Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 2 - Shloka (Verse) 27

व्याख्या-- 'जातस्य हि ध्रुवो मृत्युध्रुवं जन्म मृतस्य च'-- पूर्वश्लोकके अनुसार अगर शरीरीको नित्य जन्मने और मरनेवाला भी मान लिया जाय, तो भी वह शोकका विषय नहीं हो सकता। कारण कि जिसका जन्म हो गया है, वह जरूर मरेगा और जो मर गया है, वह जरूर जन्मेगा।
'तस्मादपरिहार्येऽर्थे न त्वं शोचितुमर्हसि'-- इसलिये कोई भी इस जन्म-मृत्युरूप प्रवाहका परिहार (निवारण) नहीं कर सकता; क्योंकि इसमें किसीका किञ्चिन्मात्र भी वश नहीं चलता। यह जन्म-मृत्युरूप प्रवाह तो अनादिकालसे चला आ रहा है और अनन्तकालतक चलता रहेगा। इस दृष्टिसे तुम्हारे लिये शोक करना उचित नहीं है।
ये धृतराष्ट्रके पुत्र जन्में हैं, तो जरूर मरेंगे। तुम्हारे पास ऐसा कोई उपाय नहीं है, जिससे तुम उनको बचा सको। जो मर जायेंगे, वे जरूर जन्मेंगे। उनको भी तुम रोक नहीं सकते। फिर शोक किस बातका?

ऐसा होनेसे जिसने जन्म लिया है उसका मरण ध्रुव निश्चित है और जो मर गया है उसका जन्म ध्रुव निश्चित है इसलिये यह जन्ममरणरूप भाव अपरिहार्य है अर्थात् किसी प्रकार भी इसका प्रतिकार नहीं किया जा सकता इस अपरिहार्य विषयके निमित्त तुझे शोक करना उचित नहीं।

Given that those two [birth and death] are inevitable, He states another reason regarding the impropriety of grief, with [the verse beginning with] 'tatha cha' (and thus).

He clarifies the absence of grief in this view (of non-eternalness/body-identification) with 'jatasya' (for the born), etc.
(Refutation of opposing interpretation): Objection: 'In the view where the Self lasts until the dissolution of the elements, or in the view of eternalness, since there is a possibility of seen and unseen suffering, I grieve out of fear of that?'—Thus it is said (by some). This has not been introduced (accepted) by the Acharyas because it does not align with the original text 'as it is heard' (literally). Therefore, the answer is indeed regarding the 'unavoidable matter' (apariharye arthe)—which is characterized by inevitable birth and death—even regarding grief caused by unseen factors. Indeed, the interpretation that 'the action called War is unavoidable for a Kshatriya' etc., should be disregarded, because it contradicts the context; for in the first half of the verse, only the certainty of the matter characterized by 'birth and death' is presented (not war).

(Refutation of alternative view): However, regarding what some say—'Or, these two verses are indeed in the view of the eternal Self, because it is impossible for the extremely theistic Arjuna to accept a view outside the Vedas (atheism). The construction of the words is: This (Self) is eternal, and due to the connection with the body and senses, it is "born"; thus it is "nitya-jatam" (eternally-born). If you consider this Self, though being eternal, as "born", and similarly, though being eternal, as "dead", even then you ought not to grieve'—having proposed this, they claim the reason is given in 'jatasya hi...' etc. (In their view) death is the separation of the body, etc., and birth is the connection.

And they claim the Bhashya (Shankara's commentary) should also be construed in this view. (Resolution): That is questionable (flawed). Because it is invalid to connect a 'part of a compound word' (i.e., 'nitya' from 'nitya-jatam') separately to the verb, and because imagining a convoluted meaning devoid of purpose is unjustifiable. Objection: 'But the purpose was stated: the impossibility of the extremely theistic Arjuna accepting a view outside the Vedas?' Reply: No. Because it has been stated that the Lord Himself has demonstrated the 'Kaimutya Nyaya' (a fortiori argument: 'if even in that case, how much more so here') by accepting (conceding) the view.

And thus, there is the statement of Lord Vasistha to the extremely theistic Sri Ramachandra: 'If you have realized the certainty that "You existed before, and similarly will exist in the future, and are present here today," then why do you grieve for the other Pranas (lives) passing away nearby, for kinsmen, and for the very many who have passed? (Eternal View). (If) you were different before, and similarly will be (different) in the future (Momentary View); if so, O Rama, even then, why are you deluded holding onto the "existent form"? (Since the griever and grieved do not persist). (If) having existed before, and having existed (now), if you will not exist again (Materialist/Destruction View); even then, being "one whose Samsara has ceased," for what purpose do you grieve? Therefore, being sorrowful is not proper in this natural worldly illusion; similarly, "Mudita" (cheerfulness) is proper, and following one's duty is proper.' This has been explained by the commentators.

Thus, given the unattached nature of the Self, the possibility of grief was stated in the vision of duality. Now, let it be unattached; but is it eternal? Or momentary? Or perishable after some time like a pot having prior-non-existence? In all these views, grief for kinsmen is not proper—wishing to resolve this with boldness (argumentative maturity), (Vasistha) says in the first alternative: 'Tvam chet' (If you...). 'Iti'—meaning if you have realized such certainty, then 'for kinsmen and Pranas, etc.' (why grieve?)—this is the ellipsis to be supplied. Due to the absence of a specific determining factor ('vinigamana'), there is incapacity for 'all grief' (grief in general); hence the purport is that grief is not proper anywhere. In the second (momentary) view also, he says: 'Purvam' (Before...) etc. Now implies one, later another; if you know the Self to be momentary, even then why are you deluded clinging to the 'present form'? Because in the second moment, both the object of grief and the griever are non-existent, so there is no occasion for grief; this is the meaning. In the third (materialist) view also, he says: 'Pura' (Before...) etc. Even then, due to the very destruction of the self, 'Samsara is ceased' (suffering ends). (Conclusion): When grief is not proper even when the Self is associated with birth, etc. (in these views), then what to say of the fact that it is not proper when the Self is unattached, indifferent, immutable, self-luminous, and of the essence of perfect bliss—with this intention, He concludes with 'Tasmat' (Therefore). 'Mudita' means the attitude of natural contentment.

And regarding what was said that 'The Bhashya also (fits this view)...' etc., that is also not correct. Because the plan to construe the Bhashya statement 'This is said having accepted the eternalness of the Self' into this view (of the opponent) is impossible. 'Having accepted the "cutting" of eternalness (impermanence)'—this does not fit, because eternalness is (Shankara's) own doctrine (so one doesn't 'accept/assume' one's own established doctrine for argument). If one supplies the ellipsis as 'non-eternalness due to connection with body, etc.', then it should have been said 'having accepted birth, etc.' (instead of non-eternalness). And 'Atha cha' is in the sense of acceptance (of an alternative). The Bhashya states: 'If you consider this Self under discussion as nitya-jatam (constantly born)... according to common belief, "born, born" with the origin of every body... or constantly "dead, dead" with every destruction...'—Since the Bhashya is intent on establishing the connection of the word 'nitya' (constantly) with 'born', etc., it is impossible to construe it in the said (opponent's eternal soul) view. This is the direction.

Why is there an absence of grief?

Because of 'inevitability'—He states this with 'jatasya' (for the born), etc.

It was said 'You ought not to grieve'; He states the reason for that with 'jatasya' (for the born), etc.

'Dhruvah' means unavoidable. 'Mrityuh' means death. Regarding the unavoidable matter named death—a subject inevitable even without your effort—you ought not to grieve.

And He will say later: 'By Me alone have these already been killed' (Gita 11.33).

For the born, destruction is 'dhruva'—found to be unavoidable. Similarly, for the destroyed also, 'birth' is unavoidable. How is this perceived, that 'there is birth of the destroyed'? Because the birth is perceived only of the 'Existent' (Sat), and there is non-perception of the non-existent. Birth, destruction, etc., are specific states of the existent substance. Threads etc. are indeed substances; when endowed with a specific arrangement, they are called cloth etc. Even by the Asatkaryavadin (one who holds the effect does not exist in the cause), only this much is perceived. For indeed, no other substance is perceived there apart from the specific arrangement of threads. Since the specifics of causal operation, taking of another name, and usage are explicable by this much alone, the imagination of another substance is not proper. Therefore, birth, destruction, etc., are specific states of the existent substance. The attainment of another state opposed to that, by the substance which had obtained the state called 'birth', is called 'destruction'. Just like the states of lump, pot, sherd, powder, etc. of the substance clay, the sequence of transformation is unavoidable for a transforming substance. There, the attainment of the later state by the substance in the previous state is destruction; that very thing is the birth of the one in that (new) state. Thus, since the sequence of transformation named birth and destruction is inevitable for a transforming substance, you ought 'not to grieve' therein. He says that whatever slight grief exists due to seeing the attainment of another state opposed to the previous state of an existent substance, even that is not possible regarding beings like men etc.

'Why [should one not grieve]?' Regarding this, He says 'jatasya' (for the born), etc. 'Hi' (Because)—since for one who is born, upon the exhaustion of the karma that initiated [the body], death is 'dhruva' (certain).

And for the dead, due to the karma performed by the respective body, birth is also indeed 'dhruva' (certain).

'Tat' (Therefore)—in such an unavoidable matter—a matter characterized by inevitable birth and death—you, being wise, ought not to grieve; meaning you are not fit [for grief].

To exclude other meanings of words like Dhruva, Mrityu, Mrita, etc., and to establish the topic at hand (non-eternalness of the body), he explains the verse 'jatasya' etc., starting with 'utpannasya' (of the produced). 'Upalabhyate' (is observed)—here, the well-known proof indicated by the word 'hi' is being stated. Although 'hi' implies a reason, practically that proof is established by it.

Regarding 'mritasya' (birth of the dead), the opponent raises an objection based on the impossibility of birth—'katham' (how) etc. (Idea): 'If this were merely a scriptural teaching, it might be accepted. But here, "jatasya hi" states it as a commonly established fact. And in the world, the origin of only what was previously non-existent is seen; never of something that was produced and then destroyed. And if the destroyed were born again, since total cessation of suffering (Moksha) would be impossible, the entire scripture of liberation would be invalid, and efforts like curing disease or conquering enemies would be futile. Also, one should not grieve for the death of a son, etc.—this too is not logical.' This is the thought.

(Resolution): He resolves this with 'sata eva' (of the existent alone...) etc. Objection: 'But both of these are incorrect; because the Existent (Sat) does not need origin, and only the origin of previously Non-existent (Asat) things like pots is seen?' Anticipating this, he says 'utpatti...' (the states named origin and destruction...) etc. He illustrates: 'tantu prabhutini hi' (for threads, etc...). Before the connection of the final thread, and even in a cloth started by a single long thread—this [sat-karya] is accepted even by you; this is the purport. And it is said by Narayanacharya: 'From a single very long thread, the origin of a cloth, etc., is seen' (Nyaya Manjari).

Against the Asat-karyavadin (who believes the effect is non-existent before origin): Regarding 'Avayavi' (the whole), is there a substance distinct from the collection of parts seen or imagined? Intending this alternative, he points out the flaw in the first option (seen) with 'asat' (it is non-existent...). 'Etavat' (This much)—meaning it is merely possessing a specific arrangement. By the words 'vadina upalabhyate' (is found by the disputant), he implies the contradiction between speech and mind (saying one thing, experiencing another). 'Etavadeva' (Only this much)—he expands on this stated meaning with 'na hi' (not indeed...) etc.

He refutes the second option (imagined) with 'karaka' (agent's operation...) etc. If, like the Sankhyas, we said that 'both' (substance and state)—i.e., everything—is 'anagantuka' (not new/eternal), then there would be flaws like the futility of the agent's operation. But we say that all substances are 'anagantuka' (eternal) and their states are 'agantuka' (new/adventitious). Like a pot, etc., even in lamps, etc., the attainment of another state is inferred. However, like a crushed and disintegrated pot, the attainment of the subtle state (of the lamp) is not perceived. Therefore, there is no fault—this is the purport. Here, by 'specific usage' (vyavahara-vishesha), fetching water, etc., is intended; because 'taking another name' is mentioned separately. By this, the difference in cause-number-size, cognition-shape, etc., and also 'prior-posterior' and 'destroyed-undestroyed' distinctions are resolved.

In imagining a 'different substance' (dravyantara), there is the issue of effects of 'additional weight', and explaining it away by obstruction of weight of either parts or whole is 'extremely convoluted'—with this intention he says 'na cha dravyantara' (nor a different substance...). And it is said (in Bhamati): 'If the effect were a different substance from the causes, weight would increase in the effect; and that is not seen. The designation "a pot of two palas" would not be appropriate.' He concludes with 'atah' (therefore) etc. Because only that much (change of state) is perceived, and nothing else (new substance) is perceived, and the assumptions (of the opponent) can be explained otherwise—this is the meaning.

Objection: 'Let the origin of a substance be a "specific state," but destruction is indeed of the nature of "non-existence" (abhava); so how can it be called "its state," which is contradictory (being positive)?'—To this, he says 'utpattyakhyam' (named origin...) etc. The intention is: We do not perceive any distinct entity called 'Non-existence' (Abhava); nor is it proper to imagine it based on usage like 'it is not'; because it can be explained by the 'other state' accepted by both parties. And do not argue that 'upon accepting the red state by abandoning the dark state, there would be the usage of "pot-destruction,"' because even you do not accept the red state as contradictory to the pot-state, unlike the kapala (shard) state.

Objection: 'Contradiction is not proper between things that fall into the same category of "Being" (Bhavatva)?'—This should not be said. Because contradiction characterized by 'not co-existing' and 'destroyer-destroyed' relation is seen between 'beings' like light and darkness, cold and heat, grass and fire. And 'non-existence of non-existence' is accepted as 'being' (Bhava). Otherwise, since 'Non-existence' (Abhava) falls in the same category as 'Padartha' (Category/Knowable), its contradiction with 'Bhava' would not be possible in any way. Thus, the contradictory subsequent state is Pradhvamsa (Destruction). The contradictory prior state is Pragabhava (Prior Non-existence). The extraordinary contradictory attribute present in another object is Anyonyabhava (Mutual Non-existence/Difference) and Atyantabhava (Absolute Non-existence), distinguished by co-locative and non-co-locative negation. Samsargabhava (Relational Non-existence) is a specific combination of space and time, or a specific state caused by it. And due to the difference in counter-correlates (pratiyogi), etc., the variety of usage like 'is' and 'is not' occurs, just like the usage of 'fatherhood' and 'sonhood'.

Objection: 'If the attainment of the subsequent state like "shard-ness" is "destruction"; then upon "shard-destruction" (when shards are ground to powder), the "pot-destruction" itself would be destroyed; so there would be the contingency of the "emergence of the pot" in the powder state? And if the lump-state is "pot-prior-non-existence"; then before the formation of the lump (in powder), due to the absence of prior-non-existence, there would be "pot-fulfillment" (pot existence) or "absolute non-existence of pot"?' To this, he says 'mriddravyasya' (of the clay substance...) etc.

The intention is: It is not that only the single state of 'shard-ness' is contradictory to 'pot-ness'; but since states like 'powder-ness' are also contradictory to it, even for one who accepts destruction as 'non-existence', a 'series of contradictory states' is unavoidable. Therefore, since 'shard-ness', 'powder-ness', etc., are indistinguishably 'contradictory subsequent states', the usage of 'pot-destruction' is justifiable in all those states. Similarly, regarding 'prior-non-existence', it is explained by the 'series of contradictory prior states'. And if this is not accepted, the stated fault is unavoidable even in the view of 'distinct non-existence'. For there too, if the substance 'pot' is the 'cessation of pot-prior-non-existence'; then upon 'pot-cessation', the 'cessation of pot-prior-non-existence' itself is ceased, so there is the contingency of the re-emergence of 'pot-prior-non-existence'. And if that happens, since the 'break' in prior-non-existence cannot occur in the middle (it being beginningless), the 'pot' would never exist. And if prior-non-existence [re-emerges and then] ends upon the availability of materials, since it heads towards 'being', the very same destroyed 'pot-individual' would re-emerge. Similarly, if 'pot' is the 'prior-non-existence' of 'destruction'; then before pot-origin, due to the absence of 'destruction-prior-non-existence' (i.e., pot), there would be 'pot-destruction' in the lump state. And if that happens, the 'pot' would never be produced; because its production is impossible while its destruction is present; otherwise, its re-emergence would occur even in the shard state. Thus, if 'pot-destruction' occurs in the lump state, since destruction is subsequent to existence, 'pot-fulfillment' would occur even before the lump. And then, the futility of the agent's operation at both the times of its fulfillment and destruction would follow—such hundreds of flaws can be given. Therefore, it is well said: 'The series of contradictory states alone are Prior-Non-existence and Destruction.'

With 'pindatva-ghatatva' etc., he recalls the statement of Lord Parashara: 'Earth is the pot-ness; from pot, the shard; from shard, the powder dust; from that, the atom...' (Vishnu Purana 2.12.42). In that context, it is clear that words like 'is not', 'non-object', 'untrue' are based on 'attainment of another state'. And this has been explained in the Shariraka Bhashya (Sri Bhashya). Objection: 'Even so, let only "For the born, death is certain" be established; because destruction of the produced pot, etc., is seen. But "For the dead, birth is certain" is not established; because re-origin of the destroyed pot, etc., is not seen. Nor is its re-origin a "cause for grief" such that its inevitability should be propounded?' To this, he says 'tatra' (there/regarding that) etc. The intention is: It is not said that the re-origin is of the substance 'in that very state' which is destroyed; but the origin is of the 'very same substance' qualified by 'another state'. Indeed, the single substance destroyed in the form of a pot is produced in the form of a shard. Indeed, the single 'shard-state' is the 'destruction' of the substance in the pot-state, and the 'origin' of the same (substance) in the shard-state. Therefore, it is established that 'Origin is indeed of the destroyed.' 'Sa eva' (That indeed)—meaning 'the attainment of the subsequent state' itself. Here, by the word 'attainment' (prapti), the 'arrival of the first moment' (of the state) is intended; thus the absence of the use of the word 'origin' in subsequent moments is justified—this is indicated. This being so, establishing the 'inevitability of re-origin' is indeed establishing the 'inevitability of destruction'. And for that very reason, its purpose of 'removing grief' is also logical. Or (the idea is): 'If you grieve that "this insentient substance is destroyed"; then that very substance has been "produced" in that subsequent state; so why do you not rejoice?'—This is the purport. Because the single modification (parinama) has the names 'origin' and 'destruction' due to difference in description, it is stated as 'modification named origin and destruction'. Similarly, even though Creation is the 'destruction' relative to Dissolution, the arrangement of usage is based on the intention of fitness or unfitness for human goals (Purushartha). 'Parinaminah' (Of the modifying)—this 'having that nature' (tat-svabhavatva) is stated as the cause of inevitability. By the word 'iti', he indicates that the word 'apariharya' (unavoidable) is intended as the reason.

भौतिकवादी नास्तिक लोगों का मत है कि बिना किसी पूर्वापर कारण के वस्तुएँ उत्पन्न नहीं होती हैं। आस्तिक लोग देह से भिन्न जीव का अस्तित्व स्वीकार करते हुए कहते हैं कि एक ही जीव विकास की दृष्टि से अनेक शरीर धारण करता है जिससे वह इस दृश्य जगत् के पीछे जो परम सत्य है उनको पहचान सकें। दोनों ही प्रकार के विचारों में एक सामान्य बात यह है कि दोनों ही यह मानते हैं कि जीवन जीवनमृत्यु की एक शृंखला है।इस प्रकार जीवन के स्वरूप को समझ लेने पर निरन्तर होने वाले जन्म और मृत्यु पर किसी विवेकी पुरुष को शोक नहीं करना चाहिए। गर्मियों के दिनों में सूर्य के प्रखर ताप में बाहर खड़े होकर यदि कोई सूर्य के ताप और चमक की शिकायत करे तो वास्तव में यह मूढ़ता का लक्षण है। इसी प्रकार यदि जीवन को प्राप्त कर उसके परिवर्तनशील स्वभाव की कोई शिकायत करता है तो यह एक अक्षम्य मूढ़ता है।उपर्युक्त कारण से शोक करना अपने अज्ञान का ही परिचायक है। श्रीकृष्ण का जीवन तो आनन्द और उत्साह का संदेश देता है। उनका जीवनसंदेश है रुदन अज्ञान का लक्षण है और हँसना बुद्धिमत्ता का। हँसते रहो इन दो शब्दों में श्रीकृष्ण के उपदेश को बताया जा सकता है। इसी कारण जब वे अपने मित्र को शोकाकुल देखते है तो उसकी शोक और मोह से रक्षा करने के लिए और इस प्रकार उसके जीवन के लक्ष्य को प्राप्त कराने के लिए वे तत्पर हो जाते हैं।अब आगे के दस श्लोक सामान्य मनुष्य का दृष्टिकोण बताते हैं। भगवान् शंकराचार्य अपने भाष्य में कहते हैं कार्यकारण के सम्बन्ध से युक्त वस्तुओं के लिए शोक करना उचित नहीं क्योंकि

'Atha vā enam' (Or if this...) etc. 'Atha api'—Even if you consider this body as 'constantly born' because the stream is indestructible, even then there is no mournability. Or, by the process of momentariness, as 'constantly perishing'; even then, what mournability? Thus, if you consider the 'constant born-ness' or 'constant dead-ness' of the Self due to connection and separation with various bodies, even then, for those of authority (the wise), grieving is improper in every way.

With this very intention, making a single sentence construction with this, he introduces the subsequent two verses in order with 'kuta' (why/how). Having restated the doubt, 'even so you ought not to grieve' was said; what is the reason therein?—this is the meaning.

Regarding the objection—'In the view where the Self persists until the dissolution of the elements, or in the view of Eternalness, since there is a possibility of "seen" (worldly) and "unseen" (other-worldly/sin) suffering, I grieve out of fear of that?'—He answers with the second verse (2.27). 'Hi' (Because), for 'jatasya'—meaning for the stable Self that has obtained connection with the body and senses due to the power of self-performed Dharma and Adharma—'mrityuh' (death)—meaning the separation from that body, etc., caused by the exhaustion of the karma that initiated it—is 'dhruva', i.e., inevitable. Because connection ends in separation. Similarly, 'for the dead', birth is also 'dhruva' (certain) for the enjoyment of the fruits of karma performed in the previous body. Since the context here pertains only to the 'sanushaya' (one with residual karma), there is no deviation regarding the 'Jivanmukta' (liberated while living).

Therefore, in this 'apariharye arthe'—in this matter characterized by birth and death which is impossible to avoid—knowing this, you ought not to grieve. And so He will say later: 'Even without you, all will cease to exist...' (Gita 11.32). For if they would live only if not killed by you in war, then grief regarding the war would be proper for you; but since they will die of their own accord due to the exhaustion of karma, for you who are unable to prevent that, grief caused by 'seen suffering' (loss of kin) is not proper—this is the purport. Similarly, regarding grief caused by 'unseen suffering' (sin)—the answer is indeed 'Therefore, in the unavoidable matter...'

War is indeed a 'niyata' (prescribed/obligatory) duty for a Kshatriya, like Agnihotra. And that (word 'yuddha'), derived from the root 'yudh samprahare' (to fight/strike), takes the form of striking with weapons favorable to the separation of the enemy's life-breath; being enjoined (by scripture), it does not generate sin (pratyavaya), just like the violence in the Agnishomiya sacrifice. Thus Gautama remembers (in his Smriti): 'There is no fault in violence in battle, except against those who have lost horses, charioteers, or weapons, those with joined palms, those with disheveled hair, those turned away, those sitting, those who have climbed a tree on land, messengers, and those who say "I am a Brahmin" (or cows and Brahmins).' The mention of Brahmins here refers to non-combatant Brahmins, as established by their mention alongside cows, etc. All this will be clarified in 'svadharmamapi chavekshya' (Gita 2.31).

Thus, since the matter characterizing war is enjoined like Agnihotra, it is 'unavoidable'—impossible to abandon, for abandoning it leads to the contingency of sin; therefore, you ought not to grieve out of fear of unseen suffering either—as stated before.

But if the action called War is considered 'Kamya' (desire-motivated/optional)—based on the statement of Yajnavalkya: 'Those who fight in battles for land without turning back, and leave (the body) with un-treacherous weapons, they go to heaven like Yogis'; and the Lord's statement: 'Slain, you will attain heaven; conquering, you will enjoy the earth'—even then, since a Kamya action that has been 'prarabdha' (commenced) must necessarily be completed, it is equal to a 'Nitya' (obligatory) action; and since the war has been commenced by you, its unavoidability is indeed equal.

Alternatively—these two verses are indeed in the view of the 'Eternal Self' itself, because it is impossible for the extremely theistic Arjuna to accept a view outside the Vedas. The construction of the words is: This (Self) is eternal, and due to the connection with the body, senses, etc., it is 'born'—thus it is 'nitya-jatam' (eternally-born/eternal-yet-born). 'If you consider this Self, though being eternal, as born; and similarly, though being eternal, as dead; even then you ought not to grieve'—having proposed this, He states the reason with 'jatasya hi', etc. The 'born-ness' and 'dead-ness' of the Eternal have already been explained. The rest is clear. The Bhashya (of Shankara) should also be construed in this view.

Objection: 'If there is no one equal to oneself (in strength), then grief regarding the weak implies a duty (is inevitable)?'—If this is argued, regarding that He says 'jatasya' (for the born), etc. For the 'born'—meaning the body—death is 'dhruva' (certain); and for the dead, birth is 'dhruva' (certain); this is the meaning.

Here, the meaning is: 'Jatasya'—for one who has taken birth—by Whom (God) his death has been fashioned, by Him alone his death is 'dhruva', i.e., decided/certain. Therefore, those whose death is fashioned by you (as an instrument), that will happen exactly so. Therefore, whatever has been fashioned by Ishvara in whichever way, it will happen exactly that way; in such an 'apariharye arthe'—a matter that is bound to happen in every way—you are not fit to grieve; this is the meaning.

'Hi' (Indeed)—this meaning is logical. Who is capable of changing what is done by Ishvara?

'Jatasya hi'—meaning for one who has obtained birth, 'mrityuh' (death) is 'dhruva'—meaning unfailing/inevitable. And 'mritasya cha' (for the dead), birth is 'dhruva' (certain). Therefore, this matter characterized by birth and death is unavoidable.

In that unavoidable matter, you ought not to grieve.

Even regarding beings which are merely aggregates of cause and effect (body and senses), it is not proper to perform grief, because...

'Why [should one not grieve]?' Regarding this, He says. 'Hi' means 'yatah' (because).

'Jatasya' (For the born), etc. Death is 'dhruva' (certain); and for the dead, birth is 'dhruva', meaning unavoidable.

Thus, in an unavoidable matter, you ought not to grieve.

जातस्य of the born? हि for? ध्रुवः certain? मृत्युः death? ध्रुवम् certain? जन्म birth? मृतस्य of the dead? च and? तस्मात् therefore? अपरिहार्ये inevritable? अर्थे in matter? न not? त्वम् thou? शोचितुम् to grieve? अर्हसि (thou) oughtest.Commentary Birth is sure to happen to that which is dead death is sure to happen to what which is born. Birth and death are certainly unavoidable. Therefore? you should not grieve over an inevitable matter.

This being so, 'death of anyone born', etc. Hi, for; mrtyuh, death; jatasya, of anyone born; dhruvah, is certain; is without exception; ca, and mrtasya, of the dead; janmah, (re-) birth; is dhruvam, a certainly. Tasmat, therefore, this fact, viz birth and death, is inevitable. With regard to that (fact), apariharye, over an enevitable; arthe, fact; tvam, you; na arhasi, ought not; socitum, to grieve.

For what has originated, destruction is certain - it is seen to be inevitable. Similarly what has perished will inevitably originate. How should this be understood - that there is origination for that (entity)which has perished? It is seen that an existing entity only can originate and not a non-existent one. Origination, annihilation etc., are merely particular states of an existent entity.
Now thread etc., do really exist. When arranged in a particular way, they are called clothes etc. It is seen that even those who uphold the doctrine that the effect is a new entity (Asatkarya-vadins) will admit this much that no new entity over and above the particular arrangement of threads is seen. It is not tenable to hold that this is the coming into being of a new entity, since, by the process of manufacture there is only attainment of a new name and special functions. No new entity emerges.
Origination, annihilation etc., are thus particular stages of an existent entity. With regard to an entity which has entered into a stage known as origination, its entry into the opposite condition is called annihilation. Of an evolving entity, a seqence of evolutionary stages is inevitable. For instance, clay becomes a lump, jug, a potsherd, and (finally) powder. Here, what is called annihilation is the attainment of a succeeding stage by an entity which existed previously in a preceding stage. And this annihilation itself is called birth in that stage. Thus, the seence called birth and annihilation being inevitable for an evolving entity, it is not worthy of you to grieve.
Now Sri Krsna says that not even the slightest grief arising from seeing an entity passing from a previous existing stage to an opposite stage, is justifiable in regard to human beings etc.