Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 2 - Shloka (Verse) 16

व्याख्या -- 'नासतो विद्यते भावः'-- शरीर उत्पत्तिके पहले भी नहीं था मरनेके बाद भी नहीं रहेगा और वर्तमानमें भी इसका क्षणप्रतिक्षण अभाव हो रहा है। तात्पर्य है कि यह शरीर भूत भविष्य और वर्तमान इन तीनों कालोंमें कभी भावरूपसे नहीं रहता। अतः यह असत् है। इसी तरहसे इस संसारका भी भाव नहीं है यह भी असत् है। यह शरीर तो संसारका एक छोटासानमूना है इसलिये शरीरके परिवर्तनसे संसारमात्रके परिवर्तनका अनुभव होता है कि इस संसारका पहले भी अभाव था और पीछे भी अभाव होगा तथा वर्तमानमें भी अभाव हो रहा है।
संसारमात्र कालरूपी अग्निमें लकड़ीकी तरह निरन्तर जल रहा है। लकड़ीके जलनेपर तो कोयला और राख बची रहती है पर संसारको कालरूपी अग्नि ऐसी विलक्षण रीतिसे जलाती है कि कोयला अथवा राख कुछ भी बाकी नहीं रहता। वह संसारका अभावहीअभाव कर देती है। इसलिये कहा गया है कि असत्की सत्ता नहीं है।
'नाभावो विद्यते सतः'-- जो सत् वस्तु है उसका अभाव नहीं होता अर्थात् जब देह उत्पन्न नहीं हुआ था तब भी देही था देह नष्ट होनेपर भी देही रहेगा और वर्तमानमें देहके परिवर्तनशील होनेपर भी देही उसमें ज्योंकात्यों ही रहता है। इसी रीतिसे जब संसार उत्पन्न नहीं हुआ था उस समय भी परमात्मतत्त्व था संसारका अभाव होनेपर भी परमात्मतत्त्व रहेगा और वर्तमानमें संसारके परिवर्तनशील होनेपर भी परमात्मतत्त्व उसमें ज्योंकात्यों ही है।
मार्मिक बात
संसारको हम एक ही बार देख सकते हैं दूसरी बार नहीं। कारण कि संसार प्रतिक्षण परिवर्तनशील है अतः एक क्षण पहले वस्तु जैसी थी दूसरे क्षणमें वह वैसी नहीं रहती जैसे सिनेमा देखते समय परदेपर दृश्य स्थिर दीखता है पर वास्तवमें उसमें प्रतिक्षण परिवर्तन होता रहता है। मशीनपर फिल्म तेजीसे घूमनेके कारण वह परिवर्तन इतनी तेजीसे होता है कि उसे हमारी आँखें नहीं पकड़ पातीं (टिप्पणी प0 56.1) । इससे भी अधिक मार्मिक बात यह है कि वास्तवमें संसार एक बार भी नहीं दीखता। कारण कि शरीर इन्द्रियाँ मन बुद्धि आदि जिन करणोंसे हम संसारको देखते हैं अनुभव करते हैं वे करण भी संसारके ही हैं। अतः वास्तवमें संसारसे ही संसार दीखता है। जो शरीरसंसारसे सर्वथा सम्बन्धरहित है उस स्वरूपसे संसार कभी दीखता ही नहीं तात्पर्य यह है कि स्वरूपमें संसारकी प्रतीति नहीं है। संसारके सम्बन्धसे ही संसारकी प्रतीति होती है। इससे सिद्ध हुआ कि स्वरूपका संसारसे कोई सम्बन्ध है ही नहीं।
दूसरी बात संसार (शरीर इन्द्रियाँ मन बुद्धि) की सहायताके बिना चेतनस्वरूप कुछ कर ही नहीं सकता। इससे सिद्ध हुआ कि मात्र क्रिया संसारमें ही है स्वरूपमें नहीं। स्वरूपका क्रियासे कोई सम्बन्ध है ही नहीं।
संसारका स्वरूप है क्रिया और पदार्थ। जब स्वरूपका न तो क्रियासे और न पदार्थसे ही कोई सम्बन्ध है तब यह सिद्ध हो गया कि शरीरइन्द्रियाँमनबुद्धिसहित सम्पूर्ण संसारका अभाव है। केवल परमात्मतत्त्वका ही भाव (सत्ता) है जो निर्लिप्तरूपसे सबका प्रकाशक और आधार है।
'उभयोरपि दृष्टोऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः'-- इन दोनोंके अर्थात् सत्असत् देहीदेहके तत्त्वको जाननेवाले महापुरुषोंने इनका तत्त्व देखा है इनका निचोड़ निकाला है कि केवल एक सत्तत्त्व ही विद्यमान है।
असत् वस्तुका तत्त्व भी सत् है और सत् वस्तुका तत्त्व भी सत् है अर्थात् दोनोंका तत्त्व एक सत् ही है दोनोंका तत्त्व भावरूपसे एक ही है। अतः सत् और असत् इन दोनोंके तत्त्वको जाननेवाले महापुरुषोंके द्वारा
जाननेमें आनेवाला एक सत्तत्त्व ही है। असत्की जो सत्ता प्रतीत होती है वह सत्ता भी वास्तवमें सत्की ही है। सत्की सत्तासे ही असत् सत्तावान् प्रतीत होता है। इसी सत्को 'परा प्रकृति' (गीता 7। 5) 'क्षेत्रज्ञ' (गीता 13। 12) 'पुरुष' (गीता 13। 19) और 'अक्ष' (गीता 15। 16) कहा गया है तथा असत्को 'अपरा प्रकृति क्षेत्र प्रकृति' और 'क्षर' कहा गया है।
अर्जुन भी शरीरोंको लेकर शोक कर रहे हैं कि युद्ध करनेसे ये सब मर जायँगे। इसपर भगवान् कहते हैं कि क्या युद्ध न करनेसे ये नहीं मरेंगे असत् तो मरेगा ही और निरन्तर मर ही रहा है। परन्तु इसमें जो सत्रूपसे है उसका कभी अभाव नहीं होगा। इसलिये शोक करना तुम्हारी बेसमझी ही है।
ग्यारहवें श्लोकमें आया है कि जो मर गये हैं और जो जी रहे हैं उन दोनोंके लिये पण्डितजन शोक नहीं करते। बारहवेंतेरहवें श्लोकोंमें देहीकी नित्यताका वर्णन है उसमें 'धीर' शब्द आया है। चौदहवेंपंद्रहवें श्लोकोंमें संसारकी अनित्यताका वर्णन आया है तो उसमें भी 'धीर' शब्द आया है। ऐसे ही यहाँ (सोलहवें श्लोकमें) सत्असत्का विवेचन आया है तो इसमें 'तत्त्वदर्शी' (टिप्पणी प0 56.2) शब्द आया है। इन श्लोकोंमें 'पण्डित धीर' और 'तत्त्वदर्शी' पद देनेका तात्पर्य है कि जो विवेकी होते हैं समझदार होते हैं उनको शोक नहीं होता। अगर शोक होता है तो वे विवेकी नहीं हैं समझदार नहीं हैं।
सम्बन्ध-- सत् और असत् क्या है इसको आगेके दो श्लोकोंमें बताते हैं।

इसलिये भी शोक और मोह न करके शीतोष्णादिको सहन करना उचित है जिससे कि वास्तवमें अविद्यमान शीतोष्णादिका और उनके कारणोंका भावहोनापन अर्थात् अस्तित्व है ही नहीं क्योंकि प्रमाणोंद्वारा निरूपण किये जानेपर शीतोष्णादि और उनके कारण कोई पदार्थ ही नहीं ठहरते क्योंकि वे शीतोष्णादि सब विकार हैं और विकार सदा बदलता रहता है। जैसे चक्षुद्वारा निरूपण किया जानेपर घटादिका आकार मिट्टीको छोड़कर और कुछ भी उपलब्ध नहीं होता इसलिये असत् है वैसे ही सभी विकार कारणके सिवा उपलब्ध न होनेसे असत् हैं। क्योंकि उत्पत्तिसे पूर्व और नाशके पश्चात् उन सबकी उपलब्धि नहीं है। पू0 मिट्टी आदि कारणकी और उसके भी कारणकी अपने कारणसे पृथक् उपलब्धि नहीं होनेसे उनका अभाव सिद्ध हुआ फिर इसी तरह उसका भी अभाव सिद्ध होनेसे सबके अभावका प्रसङ्ग आ जाता है। उ0 यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि सर्वत्र सत्बुद्धि और असत्बुद्धि ऐसी दो बुद्धियाँ उपलब्ध होती हैं। जिस पदार्थको विषय करनेवाली बुद्धि बदलती नहीं वह पदार्थ सत् है और जिसको विषय करनेवाली बुद्धि बदलती हो वह असत् है। इस प्रकार सत् और असत्का विभाग बुद्धिके अधीन है। सभी जगह समानाधिकरणमें ( एक ही अधिष्ठानमें ) सबको दो बुद्धियाँ उपलब्ध होती हैं। नील कमलके सदृश नहीं किन्तु घड़ा है कपड़ा है हाथी है इस तरह सब जगह दोदो बुद्धियाँ उपलब्ध होती हैं। उन दोनों बुद्धियोंसे घटादिको विषय करनेवाली बुद्धि बदलती है यह पहले दिखलाया जा चुका है परंतु सत्बुद्धि बदलती नहीं। अतः घटादि बुद्धिका विषय ( घटादि ) असत् है क्योंकि उसमें व्यभिचार ( परिवर्तन ) होता है। परंतु सत्बुद्धिका विषय ( अस्तित्व ) असत् नहीं है क्योंकि उसमें व्यभिचार ( परिवर्तन ) नहीं होता। पू0 घटका नाश हो जानेपर घटविषयक बुद्धिके नष्ट होते ही सत् बुद्धि भी तो नष्ट हो जाती है। उ0 यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि वस्त्रादि अन्य वस्तुओंमें भी सत्बुद्धि देखी जाती है। वह सत्बुद्धि केवल विशेषणको ही विषय करनेवाली है। पू0 सत्बुद्धिकी तरह घटबुद्धि भी तो दूसरे घटमें दीखती है। उ0 यह ठीक नहीं क्योंकि वस्त्रादिमें नहीं दीखती। पू0 घटका नाश हो जानेपर उसमें सत्बुद्धि भी तो नही दीखती। उ0 यह ठीक नहीं क्योंकि ( वहाँ ) घटरूप विशेष्यका अभाव है। सत्बुद्धि विशेषणको विषय करनेवाली है अतः जब घटरूप विशेष्यका अभाव हो गया तब बिना विशेष्यके विशेषणकी अनुपपत्ति होनसे वह ( सत्बुद्धि ) किसको विषय करे पर विषयका अभाव होनेसे सत्बुद्धिका अभाव नहीं होता। पू0 घटादि विशेष्यका अभाव होनेसे एकाधिकरणता ( दोनों बुद्धियोंका एक अधिष्ठानमें होना ) युक्तियुक्त नहीं होती। उ0 यह ठीक नहीं क्योंकि मृगतृष्णिकादिमें अधिष्ठानसे अतिरिक्त अन्य वस्तुका ( जलका ) अभाव है तो भी यह जल है ऐसी बुद्धि होनेसे समानाधिकरणता देखी जाती है। इसलिये असत् जो शरीरादि एवं शीतोष्णादि द्वन्द्व और उनके कारण हैं उनका किसीका भी भाव अस्तित्व नहीं है। वैसे ही सत् जो आत्मतत्व है उसका अभाव अर्थात् अविद्यमानता नहीं है क्योंकि वह सर्वत्र अटल है यह पहले कह आये हैं। इस प्रकार सत्आत्मा और असत्अनात्मा इन दोनोंका ही यह निर्णय तत्त्वदर्शियोंद्वारा देखा गया है अर्थात् प्रत्यक्ष किया जा चुका है कि सत् सत् ही है और असत् असत् ही है। तत् यह सर्वनाम है और सर्व ब्रह्म ही है। अतः उसका नाम तत् है उसके भावको अर्थात् ब्रह्मके यथार्थ स्वरूपको तत्त्व कहते हैं उस तत्त्वको देखना जिनका स्वभाव है वै तत्त्वदर्शी हैं उनके द्वारा उपर्युक्त निर्णय देखा गया है। तू भी तत्त्वदर्शी पुरुषोंकी बुद्धिका आश्रय लेकर शोक और मोहको छोड़कर तथा नियत और अनियतरूप शीतोष्णादि द्वन्द्वोंको इस प्रकार मनमें समझकर कि ये सब विकार है ये वास्तवमें न होते हुए ही मृगतृष्णाके जलकी भाँति मिथ्या प्रतीत हो रहे हैं ( इनको ) सहन कर। यह अभिप्राय है।

He introduces the next verse regarding the qualification of the aspirant, namely 'endurance' (titiksha), as having another reason—by saying 'Itashcha' (And for this reason) etc. He clarifies the meaning of the word 'Itah' itself—'Yasmat' (Because/Since) etc. Since cold, etc., which are causes of grief, etc., and are non-Self, have no 'reality' (Vastutva); and the 'Real' (Self) has uniformity due to being changeless; therefore 'endurance' is appropriate as a qualification for the seeker of liberation—he says 'Na' (Not), etc.

Anticipating the doubt that even if the effect is unreal (Asat), since the cause is real (Sat), absolute unreality is not established—he qualifies it by saying—'Sakaranasya' (Along with its cause). Taking 'Na asatah' (Not of the unreal), the repetition of the negative particle 'Na' is for the sake of connection (Anvaya). Anticipating the objection that since there is no contingency of existence for the 'unreal' (void/shunya), this would be a case of 'Aprasakta-pratishedha' (negating what was never proposed)—he says—'Na hi' (Not so), etc.
The disputed (duality) is not real (Atattvika) because it is not established by valid means, like the rope-snake. For valid means of knowledge like perception (Pratyaksha) which grasp the object (Dharmi) cannot be imagined to convey the Truth regarding it, because the object is difficult to define/determine; therefore, duality is 'Indefinable' (Anirvachaniya); this is the meaning.

How again is the duality of cold, heat, etc., which are objects of perception, indefinable due to being difficult to determine? To this he says—'Vikaro hi' (For modification is...), etc.
And from that, the result is that 'The disputed (duality) is false (Mithya), because it is transient (Agamapayi), like the agreed examples (rope-snake, etc.)'—he states this by—'Vikarashcha' (And modification), etc. The particle 'Cha' is used to show the support of the 'Vacharambhana' Shruti (Chandogya Up.) for the falsity of duality.

Moreover, is the effect different from the cause or non-different? Posing this alternative, he refutes the first—'Yatha' (Just as), etc. 'Nirupyamanam' (Being examined)—with this, 'internally and externally' is to be supplied. The disputed (effect) is not truly different from the cause, because it is an effect, like a pot; this is the meaning. Even for this reason, the effect does not exist as distinct from the cause—based on the maxim 'That which does not exist in the beginning and in the end, is so (non-existent) even in the present'—he says 'Janma' (Birth), etc. If the effect is non-different from the cause, then if it (effect) is unreal due to difference, it would be a non-object compared to the former (cause). And remaining as identical (Tadatmyena) is not logical, because that too does not exist apart from the cause. Intending that in a reality devoid of the division of cause and effect, the lineage of cause and effect is merely a delusion, he says—'Mridadi' (Clay, etc.), etc.

Thinking that 'Reality' devoid of cause-effect division does not exist at all, he raises an objection—'Tadasattve' (Upon its non-existence), etc. Due to the observation of two cognitions—'Anuvritta' (persisting/following) and 'Vyavritta' (deviating/turning away); and because in the persisting, the deviating ones are imagined; the Un-imagined, the substratum of the imagination of all differences, the non-causal 'Reality' is established—he refutes (the objection) by—'Na sarvatra' (Not everywhere), etc.

Now he presents an inference as proof for the 'Reality' (Vastutva) of 'Sat' (Existence)—'Yad-vishaya' etc. That regarding which the cognition persists (does not deviate) is Real (Sat); like the 'This' portion (Idam-amsha) of the rope etc. which persists in the snake, water-stream, etc. (illusions). The disputed (Sat) is True, because it is invariable, like the accepted examples; this is the meaning.
He states the proof for the 'Imagined nature' (Kalpitatva) of the deviating/variable—by 'Yad-vishaya' etc. That which deviates (turns away) is False (Mithya), like the snake, stream, etc.; the disputed (duality) is False, because it is variable, like the accepted examples; this is the meaning. Following these two inferences, the un-imagined nature of Sat and the imagined nature of Asat is established—this is the completion.
Objection: These two inferences are not appropriate, because for one who argues for the falsity of all duality, due to the absence of division (knower/known), the usage of inference etc. is impossible? To this he says—'Sadasat' etc. When the stated division is established as dependent on the two cognitions (Sat-buddhi and Asat-buddhi), the usage of inference etc. is sustained; because due to dissociation from the 'apparent' (Pratibhasika) division, and the Supreme Reality alone being the cause of that (appearance), there is an absence of 'absolute absence' (Kevala-vyatireka)—this is the meaning. Why is the Sat-Asat division dependent on two cognitions? Because the division of cognition is also absent there (in Reality)? To this he says—'Sarvatra' etc. 'Sarvatra' means in the realm of empirical transaction (Vyavahara-bhumi). Even the division of cognition, being itself imagined, is the cause of the appearance of the division of objects to be known—this is the sentiment.

If it is said: Adhering to the two cognitions, there is a Sat-Asat division; and since 'Sat' is a general form, there is an expectation of a particular; thus 'General' (Samanya) and 'Particular' (Vishesha) would be two real entities? To this he says—'Samanadhikarane' etc. The grammatical coordination (Samanadhikaranya) of words is superimposed on the cognitions. Like the coordination in 'So'yam' (This is that Devadatta), the coordination 'Ghatah San' (The pot is existent) rests on one Reality; it is not fitting in the case of difference of objects as in 'Pot and Cloth'—this is the meaning.
If it is said: Like 'Nilam Utpalam' (Blue Lotus), coordination is well-said as having attribute and substance as objects, so it is not about the oneness of reality? He says 'Na' (No)—'Na Nila' etc. For in the difference and non-difference of the General and Particular, their absence (of relation) or (simultaneous) difference-non-difference are contradictory; therefore, the coordination of Genus (Jati) and Individual (Vyakti) is not secondary (Gauna) like Blue-Lotus, but is 'resting on one' (Ekanishtha) because the Variable (Vyavritta) is imagined in the Invariable (Anuvritta)—this is the meaning.

He extends this logic of General-Particular to Quality-Qualified (Guna-Guni) etc.—'Evam' (Thus), etc. For the faults of the alternative are equal there too—this is the sentiment.

Having rejected the view that 'two realities are General and Particular' due to the impossibility of coordination, he rejects the view that 'Only Particulars are realities'—'Tayoh' etc.

Even if there is deviation of the object due to the deviation of the cognition, how is the unreality (Avastutva) of the variable particulars established? Anticipating this, he says—'Tatha cha' etc. 'Vikaro hi sah' (For it is a modification) etc.—is the remainder. And one object cannot be of the nature of both General and Particular because of the contradiction of duality in one; intending this—The General alone is the one Reality, because its cognition is invariable, and the awareness (Bodha) being Real is also such—he says—'Na tu' etc. 'Vyabhicharati' (Deviates)—this connects with the previous. Upon the particulars being variable and Sat being invariable, he concludes the resultant meaning—'Tasmat' etc. 'Asattvam' means 'Imagined nature' (Kalpitatva). He clarifies the meaning of the word 'Tat' itself—'Vyabhicharat' (Due to deviation/variability), etc.
Regarding the un-imagined nature of 'Sat', the object of the Sat-cognition, he states the very reason given by the word 'Tat'—'Avyabhicharat' (Due to invariability), etc. (Doubt:) By the deviation of the Sat-cognition, the object (Sat) also deviates, so the reason of 'Invariability' is unestablished? He doubts this—'Ghate vinashte' (When the pot is destroyed), etc. (Answer:) Since the Sat-cognition, unlike the pot-only cognition, does not have merely the pot as its object, there is no deviation (of Sat-cognition) upon the destruction of the pot—he refutes this—'Na patadau' (No, in cloth etc.), etc. (Doubt:) If the object of Sat-cognition is not the pot, then since having no support (Niralambana) is impossible, another object must be stated? Anticipating this, he says—'Visheshana' etc.
Having rescued the unestablished nature of the reason (Invariability) for the un-imagined nature of Sat, he now anticipates a doubt regarding the unestablished nature of the reason (Variability) for the imagined nature of Particulars—'Sat' etc. Just as Sat-cognition is invariable because it is seen in cloth etc. when the pot is destroyed—thus the invariability of Sat is shown; similarly, 'Pot-cognition' also, when one pot is destroyed, is seen in another pot; so due to invariability, the deviation in the pot is not established, thus the deviation of the reason for imagined nature is not established even in other particulars—this is the meaning. (Answer:) Even if pot-cognition is seen in another pot, it is not seen in cloth etc., so due to deviation there, the variability in particulars like cloth etc. is established—he gives this answer—'Patadau' etc. (Doubt:) If particulars are variable in this way, then since 'Sat' (Existence) also fits that description (if viewed as a particular property), the establishment of the reason of 'Invariability' remains in the same state (flawed)?—He doubts—'Sadbuddhih'. (Answer:) Even though Sat does not appear in the place of the destruction of pot etc. with the form colored by that (pot), it is not non-existent (Asat), because it appears as the substratum of the absence of pot etc.—he says—'Na visheshya' etc. Just as in 'The genus is omnipresent', in the place of the absence of individuals like broken-horned cows etc., 'Cowness' is not manifested due to the absence of the manifesting agent, not due to the absence of Cowness; similarly, Sat also does not shine upon the destruction of pot etc. due to the absence of the manifesting agent, not due to the absence of its own nature—he elaborates on this very statement—'Sat' etc. Even if there is deviation of 'being a qualified attribute' (Sapratiyogika-visheshanatva), since there is no deviation of its essential nature (Svarupa), the Reality (Sattva) of Sat is logical—this is the sentiment.

Since the relation of qualifier-qualified (Visheshana-Visheshya) is seen only between two existing things, if Pot and Sat also have a qualifier-qualified relation, then due to the certainty of the existence of both, the inference of 'the imagined nature of pot etc.' is contradicted by the cognition of grammatical coordination (Samanadhikaranya)—he objects—'Eka' etc. Following experience, he refutes the 'contradicted object' flaw of the said inference—'Na' etc. Upon the inference of 'pot etc. being imagined in Sat' being free from defects, he concludes the result—'Tasmat' etc. The word 'Iti' marks the completion of the explanation of the first quarter (Pada) of the verse.

(Objection:) This explanation is not intended by the Commentator (Shankara), because in the desire to express the voidness (Shunyatva) of all duality, there is a contradiction with the Scripture and its Bhashya; thus this has been invented by some foolishly burned (ignorant) person through his own imagination? (Answer:) Do not say so. What is this 'voidness' of the world of duality? Is it 'total non-existence' (Tuchchatva like a hare's horn)? Or is it 'being distinct from Real' (Sad-vilakshanatva)? The first is not accepted (by us). If the second is not accepted (by you), then the contradiction with Scripture and Bhashya applies to you alone. For all Scripture and its Bhashya result in the Reality of Non-duality (Advaita) by establishing the 'absence of reality' in duality; this has been established in various places by the Elders who know the three Vedas. And thus, (your doubt) is due to a lack of familiarity with the tradition regarding the suspicion of interpolation—this should be seen.

Having explained the first quarter (nāsato vidyate bhāvo...) as intent on demonstrating the unreality (Avastutva) of the aggregate of non-Self due to being imagined; he now explains the second quarter (nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ) as intent on establishing the Reality (Vastutva) of the Self, the substratum of all imagination, due to being un-imagined—'Tatha' (Similarly) etc.

(Doubt:) Since the particulars (bodies etc.) of the Sat-Atman (Real Self) are perishable, the destruction of That (Self) colored by them would occur? Anticipating this—since it has been stated that even upon the destruction of the qualified, the essential nature is not destroyed, it is not so—he says—'Sarvatra' etc.
(Doubt:) Sometimes the 'Asat' (unreal) itself attains 'Sat-hood' (e.g., a pot that was previously non-existent is accepted as existent upon birth); and that (Sat) sometimes attains 'Asat-hood' (a pot existing during its stay is accepted as non-existent upon destruction); thus, due to the lack of difference in the instability of both Sat and Asat, the rejectability or acceptability of both should be equal? To this he says—'Evam' etc.

The word 'Tu' connects with the word 'Drishta' (seen) and determines (emphasizes) the 'Seeing' (Drishti - correct perception).
For the 'existence' (Sattva) of a previously non-existent pot—if 'non-existence' (Asattva) remains, it is contradictory to the attainment of existence; and if (you say) the cessation of non-existence comes by the attainment of existence—then without 'mutual dependence' (Itaretarashraya), the attainment of existence (is impossible); and if non-existence ceases, 'Asattva' would become spaceless (non-existent). By this logic, the 'attainment of non-existence' by the Sat is also refuted—this is the sentiment.

Then how do the 'non-existence of Sat' and the 'existence of Asat' appear? Anticipating this, he says it is due to the absence of the vision of Truth—'Tattva' etc. 'Tasya bhavah tattvam' (Its nature is Truth). And there is nothing (specific) fit to be referred to by the word 'Tat' (That). Thinking that what is in context is determined—he explains—'Tat' etc. (Brahman).
(Doubt:) Some understand the 'otherwise-ness' (changeability) of Sat and Asat (Logicians etc.); while others, following the said decision regarding them, understand them 'as they are' (Vedantins); among these, whose view should be desired? To this he says—'Tvam api' (You too/By you also) etc.

Even though cold, heat, etc., are perceived, because they are liable to sublation (badhya), they are false (mithya), and conversely, the Self is Real; therefore, without engaging in grief and delusion, enduring cold, heat, etc., is proper—this he states with "na" (not), etc. Since the 'Asat' (Unreal) is sublated by inquiry, the bhava—meaning absolute reality (paramartha satta)—of cold, etc., which were non-existent even before, which are possessed of a cause, and which are being examined by proofs like perception, does not exist.

By this, it is expressed that the word 'Asat' here does not imply a void (shunya) like a "human horn," because there is no occasion for the existence of such a thing, and one cannot negate that which has not been presented.
The disputed objects (cold, etc.) are not real because they are not proven/valid, like silver in a shell. Since perception and other proofs that grasp the object (dharmi) are seen to be incapable of conveying absolute reality, the objects of such perception—cold, etc.—which are indefinable (anirvachaniya) and 'Asat', though perceived by deluded people through perception, do not have bhava, i.e., reality, even though grasped as existing—this is the meaning.

(Objection): Surely, in some cases, perception etc. are seen to convey absolute validity, so the duality of cold etc., which is the object of that, cannot be called 'indefinable' just because it is difficult to define? Just as when a part of the Veda is for action (ritual), the Veda teaching Brahman is also considered for action. Or just as form is not perceived by ears, it is not perceived by the eye either—(this logic is flawed). (Answer): No, because the duality of cold etc. is a modification (vikara) and its non-existence is determined by its nature of appearing and disappearing (agamapayitva). And thus, the syllogism is: The disputed is Unreal (asat), because it is subject to appearance and disappearance, like a rope-snake. Furthermore, the falsity of modification is taught by the scriptural text: "Modification is merely a name arising from speech; clay alone is true."

Moreover, the effect is not different from the cause; because the configuration of earrings etc., examined by the eye etc., is not perceived apart from the gold etc. Thus, the syllogism is: The disputed is not substantially different from the cause, being an effect, like earrings etc. By the logic "That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is so (non-existent) even in the present," and because the effect is not perceived before birth and after destruction, and is not distinct from the cause, it is proven.

All modifications like cold etc. are 'Asat' because they are not perceived apart from the cause, like earrings. Thus, it is established that everything—which is perceived as identical with its own cause—is imagined upon the substratum of the illusion of the cause-effect lineage.
(Objection): If the cause-effect lineage is unreal because there is no object devoid of the cause-effect division, then there would be a contingency of universal voidism (sarva-abhava)? (Answer): No,

because everywhere two intellects (cognitions) are observed: the persisting (anuvritta) and the deviating (vyavritta). And since the deviating are imagined upon the persisting, the un-imagined object, which is the substratum of all distinct imaginations and is not of the nature of cause and effect, is established. Thus: Whatever persists amidst the deviating is Absolutely Real, like the 'this' aspect of the shell persists in the streams of silver-illusion. The disputed is Real (Sat), because it is invariable, like the 'this' aspect. Whatever deviates is False (mithya), like the stream of silver; the disputed is False, because it is variable, like the stream of silver. By these two inferences, the un-imagined nature of the Sat and the imagined nature of the Asat are established.

(Objection): These two inferences are not valid, because for the proponent of universal falsity, there is no division, so the usage of inference etc. is impossible? (Answer): No, because the division of Sat and Asat depends on the intellect; when the division dependent on the two intellects is established, the usage of inference etc. is justifiable. (Objection): For you, the Non-dualist, there is an absence of the two intellects, so how will the division of Sat and Asat dependent on them be established? (Answer): Everywhere in the state of relative transaction (vyavahara), the two intellects that are the cause of the imagined Sat-Asat division are experienced by everyone.

(Objection): Even so, since 'Sat' is a general form, there is an expectation of a particular; thus there would be two objects, the General and the Particular? (Answer): No, like the co-reference "This is that", the co-reference "The pot is existent" rests on one object; it is not possible in a difference of objects like pot and cloth. (Objection): The said co-reference should not be said to rest on one object, because it can be easily explained as having a property and property-holder as its object, like "Blue Lotus"? (Answer): No, the co-reference "Blue Lotus" is secondary (gauna) because it deals with property and property-holder. Compared to that, since the deviating is imagined on the persisting, it is appropriate that the primary meaning rests on unity alone.

Thus, the two cognitions "Existent Pot", "Existent Cloth", "Existent Elephant", "Existent Horse", "Existent Cow" are observed. Among these two cognitions, the cognition of pot etc. varies (deviates); the variability of the modification like pot has been shown before. But the 'Sat-cognition' (cognition of Existence) does not vary, because even when the pot is destroyed, it (Existence) is seen in the cloth etc. By this, the objection "When the pot is destroyed and the pot-cognition varies, the Sat-cognition also varies" is refuted. Therefore, the object of the pot-cognition is 'Asat' due to variability, like a rope-snake. But the object of the Sat-cognition is not 'Asat', due to invariability, like the 'this' aspect.
(Objection): Just as when the pot is destroyed, the Sat-cognition is seen in the cloth etc., similarly the pot-cognition is seen in another pot? (Answer): No, because the pot-cognition is not seen in the cloth etc. (whereas Existence is). (Objection): In the destroyed pot, the Sat-cognition is also not seen there? (Answer): No, because just as in the destruction of pot etc., the individual is destroyed and the Genus is not seen due to the absence of the qualified object (visheshya) which manifests the existence standing as a qualifier—so too, the non-perception of the Sat-cognition is due to that, not due to the absence of its object, Existence.

(Objection): The relation of qualifier-qualified is seen only between two existing (sat) things, like blue and lotus; if we accept a qualifier-qualified relation between Sat and Pot, the existence of both is inevitable, so the inference of the imagined nature of pot etc. is contradicted by the cognition of co-reference? (Answer): No, because the cognition of co-reference relies on the appearance (bhana) of two objects, not the reality (sattva) of both. In a mirage, even when one (water) is absent, the co-reference "This is existent water" is observed. Therefore, the body etc., and the duality of cold-heat etc., which are with cause and are imagined as real but are essentially 'Asat', do not have bhava or absolute reality. Because they are not perceived before birth and after destruction, nor in another object or another place. And regarding the Absolutely Real, imperishable, unsublatable Self—which is unknown to those who do not know the Truth—even if it appears as non-existent (to the ignorant), its 'abhava' (non-existence/absolute unreality) is not possible, because it is invariable everywhere and devoid of the three kinds of limitations.
Thus, the Commentator (Shankara) has taught the probandum of Sat and Asat, and the reason being limitedness (paricchinnatva) and unlimitedness. Some have explained it thus: "The 'bhava'—meaning reality or absolute nature—of the limited 'Asat' world of cold etc., does not exist; meaning it lacks that unlimitedness which has a reality not less than itself. And the 'abhava'—meaning limitedness—of the 'Sat', which is pure Existence woven through everything, does not exist." Limitedness is of three kinds: spatial limitation defined as being the counter-correlative of absolute non-existence; temporal limitation defined as being the counter-correlative of destruction; and objective limitation defined as being the counter-correlative of mutual non-existence. [The commentary continues with a complex logical discussion defending why the Self is free from these three limitations and concludes:] Doubting "Why is there no decision for everyone?", he says that because not everyone is a seer of Truth; but for the seers of Truth, this decision exists—he says "of both" (ubhayoh). The 'end' (antah)—meaning the decision that "Sat is always Sat, and Asat is indeed Asat"—regarding both the Self and the Non-Self (Sat and Asat) has been seen by the seers of Truth, the knowers of Brahman. Therefore, the intention is: You too, adopting their vision, abandoning grief and delusion, endure the cold etc.

"The Self is eternal"—this has been stated. Is the Self alone eternal, or is there something else too? What is that "something else"? To this, he says—'na asatah' (not of the asat).

There is no abhava (absence/destruction) of the Asat, meaning the Cause, and of the Sat, meaning Brahman. [This is supported] by the statement: "Nature (Prakriti), the Soul (Purusha), and eternal Time (Kala) [are the three]." (Vishnu Purana). "Exists separately"—this is for the sake of emphasis/respect.

The causal nature of the Asat is established by the Bhagavata text: "Through that Asat-form, and the one consisting of Gunas which is both Sat and Asat, the attribute-less Lord..." and by "From the Asat, the Sat was born"—referring to the Unmanifest (Avyakta).

And that this is established by tradition, he states with 'ubhayorapi' (of both indeed). 'Anta' means decision/conclusion.

(Objection): Although the Self, having abandoned adjuncts (upadhis) in deep sleep (sushupti), samadhi, etc., possesses sameness in pain and pleasure, yet in the state of having adjuncts (like waking), just as a heated iron ball has the power to burn, its (the Self's) suffering is unavoidable. And since the adjunct, which is the all-pervading Primal Nature (Mula-Prakriti), is of the nature of material elements (matra), its total eradication is not possible while it exists; therefore, the statement "He becomes fit for immortality" is unjustifiable? Anticipating this doubt, he says—'na asatah' (not of the unreal).

Since the knower (pramatru) etc. are subject to appearance and disappearance and are occasional, like a rope-snake, the bhava—meaning existence—of the 'Asat' (knower, etc.) does not exist in all three times. The meaning is this: The knower etc. are imagined in the Conscious Self by primal ignorance (mula-ajnana). And upon the cessation of primal ignorance by Self-knowledge, since the cause is absent, there is no rising of the knower etc. again; thus, immortality is established without obstruction through knowledge.

(Objection): If the falsity of the knower etc. is accepted merely due to non-perception (apratiti), then since the Self is also not perceived in deep sleep etc., let it also be false due to this lack of distinction. Or let both possess reality? Anticipating this, he says—'na abhavo vidyate satah' (there is no non-existence of the Real).

The abhava—meaning non-existence—of the 'Sat' object never exists. Even in deep sleep etc., the memory/reflection (paramarsha) upon waking regarding the experienced happiness and ignorance—"I slept happily, I knew nothing"—is observed. And without experience (at that time), reflection on them is not possible. Therefore, there is no non-existence of the 'Sat'.

The Scripture (Shruti) also declares the absence of the knower etc. and the eternality of the Vision (Drik) in deep sleep and Liberation: "That he does not see in that state, it is because while seeing he does not see; for there is no cessation of the vision of the seer, because it is imperishable; but there is not that second thing, distinct from him, which he could see." (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad).

If the knower etc. were real, then the non-vision of the existing object in deep sleep etc. would have to be explained either due to lack of proximity or due to the loss of the seer's sight. The first is not tenable, because it is invalid to imagine the existence of something elsewhere that has a nature of being seen and destroyed within the Self. The latter is not tenable, because it is negated by the cited Scripture itself. Therefore, it is difficult to assert equality in reality or falsity for both.

(Objection): Although there is no absence of the 'Sat' ether (akasha) etc. in any place or time, yet there is absence of a 'Sat' atom in another place, and the 'bhava' (birth) of the previously non-existent pot etc. is seen. So how is it said "Of the unreal there is no being, and of the real there is no non-being"? Anticipating this, he refutes it through the experience of the wise—with 'ubhayorapi'.

'Anta' means the essential nature/truth (yatharthyam). Just as in a dream, the sky, pot, rope-snake, etc.—though determined as possessing attributes of eternality, non-eternality, reality, unreality, etc.—are sublated (badhya) upon waking, similarly those seen in the waking state are also sublated by the knowledge of Truth. (Objection): The determination of eternality etc. in the dream-sky is an error (bhrama) due to the force of waking impressions; (Answer): Similarly, due to the force of impressions from previous lives active since beginningless time, that (determination of reality) in the waking sky etc. is also just an error.

(Objection): Only a 'Sat' object by nature, like silver, is superimposed upon a shell etc., not an 'Asat' like a hare's horn. But how is the sky etc., being 'Asat' by nature according to your view, superimposed upon the Self? (Answer): No, because superimposition (adhyasa) relies only on prior experience, not on the inherent reality of what was experienced. The superimposition of blueness is seen even in the sky reflected in a mirror. And blueness is not real by nature in the sky, yet it is superimposed elsewhere.

Therefore, a lineage of illusion is possible. Though unseen by us—like (the waking state is unseen) by dreamers—the true nature of Sat and Asat is indeed capable of being seen by the Awakened ones. And thus the Scriptures—"There is no diversity here whatsoever," "He is to be realized as 'He Is' alone," "Whatever is other than this is perishable"—demonstrate the unreality of the non-Self and the reality of the Self. Thus, the idea is that by the knowledge of the 'Sat', the 'Asat' is sublated, and Liberation (Kaivalya) is established.

Of the asat (unreal)—i.e., the body—there is no sadbhava (real being/existence); and of the sat (real)—i.e., the Self (atman)—there is no asadbhava (non-existence). Of these two—the body and the Self—as they are perceived, the 'end' (anta) has been seen by the seers of the truth according to their actual perception/nature. Since an investigation concludes in a decision, the word 'end' (anta) here denotes 'decision' (nirnaya). The decision seen is this: the body, which is a non-sentient object (achit), has asattva (non-reality/perishability) as its very nature; and the Self, which is sentient, has sattva (reality/imperishability) as its very nature.

Indeed, asattva (unreality) means having a nature subject to destruction, and sattva (reality) means having a nature not subject to destruction. As stated by Lord Parashara: "Therefore, O Twice-born, other than Consciousness (Vijnana), there is no group of things whatsoever, anywhere, at any time." (Vishnu Purana 2.12.43) "The nature of Reality (Sadbhava) has thus been spoken to you by me; just as Knowledge is real, anything else is unreal." (Vishnu Purana 2.12.45) "The Imperishable alone is accepted by the wise as the Supreme Reality (Paramartha); but that which is perishable—there is no doubt—is composed of perishable substances." (Vishnu Purana 2.14.24) "O King! That which does not attain another designation born of modification etc., even with the passage of time—that is the Reality (Vastu); and what is that?" (Vishnu Purana 2.13.100)

Here (in the Gita) also, it is said: "These bodies are said to have an end" (Gita 2.18) "But know That to be indestructible" (Gita 2.17) It is understood that this alone is the cause for designating them as Real (Sat) and Unreal (Asat). Here, however, the theory of Satkaryavada (the Sankhya theory of the pre-existence of the effect) is not relevant; hence, this verse does not aim at that. For one who is deluded by ignorance of the nature of the body and the Self, to pacify that delusion, only the discrimination regarding their respective natures of perishability and imperishability should be stated. That very discrimination was introduced in "They grieve not for the dead nor for the living" (Gita 2.11). That very point is substantiated immediately after this in "But know That to be indestructible" (2.17) and "These bodies are said to have an end" (2.18). Therefore, the meaning is exactly as stated.

How the imperishability of the Self is established, he states regarding this—

(Objection): "Still, heat, cold, etc., are extremely difficult to bear; how can they be borne? And in enduring them to the extreme, there is the possibility of the destruction of the body itself?" Anticipating this doubt, with the intention that "through inquiry into the Truth, everything can be borne," He speaks the verse beginning with na (not).

Of the asat (unreal)—meaning cold, heat, etc., which are non-existent [in the Self] because they are properties of the non-Self—there is no bhava, meaning existence, in the Self. Similarly, of the sat—meaning the Self which is of the nature of Reality—there is no abhava, meaning destruction.

Thus, the 'end'—meaning the conclusion/decision regarding both the Real and the Unreal—has been seen. By whom? By the seers of Truth, meaning those who know the true nature of things. The meaning is: Endure them with such discrimination.

He introduces the verse "nasatah" (not of the unreal) as the commencement of establishing the subject matter that is closely proximate [distinct from the immediate context of endurance, linking back to the distinction of body/self]—with the words 'yattviti'. [The discrimination] is natural, it is inevitable for one of changing nature, and it is not independent of a cause; it is not a cause for grief, but opposes the cause of grief, meaning it is the cause for the absence of grief.

Before this, there was only a mention of the nature [of the Self], so it is said "to substantiate" (upadayitum). Since this verse is also merely a proposition for the sake of substantiation [which follows in the next verses], it is said "he begins" (arabhate).

He explains while elaborating on the specific meaning of words like Sat, Asat, Bhava, and Abhava appropriate to the context—with 'asata iti'. It should be explained as "of the Asat and of the Sat". The specific meaning of that, qualified by the context etc., is stated as "of the body" and "of the Self". The result of the instruction 'anayoh' (of these two) is stated as 'upalabhyamanayoh' (of those being perceived). With the intention that "Vision of Truth" implies not transgressing the [actual] perception/experience, indicated by the word 'tu', he says 'yathopalabdhi tattvadarshibhih' (as perceived, by the seers of truth).

By this, what was said by Shankara—"That is Brahman, That is Existence, That is Truth" (implying pure Monism)—is dismissed/rejected. Since destruction is not applicable to the Eternal indicated by the word 'Sat', the word 'Anta' has the meaning of 'Decision' (nirnaya). Regarding the mode of the word's function there, he states that in this context of discriminating the Body and Self, and in the proximity of "by the seers of truth", that very meaning (decision) is appropriate—with 'nirnayantatvat'.

(Objection): Surely, "the real being of the body does not exist" is incorrect because it contradicts perception etc. And "the non-being of the Self does not exist" is also incorrect, because in the state of total negation like "In the beginning, this was Asat alone" (Chandogya 6.2.1), It (the Self/Brahman) is also denoted by the word 'Asat'. Also, with respect to specific states, existence and non-existence are common to both the body and the Self. Therefore, like other commentaries, this verse should be interpreted as concerning Satkaryavada (theory of pre-existent effect)? To this, he says—'dehasya' (of the body), etc.

By the two terms "of the non-sentient object" (achid-vastunah) and "of the sentient" (chetanasya), the reason for 'Sattva' and 'Asattva' being their intrinsic natures, and the usage of the words 'Sat' and 'Asat' as referring to the Sentient (Chit) and Non-sentient (Achit), are indicated. (Objection): Even so, the objection regarding the reality/unreality of the body and self is not resolved? To this, he says—'vinasheti' (destruction...). The word 'hi' indicates well-known usage; he shows exactly that—with 'yathoktam'.

In the Dashashloki (the ten verses quoted from Vishnu Purana in the commentary), the words object/non-object (vastu-avastu), is/is-not (asti-nasti), and true/untrue (satya-asatya)—have been established in the Shariraka Bhashya (Sri Bhashya) as referring to the Eternal/Transient and Sentient/Insentient in terms of being changeless or changing. This is established through the introduction and conclusion of the Purana, the introduction and conclusion of that specific section, and by the text in the middle "Clay is the pot-ness..." (V.P. 2.15.42) which proves non-reality (avastutva) solely through the quality of having modifications, and also in accordance with other Shruti, Smriti, and perception. Doubting how the words 'Sat' and 'Asat', which concern objects fit or unfit for transaction, can have the same meaning as 'Satya' and 'Asatya' which concern the Ultimate and Non-ultimate reality—he quotes the Great Sage (Parashara) to show that perishability and imperishability alone are the causes for the usage of words like Ultimate/Non-ultimate—with 'anashiti', etc.

He shows the explicit statement regarding the meaning: that being denoted by the word 'non-object' (avastu) is solely due to connection with another name arising from abandoning the former state through modification, growth, etc., characterized by destruction; and being denoted by the word 'object' (vastu) is due to the absence of that—with 'yattviti'. Here, because of the identity of meaning with the subsequent two verses, this is the only meaning—he states with 'atrapi'. By this, it is expressed that sometimes the usage of the word 'Asat' regarding the Sentient (Self) is also with respect to specific states like the abandonment of names and forms like 'god' (deva), etc. But due to being changeless in its essential nature, it is denoted only by the word 'Sat'. The explanation of the verses in reverse order [in Ramanuja's commentary] is with respect to the order of "nasatah" [starting with Asat]. "What follows from that?" To this, he says—'tadeveti'.

The reason for the proposed meaning must be stated immediately after. The idea is: it is not proper to abandon the reason (causality for Sat/Asat designation) that is understood naturally here and interpret it as referring to another meaning (like Satkaryavada).

He refutes the interpretation imagined by those with distorted vision—with 'atreti'. Indeed, the refutation of Vaisheshika etc., or the substantiation of the proposition "by knowing one, all is known", or the presentation of Sankhya doctrine is not the process here. Nor can the discrimination between Body and Self, or the pacification of grief, be established by Satkaryavada. To describe the eternality of sentient beings based on the (Sankhya) view that "everything is eternal" would be proving the unproven by the utterly unproven—this is the idea.

He states the consistency with the Great Context (Maha-prakarana) in adopting the said meaning—with 'deheti'. The idea is: identifying the very object whose ignorance causes delusion will lead to its removal. Here, "for the pacification of that delusion" indicates the summary verse of the Second Chapter. Intending that in Satkaryavada there is a contradiction between the preceding and succeeding contexts, he states the consistency of his own statement with the intermediate context—with the two sentences beginning 'sa eva'. 'Anantaram' (Immediately after)—meaning there is not even a slight intervention by anything else. By the words 'prastuta' (introduced) and 'upapadyate' (substantiated), the absence of repetition is shown. He concludes—with 'ata iti'.

By the emphasis 'yathoktam eva' (exactly as stated), the false appearances (interpretations) of other commentators are removed. The following interpretation—stated by Yajnasvamin, that the word 'Asat' grasps the inauspicious, the effect of Rajas and Tamas, like suffering, etc., and the word 'Sat' grasps Sattva and its effect, like happiness, etc., and the words 'Bhava' and 'Abhava' are synonyms for prosperity and non-prosperity (bhuti and abhuti), and 'end' (anta) is seen for both these groups (rasidvayasya nashvaratvam)—is said to mean that the perishability and suffering inherent in the cause of endurance of dualities mentioned previously are elaborated. That is incorrect, because the taking of Rajas, Tamas, etc., by the words Asat, etc., is inconsistent with the context, and because of this intention, it was stated 'sa eva prastutah' (that very thing is introduced).

(Objection): Surely, in the verse 'matrasparshastu', the word 'matra' denotes the qualities like Sattva, etc. Thus, in the Kapila-Suriya dialogue, the words 'guna', 'guna-matra', 'guna-lakshana', 'guna-avayava', 'sattva', 'rajas', 'tamas' are used for the gunas. The qualities of Sattva, etc., are also designated as their 'matras'. There, the word 'matra' is used in phrases like 'Sattva-matra' (meaning vision of truth, nature of fearlessness, clear senses, happy sleep, and awareness) and also regarding accessories, such as 'one of small accessories should wander'. If the word 'matra' in 'matrasparsha' grasps sense objects like sound, then there would be a redundancy with the word 'shita-ushna' (cold/heat). That is also incorrect, because the word 'matra' is not primarily used for Sattva, etc., nor is it famous elsewhere, and there is no reason here to accept an unfamiliar meaning. The redundancy of the word 'shita-ushna' is, however, avoided because it refers to the general and the specific, and because it is meant for demonstration.

Let it be that the words 'Sat' and 'Asat' refer only to happiness and suffering which are the subjects at hand. Not so, because if those two alone are intended as forms of prosperity and non-prosperity, then a distinct designation as their causes would be improper. Furthermore, designating happiness and suffering as the causes of suffering and happiness is contrary to worldly and Vedic teaching. Also, stating the removal of lordship (aishvarya) etc., by happiness, is irrelevant to the context. In this manner, flaws should be inferred in other interpretations as well. Therefore, due to the consistency with the major context and the preceding and succeeding parts, the meaning is exactly as stated.

वेदान्त शास्त्र में सत् असत् का विवेक अत्यन्त वैज्ञानिक पद्धति से किया गया है। हमारे दर्शनशास्त्र में इन दोनों की ही परिभाषायें दी हुई हैं। असत् वस्तु वह है जिसकी भूतकाल में सत्ता नहीं थी और भविष्य में भी वह नहीं होगी परन्तु वर्तमान में उसका अस्तित्व प्रतीतसा होता है। माण्डूक्य कारिका की भाषा में जिसका अस्तित्व प्रारम्भ और अन्त में नहीं है वह वर्तमान में भी असत् ही है हमें दिखाई देने वाली वस्तुयें मिथ्या होने पर भी उन्हें सत् माना जाता है।स्वाभाविक ही सत्य वस्तु वह है जो भूतवर्तमान भविष्य इन तीनों कालों में भी नित्य अविकारी रूप में रहती है। सामान्य व्यवहार में यदि कोई व्यक्ति किसी स्तम्भ को भूत समझ लेता है तो स्तम्भ की दृष्टि से भूत को असत् कहा जायेगा क्योंकि भूत अनित्य है और स्तम्भ का ज्ञान होने पर वहाँ रहता नहीं। इसी प्रकार स्वप्न से जागने पर स्वप्न के बच्चों के लिये हमें कोई चिन्ता नहीं होती क्योंकि जागने पर स्वप्न के मिथ्यात्व का हमें बोध होता है। प्रतीत होने पर भी स्वप्न मिथ्या है। अत तीनों काल में अबाधित वस्तु ही सत्य कहलाती है।शरीर मन और बुद्धि इन जड़ उपाधियों के साथ हमारा जीवन परिच्छिन्न है क्योंकि इनके द्वारा प्राप्त बाह्य विषय भावना और विचारों के अनुभव क्षणिक होते हैं। इन तीनों में ही नित्य परिवर्तन हो रहा है। एक अवस्था का नाश दूसरी अवस्था की उत्पत्ति है। परिभाषा के अनुसार ये सब असत् हैं।क्या इनके पीछे कोई सत्य वस्तु है इसमें कोई संदेह नहीं कि वस्तुओं में होने वाले परिवर्तनों के लिये किसी एक अविकारी अधिष्ठान आश्रय की आवश्यकता है। शरीर मन और बुद्धि के स्तर पर होने वाले असंख्य अनुभवों को एक सूत्र में धारण कर एक पूर्ण जीवन का अनुभव कराने के लिये निश्चय ही एक नित्य अपरिर्तनशील सत् वस्तु का अधिष्ठान आवश्यक है।मणियों को धारण करने वाले एक सूत्र के समान हममें कुछ है जो परिवर्तनों के मध्य रहते हुये विविध अनुभवों को एक साथ बांधकर रखता है। सूक्ष्म विचार करने पर यह ज्ञान होगा कि वह कुछ अपनी स्वयं की चैतन्य स्वरूप आत्मा है। असंख्य अनुभव जो प्रकाशित हुये उनमें से कोई अनुभव आत्मा नहीं है। जीवन जो कि अनुभवों की एक धारा है योग है इस चैतन्य के कारण ही सम्भव है। बाल्यावस्था युवावस्था और वृद्धावस्था में होने वाले अनुभवों को यह चैतन्य ही प्रकाशित करता है। अनुभव आते हैं और जाते हैं। जिस चैतन्य के कारण मैंने सबको जाना जिसके बिना मेरा कोई अस्तित्व नहीं है वह चैतन्य आत्मा जन्म और नाश से रहित नित्य सत्य वस्तु है।तत्त्वदर्शी पुरुष इन दोनों सत् और असत् आत्मा और अनात्मा के तत्त्व को पहचानते हैं। इन दोनों के रहस्यमय संयोग से यह विचित्र जगत् उत्पन्न होता है।फिर वह नित्य सद्वस्तु क्या है सुनो

Objection: 'Indeed, for the very reason that all specific states are coming-and-going, for that very reason they are mourned.' (Answer): Not so. For thus: What is this named 'agama' (coming)? If you say 'origination'; what is that too? 'The gaining of self (existence) by the non-existent'—if that be it, it is false. For 'being of the nature of non-existence' means naturelessness, soullessness. How can the soulless, the natureless, be made to possess a nature? For the non-blue cannot be made blue; because becoming another nature is defective (impossible). And so the scripture: 'Indeed, the nature of entities cannot be reversed, like the heat of the sun.' Now, if 'origination' is the gaining of self of the Existent (Sat) only; then, since for this which has gained self there is never non-existence, it is eternality alone; so what mournability is there in 'agama' (coming)? Similarly, is 'apaya' (going/destruction) also of the Existent or the Non-existent? As for the Non-existent, it is non-existent indeed. Even for the Existent-natured, how can there be the nature of non-existence? If you say 'In the second moment it becomes of the nature of non-existence'; then even in the first it should be so; thus no entity would exist. Because nature is not abandoned. Now, if by the fall of a hammer etc. its destruction is created. If that (destruction) is distinct (from the object), what happened to the object? If you say 'It is not seen.' Let the object not be seen indeed; but it has not become otherwise, like (an object) covered by a cloth. But if non-distinct, it is not that (destruction)—this has been said.

(Opponent's view): Regarding "Never was I not..." (2.12), even Lord Krishna, having placed Himself in the position of the proponent to whom he (Arjuna) is objecting, shows the occasion for raising an objection—with 'nitya iti'.

"That which was stated has been inferred through the reason of being beginningless. So what?"—to this, he (Arjuna) asks with 'kimiti'. It implies: "Being beginningless should also be grasped [as the reason]." (Arjuna thinks): In the first case (positive concomitance), grasping the universal rule (vyapti) is impossible due to the absence of an example [since nothing else is beginningless like the Atman]. The second case (negative concomitance) is impossible to present because it is unproven. This is the intention of the opponent (Arjuna).

(Proponent's reply): The Siddhanthi (Krishna), knowing this intention, and considering whether to proceed through the straight positive method (anvaya) or the crooked negative method (vyatireka), accepts the second method—with 'anyadapiti' (something else too...).

With the stated intention, he asks—'taditi'. "In such a doubt"—this remains to be supplied.

Because the meaning is difficult to grasp, the Commentator explains the first half—with 'asata iti'. "Of the Asat"—meaning of the Cause, i.e., Prakriti. "Absence" (abhava)—meaning prior non-existence (pragabhava) and destruction (pradhvamsa).

"How is this established?"—to this, the Commentator first states the proof—with 'prakritiriti'. Purusha means the Supreme Self spoken of by the word Brahman. Regarding the beginninglessness of both, the Scripture (Agama) should be known thus.

(Objection): Surely, by the single sentence "Of the Asat and Sat there is no non-existence", the negation of the absence of both could be done; why then this separate negation? To this, he says—'prithagiti'. The taking of the two sentences with 'vidyate'—"Of the Asat there is no coming into being (in the sense of being created/destroyed? No, Jayatirtha interprets bhava as destruction or negates abhava for both, here the context is tricky, let's stick to his text: "of the Asat there is no bhava (change/destruction? or simply being created?) and of the Sat there is no abhava")—the separate negation of the absence of both is for the sake of adara (emphasis/respect). This construction should be made. And the emphasis is on the existence of the logical invariable concomitance (vyapti). Therefore, multiple examples are shown.

(Objection): Let it be so for the Sat, i.e., Brahman, but how for the Asat, i.e., the Cause? To this, he says—'asata iti'. The causal nature of the meaning of the word Asat is well-known in the Bhagavata—this is the meaning. 'Asatah' means the causality of the word Asat, or having the meaning of Cause. "By that which is of the form of Sat and Asat"—meaning of the form of cause and effect. Since the Shruti "From the Asat..." has many meanings, an example is given here. And the Unmanifest Cause is also the meaning of the word Asat.

The word Sat is formed from the root sad (to go/know) ending with kvip in the passive sense. [It is proven] by the statement: "Because of being of the form of Asat and Unmanifest, it is termed as Cause."

In this sense, the Lord states the proof—with 'ubhayorapi'. (Objection): That is false (asat), because the philosophy of one does not convince others? (Reply): Anticipating this,

he says that Tradition (Sampradaya) rooted in vision, which is a lineage of instruction, is spoken of here as proof through secondary implication (lakshana)—with 'sampradayatashcheti'. The word 'cha' is to combine with the proofs mentioned by the Commentator. Agama is a sentence bound in a book, while Sampradaya is merely a lineage of instruction—this is the difference.

This concerns the beginningless eternality of Matter (Prakriti) and Spirit (Purusha). Some, accepting a different order of the word 'api', describe that the proof indicated by it has been cited before.

(Objection): Surely 'anta' (end) means destruction etc., or limitation, which is said here to be seen by seers of truth; so how is there no contradiction? (Reply): To this, he says—'anta iti'. Here 'decision' (nirnaya) means the ascertainment of beginningless eternality. The wrong explanation has been refuted elsewhere.

(Objection): "Let there be the oneness of the Self (Purusha), yet the World (Samsara), consisting of that Real Self seeing the insentient, is also Real. In that case, since the causes of pleasure and pain like cold and heat exist, their experience is inevitable; and since the Real cannot be destroyed by knowledge, how can there be endurance (titiksha)? Or how does he become fit for immortality?"

(Reply): No. Because the entire dualistic world is imagined in the Self, its destruction by knowledge is justifiable. Just as silver imagined in a shell is destroyed by the knowledge of the shell.

(Objection): Again, since there is no difference in the perception (pratiti) of the Self and the non-Self, why should the non-Self not be Real like the Self? Or why should the Self not be False like the non-Self, since their status is equal? Anticipating this, the Lord states the distinction. That which is limited (paricchinna) by time, space, or object is 'Asat' (Unreal). For instance, a pot etc., being subject to birth and destruction, is limited by prior time and later time; being the counter-correlative of destruction and prior non-existence, it is called 'occasional' (kadachitka) or time-limited. Similarly, that very thing is space-limited because, being corporeal (murta), it does not exist in all places. Although it is a rule that what is time-limited is space-limited, yet atoms etc., accepted as space-limited by Logicians (Tarkikas), are not accepted as time-limited (by them), so space-limitation is mentioned separately.

And that (space-limitation) is absolute non-existence residing in some place. Similarly, the three kinds of difference—difference from the same species (sajatiya), difference from other species (vijatiya), and internal difference (svagata)—constitute object-limitation (vastu-pariccheda). For example, a tree's difference from another tree, from a stone etc., and from its own leaves/flowers. Or the fivefold difference: Jiva-Ishvara, Jiva-Jagat, Jiva-Jiva, Ishvara-Jagat, and Jagat-Jagat. Even though space (Akasha) etc. are not limited by time and space, Logicians accept object-limitation in them, hence the separate mention.

The same should be applied to the Sankhya view. Of such an 'Asat'—meaning the entire world of cold, heat, etc.—the bhava (Being), i.e., Reality or absolute nature—which means "absence of such limitation having a reality not less than itself"—does not exist, is not possible. Because, like pot-ness and non-pot-ness, limitation and unlimitedness are contradictory in one place. Indeed, there is no perceived object which is not negated in some time, place, or object, because it does not follow everywhere. Nor is the 'Sat-vastu' (Real Entity) negated in any place, time, or object, because it follows everywhere. Thus, in the 'Sat-vastu' which follows everywhere, the deviating variable object is imagined; just as in the persisting rope-piece, the variable snake-stream etc. are imagined—this is the idea.

(Objection): If the variable is imagined, then the 'Sat-vastu' would also be imagined, because it is also variable by being distinct from the Void (Tuchha)? (Reply): To this, he says—'na abhavo vidyate satah' (there is no non-existence of the Real). Being the counter-correlative of difference residing in the 'Sat' constitutes object-limitation; and that is not due to being distinct from the Void. Because reality cannot be applied to the Void (like a hare's horn), and the principle is "Absence is defined by Sat and Asat." Since the one, self-luminous, eternal, all-pervading 'Sat' is woven through everything, individual differences within 'Sat' are not accepted. And since the cognition "The pot is existent" (ghatah san) is universal, 'Sat' cannot be the counter-correlative of difference residing in the pot etc. Therefore, the abhava—meaning limitation by space, time, or object—of the 'Sat', which is Pure Existence woven through all, does not exist, is not possible; due to contradiction as before—this is the meaning.

(Objection): "There is no object called 'Sat' whose limitation by space, time, and object is being negated. Rather, 'Sattva' (Existence) is the highest Genus (Para-samanya) due to whose substratum the usage of 'Sat' occurs in Substance, Quality, and Action. It resides in Genus, Particularity, and Inherence through the relation of its single substratum. And thus, the 'existence' of the 'Asat' pot etc. (which is the counter-correlative of prior non-existence) comes from the operation of the cause, and its 'absence' occurs due to the destruction of the cause even though it was existent. So how is it said 'Of the unreal there is no being, of the real there is no non-being'?" (Reply): This being obtained, he refutes it—with the half-verse 'ubhayorapi'.

The 'anta'—meaning the limit or determinate nature, that "what is Sat is Sat indeed, what is Asat is Asat indeed"—of both the Sat and the Asat has been 'drishta' (seen/ascertained) through Shruti, Smriti, and reasoning after inquiry. By whom? By the tattvadarshis—the knowers of Brahman whose nature is to see the absolute truth of things; not by bad logicians (kutarkikas). Therefore, the misconception of bad logicians is not unjustifiable. The word 'tu' is for emphasis. The invariable rule alone is seen, not the variable otherwise-nature—this is seen only by seers of truth, not by those who do not see the truth—this is the meaning. Thus the Shruti—starting with "Existent alone, O Somya, was this in the beginning, One only without a second," and concluding with "All this has That as its Self, That is Truth, That is the Self, That Thou Art, O Shvetaketu"—shows the 'Sat' as One, devoid of same-species, other-species, and internal differences, and as Truth. The Shruti "Modification is merely a name arising from speech..." shows the falsity of mere modification due to its being variable and dependent on speech. The Shruti "By the sprout of food, O Somya, seek the root Water..." shows that all modifications are imagined in the 'Sat'.

And 'Sattva' is not a Genus (Samanya), because there is no proof for that. Since the cognition "Sat, Sat" is common to all objects, it is not proper to imagine a 'Sattva' residing only in Substance, Quality, and Action—which cannot explain itself (without another existence)—because the reverse is also easily arguable (that Substance defines Existence). Since a uniform cognition is sustained by a uniform object, it is inappropriate to imagine a difference of relation and nature. If the cognition is uniform even when the object is not uniform, there would be a contingency of the destruction of the very concept of Genus.

Therefore, the One Real Entity (Sad-vastu)—which is of the nature of self-luminous consciousness, the illuminator of known and unknown states, and the justification for the usage of "Sat" everywhere through the superimposition of its identity—is objectified in the pot by the cognition "The pot is existent" (san ghatah) as being non-different from the 'Sat-individual' alone, not as possessing Existence through inherence. Because the cognition of non-difference cannot be sustained by a relation involving difference. Thus, by cognitions like "Substance is existent, Quality is existent," the non-difference of all from 'Sat' is established. And since the difference between Substance and Quality is not established, a property called 'Sattva' is not imagined in those property-holders; rather, the property-holder being 'Sat', the non-difference of substance etc. (is accepted) for simplicity. And since that (non-difference) is not possible realistically, it is superimpostional—that is another matter. As stated by the Vartikakara (Sureshavara): "There can be no difference of Substance-ness etc. even from Existence ('Satta'); from what else could it be? For the cognition is of one form: Existent Substance, Existent Quality..." etc. Existence also does not differentiate from the 'Asat' because that (Asat) is unknown/unestablished. And Substance-ness etc. are properties of 'Sat', so they do not differentiate the 'Sat'—this is the meaning. Therefore, even the cognition "Cloth is different from Pot" does not prove difference, because pot, cloth, and their difference are one through the difference of 'Sat' (imagined within Sat). Thus, where the grasp of difference is absent, there the cognition of non-difference with Sat, gaining a foothold, triumphs.

Since Logicians accept the entity 'Time' as being the nature of everything, and all transaction is justifiable by that alone, there is no proof for imagining entities other than that. The explanation of the cognition of everything as identical (with Sat) is possible through that very (Time/Sat) which is woven through all as Existence and as Illumination. Since Illumination is also one by being woven through all, its eternality will be explained in detail in the next verse.

Thus, the Real Entity alone becomes fit for immortality by the cessation of the Unreal imagined by Maya, and endurance (titiksha) is also justified by the perspective of Pure Existence—this is the idea.

Objection: "By enduring pain and the like, this body will indeed be destroyed; and liberation through the destruction of the body is certainly not desired; therefore, what is the use of enduring pain?" Anticipating this doubt, He says—"nāsataḥ" (of the non-existent), etc. Of the "asat"—meaning the worldly (laukika)—there is no "bhāvaḥ"—meaning supernatural/divine existence (alaukika). Of the "sat"—meaning the supernatural which consists of the Lord's existence—there is no "abhāvaḥ"—meaning destruction. This is the meaning.

Here, the example is the Gopis: some were inside their homes, while others had gone to the Lord's Raas-leela; thus it is said—"ubhayorapi" (of both).

The word "tu" (indeed/but) is used to remove your [flawed] perception. The "anta" (end/conclusion) of both of these has been seen by the "tattva-darshis"—meaning by the devotees who are fit for seeing the Lord; the fruit thereof has been seen—this is the meaning. The purport is: If you also desire the same, then endure pleasure and pain, etc.; by merely this, the destruction of the body fit for the Lord, etc., will not occur.

Of the 'asatah'—non-existent—cold, heat, etc., which are 'sakaarana' (accompanied by causes), there is no 'bhavah'—becoming or existence—'na vidyate'. For indeed, cold, heat, etc., along with their cause, when examined by proofs, cannot possibly be a (real) entity. For that is a modification; and a modification deviates (is inconstant). Just as the configuration of a pot etc., when examined by the eye, is unreal because it is not perceived apart from the clay; so is every modification unreal because it is not perceived apart from the cause. And because the effect, pot etc., is not perceived before birth and after destruction, and because the cause like clay etc. is not perceived apart from its cause, there is unreality.

(Objection): If it is unreal, there is the contingency of the absence of everything (nihilism)? (Answer): No, because everywhere two understandings (cognitions) are perceived: 'real-cognition' and 'unreal-cognition'. That object regarding which the understanding does not deviate is 'Real'; that object regarding which it deviates is 'Unreal'. Thus, the division of Real and Unreal being dependent on understanding, everywhere two understandings are perceived by all, having a common locus (coordinate), not like 'blue lotus' [but like] 'Real pot', 'Real cloth', 'Real elephant'. Thus everywhere. Of those two understandings, the understanding of 'pot etc.' deviates. And so it has been shown. But not the understanding of 'Real'. Therefore, the object of the pot-understanding is unreal because of deviation; but not the object of the Real-understanding, because of non-deviation.

(Objection): When the pot is destroyed, while the pot-understanding deviates (ceases), the Real-understanding also deviates? (Answer): No, because the Real-understanding is seen even in cloth etc. That Real-understanding has only the attribute (adjective) as its object. (Objection): Like the Real-understanding, the pot-understanding is also seen in another pot? (Answer): No, because it is not seen in cloth etc. (Objection): The Real-understanding is also not seen in a destroyed pot? (Answer): No, because of the absence of the substantive (subject). The Real-understanding being concerned with the attribute, when the substantive is absent, and the attribute is thus inappropriate, what would be its object? But not, however, because of the absence of the object of the Real-understanding itself (Existence). (Objection): Having a single locus (coordination) is not proper in the absence of the substantive like pot etc.? (Answer): No, because in 'This is water' in a mirage etc., coordination is seen even in the absence of one of them.

Therefore, of the body etc. and the dualities, along with their cause, which are unreal, there is no being. Similarly, of the 'satah'—the Real, the Self—'abhavah'—non-existence—'na vidyate'—is not there, because of non-deviation everywhere—thus we have said.

Thus, of the Self and non-Self, the Real and Unreal, of 'both indeed', the 'antah'—the conclusion that the Real is indeed Real, and the Unreal is indeed Unreal—'drstah'—is seen, perceived. By whom? 'Tu' (But)—of these two as described—'tattvadarshibhih' (by the seers of truth). 'Tat' is a pronoun; and all is Brahman; Its name is 'Tat'; the nature of that is 'Tattvam', the true nature of Brahman. Those whose nature it is to see that are 'Tattvadarshinah' (seers of truth); by those seers of truth. You too, resorting to the vision of the seers of truth, abandoning grief and delusion, having determined in the mind that 'This modification—cold, heat, etc., the dualities of constant and changing forms—is indeed unreal, appearing falsely like mirage-water,' endure them; this is the intention. What, however, is That which is said to be Real always?

Refuting the modification known as 'existence' (coming into being), He speaks of the state of not warranting grief with—"nāsataḥ" etc. The idea is that 'existence' is a modification etc., because it occurs after origination. Just as in the Shruti "In the beginning this was verily non-existent (asat); from that the existent (sat) was born" (Taittiriya Up. 2.7), the theory of Asadvada (non-existence) is refuted by the logic "How can Being be produced from Non-being?" (Chandogya Up. 6.2.2); similarly, here too, Asadvada is refuted by the Lord.

Of the "asat"—that which does not exist in the three times (past, present, future), like a sky-flower—there is no "bhāvaḥ" or being. And of the "sat"—the existing, the Atman which is existent even in the three times—there is no "abhāvaḥ" (non-existence). This is because there is no perception that "the Atman was not, is not, or will not be."

Since the unreal (asat) truly has no being, one cannot assert the absolute being of the body etc., because they are perishable. Nor can one assert their absolute non-being, because they have origination. Since the 'bhava' (becoming/birth) of the non-existent is not possible, therefore this world consisting of bodies etc. must be spoken of as "sad-asat" (existent-non-existent); and even being distinct from (absolute) Sat and Asat, its character of 'sadasatva' does not vanish.

Hence it is said in the Bhagavata: "Shadows, echoes, and reflections, though unreal (asat), are effective (arthakari); similarly, existing things like the body cause fear until death." According to this statement, even though they are of perishable nature, they possess reality due to being effective/causal; otherwise, there would be an absence of actions like giving charity from that which is 'asat'. We have stated that its nature is 'sad-asat' also because it is an effect of Prakriti. This very fact constitutes its impermanence, for being the counter-positive of prior non-existence, it is also the counter-positive of destruction. And its eternality should be understood from the perspective of non-difference from Brahman, who is Saccidananda and the cause of Prakriti. As stated in Sri Vishnu Purana: "O best of Sages, this entire universe is undecaying and eternal... for this is of the nature of the Imperishable (Akshara)," etc. Nor should it be said that the 'Veda-stuti' has established only its non-existence (asattva), for there existence is refuted [only] from the standpoint of difference from That (Brahman). It is mentioned there with a glance towards refuting the views of the Mimamsakas and others, as stated in that very text: "Duality is desired for the sake of transaction," etc.

Alternatively (Or)—"nāsataḥ" etc. Here is the consideration: 'Sat' is of two kinds, pure and impure. Pure is regarding the Self, impure is regarding the non-Self. Thus, of the "asataḥ"—meaning of the person's body etc., which is devoid of pure being compared to the Self—there is no "bhāvaḥ", meaning pure being/existence does not exist, but rather [its existence] is modified and unstable. And of the "sataḥ"—meaning of the Self which possesses pure existence (the singular number is used with the intention of the oneness of the Self and the Imperishable Brahman)—there is no "abhāvaḥ" or non-being, meaning the modified existence which is the absence of pure existence is not found. The conclusion regarding these two has been seen by the seers of truth. By this, growth and modification are also refuted.

न not? असतः of the unreal? विद्यते is? भावः being? न not? अभावः nonbeing? विद्यते is? सतः of the real? उभयोः of the two? अपि also? दृष्टः (has been) seen? अन्तः the final truth? तु indeed? अनयोः of these? तत्त्वदर्शिभिः by the knowers of the Truth.Commentary -- The changeless? homogeneous Atman or the Self always exists. It is the only solid Reality. This phenomenal world of names and forms is ever changing. Hence it is unreal. The sage or the Jivanmukta is fully aware that the Self always exists and that this world is like a mirage. Through his Jnanachakshus or the eye of intuition? he directly cognises the Self. This world vanishes for him like the snake in the rope? after it has been seen that only the rope exists. He rejects the names and forms and takes the underlying Essence in all the names and forms? viz.? AstiBhatiPriya or Satchidananda or ExistenceKnowledgeBliss Absolute. Hence he is a Tattvadarshi or a knower of the Truth or the Essence.What is changing must be unreal. What is constant or permanent must be real.

Since 'the unreal has no being,' etc., for this reason also it is proper to bear cold, heat, etc. without becoming sorrowful or deluded. Asatah, of the unreal, of cold, heat, etc. together with their causes; na vidyate, there is no; bhavah, being, existence, reality; because heat, cold, etc. together with their causes are not substantially real when tested by means of proof. For they are changeful, and whatever is changeful is inconstant. As configurations like pot etc. are unreal since they are not perceived to be different from earth when tested by the eyes, so also are all changeful things unreal because they are not perceived to be different from their (material) causes, and also because they are not perceived before (their) origination and after destruction.
Objection: If it be that [Here Ast. has the additional words 'karyasya ghatadeh, the effect, viz pot etc. (and)'.-Tr.] such (material) causes as earth etc. as also their causes are unreal since they are not perceived differently from their causes, in that case, may it not be urged that owing to the nonexistence of those (causes) there will arise the contingency of everything becoming unreal [An entity cannot be said to be unreal merely because it is non-different from its cause. Were it to be asserted as being unreal, then the cause also should be unreal, because there is no entity which is not subject to the law of cuase and effect.]?
Vedantin: No, for in all cases there is the experience of two awarenesses, viz the awareness of reality, and the awareness of unreality. [In all cases of perception two awarenesses are involved: one is invariable, and the other is variable. Since the variable is imagined on the invariable, therefore it is proved that there is something which is the substratum of all imagination, and which is neither a cause nor an effect.] That in relation to which the awareness does not change is real; that in relation to which it changes is unreal. Thus, since the distinction between the real and the unreal is dependent on awareness, therefore in all cases (of empirical experiences) everyone has two kinds of awarenesses with regard to the same substratum: (As for instance, the experiences) 'The pot is real', 'The cloth is real', 'The elephant is real' (which experiences) are not like (that of) 'A blue lotus'. [In the empirical experience, 'A blue lotus', there are two awarenesses concerned with two entities, viz the substance (lotus) and the ality (blueness). In the case of the experience, 'The pot is real', etc. the awarenesses are not concerned with substratum and alities, but the awareness of pot,of cloth, etc. are superimposed on the awareness of 'reality', like that of 'water' in a mirage.] This is how it happens everywhere. [The coexistence of 'reality' and 'pot' etc. are valid only empirically according to the non-dualists; whereas the coexistence of 'blueness' and 'lotus' is real according to the dualists.]
Of these two awareness, the awareness of pot etc. is inconstant; and thus has it been shown above. But the awareness of reality is not (inconstant). Therefore the object of the awareness of pot etc. is unreal because of inconstancy; but not so the object of the awareness of reality, because of its constancy.
Objection: If it be argued that, since the awareness of pot also changes when the pot is destroyed, therefore the awareness of the pot's reality is also changeful?
Vedantin: No, because in cloth etc. the awareness of reality is seen to persist. That awareness relates to the odjective (and not to the noun 'pot'). For this reason also it is not destroyed. [This last sentence has been cited in the f.n. of A.A.-Tr.]
Objection: If it be argued that like the awareness of reality, the awareness of a pot also persists in other pots?
Vedantin: No, because that (awareness of pot) is not present in (the awareness of) a cloth etc.
Objection: May it not be that even the awareness of reality is not present in relation to a pot that has been destroyed?
Vedantin: No, because the noun is absent (there). Since the awareness of reality corresponds to the adjective (i.e. it is used adjectivelly), therefore, when the noun is missing there is no possibility of its (that awareness) being an adjective. So, to what should it relate? But, again, the awareness of reality (does not cease) with the absence of an object৷৷ [Even when a pot is absent and the awareness of reality does not arise with regare to it, the awareness of reality persists in the region where the pot had existed.
Some read nanu in place of na tu ('But, again'). In that case, the first portion (No,৷৷.since৷৷.adjective. So,৷৷.relate?) is a statement of the Vedantin, and the Objection starts from nanu punah sadbuddheh, etc. so, the next Objection will run thus: 'May it not be said that, when nouns like pot etc. are absent, the awareness of existence has no noun to alify, and therefore it becomes impossible for it (the awareness of existence) to exist in the same substratum?'-Tr.]
Objection: May it not be said that, when nouns like pot etc. are absent, (the awareness of existence has no noun to alify and therefore) it becomes impossible for it to exist in the same substratum? [The relationship of an adjective and a noun is seen between two real entities. Therefore, if the relationship between 'pot' and 'reality' be the same as between a noun and an adjective, then both of them will be real entities. So, the coexistence of reality with a non-pot does not stand to reason.]
Vedantin: No, because in such experiences as, 'This water exists', (which arises on seeing a mirage etc.) it is observed that there is a coexistence of two objects though one of them is non-existent.
Therefore, asatah, of the unreal, viz body etc. and the dualities (heat, cold, etc.), together with their causes; na vidyate, there is no; bhavah, being. And similarly, satah, of the real, of the Self; na vidyate, there is no; abhavah, nonexistence, because It is constant everywhere. This is what we have said.
Tu, but; antah, the nature, the conclusion (regarding the nature of the real and the unreal) that the Real is verily real, and the unreal is verily unreal; ubhayoh api, of both these indeed, of the Self and the non-Self, of the Real and the unreal, as explained above; drstah, has been realized thus; tattva-darsibhih, by the seers of Truth. Tat is a pronoun (Sarvanama, lit. name of all) which can be used with regard to all. And all is Brahman. And Its name is tat. The abstraction of tat is tattva, the true nature of Brahman. Those who are apt to realize this are tattva-darsinah, seers of Truth.
Therefore, you too, by adopting the vision of the men of realization and giving up sorrow and delusion, forbear the dualities, heat, cold, etc. some of which are definite in their nature, and others inconstant , mentally being convinced that this (phenomenal world) is changeful, verily unreal and appears falsely like water in a mirage. This is the idea.
What, again, is that reality which remains verily as the Real and surely for ever? This is being answered in, 'But know That', etc.

'The unreal,' that is, the body, can never come into being. 'The real,' that is, the self, can never cease to be. The finale about these, the body and the self, which can be experienced, has been realised correctly by the seers of the Truth. As analyis ends in conclusion, the term 'finale' is here used. The meaning is this: Non-existence (i.e., perishableness) is the real nature of the body which is in itself insentient. Existence (i.e., imperishableness) is the real nature of the self, which is sentient. [What follows is the justification of describing the body as 'unreal' and as having 'never come into being.']
Non-existence has, indeed, the nature of perishableness, and existence has the nature of imperishableness, as Bhagavan Parasara has said: 'O Brahmana, apart from conscious entity there does not exist any group of things anywhere and at any time. Thus have I taught you what is real existence - how conscious entity is real, and all else is unreal' (V. P., 2.12.43 - 45). 'The Supreme Reality is considered as imperishable by the wise. There is no doubt that what can be obtained from a perishable substance is also perishable' (Ibid., 2.14.24). 'That entity which even by a change in time cannot come to possess a difference through modification etc., is real. What is that entity, O King? (It is the self who retains Its knowledge)' (Ibid., 2.13.100).
It is said here also: 'These bodies ৷৷. are said to have an end' (2.18) and 'Know That (the Atman) to be indestructible' (2.17). It is seen from this that this (i.e., perishableness of the body and imperishableness of the self) is the reason for the designating the Atman as 'existence' (Sattva) and body as 'non-existence' (Asvattva). This verse has no reference to the doctrine of Satkaryavada (i.e., the theory that effects are present in the cause), as such a theory has no relevance here. Arjuna is deluded about the true nature of the body and the self; so what ought to be taught to him in order to remove his delusion, is discrimination between these two - what is alified by perishablenss and what, by imperishableness. This (declaration) is introduced in the following way: 'For the dead, or for the living' (2.11).
Again this poin is made clear immediately (by the words), 'Know that to be indestructible ৷৷.' (2.17) and 'These bodies ৷৷. are said to have an end' (2.18).
How the imperishableness of the self is to be understood, Sri Krsna now teaches: