Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 18 - Shloka (Verse) 18

[इसी अध्यायके चौदहवें श्लोकमें भगवान्ने कर्मोंके बननेमें पाँच हेतु बताये -- अधिष्ठान? कर्ता? करण? चेष्टा और दैव (संस्कार)। इन पाँचोंमें भी मूल हेतु है -- कर्ता। इसी मूल हेतुको मिटानेके लिये भगवान्ने सोलहवें श्लोकमें कर्तृत्वभाव रखनेवालेकी बड़ी निन्दा की और सत्रहवें श्लोकमें कर्तृत्वभाव न रखनेवालेकी बड़ी प्रशंसा की। कर्तृत्वभाव बिलकुल न रहे? यह साफसाफ समझानेके लिये ही अठारहवाँ श्लोक कहा गया है।]ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं परिज्ञाता त्रिविधा कर्मचोदना -- ज्ञान? ज्ञेय और परिज्ञाता -- इन तीनोंसे कर्मप्रेरणा होती है। ज्ञान को सबसे पहले कहनेमें यह भाव है कि हरेक मनुष्यकी कोई भी प्रवृत्ति होती है तो प्रवृत्तिसे पहले ज्ञान होता है। जैसे? जल पीनेकी प्रवृत्तिसे पहले प्यासका ज्ञान होता है? फिर वह जलसे प्यास बुझाता है। जल आदि जिस विषयका ज्ञान होता है? वह ज्ञेय कहलाता है और जिसको ज्ञान होता है? वह परिज्ञाता कहलाता है। ज्ञान? ज्ञेय और परिज्ञाता -- तीनों होनेसे ही कर्म करनेकी प्रेरणा होती है। यदि इन तीनोंमेंसे एक भी न हो तो कर्म करनेकी प्रेरणा नहीं होती।परिज्ञाता उसको कहते हैं? जो परितः ज्ञाता है अर्थात् जो सब तरहकी क्रियाओंकी स्फुरणाका ज्ञाता है। वह केवल ज्ञाता मात्र है अर्थात् उसे क्रियाओंकी स्फुरणामात्रका ज्ञान होता है? उसमें अपने लिये कुछ चाहनेका अथवा उस क्रियाको करनेका अभिमान आदि बिलकुल नहीं होता।कोई भी क्रिया करनेकी स्फुरणा एक व्यक्तिविशेषमें ही होती है। इसलिये शब्द? स्पर्श? रूप? रस और गन्ध -- इन विषयोंको लेकर सुननेवाला? स्पर्श करनेवाला? देखनेवाला? चखनेवाला और सूँघनेवाला -- इस तरह अनेक कर्ता हो सकते हैं परन्तु उन सबको जाननेवाला एक ही रहता है? उसे ही यहाँ,परिज्ञाता कहा है।करणं कर्म कर्तेति त्रिविधः कर्मसंग्रहः -- कर्मसंग्रहके तीन हेतु हैं -- करण? कर्म तथा कर्ता। इन तीनोंके,सहयोगसे कर्म पूरा होता है। जिन साधनोंसे कर्ता कर्म करता है? उन क्रिया करनेके साधनों(इन्द्रियों आदि)को करण कहते हैं। खानापीना? उठनाबैठना? चलनाफिरना? आनाजाना आदि जो चेष्टाएँ की जाती हैं? उनको कर्म कहते हैं। करण और क्रियासे अपना सम्बन्ध जोड़कर कर्म करनेवालेको कर्ता कहते हैं। इस प्रकार इन तीनोंके मिलनेसे ही कर्म बनता है।भगवान्को यहाँ खास बात यह बतानी है कि कर्मसंग्रह कैसे होता है अर्थात् कर्म बाँधनेवाला कैसे होता है कर्म बननेके तीन हेतु बताते हुए भगवान्का लक्ष्य मूल हेतु कर्ता को बतानेमें है क्योंकि कर्मसंग्रहका खास सम्बन्ध कर्तासे है। यदि कर्तापन न हो तो कर्मसंग्रह नहीं होता? केवल क्रियामात्र होती है।कर्मसंग्रहमें करण हेतु नहीं है क्योंकि करण कर्ताके अधीन होता है। कर्ता जैसा कर्म करना चाहता है? वैसा ही कर्म होता है? इसलिये कर्म भी कर्मसंग्रहमें खास हेतु नहीं है। सांख्यसिद्धान्तके अनुसार खास बाँधनेवाला है -- अहंकृतभाव और इसीसे कर्मसंग्रह होता है। अहंकृतभाव न रहनेसे कर्मसंग्रह नहीं होता अर्थात् कर्म फलजनक नहीं होता। इस मूलका ज्ञान करानेके लिये ही भगवान्ने करण और कर्मको पहले रखकर कर्ताको कर्मसंग्रहके पासमें रखा है? जिससे यह खयालमें आ जाय कि बाँधनेवाला कर्ता ही है। सम्बन्ध -- गुणातीत होनेके उद्देश्यसे अब आगेके श्लोकसे त्रिगुणात्मक पदार्थोंका प्रकरण आरम्भ करते हैं।

इस प्रकार शास्त्रके आशयका उपसंहार करके अब कर्मोंका प्रवर्तक बतलाया जाता है --, ज्ञान -- जिसके द्वारा कोई पदार्थ जाना जाय। यहाँ ज्ञान शब्दसे सामान्यभावसे सर्व पदार्थविषयक ज्ञान कहा गया है। वैसे ही ज्ञेय अर्थात् जाननेमें आनेवाला पदार्थ? यह भी सामान्य भावसे समस्तका ही वर्णन है। तथा परिज्ञाता अर्थात् उपाधियुक्त अविद्याकल्पित भोक्ता? इस प्रकार जो यह इन तीनोंका समुदाय है? यही सामान्यभावसे समस्त कर्मोंकी प्रवर्तक तीन प्रकारकी कर्मचोदना है। क्योंकि उक्त ज्ञान आदि तीनोंके सम्मिलित होनेपर ही त्याग और ग्रहण आदि जिनके प्रयोजन हैं? ऐसे समस्त कर्मोंका आरम्भ होता है। अब अधिष्ठानादि पाँच हेतुओंसे जिसकी उत्पत्ति है तथा मन? वाणी और शरीररूप आश्रयोंके भेदसे जिसके तीन वर्ग किये गये हैं? ऐसे समस्त कर्म? करण आदि तीन कारकोंमें संगृहीत हैं। यह बात बतलायी जाती है -- करण -- जिसके द्वारा कर्म किया जाय? अर्थात् श्रोत्रादि दस बाह्य इन्द्रियाँ और बुद्धि आदि चार,अन्तःकरण। कर्म -- जो कर्ताका अत्यन्त इष्ट हो और क्रियाद्वारा सम्पादन किया जाय। कर्ता -- श्रोत्रादि करणोंको अपनेअपने व्यापारमें नियुक्त करनेवाला उपाधिस्वरूप जीव। इस प्रकार यह त्रिविध कर्मसंग्रह है। जिनमें कुछ संगृहीत किया जाय उसका नाम संग्रह है? अतः कर्मोंके संग्रहका नाम कर्मसंग्रह है क्योंकि इन तीन कारकोंमें ही कर्म संगृहीत है। इसलिये यह तीन प्रकारका कर्मसंग्रह है।

After the conclusion of the scripture's meaning—this immediacy is stated by the word 'atha' (now); 'at this time'—by this, the state of expectation for the teaching regarding the impeller is stated. 'Of actions'—meaning, of those in which the wise have no eligibility and the ignorant have eligibility.

Explaining the word 'Jnana' (knowledge) through the etymology of the instrument (karana), he states that it means knowledge in general—'Jnanam', etc. Regarding the word 'Jneya' (known) also, he states that, in the same way, it means only that which is to be known—'Tatha' (similarly).

'Characterized by limiting adjuncts' (Upadhilakshanatvam) means having that as the principal, being conditioned; the adjective 'imagined by ignorance' is to show its unreality.

This triad alone is the impeller of all actions, he says—'Iti etat' (thus this), etc. 'The impeller of all actions'—this phrase should be supplied. 'Chodana' is the speech that impels action—following this Bhashya, he states the meaning of the word 'Chodana'—'Pravartika' (impeller), etc. 'Of all actions'—this connects with the preceding. The threefold nature has been stated before by knowledge etc.; the compound (vigraha) is 'Chodana of actions'.

He establishes their nature as impellers of all actions through experience—'Jnanadinam' (of knowledge etc.). By the word 'etc.' in 'rejection, acceptance, etc.' (hana-upadana-adi), 'indifference' (upeksha) is intended. He states the purport of 'Karanam' (instrument) etc.—'Tata' (therefore/from that). Meaning, because knowledge etc. are impellers.

He introduces the part of the verse regarding the stated meaning—'Iti etat' (thus this). He describes the two types of instruments, external and internal, by the etymology of 'instrument'—'Karanam', etc.

He clarifies the action itself which has the mentioned characteristics—'Kartuh' (of the doer), etc. The doer is indeed independent, and independence means being the employer of the factors (karakas) without being employed by the factors, he says—'Karta', etc.

How is action included in the mentioned threefold [collection]? To this he says—'Karma', etc. The idea is that it is well known that action is the locus of the factors.

It has been stated that the Self has no doership and no connection with fruit; to establish that very thing, He states the impeller of actions—'Knowledge' (Jnanam), etc. 'By this it is known'—by this etymology of the instrument (karana), knowledge in general, having all things indiscriminately as its object, is spoken of. Similarly, 'Known' (Jneyam) also refers generally to everything that is to be known. Similarly, 'Knower' (Parijnata) is the enjoyer in whom the limiting adjunct imagined by ignorance is predominant; thus is the threefold 'impulse to action' (Karma-chodana). The meaning is that the impeller of actions is of three kinds.

'Instrument' (Karanam)—'by this it is done'—refers to the external [instruments] like ears etc. and internal [instruments] like intellect etc. 'Action' (Karma) is that which is most desired by the doer, which is pervaded by the activity. 'Doer' (Karta) is independent; and independence means being the employer of the factors (karakas) without being employed by the factors; he who, having the limiting adjunct imagined by ignorance as principal, sets [things] in motion—thus is the threefold 'basis of action' (Karma-sangraha). 'In this it is gathered together'—thus it is 'Sangraha' (basis/constituent); because action inheres in these three, this is the threefold basis of action.

For, upon the combination of the three—knowledge etc.—the commencement of all action, having rejection, acceptance, or indifference as its purpose, occurs; therefore, the threefold impulse to action in the form of knowledge etc. is spoken of. And thereafter, that which is begun by the five—Adhisthana etc.—and which is accumulated in three ways by the division of speech, mind, and body, is gathered in the three—instruments etc.; therefore, the threefold basis of action in the form of instruments etc. is spoken of—this is the idea.

Here, since this commentary is of a general nature, other interpretations that are faultless and not in contradiction with it are also to be accepted.

If so, then is the injunction not dependent on the person? Because of [his] non-doership"—to this, He says—"Knowledge" (Jnanam). The impulse to action (Karma-chodana) is threefold; the injunction of action is dependent on this triad, thus it is called "threefold". Briefly stating the causes, He says—"Instrument" (Karanam), etc.

"Karma-sangraha" (basis of action) [means] the collection of the causes of action. The Seat (Adhishthana) etc. are included in the 'cause' itself. For similarly in the Khilas (supplements) of the Rig Veda [it is said]—"Dependent indeed on knowledge, the known, and the knower, the injunction has arisen. The instrument, the doer, and the action are the collection of causes of action."

Even though there is non-doership, through the injunction, and by the grace of the Lord leading to the generation of desire, and through the mentioned causes, the human goal is attained via action. Even though [everything] is dependent on the Lord, it is regulated by Him alone through injunctions. And if desire etc. arises, then it is indeed caused to be done by the Lord. And the fruit is determined. Even though in reality there is non-doership, the doership based on identification belongs to him [the individual soul] alone. And [his] independence is only in relation to inert matter; therefore, there is no futility of the injunction regarding action.

And all this is established by experience and the stated proofs, so no separate proof is mentioned.

The method of establishing the non-doership of the Self, which is useful for establishing Sattvic renunciation, has been concluded. Here the Sankhya (philosopher) says: What was said, 'these five are its causes,' and what was said, 'he does not kill,' that we tolerate. For it is not proper to say that the changeless conscious entity becomes the doer of action which is of the nature of movement and is threefold by the division of bodily etc.

But that which was said, 'he is not bound,' rejecting even the stated enjoyership (bhoktritva)—that we do not tolerate. For potters, etc., do not produce pots, etc., motivated only by themselves, but motivated by the enjoying Purusha (Self). Otherwise, in the absence of enjoyers, that activity would necessarily be pointless. Thus, the doers, etc., consisting merely of Prakriti (Pradhana), accomplish all actions, motivated by the means for the enjoyment and liberation of the Purusha. Therefore, because the Purusha is by nature an enjoyer, the action done even after investigating non-doership must necessarily be enjoyed by the enjoyer, and thus the statement of non-attachment to action, even in Sattvic renunciation, is inconsistent.

To this, he replies: Knowledge, the object of knowledge (Gneya). Knowledge is the perception of an object like a pot, generated by means of perception (pramāṇa), etc., by which the reality of the object is known and revealed, whether present or past. The object of knowledge (Gneya) is the object of comprehension, such as a pot. The knowing subject (Parijñātā) is the substratum of the consciousness reflection (Sābhāsadhī), who is called the enjoyer. The incitement (Chodanā) to action is threefold, possessing this threefold structure. The meaning is that these three combined incite action. For even if there is an object of knowledge or a knowing subject, activity is impossible without knowledge. If there is knowledge and a knowing subject, activity is impossible regarding an object of knowledge separated by time and space. Even if there is habitual knowledge (Saṃskārātmaka Jñāna) and the object of knowledge is present, still, because the knower is absent in deep sleep, activity is not seen. Therefore, these three, being mutually dependent like a tripod, generate the effect in the form of the intellect's determination regarding abandonment, acceptance, or indifference, and thus incite the activity favorable to abandonment, etc. This is the intended meaning of the term ‘doer.’

The word Chodanā (incitement) refers to the doer when the ending suffix ‘lyu’ (Nandyādi) is used in the sense of the agent (kartari). Gender (Liṅga) is unintended. Or, gender is not to be taught because gender depends on common usage. Likewise, the means (Karaṇa) is the sense organ. Action (Karma) is the reception of the object performed by that means. The doer (Kartā) is the aforementioned knowing subject (Parijñātā). These three combined are the collection of action (Karma-saṃgraha), meaning the accumulation of the most desired object of enjoyment (Karmaṇah īpsitatamasya Bhogyasya Saṃgraha), that in which it is collected, i.e., the place of synthesis, the enjoyer. Even if there is an enjoyer and a means, enjoyment is impossible without activity, and activity cannot gain its form without a locus (āśraya). Since the locus cannot assume the quality of doership, which is an ancillary part of enjoyership, without a means, the meaning is that these three together are called the enjoyer.

And thus says the Śruti: ‘The wise call the Self, equipped with sense organ and mind, the enjoyer.’ The sense organ (Indriya) is well known. By the term ‘Mind’ (Manas), only the intellect (Buddhi) is taken. Equipped (Yukta) is the action of connection between the intellect and the enjoyable object through the sense organ. In the compound (Vigraha) ‘Sense organ, and Mind, and Equipped,’ the compound ‘Indriyamanoyuktam’ forms a singular unit (Dvandaikavadbhāva). The meaning of the Śruti is that these three—Self, sense organ, and mind—are called the enjoyer by the wise. Only with this explanation is the relationship between the Śruti and Smṛti, as root and derivative, justified, and not otherwise. And thus, since the enjoyer, like the doer, is included in the category of non-Self, and enjoyership is defined as 'being the doer of enjoyment,' it is established that the one who is the doer is the enjoyer, and therefore, for one who performs actions preceded by the investigation 'I am not the doer and not the enjoyer,' there is no attachment of action caused by doership and enjoyership. This is indeed the meaning of the commentary (Bhāṣya).

But those who explain that the means (Karaṇa) is the most effective instrument of action, which is tenfold, external, and internal (in the form of mind and intellect); and that action (Karma) is what the agent most desires, that which is pervaded by action, which is fourfold (that which is produced, attained, modified, or refined); and the agent (Kartā) is the knot of consciousness and unconsciousness that motivates other factors (Kārakas). These three constitute the collection of action (Karma-saṃgraha), meaning the agent is the locus of action. And likewise, knowledge (Jñāna) is the power that illuminates the object. The object of knowledge (Gneya) is the object. The knowing subject (Parijñātā) is the locus of knowledge, the enjoyer. These three incite action. Even according to them, the intention is that the Self is neither the doer nor the inciter of Prakriti through enjoyership, as in the Sānkhyas' view.

Nevertheless, the action (Karma) which is pervaded by the activity, which is in the form of a pot, etc., and which is unworthy of the distinctions of Sattvic, etc., described later, is unfit to be included in the category of the doer. Furthermore, if it is merely intended as the locus of action, then mentioning it here is clearly irrelevant. Likewise, according to us, the action that pervades the pot, etc., is primarily denoted by the word Karma. And its inclusion in the category of the doer is justified based on the non-difference between the action and the agent (Kriyā-Kriyāvatoḥ), the quality and the qualified. Also, if knowledge (Jñāna) is considered the action of illumination, then in this knowledge which is an action, there is a need for another knowledge that incites it, leading to the unavoidable infinite regress (Anavasthā) of one needing the other everywhere.

'Jñānam' — knowledge regarding action to be done; 'jñeyam' — the action to be done; 'parijñātā' — the knower of that — thus 'threefold' is the Karma-chodana (impulsion to action); injunction of action like Jyotistoma etc. endowed with knowing, knowable, and knower, this is the meaning.

Therein, the action in the form of knowable is collected in three ways — Karana, Karma, and Karta. 'Karaṇam' — substance etc. which is the means; 'karma' — sacrifice etc.; 'kartā' — the performer.

To establish just this 'Even killing he does not kill nor is bound', with the intention that since impulse to action, locus of action, and fruit of action etc. are composed of three Gunas, the attributeless Self has no connection with them, He states the impulse to action and locus of action — 'Jñānam'.

'Jñānam' — the understanding 'this is a means to the desired end'. 'Jñeyam' — action which is means to desired end. 'Parijñātā' — the locus of such knowledge. Thus 'threefold Karma-chodana'. By which one is impelled, engaged, that is 'Chodana'. The triad of knowledge etc. is the cause of engagement in action, this is the meaning.

Or by 'Chodana', injunction (Vidhi) is stated. That is said by the Bhattas (followers of Kumarila Bhatta) — 'Chodana, Upadesha, and Vidhi denote the same meaning'. And from that this is the meaning — depending on the triad of knowledge etc. of stated characteristics composed of three Gunas, the injunction of action proceeds. That is said — 'Vedas have the three Gunas as subject' [2.45].

And so 'Karaṇam' — the most effective means. And 'Karma' — the most desired by the agent. 'Kartā' — the performer of action. 'Karmasaṃgrahaḥ' — in which action is collected. The threefold factor (Karaka) starting with Karana is the locus of action, this is the meaning.

The triad of factors like Sampradana etc. are only indirectly executors of action, not direct locus of action. Therefore, only the triad of Karana etc. is the locus of action, thus it is said.

Thus Sattvic abandonment has been clarified; now for that purpose, having clarified entirely the acceptability of Sattva mentioned many times before by 'Ever steadfast in Sattva' [2.45] etc., how does the statement of the mode of impulse to action etc. fit in the middle there? To this he says — 'Sarvam'. The statement of the mode of impulse to action is to expand on the threefold nature according to Gunas in the knowledge etc. connected with it, this is the meaning.

'Knowledge regarding action to be done' etc. — although the words Jñāna, Jñeya, Jñātri have a general subject, since they are for the purpose of threefold nature of impulse to action, they refer to the specific, this is the idea. By this, the interpretation of the word 'Jñāna' here as referring to scripture is refuted.

Since knowledge etc. are distinct in nature from 'Chodana' which is of the form of impelling words, how are they stated as varieties of Chodana? To this he says — 'Endowed with knowing, knowable, and knower'. It means the variety stated by the word 'vidhā' (kind) is merely due to knowledge etc. being connected to Chodana.

Thus in 'Threefold is collection of action', the threefold nature is by nature along with two causes. To remove the doubt of statement of another threefold nature of unmentioned subject, he distinguishes one among the three — 'Tatra'.

He states the derivation of the word 'Saṅgraha' in the sense of object (Karma) — 'Saṃgṛhyate'. Action itself is collection — this is Karmadharaya compound; or collection of action. The instrument of action propounded by 'Sacrifice with rice grains' [Ap. Shra. 6.31.24], 'Offer oblation with curd' [Ap. Shra. 6.25.10] etc. is spoken here by the word 'Karaṇa'. Because with respect to fruit, action itself is the instrument, with this intention he says — 'Substance etc. which is the means'. By the word 'adi', class (Jati) etc. are grasped. Objection: Here 'by which it is known' is knowledge, that alone is called Karana; the triad of knowledge etc. alone is explained by words Karana, Karma, Karta, this is proper; therefore indeed the subsequent restatement 'Knowledge, action and agent' [18.19] is consistent — if you say? Answer: Not so; due to lack of naturalness of words; and due to lack of purpose in restating in other words what was just said; but the stated internal division is useful for discrimination, this is the idea.

He removes the doubt that due to juxtaposition with agent and instrument, the word 'Karma' also refers to a specific factor (Karaka) — 'Karma is sacrifice etc.'. The nature of action itself will be divided in three ways according to Gunas, this is the idea.

The very one designated as 'Parijñātā' in the state of being enjoined, is again designated as 'Kartā' in the state of being a performer, due to being subsidiary to action as a mode of that, he says — 'Kartā anuṣṭhātā'.

कर्म के स्वरूप का युक्तियुक्त विवेचन करते हुए? भगवान् श्री कृष्ण ने कर्म के सम्पादन के पाँच कारणों का वर्णन किया है तथा उनसे भिन्न अकर्ता आत्मा का भी निर्देश किया है। उसी विषय का विस्तार करते हुए? अब वे कर्म के त्रिविध प्रेरक तथा जिससे कर्म संभव होता है वह त्रिविध कर्म संग्रह बताते हैं।प्रत्येक कर्म का प्रेरक है? विषय ज्ञान। इस ज्ञान की सिद्धि के लिए जिन तीन तत्त्वों की आवश्यकता होती है? वे हैं ज्ञाता? ज्ञेय अर्थात् ज्ञान का विषय तथा ज्ञान अर्थात् जानने की क्रिया से प्राप्त हुआ ज्ञान। ज्ञाता? ज्ञेय और ज्ञान इन तीनों को वेदान्त की शब्दावली में त्रिपुटी कहते हैं। इन तीनों के संबंध से ही कर्म के प्रवर्तक विषय का ज्ञान होता है।कर्म की प्रेरणा तीन प्रकार से हो सकती है (1) ज्ञाता के मन में उत्पन्न हुई इच्छा के रूप में? या (2) ज्ञेय वस्तु के प्रलोभन से? अथवा (3) पूर्वानुभूत भोग (ज्ञात सुख) की स्मृति से। इन तीनों के अतिरिक्त कर्म का प्रेरक अन्य कोई कारण नहीं है।अन्तकरण में कर्म की प्रेरणा उत्पन्न होने के पश्चात् उसको पूर्ण करने के लिए कर्ता? करण और कर्म नामक त्रिपुटी की आवश्यकता होती है? जिसे यहाँ त्रिविध कर्मसंग्रह कहा गया है। कामना से प्रेरित जीव कर्म के क्षेत्र में कर्तृत्वाभिमान (मैं कर्ता हूँ) के साथ प्रवेश करता है। यहाँ जीव कर्ता कहलाता है। यह कर्ता जीव जिस फल या लक्ष्य की कामना करता है? उसे यहाँ कर्म शब्द से इंगित किया गया है। यहाँ कर्म का तात्पर्य फल से है।कर्ता जीव को फल (कर्म) प्राप्त करने के लिए क्रिया करनी पड़ती है। क्रिया के ये साधन करण कहे जाते हैं? जिनमें ज्ञानेन्द्रियाँ? कर्मेन्द्रियाँ तथा मन बुद्धि का भी समावेश है। इस प्रकार? कर्ता? कर्म और करण ये कर्म की त्रिपुटी अथवा कर्मसंग्रह कहे जाते हैं।इन तीनों में से किसी एक के भी अभाव में कर्म संभव नहीं हो सकता।समस्त जगत् त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति का कार्य है। इसलिए? ज्ञान? कर्म और कर्ता में भी त्रिगुणों के कारण त्रिविध भेद उत्पन्न होते हैं? जिनका? अब वर्णन किया जायेगा। भगवान् कहते हैं

'Jñānam'. 'Chodana' in action — desire for engagement. At that time, for whom due to being based on non-understanding merely, there is denotability by words knowledge, knowable, knower; for them alone, the acceptance in the form of full grasping with desire for fruit and notion of 'mine' — of the form 'I shall enjoy this, because it was done by me'; at that time and at the occasion of execution thus, there is denotability by words instrument, object, agent, due to being possessed/entered.

Therefore, for Yogis there is no possession/entry, so regarding them there is no occasion for words like instrument etc., but only knowledge etc. — this is the purport.

If there is no causeness of Jiva, how then in the subsequent sentence is his knowledge etc. stated as the root cause of actions, 'The triad of knowledge etc. is the impeller of actions'? Doubting thus, intending to state another meaning of that, he states the doubt to be removed — 'Evaṃ tarhi'. If Jiva is not the cause of actions, this is the meaning. 'Vidhi' — Scriptural and Traditional injunction. Would not operate, and thence there is contingency of its futility — this is the remainder.

'Akartṛtvāt' is the explanation of 'Evaṃ tarhi'. Of the Jiva, like a pot — this is the remainder. Objection: Threefold nature of impulse to action as knowledge etc. is improper, and inappropriate; how is it said? The command of the employer is Vidhi; and that is not of the form of triad of knowledge etc. And by this the stated doubt is not removed? To this he says — 'Trividhā'. It is a restatement for clear understanding. 'Ityatra' (here) is the remainder. 'Etat' — knowledge etc. Injunction of action operates, towards the Jiva — this is the remainder. The word 'iti' is in the sense of reason. 'Threefold' is said — identity is metaphorically applied between impulse to action and its cause-effect relation, this is the meaning.

Since causes of action have been stated, why is this said again? To this he says — 'Kāraṇāni'. Then it should be 'collection of causes', how 'collection of action'? To this he says — 'Karma'. By the word 'Karma', its causes are indicated, this is the meaning. If this is a collection of five causes, then whose inclusion is where? To this he says — 'Adhiṣṭhānādi'. By the word 'adi', the Adrishta (unseen) stated by the word Daiva is grasped. Like 'eats in a bronze vessel', 'done otherwise by Daiva' etc., due to being intended as the most effective means, according to the statement 'Karakas become so by intention'. And Cheshta is not included by the word 'adi', because its inclusion in Karaka is proper, and because of separate mention as 'Karma'. And Karma is not Adrishta, because elsewhere it is explained 'Karma is Cheshta'. 'Karma is what is most desired by the agent' [Ashta. 1.4.49] — so someone [says]. That is false, because it is not included in the five causes.

He states agreement of Shruti for the meaning of the verse — 'Tathā hi'. 'Karma' is to be repeated. There one is separate, the other is compound. Objection: By 'Jñānaṃ jñeyam', how is the stated doubt refuted? To this he says — 'Akartṛtve'pi. Even in the absence of independent agency, for the Jiva there is no futility of injunction towards him. 'Kutaḥ' (Why) — this is the connection of the reason. By the word Vidhi, that knowledge is implied, by Iccha (desire) effort also. By stated causes — Adhishtana etc. By this — knowledge is regarding injunction, and characterized by desire and effort, characterized by Adhishtana etc. and characterized by human goal, and the Knower, and the Omniscient Lord the impeller of all is present in the Jiva. Therefore impulse to action is towards him — this meaning is indicated.

This is what is said — Independent agency is not the determinant for being subject of injunction, such that injunction of action towards Jiva would be futile. In that case, there would be contingency of God also being subject of injunction. But he who has knowledge of injunction related to himself, desire aiming at action and its fruit, and effort accordant with that, presence of Adhishtana etc., connection with action, and partaking of fruit; towards him injunctions of action operate. And if all this is present in the Jiva dependent on the grace of the Supreme Lord, how should there not be injunctions of action towards him? This summary sentence is explained by subsequent sentences.

Objection: If God is accepted as impeller in the Jiva's body, then desire and effort are produced by His grace alone. But knowledge of injunction is accepted? To this he says — 'Īśvara'. Desires and strives — is the remainder. By this 'Production of desire by God's grace through injunction' is explained.

It was said 'Action happens by stated causes'; by that independence of Adhishtana etc. in their operation is obtained, to refute that he says — 'Yadi ca'. Action is made to be done by God alone making Adhishtana etc. mere instruments. Here using the causative suffix (Nic), the intention 'and independence' to be stated later is implied. 'Human goal is attained through action'; by this predominance of actions in attaining human goal is obtained, so he says — 'Phalaṃ ca'. By God alone — is understood. Or by the two sentences 'Yadi ca' etc., for establishing subject-hood of injunction, the accidental nature of connection between action and fruit is refuted. And this is not present in the inert released by God which are not subjects of injunction? But it is present in transmigrating souls only, so it becomes the determinant.

Thus having stated one cause mentioned in Gita, the Bhashyakara states another cause — 'Vastutaḥ'. In reality — absolutely. 'Abhimānikam' — created by ego, appearing by delusion. Of that Jiva; by the emphasis 'eva', he supports his being the determinant in the operation of injunction towards the Jiva. For the offender thinking independence of himself in actions done by the Supreme Lord, the punishment is characterized by bondage of injunction, this is the idea.

He states another way — 'Svātantryaṃ ca'. Of him — is understood. This would be futility of operation of injunction; if the Jiva did not have agency characterized by independence of action at all. And it is not so; because of accepting that (agency) as dependent on God; the statement of its absence is relative to the independent one. And there is no equality with the inert thus, to this he says — 'Jaḍamapekṣya'. More — is the remainder. For the inert becomes active then by impulse etc. created by another. Not by its own will without an adventitious cause; but the Jiva is agent by power of action equal to existence dependent on the grace of the Supreme Lord established beginninglessly, so injunction of action towards him is proper — thus.

Objection: From what proof is all this to be understood? To this he says — 'Sarvaṃ ca'. By experience and stated proofs — production of desire when knowledge of injunction exists etc. is established by experience. 'From God's grace' etc. is established by cited scriptures like 'As I am appointed'. 'Pṛthak' (separately) again [proof is not stated].

Previously (18.13-17), the non-contact of the Self with all actions was stated due to the five factors like Adhishthana etc. being the causes of action; now, he begins to explain that very meaning through the arrangement of the process of Knowledge-Knowable etc. and the explanation of the division of the three Gunas — 'Jnanam Jneyam' (Knowledge, Knowable...), etc. 'Jnanam' — the action of illumination of object. 'Jneyam' — its object (Karma). 'Parijnata' — its locus, the enjoyer, imagined through the limiting adjunct of the internal organ. For only by the meeting of these three, the commencement of all actions like rejection, acceptance etc. occurs; therefore this triad is the impeller of all actions; he says this — 'Trividha karmacodana' (Threefold is the impeller of action).

'Codana' — is said to be the impeller; in the Shabara (Bhashya) 'Codana is the word impelling action'; and in the Bhatta (Vartika) saying 'Codana, Upadesha, and Vidhi denote the same meaning'; although 'being a word impelling action' appears to be the primary meaning of the word Codana; still, leaving aside 'being a word', mere 'impeller' is indicated here; because of the absence of 'being a word' in knowledge etc. And thus, the state of being impelled and being the impeller belongs to the non-Self alone, not to the Self; this is the intention.

Similarly 'Karanam' — the most effective means, external like ear etc., and internal like intellect etc. 'Karma' — the most desired by the doer, pervaded by action, (fourfold:) to be produced, to be reached, to be modified, and to be purified. And 'Karta' — the employer of all factors while not being employed by other factors, the accomplisher of action, of the nature of the knot of sentient and insentient — thus threefold; 'Karma sangrihyate' — attains inherence (samavaya) here, thus 'Karmasangrahah' (Basis of action). By the meaning of 'Ca' and the word 'Iti', the recipient (Sampradana), ablative (Apadana), and locative (Adhikarana) are also included in the three groups. Thus the hexad of factors alone is the threefold locus of action, not the Immutable Self; this is the meaning. Because the impeller of action and the locus of action are of the nature of factors (Karakas) and consist of the three Gunas, the Self which is of non-factor nature and beyond Gunas is untouched by all actions; this is the intention.

Or, 'Jnanam' — of the nature of impelling, generated by words like Lin (potential mood) etc.; 'Jneyam' — as the object of that knowledge, the nature of words like Lin etc., the Impeller; 'Parijnata' — the locus of that knowledge, the Impelled — thus 'Trividha karmacodana'. 'Karma' — action, Bhava (productive force) of the nature of human activity; the 'Codana' — impelling — having that as object, of the nature of Vidhi (injunction), the Shabdi-Bhavana (Verbal force); this is the meaning. Similarly 'Karanam' — the means along with procedure (itikartavyata), the meaning of the root (dhatvartha); 'Karma' — the result to be produced (bhavya), fruit like heaven etc.; 'Karta' — the person possessing desire for fruit, the accomplisher of action — thus threefold is 'Karmasangrahah' — the collection, summary, of 'Karma', i.e., of the Arthi-Bhavana (Objective force) which is of the nature of human activity. So thus, due to the absence of the human effort in the form of Arthi-Bhavana as the object of injunction (for the Self), the Vidhi in the form of Shabdi-Bhavana does not target the Pure Self; the connection of Injunction and Enjoined is due to being the locus of factors. That has been said — 'The Vedas have the three Gunas as their subject, be beyond the three Gunas, O Arjuna'. And that the factors are of the nature of three Gunas will be explained immediately after; this is the intention.

Here, incidentally, 'Vidhi' (Injunction) is reflected upon as the cause of activity. Impelling is indeed established by the experience of all people. 'I am impelled by the king, impelled by a boy, impelled by a Brahmin' — thus indeed are the speakers engaging in action. And that 'urge' (pravartana) resides in the impeller like the king etc. There, the urge of the superior towards the inferior is called 'Ajna' (Command) and 'Preshana' (Direction). The urge of the inferior towards the superior is called 'Yanca' (Request) and 'Adhyeshana' (Entreaty). The urge of equals towards equals with indifference to superiority or inferiority is called 'Anujna' (Permission) and 'Anumati' (Consent). And those commands etc., being specific knowledges or specific desires, are well-known in the world as attributes of sentient beings only; but in the Veda, people behave saying 'Impelled by the Vidhi, I do'. There, since the Vedic Vidhi is itself insentient and non-human (Apaurusheya), impelling by attributes of sentient beings like command etc. is not possible; therefore, it must be accepted by its own attribute alone, due to the impossibility of another way. And that very attribute is called Codana, Pravartana, Prerana, Vidhi, Upadesha, Shabda-Bhavana.

There, some imagine a supernatural word-function itself. But others, since it is explicable by the established (worldly) means itself, do not tolerate supernatural imagination. 'Pravartana' is indeed the operation which is the cause of activity. And for the word 'Vidhi', due to being a verb (akhyata), with the condition common to ten tenses/moods, 'vacakatva' (denotative power) towards the Arthi-Bhavana (Objective force) which is of the nature of human activity — means being the cause of the knowledge of that. And since that (activity) can be performed only when known, the causality of the word, which is the cause of that knowledge, towards that (activity) happens indirectly indeed. There, the operation of the word 'Vidhi' which is the cause of knowledge of the Bhavana (activity) of the nature of human activity — is the denoter of human activity; the knowledge of the word 'Vidhi' as possessing the power to denote that; and that very thing is its operation causing activity; thus it obtains the name 'Pravartana'. Since the word generates activity only through knowledge; since there is no proof for imagining an operation other than the operation generating knowledge; and the operation generating knowledge is its own knowledge, and in the knowledge of power (shakti), the knowledge of itself qualified by power. There, among the first two, one or the other has the status of Shabda-Bhavana, and the third has the status of instrument (karana) there; this is the distinction.

This being the case, the conclusion is — By Vidhi its own knowledge is generated, and it is also spoken of as Pravartana; therefore, the knowledge of Vidhi alone is Shabda-Bhavana; and in that, the Arthi-Bhavana of the nature of human activity alone connects as the object to be produced (bhavya). And as instrument, the knowledge of Vidhi possessing the power to denote activity alone; although it is achievable by Bhavana, its instrumentality towards the Bhavana delimited by fruit is not contradictory, just like (instrumentality) of sacrifice towards the Bhavana of heaven, because of being the instrument of fruit.

And thus — The person should produce (bhavayet) his own activity. Regarding the expectation 'By what?', the instrumental part is filled by — 'By the word Vidhi known as possessing the power to denote human activity'. Regarding the expectation 'How?', the procedural part (itikartavyata) is filled by — 'By praising with eulogies (Arthavadas)'; like in the worldly injunction 'This cow is to be bought', the worldly eulogy 'Giving much milk, having a living calf, bearing female calves, calving every year', etc. 'Samam samam' means that cow calves every year. Objection: Let the human activity presented by the word Vidhi as a verb connect as the object to be produced; but how does the instrument (Vidhi-knowledge) connect without being presented? Answer: It is said — The word Vidhi is first presented by hearing; its power to denote human activity is also presented by memory; the qualification by both and the unknown-ness residing in it (is presented) by the mind; thus the word Vidhi known as possessing denotative power is indeed presented. 'By this (word) whatever one can, that one should produce' — by this logic, for every word, due to the purport of the injunction of self-study (Svadhyaya-vidhi), even what is presented by other than word indeed shines in the verbal understanding; like the name Jyotishtoma etc., or like the Mantra applicable by indication (Linga). That has been said by the Acharyas in the Udbhid Adhikarana — 'There is no cognition in the qualified without the presence of the qualification; but not (that there is no cognition) in the adjective not expressed (by word)'; thus is the presence of Arthavadas. Of the praise (prashastya) by the ear, by those very (Arthavadas) through implication (lakshana); and of the known-ness residing in both by the mind; thus 'Having known as praiseworthy by Arthavadas' — the connection of the procedural part is also indeed proper.

Objection: What is praiseworthiness? Not 'being a means to fruit'; because that is obtained from the injunction sentence itself by force of the syntax of Arthi-Bhavana as 'By sacrifice one should produce heaven'; not another, because of uselessness in activity. Answer: It is said — 'Not being followed by strong undesirable result' is praiseworthiness; and that is not obtained from the knowledge of being a means to the desired. For even in a means to the desired, like eating poisoned meat etc., being a cause of the undesirable is also seen. And for the fruit of the enjoined Syena sacrifice, which is black magic for killing the enemy, being followed by the undesirable (sin) is seen. Therefore, as long as the non-causality of evil of the means and the fruit is not stated, till then, even if known as a means to the desired, the person does not engage in it. Therefore it is said — 'Even in result, the action which is not followed by evil; being the cause of pure pleasure, that is called Dharma'. Therefore, by teaching praiseworthiness in the form of 'not being followed by evil' either inherently or in result, Arthavadas support the power of Vidhi. What is support? The removal of the doubt of 'being followed by evil' inherently or in result, which obstructs activity. And this very help is rendered to Vidhi by Arthavadas in generating activity; therefore Vidhi has expectation of Arthavada.

Similarly, Arthavadas also, even though stating an existing fact by primary or secondary function, have expectation of Vidhi to attain the 'possessing of purpose' brought about by the injunction of self-study. This is a combination like 'lost horse and burnt chariot'. Just as the combination of one burnt chariot with living horses, and another existing chariot with non-existing horses, is for mutual meaningfulness; similarly, the purpose-part of Arthavadas is filled by Vidhi, and the procedural-part of the Shabda-Bhavana of Vidhi by Arthavadas. So this sentence is indeed complete when both are heard; but when one is heard, it is to be completed by imagining the other. Just as in the injunction 'He should sacrifice Kapiñjalas for Spring', the Arthavada part, though unheard, is imagined; and in the Arthavada 'They indeed become established who perform these nights (sessions)', the injunction part. And so is the Sutra — 'But because of being one sentence with the injunction, they (Arthavadas) would be for the sake of praise of injunctions' [Purva Mimamsa 1.2.7]. Because of the syntactical unity of Arthavadas, which expect a purpose, with the Injunction which expects praise; since there is no uselessness (of Arthavadas) due to the meaning — which is 'for the sake of praise' of the injunctions (enjoined acts), i.e., for the purpose of praise, implied by the desire for praise, expecting a purpose, figurative — therefore Arthavadas are authorities in Dharma; this is its meaning.

Objection: By the maxim 'Whatever are worldly words, they indeed are Vedic, and they indeed are their meanings'; where the power of the word 'Vidhi' is grasped in the world, it should have that very meaning in the Veda also. And in the world, its denoting human attributes like command etc. is established; so how is denoting Shabda-Bhavana proper in the Veda? Answer: It is said — There is indeed uniformity between the world and Veda. To explain — In the world, command etc. are not denoted by the word 'Vidhi' in those specific forms; because of the contingency of multiple meanings due to lack of uniformity; and because denotation of Bhavana is possible just like that (in Veda). But the 'nature of beneficial impelling' (svasti-pravartanatva) is one in command, entreaty, permission; and that is equal even in the operation of word; therefore that alone is denoted by words like Lin etc.; and that does not exist in the worldly word at all. Because there the King etc. alone are impellers. For the impelling activity itself is not denoted by the word 'Vidhi' as 'command-ness' etc., but as 'impelling-ness' (pravartanatva). And impelling and impeller-ship are established by experience for the Veda also, just as for the King etc.

Objection: Let a Lord possessing impelling be imagined in the Veda also, like the King etc. in the world; as it is said — 'Vidhi alone is the proof for the connection with a Male (Purusha) of the Virgin Shruti, like a fetus (is proof of connection with a male)'. Answer: No; because the Veda is non-human (Apaurusheya). For a male author of Veda is not known in the world or in the Veda. And if imagined, the self-validity of Veda, which stands as independent, would be broken due to dependence on the validity of his knowledge. And because of the contingency of validity even in Buddha's words. Even if being 'word of God' is common, Buddha's word is not proof and Veda's word is proof — this would be a case of 'Subhaga-Bhikshuka' maxim (partiality). Because of the impossibility of distinction even by acceptance and non-acceptance by great people, as they are not established for both. Since God's impelling is common to world and Veda, in the world also the King etc. would be (merely) impellers (and God the real one). If you say that while God's impelling exists, the King etc. is also an impeller in a special way; Alas, let that (God's impelling) remain or not; but here too the Veda alone is the special impeller standing in place of King etc. — this has come in the path (is established). Because the common impelling of God causes activity only with the help of a special impelling. Moreover, in God's impelling, everyone would indeed perform the enjoined; would anyone transgress? And there is God's impelling even in the prohibited. Otherwise no one would engage there; so that too would be enjoined. And so it is said — 'This ignorant creature is not master of his own happiness and sorrow; impelled by God he would go to heaven or indeed to hell'. Therefore, just like the King etc., the Veda also, making known its own impelling, causes activity through the offering of desire; thus the uniformity of world and Veda is established. Although there is a difference that for Purva Mimamsakas the Veda is independent, and for Brahma Mimamsakas (Vedantins) the Veda is a transfiguration of Brahman and dependent on It; still, the non-human origin of Veda as being like breath is common to both.

And here, 'possessing activity favorable to exertion' is 'Pravartanatva' (impelling-ness); whether it is a qualified or unqualified attribute; even if the word 'Vidhi' denotes that (attribute), the presence of its specific locus is just like 'cow' etc. (where universal implies individual); or 'being favorable activity' is the denotation; the 'exertion' part is obtained by another power due to being a verb (akhyata); just as in 'Dandi' (Staff-bearer), regarding the meaning of the suffix 'Matup' which is the possessor, the 'staff' part which is the meaning of the stem (is obtained). 'The understanding of instrumentality to fruit alone is the urging (prerana); doing that alone, the Vidhi is the urger; therefore instrumentality to fruit alone is denoted by the word Vidhi as urging' — thus say the Mandanacharyas (Mandana Mishra). And instrumentality to fruit is obtained by the syntax of Arthi-Bhavana, as stated before. And this very view is accepted by scholars like Parthasarathi etc. The doctrine of 'instrumentality to the desired' of some Vedantins also should be explained by this very view. 'Instrumentality to the desired is denoted by words like Lin etc. by its own form, not as urging' — thus say the Tarkikas (Logicians).

That is not correct. Due to heaviness (gaurava), due to being obtained from another, and due to being unfit for syntax. Compared to 'instrumentality to the object of desire', 'Pravartanatva' (impelling-ness) is very light, because desire and its object do not enter (into the definition). Because knowledge of desire would also cause activity like knowledge of tendency. In reality, it is impossible to express by word 'this is the means to what is the object of desire'; and if mere 'instrumentality' is the denotation; when its connection with the activity presented by that very suffix is possible by direct statement (Shruti); its connection with Heaven presented by another word through Sentence (Vakya) is impossible; therefore it culminates in 'Pravartanatva' alone; because Sentence is sublated by Direct Statement. Because the Direct Statement of Suffix is stronger even than the Direct Statement of Word (Stem) — in 'Pashuna yajeta' (Sacrifice with an animal), leaving aside the 'animal' which is the meaning of the stem, by the syntax of unity with the instrument which is the meaning of the suffix, the subsidiarity of unity to the sacrifice is established by the expression 'The instrument is one, an animal'; what to speak of strength over Sentence which consists of collocation with another word.

And 'instrumentality to the desired' is not the meaning of the word because it is obtained by the syntax of sentence meaning. To explain — The Arthi-Bhavana of the nature of human activity, which is the object of the urge, possessing the three parts 'what, by what, how', is propounded by Vidhi due to lightness; this was stated before. And since the urge is inappropriate in that (Bhavana) which has a non-human-goal as object; leaving aside the root-meaning which is not a human goal, even though presented by the same word; how does this (Vidhi) rely on Heaven alone as the human goal by nature, which is capable of connecting as the object to be accomplished, even though taken by a different word and being a qualification of another? Because in 'Svargakamah' (Desirous of heaven), the accusative is included in 'Svargam kamayate'; and since 'Yajati' (sacrifice) is intransitive, there is no connection with 'Svargam' (Heaven) stated (separately). Therefore, even where the word 'desirous' (Kami) is not heard, there too it is imagined; as in 'They indeed become established...' etc., 'Desirous of establishment should perform the night session' etc. And thus, in that (Bhavana) which has obtained its object to be produced (bhavya), the meaning of the root presented by the same word alone connects as the instrument; because the part of 'bhavya' (result) is not contradictory to the subject of the agent; because the third case (instrumental) is heard in Jyotishtoma etc. which are names of the root-meaning capable of case endings; and where the second case is heard in the name, there too the third case is imagined by the rule of inversion (vyatyaya). That has been said by the Mahabhashyakara (Patanjali) — 'Agnihotram juhoti' — here the second case is in the sense of the third. Therefore, by them (Grammarians) — 'The stem and suffix speak the suffix-meaning together; of the two, the suffix-meaning is principally, the stem-meaning subordinately' — thus the instrumentality of the root-meaning towards the Bhavana which is the suffix-meaning is stated as a subordinate quality. This very thing is stated by the Niruktakaras (Yaska) also who say 'The verb has action as principal'. And in the Bhavartha Adhikarana also it is established so. Therefore, everywhere, the rule is the connection of the root-meaning to the suffix-meaning only as an instrument.

Therefore, in the injunction of root-meaning qualified by quality, and in the injunction of mere quality by restating the root-meaning, the injunction of Matvartha-lakshana (implying possession) has a remote subject. As in the qualified injunction 'Sacrifice with Soma', (it means) 'by the sacrifice possessing Soma'; in the quality injunction 'Sacrifice with curd', (it means) 'by the oblation possessing curd'. But in the connection of Name (Namadheya), due to the propriety of coordinate predication, and due to the injunction of the root-meaning alone, there is neither Matvartha-lakshana nor remoteness of injunction. So thus — in 'Jyotishtomena yajeta svargakamah' (The desirer of heaven should sacrifice with Jyotishtoma), regarding the meaning of the verb 'should produce', 'What?' — in this expectation, 'Heaven' which is the object of desire (is the answer); because the scriptural injunction is stronger and the expectation is intense. And so it is established in the first quarter of the sixth (chapter). Then 'By what?' — in this expectation, 'By sacrifice' — because of coordinate predication with the word ending in third case, and because of the rule of connection as instrument alone. 'Of what name?' — in this expectation, 'By Jyotishtoma' — meaning by that name. Even if not presented by the word (directly as instrument?), the word Jyotishtoma shines indeed in the verbal understanding; presented by hearing, due to purport. And in the connection of Name, the meaning of the case ending is not the door (medium), unlike the connection of the expressed meaning in a negative particle (Nanj); therefore, without Matvartha-lakshana itself, the connection as 'possessing the word Jyotishtoma' is obtained. And so is the usage of poets — 'The King of Mountains named Himalaya' — meaning possessing the name Himalaya. Similarly here — in 'The bee drinks honey in the opened lotus interior' etc., in a sentence containing a single word whose relation is not grasped, the word 'Madhukara' etc. shines by its own form alone; it does not present the meaning like a Name, due to the relation being not grasped before. Therefore, 'denoted by the word Madhukara' — even this implication does not connect; because knowledge of the indicated depends on the knowledge of the primary meaning. But when the word shines by its form, the relation of denoted-denoter is imagined later to support the association. So this is the sentence meaning — 'One should produce the desired Heaven by the sacrifice named Jyotishtoma'.

In the expectation 'How?', by the completion of the group of auxiliaries which are inherent and remote helpers, through Shruti, Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana, Samakhya; by the condition 'in modification like the original'; by the condition 'according to capacity in obligatory'; 'even by substitute if the main is unavailable' — the completion of that is obtained by logic. And thus, the 'causality of heaven' of the sacrifice due to being the instrument of Bhavana delimited by heaven; and the 'accomplishability by effort' in the form of being the direct object of agent's activity due to being the instrument; are obtained from the Shruti and Meaning; therefore, both of them are not the expressed meaning of words like Lin etc.

Because of the maxim 'Scripture is meaningful in what is not obtained', and because of lack of connection — in the compound 'Ishtasadhanam' (means to desired), how can the word 'Ishta' which is subordinate connect with the word 'Svarga' which is subordinate in another compound 'Svargakamah' as 'Ishtasvargasadhanam' (means to desired heaven)? For in 'Rajapurusho viraputrah' (King's man is hero's son), there is no connection between the word 'Vira' and 'Raja'; because of the maxim 'Word-meaning connects with word-meaning, not with a part of word-meaning'. And faults like the contingency of non-connection of names like Jyotishtoma ending in instrumental case should be seen in this view. By this, 'instrumentality to desired', 'instrumentality to undesired', and 'accomplishability by effort' — that this triad is the meaning of Vidhi is refuted; due to excessive heaviness and the contingency of total uselessness of Arthavadas. Therefore, 'accomplishability by effort alone is the meaning of Vidhi' — this is also not (correct); because it is said to be obtained by implication as the instrument of Bhavana. Supernatural 'Niyoga' (Command) is not the meaning of Vidhi precisely because it is supernatural. And this has been valiantly discussed by the learned here. Therefore, 'Impelling' (Prerana) alone, which is not obtained from another and is light, is the expressed meaning of words like Lin etc.; this is established. But the knowledge which is the impeller is indeed different, obtained by the boundary of sentence meaning; for all disputants, the meaning of the verb alone shines as the principal (visheshya); not the root-meaning, nor the name-meaning, nor the desirer of heaven; this has been practically said. And by that, the Logician's view 'The desirer of heaven possesses effort favorable to sacrifice' — the knowledge of sentence meaning with the Person as principal — is refuted. Briefly, this Bhatta view has been explained here. Whatever else is to be said here should be researched from the original sources.

Moreover. Impulse to action is also composed of three Gunas? And its triguna fruit belongs to triguna agents only? For the attributeless (Nirguna), due to non-contemplation of fruit and due to acting by My command, being unqualified for respective fruits, there is no bondage either, thus He says — 'Jñānam'.

'Jñānam' — understanding preceded by understanding of nature of fruit as dependent on Self; 'jñeyam' — action accomplishing fruit; 'parijñātā' — the Jiva knowing the nature of knowledge and knowable and being their locus. Thus regarding the triad of knowledge etc., 'karmacodanā' — impulse to action — is threefold.

Similarly 'karaṇam' — means; 'karma' — action having that fruit; 'kartā' — one having tendency for action; in this manner 'karmasaṅgrahaḥ' — action is collected in this — thus collection of action. The triad of Karana etc. also is Karaka, of the nature of locus of action, that too is threefold.

By this the non-qualification of the Nirguna is described.

'Jñānam' — by this it is known — thus all objects are stated without distinction (generally). And 'Jñeyam' — to be known; that too is stated generally as everything. And 'Parijñātā' — characterized by adjunct, imagined by ignorance, the enjoyer.

This triad, without distinction, is the impeller of all actions, 'trividhā' — of three kinds — Karma-chodana. For only on the concurrence of the three, knowledge etc., will the starting of all action having purpose of rejection, acceptance etc. occur.

Then, started by the five Adhishtana etc., grouped in three ways by difference of locus of speech, mind, and body, it is collected in the three Karana etc., this is stated — 'Karaṇam' — by this it is done — external Ear etc., internal Intellect etc.; 'Karma' — the most desired, being pervaded by the action of the agent; 'Kartā' — the operator of instruments, characterized by adjunct; thus 'trividhaḥ' — of three kinds — Karma-sangraha; is collected in this, thus 'Saṅgraha'; collection of action is 'Karmasaṅgrahaḥ'; for action inheres in these three; therefore this is the threefold collection of action.

Now, since action, factors (Karakas), and fruits are all of the nature of Gunas, the threefold difference according to difference of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas Gunas is to be stated, so He begins.

'Jñānam'. Therefore all this happens only by increase of Sattva, so to make known the acceptability of Sattva everywhere, He will expand on the diversity caused by Gunas like Sattva etc. everywhere, so He first states the mode of impulse to action — 'Jñānam'.

'Jñeyam' — means, regarding action to be done; 'kartavya' — action; 'parijñātā' — knower of such action; thus threefold injunction of action is stated. That is said by Bhattas — 'Chodana, Upadesha, and Vidhi denote the same meaning'. Thus in Veda the injunction of action is composed of three Gunas, this is the meaning.

Therefore it is said — 'Vedas have the three Gunas as subject' [2.45]. There the accomplished collection of action is also threefold — Karana, Karma, Karta. 'Karaṇam' is means-form senses etc. and substance etc.; 'karma' is sacrifice etc.; 'kartā' is its performer.

ज्ञानम् knowledge? ज्ञेयम् the knowable? परिज्ञाता the knower? त्रिविधा threefold? कर्मचोदना impulse to action? करणम् the organ? कर्म the action? कर्ता the agent? इति thus? त्रिविधः threefold? कर्मसंग्रहः the basis of action.Commentary Knowledge? the knower and the thing to be known? are together the seed of this world. This is known as the Triputi or the traid. It is the conjunction of these three that impels a man to threefold action? viz.? mental? verbal and physical. This triad is the driving force of all the activities of man. He rejoices at the sight of palatable sweetmeats and delicious fruits but is terrified at the sight of a cobra or tiger. The sight of pleasant or unpleasant objects affects him and he attempts either to possess the agreeable objects or to avoid the disagreeable ones.The Antahkarana (the inner instrument) consists of the mind? intellect? subconscious mind and egoism. The ear? the skin? the tongue? the nose and the eye are the five organs of knowledge. The individual soul? propelled by these five senses? is led into activity. He does actions with the help of the five organs of action? viz.? speech? hands? feet? genitals and anus.Jnanam Any knowledge knowledge in general knowledge of worldly objects? etc.Jneyam The object to be known objects in general.Parijnata The knower? the experiencer or the enjoyer? putting on the nature of the limiting adjuncts? a creature of ignorance.This triad forms the threefold impulse to all action? to action in general. The performance of an action in order to get a thing or to avoid an object is possible only when there is the conjunction of the three? viz.? knowledge? knowable and knower.Karanam The organ That by which something is done. The actions done by the five causes of action? viz.? the body? etc.? which are grouped under the three classes according to their respective seats? viz.? mind? speech and body? are all due to the interplay of the organ? etc.Karta The agent or the doer he who sets the organs in motion or action and puts on the nature of the limiting adjunct or vehicle in which he acts. All actions inhere in these three (the organ? the doer and the action itself) and they are? therefore? said to form the basis or the threefold constituents of action.As action? the various factors of action and the fruits are all made up of the Gunas? the Lord describes them in the following verses.

Jnanam, knowledge (-being derived in the sense of 'that through which something is known', jnana means knowledge concerning all things in general-): so also jneyam, the object of knowledge (-that also is a reference to all objects in general-); similarly, parijnata, the knower, the experiencer, a product of ignorance, who partakes of the nature of the limiting adjuncts;-thus, this tripartite group formed by these is the trividha, threefold; karma-codana, inducement ot action, inducer of all actions in general. For, it is when the three, viz knowledge etc., combine that commencement of all actions meant either for acceptance or rejection [Acceptance, rejection or indifference.] are possible. After that, what are initiated by the five, viz locus etc., and are grouped in three ways according to the differences of their being based on speech, mind and body become comprehended under the three, viz instrument etc. This is what is being stated: Karma-sangrahah, the comprehension [It is well know that actions are based on the three-instrument etc.] of actions; iti, comes under; trividhah, three heads, three classes; viz karanam, the instrument (-derived in the sense of that through which anything is done-), i.e. the external (organs) (ear etc.) and the internal (organs) (intellect etc.); karma, the object (-derivatively meaning that which is most cherished by the subject and is achieved through an act-); and karta, the subject (agent), who employs the instrument etc., who partakes of the nature of the limiting adjuncts.
Sangrahah is derived thus: that in which something is comprehended. The comprehension of action (karma) is karma-sangrahah. Indeed, action becomes included in these three. Hence is this 'threefold comprehension of action'.
Now then, since action, instrument and result are all constituted by the gunas, it becomes necessary to state the three fold variety in them based on the differences among the gunas, viz sattva, rajas and tamas. Hence it is begun:

i) 'Knowledge' means this knowledge about the acts which ought to be performed. (ii) The 'object of knowledge' is the act which ought to be performed. (iii) 'The knower' is the person who knows that act. The meaning is that the injunction to do acts, like Jyotistoma etc., is a combination of knowledge, object of knowledge, and the knower. Among these, action itself, which is the object of knowledge, is briefly described as threefold - these being the instrument, action and the agent. The instrument forms the materials etc., which are the means. The action consists of the sacrifice etc. The agent is the performer.