed as Tamasic';

because it arises from delusion which is an effect of Tamas, from the sentence 'Inadvertence and delusion arise from Tamas' [14.17] etc.; and it brings sin — this is the meaning of the prefix 'pari'.

नियतस्य obligatory? तु verily? संन्यासः renunciation? कर्मणः of action? न not? उपपद्यते is proper? मोहात् from delusion? तस्य of the same? परित्यागः abandonment? तामसः Tamasic? परिकीर्तितः is declared.Commentary Renunciation of obligatory action is not proper because it is purifying in the case of an ignorant man. Should a man renounce actions that he should perform as a duty? such renunciation can only be of the ality of darkness. Prescribed duties must not be abandoned and if anyone does so? he is certainly deluded by ignorance. Tamas is ignorance.Niyata Prescribed according to ones religion. To hold that a duty is obligatory and then to relinish it is indeed selfcontradictory.

Therefore, sannyasah, the abandoning; niyatasya tu karmanah, of the daily obligatory acts, by the seeker of Liberation who is as yet unenlightened and is fit for rites and duites; na apapadyate, is not justifiable, because what is desired is the purification of unenlightened persons. Parityagah, giving up; tasya, of that, of the daily obligatory duty; mohat, through delusion, through ignorance; parikirtitah, is declared; to be tamasah, based on tamas.
Niyata is that duty which must be performed. That an act is niyata (obligatory) and it is relinished is contradictory. Therefore the giving up of that through delusion is declared to be based on tamas, for delusion is tamas.
Besides,

Obligatory acts consist of daily, and occasional ceremonies like the five great sacrifices; their abandonment is not proper, for without actions even the sustenance of the body would be impossible, as already stated: 'From no-work, not even the body can be sustained' (3.8). The sustenance of the body by eating the sacrificial remnants produces perfect knowledge. Otherwise, as declared in the statement, 'But the sinful ones eat sin' (3.13). The satisfaction that comes by eating food which is not the remnant of sacrifice and which is therefore of the form of sin, is productive of erroneous knowledge in the mind. For, as declared in the Sruti, 'The mind consists of food' (Cha. U., 6.5.4), the mind is sustained by food. Also, there is the Sruti text, 'When the food is pure, the mind becomes pure; when the mind is pure, remembrance becomes firmly fixed; and when remembrance is acired, there is release from all knots of the heart' (Ibid., 7.26.2). It is therefore proved by the Sruti that knowledge of the form of direct perception of Brahman, is dependent on the purity of food. Hence the great sacrifices and such other obligatory and occasional rites are worthy of adoption till one's death, as they help in the knowledge of the Brahman. The renunciation of these is therefore not proper. Thus, the relinishment of these acts which produce knowledge through the delusion that they bind the self, is rooted in Tamas.
Tamasika renunciation has its roots in Tamas. Since such renunciation has its roots in ignorance which is the effect of Tamas, such renunciation is said to have its roots in Tamas. For Tamas is the root of ignorance as has been stated: 'From Tamas arise negligence and delusion, and also, ignorance' (14.17). Ignorance is erroneous knowledge which is antagonistic to right knowledge. So, it will be taught, 'That reason which, enveloped in Tamas, regards wrong as right, and which reverses every value, O Arjuna, is Tamasika' (18.32). It is for this reason that the renunciation of obligatory and occasional actions are said to have their roots in erroneous knowledge.