Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 18 - Shloka (Verse) 48

[पूर्वश्लोकमें यह कहा गया कि स्वभावके अनुसार शास्त्रोंने जो कर्म नियत किये हैं? उन कर्मोंको करता हुआ मनुष्य पापको प्राप्त नहीं होता। इससे सिद्ध होता है कि स्वभावनियत कर्मोंमें भी पापक्रिया होती है। अगर पापक्रिया न होती तो पापको प्राप्त नहीं होता यह कहना नहीं बनता। अतः यहाँ भगवान् कहते हैं कि जो सहज कर्म हैं? उनमें कोई दोष भी आ जाय तो भी उनका त्याग नहीं करना चाहिये क्योंकि सबकेसब कर्म धुएँसे अग्निकी तरह दोषसे आवृत हैं। ]सहजं कर्म कौन्तेय सदोषमपि न त्यजेत् -- स्वभावनियतकर्म सहजकर्म कहलाते हैं जैसे -- ब्राह्मणके शम? दम आदि क्षत्रियके शौर्य? तेज आदि वैश्यके कृषि? गौरक्ष्य आदि और शूद्रके सेवाकर्म -- ये सभी सहजकर्म हैं। जन्मके बाद शास्त्रोंने पूर्वके गुण और कर्मोंके अनुसार जिस वर्णके लिये जिन कर्मोंकी आज्ञा दी है? वे शास्त्रनियत कर्म भी सहजकर्म कहलाते हैं जैसे ब्राह्मणके लिये यज्ञ करना और कराना? पढ़ना और पढ़ाना आदि क्षत्रियके लिये यज्ञ करना? दान करना आदि वैश्यके लिये यज्ञ करना आदि और शूद्रके लिये सेवा।सहज कर्ममें ये दोष हैं --,(1) परमात्मा और परमात्माका अंश -- ये दोनों ही स्व हैं तथा प्रकृति और प्रकृतिका कार्य शरीर आदि -- ये दोनों ही पर हैं। परन्तु परमात्माका अंश स्वयं प्रकृतिके वश होकर परतन्त्र हो जाता है अर्थात् क्रियामात्र प्रकृतिमें होती है और उस क्रियाको यह अपनेमें मान लेता है तो परतन्त्र हो जाता है। यह प्रकृतिके परतन्त्र होना ही महान् दोष है।(2) प्रत्येक कर्ममें कुछनकुछ आनुषङ्गिक अनिवार्य हिंसा आदि दोष होते ही हैं।(3) कोई भी कर्म किया जाय? वह कर्म किसीके अनुकूल और किसीके प्रतिकूल होता ही है। किसीके प्रतिकूल होना भी दोष है।(4) प्रमाद आदि दोषोंके कारण कर्मके करनेमें कमी रह जाना अथवा करनेकी विधिमें भूल हो जाना भी दोष है।अपने सहजकर्ममें दोष भी हो? तो भी उसको नहीं छोड़ना चाहिये। इसका तात्पर्य है कि जैसे ब्राह्मणके कर्म जितने सौम्य हैं? उतने ब्राह्मणेतर वर्णोंके कर्म सौम्य नहीं हैं। परन्तु सौम्य न होनेपर भी वे कर्म दोषी नहीं,माने जाते अर्थात् ब्राह्मणके सहज कर्मोंकी अपेक्षा क्षत्रिय? वैश्य आदिके सहज कर्मोंमें गुणोंकी कमी होनेपर भी उस कमीका दोष नहीं लगता और अनिवार्य हिंसा आदि भी नहीं लगते? प्रत्युत उनका पालन करनेसे लाभ होता है। कारण कि वे कर्म उनके स्वभावके अनुकूल होनेसे करनेमें सुगम हैं और शास्त्रविहित हैं।ब्राह्मणके लिये भिक्षा बतायी गयी है। देखनेमें भिक्षा निर्दोष दीखती है? पर उसमें भी दोष आ जाते हैं। जैसे किसी गृहस्थके घरपर कोई भिक्षुक खड़ा है और उसी समय दूसरा भिक्षुक वहाँ आ जाता है तो गृहस्थको भार लगता है। भिक्षुकोंमें परस्पर ईर्ष्या होनेकी सम्भावना रहती है। भिक्षा देनेवालेके घरमें पूरी तैयारी नहीं है तो उसको भी दुःख होता है। यदि कोई गृहस्थ भिक्षा देना नहीं चाहता और उसके घरपर भिक्षुक चला जाय तो उसको बड़ा कष्ट होता है। अगर वह भिक्षा देता है तो खर्चा होता है और नहीं देता है तो भिक्षुक निराश होकर चला जाता है। इससे उस गृहस्थको पाप लगता है और बेचारा उसमें फँस जाता है। इस प्रकार यद्यपि भिक्षामें भी दोष होते हैं? तथापि ब्राह्मणको उसे छोड़ना नहीं चाहिये।क्षत्रियके लिये न्याययुक्त युद्ध प्राप्त हो जाय तो उसको करनेसे क्षत्रियको पाप नहीं लगता। यद्यपि युद्धरूप कर्ममें दोष हैं क्योंकि उसमें मनुष्योंको मारना पड़ता है? तथापि क्षत्रियके लिये सहज और शास्त्रविहित होनेसे दोष नहीं लगता। ऐसे ही वैश्यके लिये खेती करना बताया गया है। खेती करनेमें बहुतसे जन्तुओंकी हिंसा होती है। परन्तु वैश्यके लिये सहज और शास्त्रविहित होनेसे हिंसाका इतना दोष नहीं लगता। इसलिये सहज कर्मोंको छोड़ना नहीं चाहिये।सहज कर्मोंको करनेमें दोष (पाप) नहीं लगता -- यह बात ठीक है परन्तु इन साधारण सहज कर्मोंसे मुक्ति कैसे हो जायगी वास्तवमें मुक्ति होनेमें सहज कर्म बाधक नहीं हैं। कामना? आसक्ति? स्वार्थ? अभिमान आदिसे ही बन्धन होता है और पाप भी इन कामना आदिके कारणसे ही होते हैं। इसलिये मनुष्यको निष्कामभावपूर्वक भगवत्प्रीत्यर्थ सहज कर्मोंको करना चाहिये? तभी बन्धन छूटेगा।सर्वारम्भा हि दोषेण धूमेनाग्निरिवावृताः -- जितने भी कर्म हैं? वे सबकेसब सदोष ही हैं जैसे -- आग सुलगायी जाय तो आरम्भमें धुआँ होता ही है। कर्म करनेमें देश? काल? घटना? परिस्थिति आदिकी परतन्त्रता और दूसरोंकी प्रतिकूलता भी दोष है? परन्तु स्वभावके अनुसार शास्त्रोंने आज्ञा दी है। उस आज्ञाके अनुसार निष्कामभावपूर्वक कर्म करता हुआ मनुष्य पापका भागी नहीं होता। इसीसे भगवान् अर्जुनसे मानो यह कह रहे हैं कि भैया तू जिस युद्धरूप क्रियाको घोर कर्म मान रहा है? वह तेरा धर्म है क्योंकि न्यायसे प्राप्त हुए युद्धको करना क्षत्रियोंका धर्म है? इसके सिवाय क्षत्रियके लिये दूसरा कोई श्रेयका साधन नहीं है (गीता 2। 31)। सम्बन्ध -- अब भगवान् सांख्ययोगका प्रकरण आरम्भ करते हुए पहले सांख्ययोगके अधिकारीका वर्णन करते हैं।

उपर्युक्त श्लोकमें यह बात कही कि स्वभावनियत कर्मोंको करनेवाला मनुष्य? विषमें जन्मे हुए कीड़ेकी भाँति पापको प्राप्त नहीं होता? तथा ( तीसरे अध्यायमें ) यह भी कहा है कि दूसरेका धर्म भयावह है और कोई भी अज्ञानी बिना कर्म किये क्षणभर भी नहीं रह सकता। इसलिये --, जो जन्मके साथ उत्पन्न हो उसका नाम सहज है। वह क्या है कर्म। हे कौन्तेय त्रिगुणमय होनेके कारण जो दोषयुक्त है? ऐसे दोषयुक्त भी अपने सहजकर्मको नहीं छोड़ना चाहिये। क्योंकि सभी आरम्भजो आरम्भ किये जाते हैं उनका नाम आरम्भ है? अतः यहाँ प्रकरणके अनुसार सर्वारम्भका तात्पर्य समस्त कर्म है। सा स्वधर्म या परधर्मरूप जो कुछ भी कर्म है? वे सभी तीनों गुणोंके कार्य हैं। अतः त्रिगुणात्मक होनेके कारण? साथ जन्मे हुए धुएँसे अग्निकी भाँति दोषसे आवृत हैं। अभिप्राय यह है कि स्वधर्म नामक सहजकर्मका परित्याग करनेसे और परधर्मका ग्रहण करनेसे भी? दोषसे छुटकारा नहीं हो सकता और परधर्म भयावह भी है तथा अज्ञानीद्वारा सम्पूर्ण कर्मोंका पूर्णतया त्याग होना सम्भव भी नहीं है सुतरां सहजकर्मको नहीं छोड़ना चाहिये। ( यहाँ यह विचार करना चाहिये कि ) क्या कर्मोंका अशेषतः त्याग होना असम्भव है? इसलिये उनका त्याग नहीं करना चाहिये? अथवा सहज कर्मका त्याग करनेमें दोष है इसलिये पू0 -- इसमें क्या सिद्ध होगा उ0 -- यदि यह बात हो कि अशेषतः त्याग होना अशक्य है? इसलिये सहजकर्मोंका त्याग नहीं करना चाहिये? तब तो यही सिद्ध होगा कि कर्मोंका अशेषतः त्याग करनेमें गुण ही है। पू0 -- यह ठीक है? परंतु यदि कर्मोंका पूर्णतया त्याग हो ही नहीं सकता ( तो फिर गुणदोषकी बात ही क्या है ) उ0 -- तो क्या सांख्यवादियोंके गुणोंकी भाँति आत्मा सदा चलनस्वभाववाला है अथवा बौद्धमतावलम्बियोंके प्रतिक्षणमें नष्ट होनेवाले ( रूप? वेदना? विज्ञान? संज्ञा और संस्काररूप ) पञ्च स्कन्धोंकी भाँति क्रिया ही कारक है इन दोनों ही प्रकारोंसे कर्मोंका अशेषतः त्याग नहीं हो सकता। हाँ? तीसरा एक पक्ष और भी है कि जब आत्मा कर्म करता है तब तो वह सक्रिय होता है और जब कर्म नहीं करता? तब वही निष्क्रिय होता है? ऐसा मान लेनेसे कर्मोंका अशेषतः त्याग भी हो सकता है। इस तीसरे पक्षमें यह विशेषता है? कि न तो आत्मा नित्य चलनस्वभाववाला माना गया है? और न क्रियाको ही कारक माना गया है? तो फिर क्या है? कि अपने स्वरूपमें स्थित द्रव्यमें ही अविद्यमान क्रिया उत्पन्न हो जाती है और विद्यमान क्रियाका नाश हो जाता है शुद्ध द्रव्य? क्रियाकी शक्तिसे युक्त होकर स्थित रहता है और वही कारक है। इस प्रकार वैशेषिकमतावलम्बी कहते हैं। पू0 -- इस पक्षमें क्या दोष है उ0 -- इसमें प्रधान दोष तो यही है कि यह मत भगवान्को मान्य नहीं है। पू0 -- यह कैसे जाना जाता है। उ0 -- इसीलिये कि भगवान् तो असत् वस्तुका कभी भाव नहीं होता इत्यादि वचन कहते हैं और वैशेषिकमतवादी असत्का भाव और सत्का अभाव मानते हैं। पू0 -- भगवान्का मत न होनेपर भी यदि न्याययुक्त हो तो इसमें क्या दोष है उ0 -- बतलाते हैं ( सुनो ) सब प्रमाणोंसे इस मतका विरोध होनेके कारण भी यह मत दोषयुक्त है। पू0 -- किस प्रकार उ0 -- यदि यह माना जाय कि द्व्यणुक आदि द्रव्य उत्पत्तिसे पहले अत्यन्त असत् हुए ही उत्पन्न हो जाते हैं और किञ्चित् काल स्थित रहकर फिर अत्यन्त ही असत् भावको प्राप्त हो जाते हैं? तब तो यही मानना हुआ कि असत् ही सत् हो जाता है अर्थात् अभाव भाव हो जाता है और भाव अभाव हो जाता है। अर्थात् ( यह मानना हुआ कि ) उत्पन्न होनेवाला अभाव? उत्पत्तिसे पहले शश -- श्रृङ्गकी भाँति सर्वथा असत् होता हुआ ही? समवायि? असमवायि और निमित्त नामक तीन कारणोंकी सहायतासे उत्पन्न होता है। परंतु अभाव इस प्रकार उत्पन्न होता है अथवा कारणकी अपेक्षा रखता है -- यह कहना नहीं बनता क्योंकि खरगोशके सींग आदि असत् वस्तुओंमें ऐसा नहीं देखा जाता। हाँ? यदि यह माना जाय कि उत्पन्न होनेवाले घटादि भावरूप हैं और वे अभिव्यक्तिके किसी कारणकी सहायतासे उत्पन्न होते हैं? तो यह माना जा सकता है। तथा असत्का सत् और सत्का असत् होना मान लेनेपर तो किसीका प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारमें कहीं विश्वास ही नहीं रहेगा क्योंकि ऐसा मान लेनेसे फिर यह निश्चय नहीं होगा कि सत् सत् ही है और असत् असत् ही है। इसके सिवा वे उत्पन्न होता है इस वाक्यसे द्व्यणुक आदि द्रव्यका अपने कारण और सत्तासे सम्बन्ध होना बतलाते हैं अर्थात् उत्पत्तिसे पहले कार्य असत् होता है? फिर अपने कारणके व्यापारकी अपेक्षासे,( सहायतासे ) अपने कारणरूप परमाणुओंसे और सत्तासे समवायरूप सम्बन्धके द्वारा संगठित हो जाता है और संगठित होकर कारणसे मिलकर सत् हो जाता है। इसपर उनको बतलाना चाहिये कि असत्का कारण सत् कैसे हो सकता है और असत्का किसीके साथ सम्बन्ध भी कैसे हो सकता है क्योंकि वन्ध्यापुत्रकी सत्ता? उसका किसी सत् पदार्थके साथ सम्बन्ध अथवा उसका कारण? किसीके भी द्वारा प्रमाणपूर्वक सिद्ध नहीं किया जा सकता। पू0 -- वैशेषिकमतवादी अभावका सम्बन्ध नहीं मानते। वे तो भावरूप द्व्यणुक आदि द्रव्योंका ही अपने कारणके साथ समवायरूप सम्बन्ध बतलाते हैं। उ0 -- यह बात नहीं है क्योंकि ( उनके मतमें ) कार्यकारणका सम्बन्ध होनेसे पहले कार्यकी सत्ता नहीं मानी गयी। अर्थात् वैशेषिकमतावलम्बी कुम्हार और दण्डचक्र आदिकी क्रिया आरम्भ होनेसे पहले घट आदिका अस्तित्व नहीं मानते और यह भी नहीं मानते कि मिट्टीको ही घटादिके आकारकी प्राप्ति हुई है। इसलिये अन्तमें असत्का ही सम्बन्ध मानना सिद्ध होता है। पू0 -- असत्का भी समवायरूप सम्बन्ध होना विरुद्ध नहीं है। उ0 -- यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि वन्ध्यापुत्र आदिका किसीके साथ सम्बन्ध नहीं देखा जाता। अभावकी समानता होनेपर भी यदि कहो कि घटादिके प्रागभावका ही अपने कारणके साथ सम्बन्ध होता है? वन्ध्यापुत्रादिके अभावका नहीं? तो इनके अभावोंका भेद बतलाना चाहिये। एकका अभाव? दोका अभाव? सबका अभाव? प्रागभाव? प्रध्वंसाभाव? अन्योन्याभाव? अत्यन्ताभाव इन लक्षणोंसे कोई भी अभावकी विशेषता नहीं दिखला सकता। फिर किसी प्रकारकी विशेषता न होते हुए भी यह कहना कि घटका प्रागभाव ही कुम्हार आदिके द्वारा घटभावको प्राप्त होता है तथा उसका कपालनामक अपने कारणरूप भावसे सम्बन्ध होता है और वह सब व्यवहारके योग्य भी होता है। परंतु उसी घटका जो प्रध्वंसाभाव है? वह अभावत्वमें समान होनेपर भी सम्बन्धित नहीं होता। इस तरह प्रध्वंसादि अभावोंको किसी भी अवस्थामें व्यवहारके योग्य न मानना और केवल द्व्यणुक आदि द्रव्यनामक प्रागभावको ही उत्पत्ति आदि व्यवहारके योग्य मानना? असमञ्जसरूप ही है क्योंकि अत्यन्ताभाव और प्रध्वंसाभावके समान ही प्रागभावका भी अभावत्व है? उसमें कोई विशेषता नहीं है। पू0 -- हमने प्रागभावका भावरूप होना नहीं बतलाया है। उ0 -- तब तो तुमने भावका ही भावरूप हो जाना कहा है? जैसे घटका घटरूप हो जाना वस्त्रका वस्त्ररूप हो जाना परंतु यह भी अभावके भावरूप होनेकी भाँति ही प्रमाणविरुद्ध है। सांख्यमतावलम्बियोंका जो परिणामवाद है? उसमें अपूर्व धर्मकी उत्पत्ति और विनाश स्वीकार किया जानेके कारण? वह भी ( इस विषयमें ) वैशेषिकमतसे कुछ विशेषता नहीं रखता। अभिव्यक्ति ( प्रकट होना ) और तिरोभाव ( छिप जाना ) स्वीकार करनेसे भी? अभिव्यक्ति और तिरोभावकी विद्यमानता और अविद्यमानताका निरूपण करनेमें? पहलेकी भाँति ही प्रमाणसे विरोध होगा। इस विवेचनसे कारणका कार्यरूपमें स्थित होना ही उत्पत्ति आदि हैं ऐसा निरूपण करनेवाले मतका भी खण्डन हो जाता है। इन सब मतोंका खण्डन हो जानेपर अन्तमें यही सिद्ध होता है कि एक ही सत्य तत्त्व ( आत्मा ) अविद्याद्वारा नटकी भाँति उत्पत्ति? विनाश आदि धर्मोंसे अनेक रूपमें कल्पित होता है। यही भगवान्का अभिप्राय नासतो विद्यते भावः इस श्लोकमें बतलाया गया है क्योंकि सत्प्रत्ययका व्यभिचार नहीं होता और अन्य ( असत् ) प्रत्ययोंका व्यभिचार होता है ( अतः सत् ही एकमात्र तत्त्व है )। पू0 -- यदि ( भगवान्के मतमें ) आत्मा निर्विकार है तो ( वे ) यह कैसे कहते हैं कि अशेषतः कर्मोंका त्याग नहीं हो सकता उ0 -- शरीरइन्द्रियादिरूप गुण चाहे सत्य वस्तु हों? चाहे अविद्याकल्पित हों? जब कर्म उन्हींका धर्म है? तब आत्मामें तो वह अविद्याध्यारोपित ही है। इस कारण कोई भी अज्ञानी अशेषतः कर्मोंका त्याग क्षणभर भी नहीं कर सकता यह कहा गया है। परंतु विद्याद्वारा अविद्या निवृत्त हो जानेपर ज्ञानी तो कर्मोंका अशेषतः त्याग कर ही सकता है क्योंकि अविद्या नष्ट होनेके उपरान्त? अविद्यासे अध्यारोपित वस्तुका अंश बाकी नहीं रह सकता। ( यह प्रत्यक्ष ही है कि ) तिमिररोगसे विकृत हुई दृष्टिद्वारा अध्यारोपित दो चन्द्रमा आदिका कुछ भी अंश? तिमिररोग नष्ट हो जानेपर? शेष नहीं रहता। सुतरां सब कर्मोंको मनसे छोड़कर इत्यादि कथन ठीक ही हैं। तथा अपनेअपने कर्मोंमें लगे हुए मनुष्य संसिद्धिको प्राप्त होते हैं मनुष्य अपने कर्मोंसे उसकी पूजा करके सिद्धि प्राप्त करता है -- ये कथन भी ठीक हैं।

And for this reason also, prescribed action, even if faulty, is to be performed because no other alternative is possible

He states the fruit of the adjective 'Svakarmaṇā' — 'Śreyān'. 'Svadharmo viguṇaḥ' — even if slightly deficient in parts — is better — more praiseworthy. Better than what? 'Paradharmāt svanuṣṭhitāt' — than even well-enjoined [another's duty]. And it is said — 'Death in one's own duty is better, another's duty is fraught with fear'. 'Svabhāvaniyatam' — born of the aforementioned threefold nature — performing action one does not incur Kilbisha — fault. Like poison for a poison-worm, it is not harmful. Therefore for you begging, even if devoid of violence, is not proper. But one's own duty, even if involving violence, is more praiseworthy. Being enjoined as Dharma, when done like the killing of the animal for Agni and Soma, there is no occasion for sin, this is the meaning.

Thus one's own duty which is of the nature of My worship with abandoned agency etc. is the Dharma fit to be accepted by oneself alone.

For by a person associated with Prakriti, the Dharma of the nature of Karma Yoga which is of the form of sense-activity is easily done.

Therefore, one's own duty named Karma Yoga, even if defective, is better than another's duty — than the duty of a person skilled in conquering senses, than Jnana Yoga — which being of the nature of control of all senses is accompanied by inadvertence, [even if] sometimes well-performed. He establishes that very thing — For a person associated with Prakriti, being of the nature of sense-activity, action is ordained by nature itself; doing action he does not incur Kilbisha — Samsara; because action is free from inadvertence. Because Jnana Yoga is achievable by control of all senses, it is accompanied by inadvertence. One devoted to that might incur sin due to inadvertence; therefore Karma-nishtha alone is superior — thus He reminds of what was said in the third chapter.

He states the fruit of the adjective 'Svakarmaṇā' — 'Śreyān'. One's own duty even if defective is better — superior — to another's duty even if well performed. And it should not be thought that another's duty like begging etc. is superior to one's own duty like war etc. involving killing of relatives etc.

Because by nature — aforementioned — 'niyata' — stated by rule — performing action one does not incur sin.

Thus the non-abandonability of Varna and Ashrama duties by nature and the mode of being means to attain the Supreme has been shown. Now, of those very duties included in Karma Yoga by connection with principal Dharma stated in 'Some offer sacrifice to gods alone' [4.25] etc. and by connection with special rules etc., their non-abandonability even for those qualified for Jnana Yoga stated before [3.35] is recognized — by 'Śreyān svadharmaḥ' etc.

Here the word 'Svadharma' does not refer to duties fixed for Varna and Ashrama? If so, by the word 'Paradharma' there would be occasion for taking duties of other Varnas etc.; and that is not proper? Because that being prohibited is Adharma, so stating superiority characterized by most-praiseworthiness of Svadharma there is inappropriate.

For it is not said that merit is better than sin; therefore 'Vedic Dharma is better than non-Vedic Dharma' — this also should not be applied; if you say this is prohibition of begging which is Brahmana-dharma mentioned by Kshatriya Arjuna in 'Better to eat by begging' [2.5]? [Then] No, because if it is obtained (possible), prohibition is inappropriate; if unobtained, answer is given by its being sin itself. In calamities, the immediate next vocation is hard to give up.

Therefore here words Svadharma and Paradharma are explained as concerning Karma Yoga and Jnana Yoga as before. From 'Evam' starting up to 'Svadharmaḥ' is one sentence? Otherwise there would be contingency of lack of connection with subsequent text. To refute the intention of caste for the word 'Sva', he says — 'Svenaiva' (By oneself alone). According to the subsequent statement 'Action ordained by nature', the word Svadharma concerning action concerns desireless action from context.

There 'fit to be accepted by oneself alone' — explaining this he says — 'Prakṛti'. He states that the word 'Viguṇa' implies doubt of rejectability — 'Viguṇo'pi'. Due to lack of other way, allowed even as a secondary alternative, this is the meaning. Other than the one fit for Karma Yoga indicated by the word 'Sva' is 'Para' here, and he is fit for Jnana Yoga, with this intention he says — 'Indriyajaya'.

How can one with inadvertence have 'well-performed-ness', to this he says — 'Kadācit'. To remove the doubt of caste-ordained-ness in 'Svabhāvaniyatam', he says — 'Tadeva'. Just as foods of creatures born in poison-tree, Neem, Tamarind etc. are fixed by nature, this is the idea. The word 'Kilbiṣa' is explained as 'Samsara' up to its fruit to indicate extreme undesirability.

To prohibit possible commitment to Jnana Yoga, or with the intention that prohibition of specific implies permission of the rest, or he says — 'Jñānayogasya'. To remove the doubt of referring to another meaning, intending excessive regard, and to avoid redundancy, it is said 'reminds of what was said in third chapter (35)'.

'Na tadasti'. Thus, of agent, action, instruments, of intellect and fortitude, and of happiness, being distinct by difference of Sattva etc., due to combination of mutual relationship of principal and subsidiary and of sublater and sublated, due to connection (difference) of sequence and simultaneity of modifications etc., due to innumerable varieties, there is capacity to produce diverse fruits. By this, the depth of actions which was briefly stated before is determined in detail with reasons.

And all these from gods down to immovable do not transcend the connection with the three Gunas. For it is said — 'From Brahma down to an insect, no one is happy in reality. Everyone desiring to live creates various modifications'. Thus, in reality happiness belongs to one whose mind has transcended Gunas, not to another, this is the intention. Thus by this much, the threefold nature of each of the six and of Dhriti etc. has been propounded.

Being in the Sattvic heap among them, having obtained divine wealth, one is fit for knowledge here; and you are such, thus Arjuna was encouraged. Now however this is said — If indeed with this wisdom of knowledge you engage in action, then by engagement in one's own duty and by being purified by special knowledge, there is no connection of action for you.

But if you do not accept this? Then surely your engagement must indeed happen, because the caste itself is situated in that state. Since everyone is bound by nature, even if having that nature concealed by some defect for some time, upon the removal of that concealer, he indeed obtains the nature which has become manifest. For such is the nature of Varnas. Thus in the inevitable engagement, there would be sharing of fruit from that.

He states that — from 'Brāhmaṇa' etc. up to 'Avaśo'pi tat' (Even helplessly that). The nature of the description of division of actions of Brahmanas etc. surely does not transgress, thus for you of Kshatriya nature, even if unwilling, Prakriti — named Svabhava — resorts to the state of impeller without deviation. Only for one impelled by that there is connection with merit and sin. Therefore, placing the authority of special knowledge spoken by Me in front, perform actions. That being so, bondage will cease. This is the purport of preparing the equipment for this meaning of the Great Sentence.

The meaning of intermediate sentences is clear. 'Samāsena' (briefly) [18.50]. Of knowledge, stated before. He states the consummation (Nishtha) as ascertained by avoiding the web of words. 'Buddhyā viśuddhayā' etc. all this is almost explained, so effort is not made again.

स्वभाव (वर्ण) और स्वधर्म (आश्रम) का इतना वर्णन करने के पश्चात् भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण विचाराधीन सिद्धांत के एक अत्यन्त सूक्ष्म पक्ष का विवेचन करते हैं। उनका उपदेश सामान्य है? जिसकी उपादेयता सार्वभौमिक एवं सार्वकालिक है। भगवान् का यह उपदेश है कि सहज कर्म के सदोष होने पर भी उसका त्याग नहीं करना चाहिए।शीघ्रता में केवल सतही दृष्टि से इस श्लोक का अध्ययन करने पर कोई भी पाठक इसे आध्यात्मिकता नहीं मानेगा। परन्तु ध्यानपूर्वक अध्ययन करने पर? सहज शब्द से इस श्लोक की गुत्थी सुलझ जाती है। सहज शब्द का अर्थ है जन्म के साथ। प्रत्येक व्यक्ति का जन्म अपनी पूर्वार्जित वासनाओं के साथ ही होता है। अत सहज कर्म से तात्पर्य उन वासनाओं से है जिनके साथ मनुष्य का जन्म होता है। भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण का यह कथन है कि उन कर्मों को नहीं त्यागना चाहिए? जो मनुष्य की सहज अर्थात् स्वाभाविक वासनाओं से प्रेरित होते हैं? परन्तु उन्होंने यह नहीं कहा कि जिस दूषित वातावरण में मनुष्य का जन्म होता है उस वातावरण के दोषयुक्त कमर्ों को उसे करना चाहिए।दो प्रकार की शक्तियां हमारे कर्मों को प्रेरित और नियमित? सीमित और निश्चित करती हैं (1) आन्तरिक मानसिक स्वभाविक से उत्पन्न होने वाली प्रवृत्तियाँ? तथा (2) बाह्य वातावरण तथा विषयों से उत्पन्न होने वाली नयेनये प्रलोभन। मनुष्य को अपनी स्वाभाविक वासनाओं के सदोष होने पर भी उनका अनुसरण करना चाहिए? परन्तु उसी समय? उसमें बाह्य प्रलोभनों का त्याग करने का साहस और क्षमता होनी चाहिए।जिन संस्कारों के साथ हमारा जन्म हुआ है? उसके अनुसार हमको कर्म करने चाहिए। परन्तु स्मरण रहे कि ये कर्म निरहंकार और निस्वार्थ भाव से ही किये जाने चाहिए। बाह्य जगत् के प्रलोभन हमारे प्रलोभन को दूषित नहीं कर सकें? इसकी हमें सावधानी रखनी चाहिए। इस तथ्य पर भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण विशेष बल देते हैं। गीता के अनुसार? मनुष्य परिस्थितियों का स्वामी है? दास नहीं। जिस मात्रा में मनुष्य अपने स्वामित्व को दृढ़तापूर्वक व्यक्त कर पायेगा? उसी मात्रा में उसका विकास संभव होगा।क्या सभी कर्म दोष से आवृत नहीं हैं भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण का युक्तिवाद यह है कि जब सभी कर्म दोषयुक्त हैं? तो स्वकर्म का त्याग कर परधर्म का आचरण क्यों करना चाहिए यह सर्वथा अनुपयुक्त है। दूसरी बात यह है कि अहंकारपूर्वक कर्म करने पर ही वे बन्धन कारक होते हैं? अन्यथा नहीं। अत साधक को निरहंकार भाव से सहज कर्म का पालन करना चाहिए। इस तथ्य को यहाँ आरम्भ शब्द से इंगित किया गया है। इसके पूर्व? हम आरम्भ शब्द का वास्तविक अर्थ देख चुके हैं कि कर्तृत्वाभिमान रहितकर्म। कर्तृत्व का अभिमान ही वासनाओं को उत्पन्न करके कर्म को दोषयुक्त बना देता है।अज्ञान अवस्था में यह दोष अपरिहार्य है? जैसे अग्नि के साथ धूम्र। परन्तु यदि चूल्हे को बाहर खुले वातावरण में रखा जाये? तो धुंआ नष्ट हो जाता है और अग्नि प्रज्वलित हो उठती है। इसी प्रकार? ईश्वर का स्मरण करके निरहंकार भाव से जगत् कर्म करने पर अहंकार के अभाव में वासनाओं का आवरण नष्ट होकर स्वयं का शुद्ध चैतन्य स्वरूप स्पष्ट अनुभव होता है।सहज कर्म के पालन का फल क्या है सुनो

'Śreyān'. Since one's own duty alone is the cause of God's grace for humans, therefore 'paradharmāt' — than [another's duty] even well performed — 'śreyān' — better/more praiseworthy is one's own duty, 'viguṇaḥ' — even if improperly performed. Therefore, being a Kshatriya, by you one's own duty war etc. alone is to be performed, not another's duty begging etc. — this is the intention.

Objection: But one's own duty also like war etc., being cause of sin like killing relatives etc., is not to be performed — if thus [you say], He says 'No' — 'Svabhāva'. 'Svabhāvaniyatam' — doing action like war etc. born of nature like valor, radiance etc. mentioned before, one does not incur 'kilbiṣam' — sin — caused by killing relatives etc. And so explained before in 'Making pleasure and pain equal' [2.38], just as violence to animal which is a part of enjoined Jyotistoma [is not sin], so violence to relatives which is a part of enjoined war also lacks causeness of sin. And so stated below.

'Śreyān'. Since one's own duty alone is the cause of God's grace for humans, therefore 'paradharmāt' — than [another's duty] even well performed — 'śreyān' — better/more praiseworthy is one's own duty, 'viguṇaḥ' — even if improperly performed. Therefore, being a Kshatriya, by you one's own duty war etc. alone is to be performed, not another's duty begging etc. — this is the intention.

Objection: But one's own duty also like war etc., being cause of sin like killing relatives etc., is not to be performed — if thus [you say], He says 'No' — 'Svabhāva'. 'Svabhāvaniyatam' — doing action like war etc. born of nature like valor, radiance etc. mentioned before, one does not incur 'kilbiṣam' — sin — caused by killing relatives etc. And so explained before in 'Making pleasure and pain equal' [2.38], just as violence to animal which is a part of enjoined Jyotistoma [is not sin], so violence to relatives which is a part of enjoined war also lacks causeness of sin. And so stated below.

Since thus, prescribed violence etc. is not a cause of sin, and another's duty is fraught with fear, and all actions are defective due to a general fault; therefore, for the ignorant one who is proud of his Varna and Ashrama—[it is said] "Natural" (sahajam), etc.

O Son of Kunti! "Natural" (sahajam), i.e., born of one's nature, action; "even if faulty" (sadosham api), i.e., even if associated with prescribed violence etc. like Jyotistoma, war, etc.; "one should not abandon" (na tyajet) before the purification of the internal organ—whether you or another.

For indeed, no knower of the non-Self (ignorant person) can remain even for a moment without performing actions.

And nor is he released from fault even while performing another's duty.

"All undertakings" (sarvarambhah)—one's own duties and others' duties, all indeed; because "by fault" (doshena), i.e., by the general [fault] of being of the nature of the three Gunas, they are "covered" (avrita), i.e., pervaded; they are indeed faulty.

And similarly, it was explained before: "To the discriminating one, all is indeed sorrow due to the consequences, anxiety, and latent impressions, and due to the conflict of the functions of the Gunas" (Yoga Sutra 2.15).

Therefore, helplessly, the ignorant one performing actions—like a worm born in poison [does not abandon] poison—should not abandon the "natural" action like war etc., even if faulty generally due to being of the nature of the three Gunas and specifically due to being the cause of killing kinsmen etc.

Because of the inability to renounce all actions; but he who is capable of renouncing all actions, whose internal organ is pure, should indeed renounce [it]—this is the intention.

Since even if defective, the Dharma of the Lord is superior? Therefore action for the Lord should not be abandoned, thus He says — 'Sahajam'. O Kaunteya, even though accompanied by the fault of womanhood, favored by the quality of devotion, 'sahajam' — natural, action born along with the Lord's desire for sport, even if faulty, even if worldly, a person should not abandon the engagement in himself. Therefore by all means that which leads to perfection must indeed be done, this is the meaning.

Why should he not abandon, to this He says — 'Sarva'. 'Hi' — surely all undertakings are covered by defect — in the form of absence of connection with Me — like fire by smoke? Therefore they cause abandonment by their own defect. Just as fire covered by smoke does not make wet wood into fire? Due to being covered by smoke it is not enjoyable? But smokeless fire, being opposite to that, does so (makes it enjoyable)? Similarly, My action also being faultless should not be abandoned, this is the idea.

'Sahajam' means born together with birth itself. What is that action, O Kaunteya? Even if faulty, because it is composed of the three Gunas, one should not abandon it. 'Sarvarambhah' means undertakings that are begun. By the context of 'sarvakartmani' (all actions), whatever undertakings there are, whether they be Svadharma (one's own duty) or Paradharma (another's duty)—all of them, because (the reason here is the nature of having three Gunas) they are composed of the three Gunas, are covered by fault just as innate fire is covered by smoke. One is not freed from fault even by abandoning the innate action called Svadharma and performing Paradharma, and Paradharma is fraught with fear. And since action cannot be abandoned entirely by the ignorant, therefore one should not abandon it. That is the meaning.

Is it that one should not abandon action because it is impossible to abandon it entirely, or is it that there is a fault in abandoning innate action? What follows from this? If innate action is not to be abandoned because it is impossible to abandon entirely, then it is proven that in entire abandonment, there would indeed be merit. (Opponent): It is true that absolute abandonment is not possible in this way. Is the Purusha (Self) ever-active (like the Gunas of the Sankhyas)? Or is action itself the agent (like the momentary Skandhas of the Buddhists)? In both cases, total abandonment of action is not possible.

Now, there is a third view—when it (the substance) acts, the thing is active. When it does not act, that same thing is inactive. In that case, it is possible to abandon action entirely. The distinction in this third view is this—the thing is not ever-active, nor is action itself the agent. What then? Non-existent action arises in a stable substance, and existent action perishes. That pure substance remains possessing potential. Thus say the Kanadas (Vaisheshikas). And that is the agent. What is the fault in this view? The fault is precisely this—that this is a non-Bhagavat (non-scriptural/not the Lord's) view. How is this known? Because the Lord has said, 'The unreal has no being' (Gita 2.16), etc. The view of the Kanadas that 'there is being of the non-existent' and 'non-being of the existent' is non-Bhagavat.

(Opponent): Even if it is non-Bhagavat, if it is logical, what is the fault? It is said—it is indeed faulty, because it contradicts all means of knowledge (Pramanas). How? If substances like dyads (dvyanuka) are absolutely non-existent before production, and having been produced and remaining for some time, they again attain absolute non-existence; then in that case, the non-existent indeed becomes existent, and the existent attains non-existence; non-being becomes being, and being becomes non-being. There (in that view), non-existence, which before production is like a rabbit's horn, is born depending on causes called inherent (samavayi), non-inherent, and efficient causes. But it is not possible to say thus—that non-existence is produced and depends on a cause, because non-existent things like rabbit's horns are not seen (to be produced). If pots, etc., being of the nature of existence (Bhava), are being produced, it can be understood that they are produced depending on a cause merely for their manifestation.

Moreover, if there is uncertainty regarding the existence and non-existence of the non-existent and the existent, no one would have faith in any dealings involving proofs and objects of knowledge, because the certainty that 'the existent is existent' and 'the non-existent is non-existent' would not hold. Furthermore, they say that 'being produced' is the connection of the substance, like a dyad, with the existence of its cause. Before production, it is non-existent; afterwards, depending on the operation of the cause, it is connected with its own causes, the atoms, and with Existence (Satta) through the relation of inherence (Samavaya). Being connected, it becomes existent and inherent in the cause. Here it must be stated: How can the non-existent have its own cause, or how can it have a connection with anything? Neither can a barren woman's son have his own cause, nor can a connection with anything be imagined by any proof.

(Vaisheshika): The connection of non-existence is not imagined by us in this way. The connection characterized by inherence with their own causes is spoken of only regarding existent substances like dyads. (Vedantin): No, because you do not accept their existence prior to the connection. The Vaisheshikas do not desire the existence of pots, etc., prior to the operation of the potter, stick, and wheel. Nor do they desire that the clay itself attains the form of the pot. Therefore, by elimination (Parisheshyat), the connection of the non-existent itself becomes the accepted view.

(Vaisheshika): Even for the non-existent, the relation of inherence is not contradictory. (Vedantin): No, because barren women's sons, etc., are not seen. (Vaisheshika): The prior non-existence (Pragabhava) of the pot alone has a connection with its cause, not the barren woman's son; although the non-existence is equal, the specific distinction of the non-existence must be stated. Whether it is the non-existence of one, of two, of all, prior non-existence, posterior non-existence (destruction), mutual non-existence, or absolute non-existence—no distinction can be shown by any definition. And in the absence of a distinction, the fact that the prior non-existence of a pot alone attains the state of a pot through the potter, etc., and connects with the existent called the potsherd (Kapala), and having connected becomes fit for all practical transactions—but not the posterior non-existence of the pot, despite the truth of its abstract non-existence—is inconsistent. Thus, posterior non-existence, etc., have no fitness for practical transaction anywhere, while only the prior non-existence called the dyad-substance is fit for transactions like production—this is inconsistent because of the lack of distinction in 'non-existence-ness', just as between absolute and posterior non-existence.

(Vaisheshika): We do not say that prior non-existence turns into existence. (Vedantin): Then does existence turn into existence? Like a pot becoming a pot, or a cloth becoming a cloth? This too, like non-existence turning into existence, is contrary to proof. The transformation view (Parinama-paksha) of the Sankhya also does not differ from the Vaisheshika view because it accepts the production and destruction of previously non-existent attributes. Even if manifestation and disappearance are accepted, the contradiction with proof regarding the description of the existence and non-existence of manifestation and disappearance remains as before. By this, the view that the arrangement of the cause itself is production, etc., is also refuted.

By elimination (Parisheshyat), the One Real Substance alone is imagined in many ways with attributes of birth, destruction, etc., through Avidya (ignorance), like an actor. This is the Bhagavat (Lord's) view stated in the verse 'The unreal has no being' (Gita 2.16), because the cognition of the Real is invariable, and that of others is variable.

How then, if the Self is immutable, is the entire abandonment of action not appropriate? Whether the Gunas are real entities or imagined by Avidya, action is their attribute; thus, strictly speaking, it is superimposed on the Self by Avidya. Therefore, it is said that no ignorant person can abandon action entirely even for a moment. But the Knower (Vidvan), when Avidya is removed by Vidya (knowledge), can indeed abandon action entirely, because the remainder of what is superimposed by Avidya cannot be established. The two moons, etc., superimposed by vision affected by cataracts (Timira) do not remain as a residue when the cataracts are removed. And this being so, this statement is appropriate—'Renouncing all actions by the mind' (Gita 5.13) etc., 'Devoted to his own duty, man attains perfection' (Gita 18.45), 'Worshipping Him through his own duty, man finds perfection' (Gita 18.46).

That which was spoken of as 'perfection born of action' (Karmaja Siddhi), characterized by the fitness for steadfastness in knowledge—its fruit, 'Naishkarmya Siddhi' (perfection of actionlessness), which is characterized by steadfastness in knowledge, is to be spoken of; thus the verse begins—

If again by Sankhya view, considering the fault of violence in one's own duty, you consider another's duty better, then faultiness is equal in another's duty also, therefore Karma-nishtha alone is superior — He reminds of this stated before — 'Sahajam'.

Created by the Lord along with the origin of Varnas — 'From mouth, arms, thighs, feet of the Purusha along with Ashramas' [Bhagavata 11.5.2] — natural action, even if faulty, one should not abandon.

Even being wise, doing action is better, because holding the world together is established.

Or the word 'Doṣa' means pain? And thus all beginnings of knowledge or action are covered by pain in the beginning indeed, thus it is said. Because — 'That which is like poison in the beginning, like nectar in the end' [18.37].

There the example is: — Like fire covered by smoke in the beginning, so light alone in the end — thus 'Tathā'.

सहजम् which is born? कर्म action? कौन्तेय O Kaunteya? सदोषम् with fault? अपि even? न not? त्यजेत् (one) should abandon? सर्वारम्भाः all undertakings? हि for? दोषेण by evil? धूमेन by smoke? अग्निः fire? इव like? आवृताः are enveloped.Commentary Sahajam Born with oneself born with the birth of man.Sadosham Faculty for everything is constituted of the three Gunas.All undertakings Ones own as well as others duties.If a Vaisya or a Kshatriya does the duties of a Brahmana he will not in any way be benefited. Anothers duty brings in fear. Therefore it is not proper to perform anothers duty. It is not possible for any man who has no knowledge of the Self to relinish action totally therefore he should not abandon action.

Kaunteya, O son of Kunti; na tyajet, one should not give up;-what?-the karma, duty; sahajam, to which one is born, which devolves from the very birth; api, even though; it be sadosam, faulty, consisting as it is of the three gunas. Hi, for; sarva-arambhah, all undertakings (-whatever are begun are arambhah, i.e. 'all actions', according to the context-), being constituted by the three gunas (-here, the fact of being constituted by the three gunas is the cause-); are avrtah, surrounded; dosena, with evil; iva, as;; agnih, fire; is dhumena, with smoke, which comes into being concurrently.
One does not get freed from evil by giving up the duty to which one is born-called one's own duty-, even though (he may be) fulfilling somody else's duty. Another's duty, too, is fraught with fear. The meaning is: Since action cannot be totally given up by an unelightened person, therefore he should not relinish it.
Opponent: Well, is it that one should not abandon action because it cannot be given up completely, or is it because evil [Evil resulting from discarding daily obligatory duties.] follows from the giving up of the duty to which one is born?
Counter-objection: What follows from this?
Opponent: If it be that the duty to which one is born should not be renounced because it is impossible to relinish it totally, then the conclusion that can be arrived at is that complete renunciation (of duty) is surely meritorious!
Counter-objection: Truly so. But, may it not be that total relinishment is itself an impossibility? Is a person ever-changeful like the gunas of the Sankhyas, or is it that action itself is the agent, as it is in the case of the momentary five [Rupa (from), vedana (feeling), vijnana (momentary consciousness), sanjna (notion), samskara (mental impressions)-these have only momentary existence. In their case there can be no distinction between action and agent, simply due to the fact of their being momentary.] forms of mundane consciousness propounded by the Buddhists? In either case there can be no complete renunciation of action.
Then there is also a third standpoint (as held by the Vaisesikas): When a thing acts it is active, and inactive when that very thing does not act. If this be the case here, it is possible to entirely give up actions. But the speciality of the third point of view is that a thing is not ever-changing, nor is action itself the agent. What then? A nonexistent action originates in an existing thing, and an existing action gets destroyed. The thing-in-itself continues to exist along with its power (to act), and that itself is the agent. This is what the followers of Kanada say. [Their view is that agentship consists in 'possessing the power to act', not in being the substratum of action.] What is wrong with this point of view.
Vedantin: The defect indeed lies in this that, this veiw is not in accord with the Lord's view.
Objection: How is this known?
Vedantin: Since the Lord as said, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.,' etc. (2.16). The view of the followers of Kanada is, indeed, this that the non-existent becomes existent, and the existent becomes nonexistent.
Objection: What defect can there be if it be that this view, even though not the view of the Lord, yet conforms to reason?
Vedantin: The answer is: This is surely faulty since it contradicts all valid evidence.
Objection: How?
Vedantin: As to this, if things like a dvyanuka (dyad of two anus, atoms) be absolutely nonexistent before origination, and after origination continue for a little while, and again become absolutely non-existent, then, in that acase, the existent which was verily nonexistent comes into being, [Here Ast. adds, 'sadeva asattvam apadyate, that which is verily existent becomes nonexistent'.-Tr.] a non-entity becomes an entity, and an entity becomes a non-entity! If this be the view, then the non-enity that is to take birth is comparable to the horns of a hare before it is born, and it comes into being with the help of what are called material (inherent), non-mateial (non-inherent) and efficient causes. But it cannot be said that nonexistence has origination in this way, or that it depends on some cause, since this is not seen in the case of nonexistent things like horns of a hare, etc. If such things as pot etc. which are being produced be of the nature of (potentially) existing things, then it can be accepted that they originate by depending on some cause which merely manifests them. [According to Vedanta, before origination a thing, e.g. a pot, remains latent in its material cause, clay for instance, with its name and form unexpressed, and it depends on other causes for the manifestation of name and form.] Moreover, if the nonexistent becomes existent, and the existent becomes non-existent, then nobody will have any faith while dealing with any of the means of valid knowledge objects of such knowledge, because the conviction will be lacking that the existent is existent and the nonexistent is nonexistent!
Further, when they speak of origination, they (the Viasesikas) hold that such a thing as a dvyanuka (dyad) comes to have relationship with its own (material) causes (the two atoms) and existence, and that it is nonexistent before origination; but later on, depending on the operation of its own causes, it becomes connected with its own causes, viz the atoms, as also with existence, through the inherent (or inseparable) relationship called samavaya. After becoming connected, it becomes an existent thing by its inherent relationship with its causes. [The effect (dyad) has inherent relationship with existence after its material causes (the two atoms) come into association.]
It has to be stated in this regard as to how the nonexistent can have an existent as its cuase, or have relationship with anything. For nobody can establish through any valid means of knowledge that a son of a barren woman can have any existence or relationship or cause.
Vaisesika: Is it not that relationship of a non-existent thing is not at all established by the Vaisesikas? Indeed, what is said by them is that only existent entities like dvyanuka etc. have the relationship in the form of samavaya with their own causes.
Vedantin: No, for it is not admitted (by them) that anything has existence before the (samavaya) relationship (occurs). It is surely not held by the Vaisesikas that a pot etc. have any existence before the potter, (his) stick, wheel, etc. start functioning. Nor do they admit that clay itself takes the shape of a pot etc. As a result, it has to be admitted (by them) as the last aternative that nonexistence itself has some relationship!
Vaisesika: Well, it is not contradictory even for a nonexistent thing to have the relationship in the form of inherence.
Vedantin: No, because this is not seen in the case of a son of a barren woman etc. If the antecedent nonexistence (prag-abhava) of the pot etc. alone comes into a relationship with its own (material) cause, but not so the nonexistence of the son of a barren woman etc. though as nonexistence both are the same, then the distinction between the (two) nonexistences has to be explained. Through such descriptions ( of abhava, nonexistence) as nonexistence of one, nonexistence of two, nonexistence of all, antecedent nonexistence, nonexistence after destruction, mutual nonexistence and absolute non-existence, nobody can show any distinction (as regards nonexistence itself)! There being no distinction, (therefore, to say that:) 'it is only the "antecedent nonexistence" of the pot which takes the form of the pot through the (action of) the potter and others, and comes into a relationship with the existing pot-halves which are its own (material) causes and becomes fit for all empirical processes [Such as production, destruction, etc.] but the "nonexistence after destruction" of that very pot does not do so, though it, too, is nonexistence. Hence, the "nonexistence after destruction", etc. [Etc. stands for 'mutual nonexistence (anyonya-abhava)' and 'absolute nonexistence (atyanta-abhava)'.] are not fit for any empirical processes, whereas only the "antecedent nonexistence" of things called dvyanuka etc. is fit for such empirical processes as origination etc.'-all this is incongruous, since as nonexistence it is indistinguishable, as are 'absolute nonexistence' and 'nonexistence after destruction'.
Vaisesika: Well, it is not at all said by us that the 'antecedent nonexistence' becomes existent.
Vedantin: In that case, the existent itself becomes existent , as for instance, a pot's becoming a pot, or a cloth's becoming a cloth. This, too, like nonexistence becoming existent, goes against valid evidence.
Even the theory of transformation held by the Sankhyas does not differ from the standpoint of the Vaisesikas, since they believe in the origination of some new attribute [i.e. in the origination of a transformation that did not exist before.] and its destruction. Even if manifestation and disappearance of anything be accepted, yet there will be contradiction with valid means of knowledge as before in the explanation of existence or nonexistence of manifestation and disappearance. Hery is also refuted the idea that origination etc. (of an effect) are merely particular states of its cuase. As thelast alternative, it is only the one entity called Existence that is imagined variously through ignorance to be possessed of the states of origination, destruction, etc. like an actor (on a stage). This veiw of the Lord has been stated in the verse, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.' (2.16). For, the idea of existence is constant, while the others are inconstant.
Objection: If the Self be immutable, then how does the 'renunciation of all actions' become illogical?
Vedantin: If the adjuncts (i.e. body and organs) be real or imagined through ignorance, in either case, action, which is their attribute, is surely superimposed on the Self through ignorance. From this point of view it has been said that an unenlightened person is incapable of totally renouncing actions even for a moment (cf. 3.5). The enlightened person, on the other hand, can indeed totally renounce actions when ignorance has been dispelled through Illumination; for it is illogical that there can (then) remain any trace of what has been superimposed through ignorance. Indeed, no trace remains of the two moons, etc. superimposed by the vision affected by (the disease called) Timira when the desease is cured.
This being so, the utterance, 'having given up all actions mentally' (5.13), etc. as also, 'Being devoted to his own duty' (45) and 'A human being achieves 'success by adoring Him through his own duties (46), becomes justifiable.
What was verily spoken of as the success arising from Karma (-yoga), characterized as the fitness for steadfastness in Knowledge,-the fruit of that (fitness), characterized as 'steadfastness in Knowledge' consisting in the perfection in the form of the state of one (i.e. a monk) free from duties, has to be stated. Hence the (following) verse is begun:

So, one should not relinish one's works, understanding that they are natural, are easy to perform and not liable to negligence. Such thoughts coupled with the idea that there are imperfections in them should not lead you to abandon them. The meaning is that though one is fit for Jnana Yoga, one should perform Karma Yoga only. All enterprises, be they of Karma or Jnana, are indeed enveloped by imperfections, by pain, as fire by smoke. But still there is this difference: Karma Yoga is easy and does not involve negligence, but Jnana Yoga is contrary to this.