Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 18 - Shloka (Verse) 17

यस्य नाहंकृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यते -- जिससे मैं करता हूँ -- ऐसा अहंकृतभाव नहीं है और जिसकी बुद्धिमें मेरको फल मिलेगा -- ऐसे स्वार्थभावका लेप नहीं है। इसको ऐसे समझना चाहिये -- जैसे शास्त्रविहित और शास्त्रनिषिद्ध -- ये सभी क्रियाएँ एक प्रकाशमें होती हैं और प्रकाशके ही आश्रित होती हैं परन्तु प्रकाश किसी भी क्रियाका कर्ता नहीं बनता अर्थात् प्रकाश उन क्रियाओँको न करनेवाला है और न करानेवाला है। ऐसे ही स्वरूपकी सत्ताके बिना विहित और निषिद्ध -- कोई भी क्रिया नहीं होती परन्तु वह सत्ता उन क्रियाओंको न करनेवाली है और न करानेवाली है -- ऐसा जिसको साक्षात् अनुभव हो जाता है? उसमें मैं क्रियाओंको करनेवाला हूँ -- ऐसा अहंकृतभाव नहीं रहता और अमुक चीज चाहिये? अमुक चीज नहीं चाहिये अमुक घटना होनी चाहिये? अमुक घटना नहीं होनी चाहिये -- ऐसा बुद्धिमें लेप (द्वन्द्वमोह) नहीं रहता। अहंकृतभाव और बुद्धिमें लेप न रहनेसे उसके कर्तृत्व और भोक्तृत्व -- दोनों नष्ट हो जाते हैं अर्थात् अपनेमें कर्तृत्व और भोक्तृत्व -- ये दोनों ही नहीं हैं? इसका वास्तविक अनुभव हो जाता है।प्रकृतिका कार्य स्वतःस्वाभाविक ही चल रहा है? परिवर्तित हो रहा है और अपना स्वरूप केवल उसका प्रकाशक है -- ऐसा समझकर जो अपने स्वरूपमें स्थित रहता है? उसमें मैं करता हूँ ऐसा अहंकृतभाव नहीं होता क्योंकि अंहकृतभाव प्रकृतिके कार्य शरीरको स्वीकार करनेसे ही होता है। अहंकृतभाव सर्वथा मिटनेपर उसकी बुद्धिमें फल मेरेको मिले ऐसा लेप भी नहीं होता अर्थात् फलकी कामना नहीं होती।अहंकृतभाव एक मनोवृत्ति है। मनोवृत्ति होते हुए भी यह भाव स्वयं(कर्ता)में रहता है क्योंकि कर्तृत्व और अकर्तृत्व भाव स्वयं ही स्वीकार करता है।हत्वापि स इमाँल्लोकान्न हन्ति न निबध्यते -- वह इन सम्पूर्ण प्राणियोंको एक साथ मार डाले? तो भी वह मारता नहीं क्योंकि उसमें कर्तृत्व नहीं है और वह बँधता भी नहीं क्योंकि उसमें भोक्तृत्व नहीं है। तात्पर्य यह है कि उसका न क्रियाओंके साथ सम्बन्ध है और न फलके साथ सम्बन्ध है।वास्तवमें प्रकृति ही क्रिया और फलमें परिणत होती है। परन्तु इस वास्तविकताका अनुभव न होनेसे ही पुरुष (चेतन) कर्ता और भोक्ता बनता है। कारण कि जब अहंकारपूर्वक क्रिया होती है? तब कर्ता? करण और कर्म -- तीनों मिलते हैं और तभी कर्मसंग्रह होता है। परन्तु जिसमें अहंकृतभाव नहीं रहा? केवल सबका प्रकाशक? आश्रय? सामान्य चेतन ही रहा? फिर वह कैसे किसको मारे और कैसे किससे बँधे उसका मारना और बँधना सम्भव ही नहीं है (गीता 2। 19)।सम्पूर्ण प्राणियोंको मारना क्या है जिसमें अहंकृतभाव नहीं है और जिसकी बुद्धिमें लेप नहीं है -- ऐसे मनुष्यका शरीर जिस वर्ण और आश्रममें रहता है? उसके अनुसार उसके सामने जो परिस्थिति आ जाती है? उसमें प्रवृत्त होनेपर उसे पाप नहीं लगता। जैसे? किसी जीवन्मुक्त क्षत्रियके लिये स्वतः युद्धकी परिस्थिति प्राप्त हो जाय तो वह उसके अनुसार सबको मारकर भी न तो मारता है और न बँधता है। कारण कि उसमें अभिमान और स्वार्थभाव नहीं है।यहाँ अर्जुनके सामने भी युद्धका प्रसङ्ग है। इसलिये भगवान्ने हत्वापि पदसे अर्जुनको युद्धके लिये प्रेरणा की है। अपि पदका भाव हैं -- कर्मण्यभिप्रवृत्तोऽपि नैव किञ्चित्करोति सः (गीता 4। 20) कर्मोंमें अच्छी तरह प्रवृत्त होनेपर भी वह कुछ नहीं करता। सर्वथा वर्तमानोऽपि स योगी मयि वर्तते (गीता 6। 31) सर्वथा बर्ताव करता हुआ भी वह योगी मेरेमें रहता है। शरीरस्थोऽपि कौन्तेय न करोति न लिप्यते (गीता 13। 31) शरीरमें स्थित होनेपर भी न करता है और न लिप्त होता है। तात्पर्य यह है कि कर्मोंमें साङ्गोपाङ्ग प्रवृत्त होनेके समय और जिस समय कर्मोंमें प्रवृत्त नहीं है? उस समय भी स्वरूपकी निर्विकल्पता ज्योंकीत्यों रहती है अर्थात् क्रिया करनेसे अथाव क्रिया न करनेसे स्वरूपमें कुछ भी फरक नहीं पड़ता। कारण कि क्रियाविभाग प्रकृतिमें है? स्वरूपमें नहीं।वास्तवमें यह अहंभाव (व्यक्तित्व) ही मनुष्यमें भिन्नता करनेवाला है। अहंभाव न रहनेसे परमात्माके साथ भिन्नताका कोई कारण ही नहीं है। फिर तो केवल सबका आश्रय? प्रकाशक सामान्य चेतन रहता है। वह न तो क्रियाका कर्ता बनता है? और न फलका भोक्ता ही बनता है। क्रियाओंका कर्ता और फलका भोक्ता तो वह पहले भी नहीं था। केवल नाशवान् शरीरके साथ सम्बन्ध मानकर जिस अहंभावको स्वीकार किया है? उसी अहंभावसे उसमें कर्तापन और भोक्तापन आया है।अहम् दो प्रकारका होता है -- अहंस्फूर्ति और अहंकृति। गाढ़ नींदसे उठते ही सबसे पहले मनुष्यको अपने होनेपन(सत्तामात्र) का भान होता है? इसको अहंस्फूर्ति कहते हैं। इसके बाद वह अपनेमें मैं अमुक नाम? वर्ण? आश्रम आदिका हूँ -- ऐसा आरोप करता है? यही असत्का सम्बन्ध है। असत्के सम्बन्धसे अर्थात् शरीरके साथ तादात्म्य माननेसे शरीरकी क्रियाको लेकर मैं करता हूँ -- ऐसा भाव उत्पन्न होता है? इसको अहंकृति कहते हैं।अहम् को लेकर ही अपनेमें परिच्छिन्नता आती है। इसलिये अहंस्फूर्तिमें भी किञ्चित् परिच्छिन्नता (व्यक्तित्व) रह सकती है। परन्तु यह परिच्छिन्नता बन्धनकारक नहीं होती अर्थात् परिच्छिन्नता रहनेपर भी अहंस्फूर्ति दोषी नहीं होती। कारण कि अहंकृति अर्थात् कर्तृत्वके बिना अपनेमें गुणदोषका आरोप नहीं होता।,अहंकृति आनेसे ही अपनेमें गुणदोषका आरोप होता है? जिससे शुभअशुभ कर्म बनते हैं। बोध होनेपर अहंस्फूर्तिमें जो परिच्छिन्नता है? वह जल जाती है और स्फूर्तिमात्र रह जाती है। ऐसी स्थितिमें मनुष्य न मारता है और न बँधता है।न हन्ति न निबध्यते (न मारता है और न बँधता है) का क्या भाव है एक निर्विकल्पअवस्था होती है और एक निर्विकल्पबोध होता है। निर्विकल्पअवस्था साधनसाध्य है और उसका उत्थान भी होता है अर्थात् वह एकरस नहीं रहती। इस निर्विकल्पअवस्थासे भी असङ्गता होनेपर स्वतःसिद्ध निर्विकल्पबोधका अनुभव होता है। निर्विकल्पबोध साधनसाध्य नहीं है और उसमें निर्विकल्पता किसी भी अवस्थामें किञ्चिन्मात्र भी भंग नहीं होती। निर्विकल्पबोधमें कभी परिवर्तन हुआ नहीं? होगा नहीं और होना सम्भव भी नहीं। तात्पर्य है कि उस निर्विकल्पबोधमें कभी हलचल आदि नहीं होते? यही न हन्ति न निबध्यते का भाव है।अहंकृतभाव और बुद्धिमें लेप न रहनेका उपाय क्या है क्रियारूपसे परिवर्तन केवल प्रकृतिमें ही होता है और उन क्रियाओंका भी आरम्भ और अन्त होता है तथा उन कर्मोंके फलरूपसे जो पदार्थ मिलते हैं? उनका भी संयोगवियोग होता है। इस प्रकार क्रिया और पदार्थ -- दोनोंके साथ संयोगवियोग होता रहता है। संयोगवियोग होनेपर भी स्वयं तो प्रकाशकरूपसे ज्योंकात्यों ही रहता है। विवेकविचारसे ऐसा अनुभव होनेपर अहंकृतभाव और बुद्धिमें लेप नहीं रहता। सम्बन्ध -- ज्ञान और प्रवृत्ति (क्रिया) दोषी नहीं होते? प्रत्युत कर्तृत्वाभिमान ही दोषी होता है क्योंकि कर्तृत्वाभिमानसे ही कर्मसंग्रह होता है -- यह बात आगेके श्लोकमें बताते हैं।

तो फिर जो वास्तवमें देखता है ( ऐसा ) सुबुद्धि कौन है इसपर कहते हैं --, शास्त्र और आचार्यके उपदेशसे तथा न्यायसे जिसका अन्तःकरण भली प्रकार शुद्धसंस्कृत हो गया है? ऐसे जिस पुरुषके अन्तःकरणमें मैं कर्ता हूँ इस प्रकारकी भावनाप्रतीति नहीं होती? जो ऐसा समझता है कि,अविद्यासे आत्मामें अध्यारोपित? ये अधिष्ठानादि पाँच हेतु ही समस्त कर्मोंके कर्ता हैं? मैं नहीं हूँ? मैं तो केवल उनके व्यापारोंका साक्षीमात्र प्राणोंसे रहित? मनसे रहित? शुद्ध श्रेष्ठ? अक्षरसे भी पर केवल और अक्रिय आत्मस्वरूप हूँ। तथा जिसकी बुद्धि यानी आत्माका उपाधिस्वरूप अन्तःकरण? लिप्त नहीं होता -- अनुताप नहीं करता? यानी,मैंने अमुक कार्य किया है उससे मुझे नरकमें जाना पड़ेगा इस प्रकार जिसकी बुद्धि लिप्त नहीं होती वह सुबुद्धि है वही वास्तवमें देखता है। ऐसा ज्ञानी इन समस्त लोकोंको अर्थात् सब प्राणियोंको मारकर भी ( वास्तवमें ) नहीं मारता अर्थात् हननक्रिया नहीं करता और उसके परिणामसे अर्थात् पापके फलसे भी नहीं बँधता। पू0 -- यद्यपि यह ( ज्ञानकी ) स्तुति है? तो भी यह कहना सर्वथा विपरीत है कि मारकर भी नहीं मारता,। उ0 -- यह दोष नहीं है? क्योंकि लौकिक और पारमार्थिक इन दो दृष्टियोंकी अपेक्षासे ऐसा कहना बन सकता है। शरीर आदिमें आत्मबुद्धि करके मैं मारनेवाला हूँ ऐसा माननेवाले लौकिक मनुष्योंकी दृष्टिका आश्रय लेकर मारकर भी यह कहा है और पूर्वोक्त पारमार्थिक दृष्टिका आश्रय लेकर न मारता है और न बँधता है यह कहा है। इस प्रकार ये दोनों कथन बन सकते हैं। पू0 -- कर्तारमात्मानं केवलं तु इस कथनमें केवलशब्दका प्रयोग होनेसे यह पाया जाता है कि आत्मा,( अकेला कर्म नहीं करता? पर ) अधिष्ठान आदि अन्य हेतुओंके साथ सम्मिलित होकर निःसंदेह कर्म करता है। उ0 -- यह दोष नहीं है? क्योंकि अविक्रियस्वभाववाला होनेके कारण? आत्माका अधिष्ठानादिसे संयुक्त होना नहीं बन सकता। विकारवान् वस्तुका ही अन्य पदार्थोंके साथ संघात हो सकता है और विकारी पदार्थ ही संहत होकर कर्ता बन सकता है। निर्विकार आत्माका? न तो किसीके साथ संयोग हो सकता है और न संयुक्त होकर उसका कर्तृत्व ही बन सकता है। इसलिये ( यह समझना चाहिये कि ) आत्माका केवलत्व स्वाभाविक है? अतः यहाँ केवल शब्दका अनुवादमात्र किया गया है। आत्माका अविक्रियत्व श्रुतिस्मृति और न्यायसे प्रसिद्ध है। गीतामें भी यह विकाररहित कहलाता है,सब कर्म गुणोंसे ही किये जाते हैं आत्मा शरीरमें स्थित हुआ भी नहीं करता इत्यादि वाक्योंद्वारा अनेक बार प्रतिपादित है और मानो ध्यान करता है? मानो चेष्टा करता है इस प्रकारकी श्रुतियोंमें भी प्रतिपादित है। तथा न्यायसे भी यही सिद्ध होता है? क्योंकि आत्मतत्त्व अवयवरहित? स्वतन्त्र और विकाररहित है। ऐसा मानना ही राजमार्ग है। यदि आत्माको विकारवान् मानें तो भी इसका स्वकीय विकार ही अपना हो सकता है। अधिष्ठानादिके किये हुए कर्म आत्मकर्तृक नहीं हो सकते क्योंकि अन्यके कर्मोंको बिना किये ही अन्यके पल्ले बाँध देना उचित नहीं है। जो अविद्यासे आरोपित किये जाते हैं? वे वास्तवमें उसके नहीं होते। जैसे सीपमें आरोपित चाँदीपन सीपका नहीं होता एवं जैसे मूर्खोंद्वारा आकाशमें आरोपित की हुई तलमलीनता आकाशकी नहीं हो सकती? वैसे ही अधिष्ठानादि पाँच हेतुओंके विकार भी उनके ही हैं? आत्माके नहीं। सुतरां यह ठीक ही कहा है कि मैं कर्ता हूँ ऐसी भावनाका और बुद्धिके लेपका अभाव होनेके कारण? पूर्ण ज्ञानी न मारता है और न बँधता है। दूसरे अध्यायमें यह आत्मा न मारता है और न मारा जाता है इस प्रकार प्रतिज्ञा करके? न जायते इत्यादि हेतुयुक्त वचनोंसे आत्माका अविक्रियत्व बतलाकर? फिर वेदाविनाशिनम् इस श्लोकसे उपदेशके आदिमें विद्वान्के लिये संक्षेपमें कर्माधिकारकी निवृत्ति कहकर? जगहजगह? प्रसङ्ग लाकर बीचबीचमें जिसका विस्तार किया गया है? ऐसी कर्माधिकारकी निवृत्तिका? अब शास्त्रके अर्थका संग्रह करनेके लिये विद्वान् न मारता है और न बँधता है इस कथनसे उपसंहार करते हैं। सुतरां यह सिद्ध हुआ कि विद्वान्में देहधारीपनका अभिमान न होनेके कारण उसके अविद्याकर्तृक समस्त कर्मोंका संन्यास हो सकता है? इसलिये संन्यासियोंको अनिष्ट आदि तीन प्रकारके कर्मफल नहीं मिलते। साथ ही यह भी अनिवार्य है कि दूसरे ( कर्माधिकारी ) इससे विपरीत होते हैं। इस कारण उनको तीन प्रकारके कर्मफल ( अवश्य ) मिलते हैं। इस प्रकार यह गीताशास्त्रके अर्थका उपसंहार किया गया। ऐसा यह समस्त वेदोंके अर्थका सार? निपुणबुद्धिवाले पण्डितोंद्वारा विचारपूर्वक धारण किया जाने योग्य है। इस विचारसे हमने जगहजगह प्रकरणोंका विभाग करके? शास्त्रन्यायानुसार इस तत्त्वको दिखलाया है।।17।।

Having taught the perverted intelligence of one with contrary vision, He states the right intelligence of one with right vision, preceded by a question — with 'Kah punah' (Who then...), etc. In the absence of the idea of doership in the Self as 'I am the doer', where is the idea of doership (located)? Doubting this, he says — 'Ete' (These...). Then how does the idea of doership arise in the Self? Doubting this, he says it is due to being the Witness of Adhishthana etc. and their activities — 'Aham tu' (But I...).

The Self does not inherently possess the power of action; he states the proof for this — 'Aprano hi' (For breath-less...). Nor does It inherently possess the power of knowledge; he says — 'Amanah' (Mind-less...). In the absence of connection with the two adjuncts (Prana and Manas), Its purity is established; he says — 'Shubhrah' (Pure). Doubting impurity due to connection with the cause, it is said — 'Aksharat' (Than the Imperishable...). Regarding the distinctness of effect and cause due to not touching the Self, doubting duality (sad-vitiyatva), he says 'not so' because of their unreality — 'Kevalah' (Absolute/Alone). He states the immutability (kautasthya) due to being devoid of all modifications like birth etc. — 'Avikriyah' (Changeless).

He explains 'Buddhiryasya' (Whose intellect...) etc. — 'Buddhih' (Intellect...). 'Na anushayini' — not having remorse. Meaning not possessing affliction. Having stated the literal meaning of the second quarter, he states the sentence meaning — 'Idam' (This...). By 'Idam', sinful action is referred to. In the absence of connection of people with Prana (life), how is there killing? Doubting this, he says — 'Praninah' (Living beings...).

Doubting that praise by stating contradictory meaning is also not proper — 'Nanu' (Objection). He removes the contradiction — 'Naisha doshah' (This is not a fault). Relying on the worldly view, he clarifies the statement 'Hatvapi' (Even having killed) — 'Dehadi' (Body etc...). Relying on the vision of Reality, he explains the statement 'Na hanti' (Does not kill) etc. — 'Yatha' (As...).

'I am not the doer, but the Witness of the doer and his activities; being Pure, liberated from the two adjuncts possessing powers of action and knowledge; devoid of connection with cause and effect; non-dual; changeless' — thus the vision of supreme reality should be seen as shown. He concludes that both 'Even having killed' and 'Does not kill' etc. are proper based on the reliance on the two views — 'Tadubhayam' (That both...).

regarding 'He who sees the Absolute Self alone as the doer is of perverted intelligence', due to the force of the word 'Kevala' (Alone) which supplies an adjective to the Self, one might doubt that doership belongs to the 'qualified' (vishishta) Self — 'Nanu' (Objection). He refutes this saying that since qualification is impossible for the Self, doership does not belong even to the qualified one — 'Naisha doshah' (This is not a fault).

Doubting that even with a changeless nature, how can the Self be uncombined (asamhata)? He says — 'Vikriya' (Modification...). Even if the Self is combined with Adhishthana etc., there is no doership; because connection with action is contradictory for the Changeless; he says — 'Samhatya' (Having combined...). He clarifies the impossibility of being combined — 'Na tu' (But not...). If uncombined, he states the result — 'Iti na' (Therefore not...). Then how is 'Kevalatva' (Absoluteness) stated for the Self by the word 'Kevala'? He states that — 'Atah' (Therefore...). Non-doership of the Self is accepted, but changelessness does not apply to it? Doubting this, he says — 'Avikriyatvam ca' (And changelessness...).

There he cites Smriti sentences — 'Avikaryo'yam' (This is changeless...). Sentences like 'This one does not kill nor is killed' etc. are the meaning of the word 'Adi' (etc.). He indicates the purport of the stated sentences in the changelessness of the Self — 'Asakrit' (Repeatedly...). Sentences in Shruti like 'Partless, inactive, peaceful' etc. are the meaning of the word 'Adi'; the construction is that the changelessness of the Self is shown by those sentences; and it is shown by reasoning also — this connects with the preceding. He shows the reasoning itself — 'Niravayavam' (Partless...). The Self does not undergo modification by Itself, because of being partless like space; nor by another, because it is impossible for the unattached and non-effect (akarya) to be dependent on another; this is the meaning.

Moreover, is the modification of the Self inherent in Itself or inherent in Adhishthana etc.? Not the first; intending that the impossibility of modification inherent in Itself has been shown for the Self, he says — 'Vikriyavattva' (Possessing modification...). And that is incorrect — is to be supplied. He refutes the second — 'Na' (No...), etc. Doubting that action performed even by Adhishthana etc. comes to the Self due to connection with them; analyzing whether that coming is real or due to Avidya, he refutes the first — 'Na hi' (For not...). He rejects the second — 'Yattu' (But as for...). That action brought to the Self by Avidya does not belong to the Self; he explains this with two examples — 'Yatha' (Just as...), etc.

He states the result of the absence of doership due to the changelessness of the Self — 'Tasmat' (Therefore...). Objection: The changelessness of the Self was established earlier itself, why is it stated here? To that he says — 'Na ayam' (Not this...). The connection is: He concludes here the cessation of eligibility for action which was promised at the beginning of the Shastra with reasons, stated briefly, and expanded in between by creating contexts here and there. What is the purpose of the conclusion at the end for what was promised and established by reason? Doubting this, he says — 'Shastrartha' (Meaning of the Shastra...).

When it is established that the wise one has no eligibility for action; since in the absence of body-identification, the renunciation of all actions arising from Avidya is established; it is indeed proper as stated before that the threefold fruit of action — undesirable, desirable, and mixed — does not accrue to Sannyasis; thus he concludes the supreme subject matter — 'Evamca' (And thus...). But those who are ignorant and identified with the body, for them the threefold fruit of action is indeed possible; he concludes the meaning established by the statement of reason — 'Tadviparyayacca' (And due to the reverse of that...). Action performed by Adhishthana etc. is not performed by the Self; eligibility for action belongs only to the ignorant because renunciation of that is impossible due to body-identification; but for the wise, due to absence of body-identification, there is cessation of eligibility for action — summarizing this concluded meaning, he says — 'Ityesha' (Thus this...).

And the stated meaning of Gita is acceptable because it is the meaning of Veda; he says — 'Sa esha' (That this...). How can this meaning be understood even if it is the meaning of Veda? To that he says — 'Nipuna' (Skilled/Subtle...). Doubting that since it was not stated by the Bhashyakara by dividing with proof and reasoning, this meaning is not acceptable; he says — 'Tatra' (There...).

Then who is the Sumati (wise one) who sees correctly, in this expectation He says — 'Yasya'. Whose — due to intellect refined by scripture, teacher, instruction, logic — 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — characterized by 'I am the doer' — 'bhāvaḥ' — feeling/notion; 'these five Adhishtana etc. alone are agents of all actions superimposed on Self by ignorance, not I; I am the witness of their operations, 'Without Prana indeed, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable', 'Alone and immutable' — seeing thus, for him the 'egoistic notion' does not exist, this is the meaning. Whose intellect 'na lipyate' — the intellect (Antahkarana) which is the limiting adjunct of the Self, does not get smeared — 'I did this, by this I will go to hell' — does not become possessed of affliction thus, this is the meaning. He is Sumati, of cultivated intellect, right seer, 'imān' — experienced by perception etc. — people (beings) 'hatvāpi' (even killing) 'na hanti' — does not perform the act of killing, due to being devoid of pride of agency. 'Na nibadhyate' — nor is he bound by its effect, the fruit of the act of killing, due to being of unsmeared intellect.

'Bhāvaḥ' — existence; 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — not worthy of the designation 'I', due to sublation of ego and remaining as pure nature only — thus [some interpret]; or 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — nature of ego — identity with that — does not exist for whom, due to being sublated by discrimination — thus some [say]. In 'Yasya nāhaṅkṛtaḥ', the genitives are in apposition. Thence, of which adjunct characterized by Mark (Linga), while not producing modification of the nature of ego, there is existence of nature devoid of 'I'-superimposition. Or 'Aham ahaṅkṛtiṃ karoti' (I do ego-making) thus 'Ahaṅkṛt' — Antahkarana; of which related one the state/presence of 'Ahaṅkṛt' — Antahkarana — is not there. Whose Antahkarana is void of egoism, this is the meaning. And 'Aham kṛtaḥ' (I am made) — rooted in 'I'-superimposition, this much is the meaning. Such 'Bhāvaḥ' — object — of the form of superimposition 'mine' — for which Linga-Self does not exist, thus voidness of both kinds of superimposition is stated. Of which knower the 'Bhāvaḥ' — Self of the nature of pure cognition — is not 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — 'made like I' — 'ahaṅkṛta' obtained by identity with ego; and whose intellect is not 'lipyate' — not colored by Self-hood; for one seeing the Self as distinct from the intellect, properties of intellect like agency etc. do not appear in the Self — this is refutation of the Logician arguing for agent-Self. And whose Self-properties like consciousness etc. do not commingle in the intellect — thus refutation of the Buddhist calling intellect itself as conscious. Of Chit (consciousness) and Achit (matter) mutually in each other there is no mutual superimposition of properties, this is the meaning — finally. Whose intellect concentrated by scripture and teacher, uninterrupted like a stream of oil, 'na lipyate' — does not attain smearing by heterogeneous cognition; he sees — he is the knower — this should be connected by dragging the word 'paśyati' from the previous verse.

Again, how is he known as such — doubting thus, he states inference with effort as sign — 'Hatvāpi'. By the root 'Han', here means (of killing) are indicated, and 'avasthitān' (situated) is supplied. Thence, having employed means of violence like throwing stones etc., he does not himself kill these situated people, due to being void of pride of I and Mine, this is the meaning. And therefore 'na nibadhyate' — he has no bondage due to being Jivanmukta etc. — thus 'Itare' (others) [say]. Regarding 'Yasya' etc. appearing as cause in the remainder of the sentence 'Hatvāpi na hanti na nibadhyate', and regarding 'Hatvāpi' etc. appearing as its fruit, by making mere imaginary explanations cited above, deficiency should not be brought upon the Omniscient Guide Bhashyakara who explained in accordance with preceding and succeeding [text]. Objection: Even if this is praise, still how is the contradictory statement 'killing he does not kill' justified? Answer: By intellect of body etc. as Self, 'I am killer' is indeed seen by people. 'I am not doer but witness of their operation, freed from the two adjuncts possessing power of action and knowledge, being pure, unconnected with cause and effect, non-dual, immutable' — thus indeed the knower sees; resorting to worldly and absolute view, both are justified indeed, accept this. And thus, he who sees the 'Kevalam' non-doer Self as doer, he is Durmati. But he who sees the Self as It is as non-doer, he is Sumati — this is the combined meaning of the two.

Objection: By the use of the word 'kevala' in 'Ātmānaṃ kevalaṃ tu yaḥ', the Self qualified by Adhishtana etc. indeed acts. When agency belongs to such qualified one, he who sees the 'kevala' (pure) Self as agent is Durmati — if you say? Answer: No. Because of establishing the immutable nature of Self by Shruti, Smriti etc. And so Shruti: 'Unattached indeed is this Person', 'Witness, conscious, alone, and attributeless', 'Without Prana indeed, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable', 'Unborn Self, great, constant', 'Fruitless, actionless', 'Thinks as it were, moves as it were' etc. And Smritis: 'How does that Person, O Partha, whom does he cause to kill, whom does he kill', 'He is called unchangeable', 'Actions are being done by Gunas of Prakriti in all ways. One deluded by ego thinks I am doer', 'Even residing in body, O Kaunteya, he does not act nor is tainted' etc.

And logic: Neither does Self change by Itself, being partless like sky. Nor by another, because it is inappropriate for the unattached, unchangeable, independent to have change by another. Moreover, if change is accepted in Self, is that change inherent in Self or in Adhishtana etc.? Not the first. Because of establishing immutability of Self by Shruti etc. Not the second. 'Change inherent in another is in another' — because this is contradictory. Even if conveyed by ignorance, there is no inherence in another for another, as silver-ness is not in nacre; as surface-dirtiness conveyed by children (ignorant) through ignorance is not of the sky; so change of Adhishtana etc. is theirs only, not of the Self; therefore for the immutable Self, association with anything or agency by association is possible [not], so the word 'kevala' translates the natural aloneness of the Self. Having promised 'This one does not kill nor is killed', stating immutability by the reason 'is not born' etc., stating briefly the cessation of qualification for action for the knower by 'Vedāvināśinam' at the beginning of the scripture, having expanded it by making context here and there, He concludes by 'Na hanti na nibadhyate' (Does not kill, is not bound).

This being so, due to unjustifiability of pride of body-bearing, and justification of renunciation of all actions created by ignorance, it is justified that the threefold fruit of action like undesirable etc. does not occur for supreme Sannyasis; and its reverse occurs for others, and this is unavoidable — this meaning of the Gita scripture is concluded. This essence of Vedic meaning is to be understood by pundits of sharp intellect after deliberation.

He praises that knowledge — 'Yasya'.

But he who is slightly bound is slightly egoistic also.

He states the second purpose — 'Yasya'. Of which knower the 'Bhāvaḥ' — Self of the nature of pure cognition — is 'na ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — 'made like I' — 'ahaṅkṛta' obtained by identity with ego; not so. Whose intellect 'na lipyate' — is not colored by Self-hood.

Seeing the Self as distinct from whose intellect, the properties of intellect like agency etc. do not appear in the Self — this is refutation of the Logician arguing for agent-Self. And whose Self-properties like consciousness etc. do not commingle in the intellect — this is refutation of the Buddhist calling intellect itself as conscious.

Of Chit and Achit mutually in each other, mutual superimposition of properties is sublated — thus by negation of contact with pain etc., absence of enjoyership is shown. 'Even killing these worlds he does not kill nor is bound' — this is mere praise. Because due to sublation of agency itself, killer-ship is inapplicable; and even if agency continues like a burnt cloth, due to absence of attachment, aversion etc. impelling towards the act of killing.

By this — action performed by one contemplating the real non-agency of the Self, being caused by unreal pride of agency, is not fit to present its fruit — this is shown. For one striking a rope-snake with the knowledge of rope does not get the fruit of biting etc. born of snake's agitation. But for one doing so to a snake, it indeed happens, like that this also should be known.

By contemplation of the agency of the Supreme Person, whose 'bhāvaḥ' — specific mental modification regarding specific agency — is 'na ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — not created by pride of 'I' — knowledge 'I do' does not exist for whom, this is the meaning.

Whose intellect 'na lipyate' — 'Due to absence of my agency in this action, this fruit is not connected with me? Nor is this action mine' — whose intellect arises thus, this is the meaning.

He, even killing these people in battle, does not kill them — not only Bhishma etc., this is the meaning. Thence by that action named battle 'na nibadhyate' — does not experience its fruit, this is the meaning.

All this contemplation of non-agency etc. happens only by increase of Sattva Guna, thus to make known the acceptability of Sattva, He will expand on the diversity caused by Gunas like Sattva etc. in action, so He first states the mode of impulsion to action —

Then who is the Sumati for whom there is no taint of action as stated — in this expectation He says — 'Yasya'. 'Aham' — whence 'I am doer' — such 'bhāvaḥ' — intention does not belong to whom. Or 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — nature of ego — adherence to agency does not belong to whom. Due to considering body etc. alone as agent of action, this is the meaning.

Therefore whose intellect is not smeared — does not get attached to actions with intellect of desirable and undesirable; he being such, seer of Self distinct from body etc., these worlds — even all beings — even killing from worldly view, by discrimination, from his own view does not kill. And is not bound by their fruits — does not attain bondage.

What then [to say] of the doubt of his bondage by actions which are causes of indirect knowledge through purification of Sattva, this is the meaning. That is said — 'Placing actions in Brahman, abandoning attachment who acts. He is not tainted by sin.'

In the context of wicked-minded, who then is 'good-minded' — in this desire to know, the purpose of such contemplation of non-agency is stated — by the verse 'Yasya'. 'Bhāva' here means intention/notion, because another meaning does not fit. And that is qualified by context and juxtaposition — as specific mental modification regarding agency. In 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ', since agent meaning does not fit, and even in object meaning mental modification cannot be the object of ego-pride, only its rootedness in that is intended here, he says — 'Ahamabhimānakṛta' (Created by ego-pride). Here by the word 'Aham', ego-pride is indicated. Or 'ahaṅkṛtaḥ' — like 'Brahmins have eaten' — 'Kta' suffix is in agent; 'doing ego-pride' is the resultant statement.

Objection: Since Self is the meaning of 'I', how is abandonment of ego-pride possible? To that he says — 'Ahaṃ karomi' (I do). This should be applied with emphasis/determination? Otherwise there would be contradiction with direct agency.

Thus when abandonment of agency is explicitly stated, the abandonment of attachment to fruit established by implication from that is restated by 'buddhiryasya na lipyate', he says — 'Asmin'.

'Not one not desisted from bad conduct' [Katho. 1.2.23] etc. — to exclude killing other than prohibited and legal, dragging what is established by the beginning of scripture etc., he says — 'Yuddhe hatvāpi' (Even killing in battle). 'Na hanti' — distinct from another killer who is fit for connection with fruit due to possessing unseen (merit/demerit) born of pride of killing, this is the meaning. Otherwise 'even killing he does not kill' would be a contradiction. As for what others said here — 'Since the Self lacks agency of killing, it is said he is not connected with its effect, the fruit of unrighteousness' — that is false; because the qualification 'Yasya nāhaṅkṛto bhāvaḥ' would be useless; and because for another ignorant person also, in their view, due to absence of agency, the tainting by fruit of action is accepted as false in him also.

To refute the question 'How Bhishma' [2.4] etc. by a fortiori argument, 'Imān lokān' is said generally, with this intention he says — 'Na kevalam'. Here the interpretation of 'Na hanti' as 'Na nibadhyate' — this construction is not proper when a better alternative is possible. Therefore 'Whose notion is not egoistic, whose intellect is not smeared' — these two being situated as cause and effect, the fruit also is restated as cause and effect by 'Na hanti na nibadhyate', he says — 'Tataḥ'. By 'Na nibadhyate', non-connection with the fruit opposed to liberation achievable by action is intended, with this intention he says — 'Tatphalaṃ nānubhavati'. By this 'No ego during action time, non-smearing by the thought "I did" in post-action time; by both "na hanti na nibadhyate" prohibition of sin of this world and the next' — this other interpretation is refuted.

कर्म का नियम यह है कि जो कर्म का कर्ता होता है वही फल का भोक्ता भी होता है। हम यह देख चुके हैं कि केवल जड़ उपाधियाँ कर्म नहीं कर सकतीं और न केवल चैतन्य स्वरूप आत्मा ही कर्ता हो सकता है। दोनों के परस्पर सम्बन्ध से कर्ताभिमानी जीव केवल अविद्या से ही उत्पन्न हो सकता है क्योंकि परस्पर विरोधी धर्मी जड़ उपाधि और चेतन आत्मा के मध्य कोई वास्तविक सम्बन्ध नहीं हो सकता। अत स्पष्ट है कि आत्मा को न जानकर अनात्मा के सम्बन्ध से जीव भाव को प्राप्त होकर मनुष्य शुभाशुभ कर्मों का कर्ता बनता है और उसकी बुद्धि पाप पुण्यरूपी फलों से लिप्त भी होती है। अज्ञान दशा में यही बन्धन अपरिहार्य है।इस श्लोक में सम्यक् ज्ञान प्राप्त पुरुष का वर्णन किया गया है। आत्मज्ञानी पुरुष का अहंकार अर्थात् जीवभाव ही समाप्त हो जाता है। तब उसकी बुद्धि कौन से विषयों में आसक्त होगी अथवा गुण दोषों से दूषित होगी यह सर्वथा असम्भ्व है। इसी तथ्य को यहाँ इस प्रकार बताते हैं कि वह पुरुष इन लोकों को मारकर भी? (वास्तव में)? न मारता है न बँधता है।उपर्युक्त कथन में कोई विरोध नहीं हैं? क्योंकि मारने की क्रिया शरीरादि लौकिक दृष्टि से कही गई है और मारता नहीं है यह आत्मदृष्टि से कहा गया है। जब भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण यह कहते हैं कि ज्ञानी पुरुष हत्या करके भी वास्तव में हत्या नहीं करता है? तब इसका अर्थ यह नहीं समझना चाहिए कि सभी ज्ञानी पुरुष हत्या जैसे हीन कर्मों में प्रवृत्त होते हैं इस वाक्य का अभिप्राय केवल इतना ही है कि कर्तृत्वाभिमान के अभाव में मनुष्य को किसी भी कर्म का बन्धन नहीं हो सकता। लोक में भी हम देखते हैं कि एक हत्यारे व्यक्ति को मृत्युदण्ड दिया जाता है? और रणभूमि पर शत्रु की हत्या करने वाले वीर सैनिक को महावीर चक्र प्रदान किया जाता है हत्या का कर्म दोनों में समान होते हुए भी अहंकार और स्वार्थ के भाव और अभाव के कारण दोनों के फलों में अन्तर होता है। जिसका अहंकार पूर्णतया नष्ट हो जाता है? ऐसे ज्ञानी पुरुष को किसी भी प्रकार का बन्धन नहीं होता है।अब इसके पश्चात् गीताचार्य भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण? कर्म के प्रवर्तक या प्रेरक तत्त्वों का और कर्म संग्रह का वर्णन करते हैं

'Śarīra'. 'Nyāyyam' — righteous, scriptural. 'Viparītam' — unrighteous, non-scriptural.

Objection: It is said contradictorily that 'it is started by three, body etc.' and 'these five are its causes'.

Answer: This is not a fault. Here also, by the word body Adhishtana is included, by the word man (Nara) the agent, by speech-mind the instruments, by 'starts' the efforts, and by 'righteous' the Daiva in the form of Dharma and Adharma.

Although the use of the five is equal in all actions, only the threefold action characterized by injunction and prohibition is well known in scripture. 'This is physical action, this is mental, this is verbal' — such designation is with respect to the predominance of body etc., so there is no contradiction.

To explain 'Adhiṣṭhānam'. By body, speech, mind — rightful (scriptural), or contrary (prohibited), all other action — physical, verbal, and mental — has these five causes.

He states them — 'Adhiṣṭhāna' first body is the cause? 'Kartā' Jivatma, with ego, knower; 'He is knower' therefore 'Agent, on account of scripture having a purport' [B.S. 2.3.33] from this Sutra. And 'Karaṇam' with mind, eye-ear etc. distinct by difference of knowledge and action grasped as various; 'ceṣṭā' diverse by nature of effect — functions of Prana etc. are causes in action here.

'Daivam' and fifth is 'Adrishta' (destiny/unseen) so some (Madhvas) [say].

So thus, by the four verses, the three quarters ending with "unfavorable, favorable, and mixed is the threefold fruit of action for the non-renouncers after death" have been explained. Now, He explains the fourth quarter "But not for the renouncers, anywhere" with one verse—"Whose" (yasya), etc.

He who is contrary to the aforementioned [ignorant one], who, having attained the fourfold means (Sadhana Chatushtaya) like discrimination between eternal and non-eternal objects upon the destruction of sins opposing discrimination by meritorious deeds, and for whom, upon the sublation of ignorance along with its effects by the direct realization of the non-agent, non-enjoyer, self-luminous, supreme bliss, non-dual Brahman-Self generated by the instruction of the scripture and the teacher and by reasoning—the feeling, i.e., the cognition "I am the doer" does not exist; [meaning] whose "bhava"—existence—is not fit to be designated as "ahankrita" (ego-ized/I-am), because only the pure nature remains due to the sublation of the ego—(this is the meaning); or, "ahankrita" means the "bhava"—the state or identification—of the ego; for whom this does not exist due to being sublated by discrimination. Even in the case of "appearance of what has been sublated" (badhitanuvritti), these very five causes, Adhisthana etc., are superimposed by Maya upon Me, the Self of all, and are the doers of all actions, being illumined by Me, the self-luminous Consciousness, the Unattached, through a superimposed relationship.

"But I am not the doer, but the witness of the doer and his functions, free from the two adjuncts possessing the power of action and knowledge, pure, unconnected with all effects and causes, immutable, eternal, non-dual, devoid of all modifications"—according to Sruti texts like "This Purusha is indeed unattached," "Witness, knower, absolute, and attributeless," "Without Prana, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable," "Unborn, Self, great, permanent," "Like water, the one seer, non-dual," "Unborn, eternal, everlasting is this ancient one," "Partless, actionless, peaceful, faultless, taintless," etc.

And from Smriti texts like "This is said to be unchangeable," "Actions are performed in all ways by the Gunas of Prakriti; one whose mind is deluded by egoism thinks 'I am the doer'," "But the knower of truth, O Mighty-armed, regarding the divisions of Gunas and actions, thinking 'The Gunas revolve in the Gunas,' is not attached," "Even while dwelling in the body, O son of Kunti, He does not act, nor is He tainted," etc.

Therefore, "I am not the doer"—for one of such supreme vision, the "intelligence" (buddhi), i.e., the internal organ, "is not tainted" (na lipyate), i.e., does not become remorseful. "I did this, I will enjoy this fruit"—this contemplation caused by the latent impression (vasana) of doership is "lepa" (taint/remorse). And that [taint] is in the form of elation regarding meritorious action, and in the form of regret regarding sinful action. The intellect is not conjoined with even this twofold taint, because the identification with doership has been sublated.

And thus, concerning the Knower, there is the Sruti: "Him these two do not overcome—'Therefore I did sin,' 'Therefore I did good'; he crosses over both these; neither what is done nor what is not done burns him" (Brihadaranyaka 4.4.22). This has been stated by the Rig Mantra: "This eternal glory of the Brahmana does not increase by action nor become less. One should know the nature of that alone; having known it, he is not tainted by evil action." "By evil action" is an implication for merit also. "Increases" and "becomes less" are with the intention of satisfaction and regret regarding merit and sin.

Thus, he who has no egoistic feeling, whose intellect is not tainted—that right-minded one (Sumati), distinct from the aforementioned wrong-minded one (Durmati), the seer of the supreme truth, sees the Self as the absolute non-doer; due to the absence of the identification with having agency, he does not become a partaker of the threefold fruit of action like the unfavorable etc.—to praise the absence of egoism and the absence of taint in the intellect in this much import of the scripture, He says—"Having killed" (hatva), etc.

"Having killed," i.e., even having caused injury to, "these worlds," i.e., all living beings, "he does not kill"—he does not become the agent of the act of killing, because of the realization of his nature as a non-doer; "he is not bound"—he does not get bound. Nor is he connected with its effect, the fruit of unrighteousness. Here, the fruit of "he has no egoistic feeling" is "he does not kill"; the fruit of "the intellect is not tainted" is "he is not bound." And by this, in demonstrating the non-tainting by action, a mere hyperbole is stated; it is not that the killing of all beings is possible [for a Knower]; "even having killed"—this is from the worldly perspective where doership is perceived [though] sublated by the admission of doership [for argument's sake]; "he does not kill"—this denial of doership is from the scriptural, absolute perspective; thus there is no contradiction.

In the beginning of the scripture, having promised the Self's non-contact with all actions by "He does not kill, nor is he killed," and having established it by reasons like "He is not born," etc., and having briefly stated the cessation of eligibility for all actions for the Knower by "Know Him to be indestructible," etc.—in the middle, the meaning of the scripture having been expanded by various contexts, it is concluded with "he does not kill, he is not bound" to demonstrate the validity/totality of that [teaching].

And thus, since the complete annihilation of all actions performed by the non-Self like Adhisthana etc., which are imagined by ignorance, is reasonable through Self-knowledge, it is established that for the supreme renouncers, the threefold fruit of action, unfavorable etc., does not exist. And supreme renunciation is indeed the direct realization of the non-agent Self.

Even though Janaka and others possessed such renunciation, the perception of action due to the "appearance of what is sublated" (badhitanuvritti) caused by powerful Prarabdha karma, or through the projection of others, is not contradictory, just like the begging for alms etc. of such Paramahamsas. Therefore, it is called "Vidvat Sannyasa" (Renunciation of the Knower) which is the fruit of knowledge. But "Vividisha Sannyasa" (Renunciation of the seeker) which is the means, though not of this kind initially, becomes of this kind later upon the rise of knowledge; this will be stated.

Thus having stated the causeness of Adhishtana etc. in all action, He restates the ignorant one's view of agency in the non-doer Self — 'Tatraivaṃ sati'.

Thus, while all action is being performed by the mentioned five causes, the 'Kevalam' — pure, unconnected, non-doer — Self; regarding action being done by Adhishtana etc. imagined as non-different from the Self, 'I alone am the doer' — thus he who sees the 'Kartā' — 'akṛtabuddhitvāt' — due to intellect uncultivated by Vedanta, teacher's instruction and logic — sees;

'therefore he is wicked-minded' — he does not see at all.

He whose Self (mind/antahkarana) has been refined (samskrita) by the instruction of the scripture and the teacher and by reasoning; "na bhavati ahankritah" (who does not have egotism)—meaning, in whom the notion, feeling, or concept characterized by 'I am the doer' does not exist. (He sees thus:) 'These five alone—the Seat (body) and the others—projected by Avidya (ignorance) onto the Self, are the doers of all actions; not I. I am but the witness of their activities, without prana, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable (Mundaka Upanishad 2.1.2), absolute (kevala), and unchanging.' He who sees in this manner—
"Buddhih" (his intellect)—meaning the intellect which is an adjunct (upadhi) of the Self—"na lipyate" (is not tainted), meaning it does not become remorseful (anushayini). The meaning is: he whose intellect is not tainted by the regret, 'I did this, therefore I shall go to hell'—he is of right understanding; he sees (truly).
"Hatva api" (Even having killed)—even if he kills these worlds, meaning all these living beings; "na hanti" (he does not kill), meaning he does not perform the act of killing; "na nibadhyate" (nor is he bound), nor does he become connected with the effect of that action, i.e., the fruit of unrighteousness (adharma).

(Objection:) "Having killed, he does not kill"—this is stated as a contradiction, even if it is meant as praise (stuti).
(Reply:) This is not a fault; because it is reasonable from the standpoints of the worldly view and the absolute view. Relying on the worldly view, where one identifies with the body, etc., saying "I am the killer," the text says "having killed." Relying on the absolute view as previously demonstrated, it says "he does not kill, nor is bound." Both of these are indeed consistent.

(Objection:) But does the Self not act in combination (sambhuya) with the Seat (adhisthana) and the others? Since the word 'kevala' (absolute/alone) was used (in the previous verse 18.16: "the Self as the absolute agent").
(Reply:) This is not a fault; because the Self being of a changeless nature, its combination with the Seat, etc., is impossible. Combination with others is possible only for that which is subject to change; and agency could arise from such combination. But for the changeless Self, there is no combination with anything; thus, agency through combination is not possible. Therefore, the absoluteness (kevalatvam) of the Self is its natural state, and the word 'kevala' is merely a restatement of fact.

And the changelessness of the Self is well-known in Shruti, Smriti, and Logic (Nyaya). "It is called unchangeable" (Gita 2.25), "Actions are performed by Gunas alone... though dwelling in the body, It does not act" (Gita 13.31)—this has been repeatedly demonstrated in the Gita itself. And in the Shrutis, such as "It thinks, as it were; it moves, as it were" (Brihadaranyaka 4.3.7). And by Logic too—'The Self-principle is partless, independent, and changeless'—this is the Royal Road (the standard established path).
(Argument:) Even if one admits that the Self has change, its own change would belong to itself; the actions of the Seat (body), etc., cannot belong to the Self as the agent. Indeed, an action done by one cannot logically belong to another who has not done it. And that which is attributed via Avidya (ignorance) does not belong to It. Just as the quality of silver does not belong to the nacre (shell), or as the surface-dirt attributed by children to the sky through ignorance does not belong to the sky; similarly, the changes (activities) of the Seat and the others belong to them alone, not to the Self.

Therefore, it is rightly said that due to the absence of the taint of egoism and understanding (of agency), the Knower kills not, nor is he bound. Having promised "This (Self) slays not, nor is slain" (Gita 2.19), and having stated the changelessness of the Self with reasons like "It is not born" (Gita 2.20), and having briefly stated the cessation of the competence for action for the Knower at the beginning of the Scripture with "Knows this to be indestructible" (Gita 2.21)—and having expanded on this in the middle wherever the occasion arose—He now concludes here to consolidate the meaning of the Scripture: "The Knower kills not, nor is bound."
And this being so, since the identification of being a 'bearer of the body' is untenable, the renunciation of all actions caused by Avidya is established; thus, it is reasonable that the three kinds of fruits of action (disagreeable, etc.) do not accrue to the Renunciates (Sannyasis). And, due to the reverse of this, they do accrue to the others (the ignorant)—this too is unavoidable. Thus, the meaning of the Gita-Shastra is concluded.
This, indeed, is the essence of the meaning of all Vedas, which is to be understood by Pundits of sharp intellect after due enquiry—this has been shown by us here and there by dividing the sections in accordance with Scripture and Logic.

Now, the impeller of actions is stated.

The fruit of this exposition — establishing agency as superimposed and non-agency as natural — He shows by two verses — 'Tatra'. 'Tatra' — in that action. 'Evam' — being performed by the five in the stated manner.

'Kevalam tu' — the Self, though non-doer — conscious, from the Shruti 'Witness, conscious, alone, and attributeless' [Shvetashvatara 6.11] — seer of the movement of the pentad Adhishtana etc., though indifferent —

who sees as 'Kartāram' — the locus of agency — he is 'durmatiḥ' — of intellect overcome by sin — does not see.

यस्य whose? न not? अहंकृतः egoistic? भावः the notion? बुद्धिः intelligence? यस्य of whom? न not? लिप्यते is tainted? हत्वा having slain? अपि even? सः he? इमान् these? लोकान् people? न not? हन्ति slays? न not? निबध्यते is bound.Commentary I will explain to thee? O Arjuna? the characterisitics of the man who has transcended activity? and who has gone beyond the bonds of Karma.When selfishnes and egoism are destroyed? when desire and personal gain are renounced? actions cannot bind a man. He knows that the Self is not destroyed when the body perishes. He has no idea of agency. The act of killing itself? in his case? becomes one necessary for the peace and harmony of the world. His killing without desire is like the killing of a murderer by the executioner and the judge on behalf of the community for the preservation of peace and harmony in the world.He who has a trained intellect? pure understanding and developed reason? who has a knowledge of the scriptures? who has devoted himself to the study of the scriptures? who is eipped with the knowledge of logic? who is well trained by the instructions of his preceptor? is absolutely free from the egoistic notion that I am the agent or the doer. He knows perfectly well that Nature or Guna or ones own nature does everything. He thus thinks I am the silent witness of all activities. I am not the doer. These five (the body? the actor? etc.) which are superimposed on the pure? actionless Self through ignorance are the causes of all actions. I do not do anything. The senses move amongst the senseobjects. The alities (Gunas) move in their counterparts in the senses which are also the products of the Gunas. I know the essence of the divisions of the alities and their functions. I am in essence without limbs. How can action or work be ascribed to me I am without hands? without legs? without feet? without breath and without mind. I am ever pure? spotless and immovable and immutable. He will never repent thus I have done a wrong action. I ought to have done like this. I have done an evil action. I will go to hell. He is always wise. He can,never do a wrong action. His will has become one with the cosmic will. His will has become blended with the will of the Lord. Whatever he does is done by the Lord only. He has no will of his own. He sees rightly. Though he kills? he does not commit the act of killing. He is not bound by the fruit of a vicious action as an effect of that act. He is beyond good and evil? beyond the pairs of opposites? as he has knowledge of the Self.An objector says The statement that though he kills these people? he does not kill? is selfcontradictory.We say This objection is really not tenable. From the worldly point of view the Lord says though he kills? because man identifies the Self with the body? etc.? and thinks I am the killer. From the transcendental point of view explained above? the Lord says? He kills not? he is not bound.Another objector says The Self acts in conjunction with the body? etc.? -- He who looks upon his Self Which is isolated? as the agent৷৷. (XVIII.16)We say This objection also cannot stand. As the omnipresent ether is not affected by reason of its subtlety? even so the Self? seated everywhere in the body? is not affected. This immortal? immutable? changeless? formless? attributeless Self? though seated in the body? does not act and is not affected? just as the crystal is not affected by the red colour of the flower that comes into contact with it? just as the sun is not affected by the diseases of the eye. A thing that changes only can join with others and become the agent. The Self is always isolated? independent and free. This Self is immutable (II.25). The alities move amidst the alities (III.28). Though seated in the body? He does not act (XIII.31). Actions are wrought by the alities (III.27). You will find in the Brihadaranyaka were. By reasoning also we may establish the same conclusion thusThe Self is indivisible? allpervading? infinite? limbless? without parts? independent? ever free and immutable. Therefore the actions of the body can never be ascribed to the agency of the Self.Verily the actions of one cannot go to another who has not done them. Just as blue colour cannot belong to the sky? silver to the motherofpearl? water to mirage? so also what is ascribed to the Self by ignorance cannot really belong to It. The changes that occur in the body pertain to the body but not to the pure actionless Self which is always the spectator or the silent witness. Therefore? it is right to say that the wise man who is free from egoism and all impurities of the mind? neither kills nor is he bound though he kills.In chapter II.19? the Lord stated the proposition -- He slayeth not? nor is he slain. In chapter II.20? He said The Self is unborn? eternal? ancient the Self is not slain when the body is killed. The Lord has touched here and there that the Self is not affected by works? that there is no necessity for the wise man of doing actions. He concludes that the sage kills not? nor is he bound? and sums up the teaching of the Gita. The teaching of the Gita has been concluded in this verse. The Sannyasins who are free from egoism are not affected by Karma. The threefold fruits of action? viz.? evil? good and mixed (see verse 12 above) do not accrue to them. Those worldlyminded persons who work with egoism and expectation of fruits are tainted by the works. They are forced to experience the fruits of their actions and to take birth again and again. (Cf.II.19V.7)

Yasya, he who, the person whose intellect is refined by the instructions of the scriptures and the teachers, and reason; who has na, not; ahankrtah bhavah, the feeling of egoism, in whom does not occur the notion in the form, 'I am the agent'; i.e., he who sees thus: 'These five, viz locus etc. (14), imagined in the Self through ignorance, are verily the agents of all actions; not I. But I am the absolute, unchanging witness of their functions, 'Without vita force, without mind, pure, superior to the (other) superior immutable (Maya)" (Mu. 2.1.1)'; yasya, whose; buddhih, intellect, the internal organ, which is the limiting adunct of the Self; is na, not; lipyate, tainted, does not become regretful thinking, 'I have done this; as a result, I shall enter into hell'; whose intellect does not become thus tainted, he has a good intellect and he perceives (rightly). Api, even; hatva, by killing; iman, these; lokan, creatures, i.e. all living beings; sah he; does not hanti, kill-he does not perform the act of killing; nor does he nibadhyate, become bound, nor even does he become connected with its result, the fruit of an unrighteous action.
Objection: Even if this be a eulogy, is it not contradictory to say, 'even by killing he does not kill'?
Reply: This defect does not arise; for this becomes logical from the ordinary and the enlightened points of view. By adopting the empirical point of view (which consists in thinking), 'I am the slayer', by identifying the body with the Self, the Lord says, 'even by killing'; and, by taking His stand on the supreme Truth as explained above (the Lord says), 'he does not kill, nor does he become bound'. Thus both these surely become reasonable.
Objection; Is it not that the Self certainly does act in combination with the locus etc., which conclusion follows from the use of the word kevala (absolute) in the text, 'the absolute Self as the agent' (16)?
Reply: There is not such fault, because, the Self being changeless by nature, there is no possiblity of Its becoming united with the locus etc. For it is only a changeful entity that can possibly be united with another, or come to have agentship through combination. But, for the changeless Self there can be no combination with anything whatsoever. Hence, agentship through combination is not logical. Therefore, the absoluteness of the Self being natural, the word kevalam is merely a reiteration of an established fact.
And the changelessness of the Self is well known from the Upanisads, the Smrtis and logic. As to that, in the Gita itself this has been established more than once in such texts as, 'It is said that৷৷.This is unchangeable' (2.25), 'Actions are being done by the gunas themselves' (see 3.27), 'this ৷৷.supreme Self does not act৷৷.although existing in the body' (13.31), and in the Upanisads also in such texts as, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (Br. 4.3.7).
And from the standpoint of reason also, the royal path is to hold that the true nature of the Self is that It is partless, independent of others and changeless. Even if mutability (of the Self) be accepted, It should have a change that is Its own. The functions of the locus etc. cannot be attributed to the agency of the Self. Indeed, an action done by someone else cannot be imputed to another by whom it has not been done! As for what is imputed (on somody) through ignorance, that is not his. As the ality of silver is not of nacre, or as surface or dirt attributed through ignorance to the sky by foolish people is not of the sky, similarly, the changes in the locus etc. also are verily their own, and not of the Self. Hence it has been well said that the enlightened person 'does not kill, nor is he bound', becuase of the absence of his being tainted by the idea that actions are done by himself. [Some translate this portion thus: '৷৷.because of the absence of the thought 'I am doing', and also due to the taintlessness of the mind'; or, '৷৷.in the absence of egotism and of all taint in the mind'.-Tr.]
After having declared, 'This One does not kill, nor is It killed' (2.19); having stated the immutability of the Self through such texts as, 'Never is this One born' (2.20) , etc., which adduce the reason for this; having briefly stated at the commencement of the Scripture-in, 'he who knows this One as indestructible' (2.21)-that the enlightened man has no eligibility for rites and duties; and having deliberated in various places on that (cessation) which has been mooted in the middle (of the Scripture), the Lord, by way of summarizing the purport of the Scripture, concludes here by saying that the enlightened person 'does not kill, nor does he become bound.' If this be so, then it becomes established that the three kinds of results of actions, viz the undesirable etc., do not accrue to the monks, since it is reasonable that, because of the illogicality of their entertaining the idea of being embodied, all actions resulting from ignorance become abandoned (by them). And hence, as a conseence of a reversal of this, it becomes inevitable that the results do accrue to others.
Thus, this is how the purport of the scripture Gita has been summed up. In order that this which is the essence of the teachings of all the Vedas should be. understood after deliberation by the learned ones possessing a sharp intellect, it has been explained by us in accordance with the scriptures and reasoning, in various places by dealing with it topically.
Thereafter, now is being stated what promts actions:

He who, through the contemplation of the agency of the Supreme Being, is free from the self-conceit, 'I alone do everything'; he whose understanding is not therefore tainted, and has come to be informed by the understanding; 'As I am not the agent of this work, its fruit is not connected with me; so this work does not belong to me' - such a person, though he slays all these men, not merely Bhisma, etc., does not slay them. Therefore, he is not bound by the actions known as battle. The meaning is that the fruits of such actions do not accrue to him.
Sri Krsna now teaches how action is induced. For this he differentiates actions generated by Sattva and the other Gunas. The object is to inculcate the desirability of the Sattvika type. For, only meditation on the self not being the agent, brings about the growth of Sattva.