Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 18 - Shloka (Verse) 67

इदं ते नातपस्काय -- पूर्वश्लोकमें आये सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज -- इस सर्वगुह्यतम वचनके लिये यहाँ इदम् पद आया है।अपने कर्तव्यका पालन करते हुए स्वाभाविक जो कष्ट आ जाय? विपरीत परिस्थिति आ जाय? उसको प्रसन्नतापूर्वक सहनेका नामतप है। तपके बिना अन्तःकरणमें पवित्रता नहीं आती? और पवित्रता आये बिना अच्छी बातें धारण नहीं होतीं। इसलिये भगवान् कहते हैं कि जो तपस्वी नहीं है? उसको यह सर्वगुह्यतम रहस्य नहीं कहना चाहिये।जो सहिष्णु अर्थात् सहनशील नहीं है? वह भी अतपस्वी है। अतः उसको भी यह सर्वगुह्यतम रहस्य नहीं कहना चाहिये। यह सहिष्णुता चार प्रकारकी होती है --,(1) द्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता -- रागद्वेष? हर्षशोक? सुखदुःख? मानअपमान? निन्दास्तुति आदि द्वन्द्वोंसे रहित हो जाना -- ते द्वन्द्वमोहनिर्मुक्ताः (गीता 7। 28) द्वन्द्वैर्विमुक्ताः सुखदुःखसंज्ञैः गीता (15। 5)।(2) वेगसहिष्णुता -- काम? क्रोध? लोभ? द्वेष आदिके वेगोंको उत्पन्न न होने देना -- कामक्रोधोद्भवं वेगम् (गीता 5। 23)।(3) परमतसहिष्णुता -- दूसरोंके मतकी महिमा सुनकर अपने मतमें सन्देह न होना और उनके मतसे उद्विग्न न होना (टिप्पणी प0 987.1) -- एकं सांख्यं च योगं च यः पश्यति स पश्यति (गीता 5। 5)।(4) परोत्कर्षसहिष्णुता -- अपनेमें योग्यता? अधिकार? पद? त्याग? तपस्या आदिकी कमी है? तो भी दूसरोंकी योग्यता? अधिकार आदिकी प्रसंशा सुनकर अपनेमें कुछ भी विकार न होना -- विमत्सरः (गीता 4। 22) हर्षामर्षभयोद्वेगैर्मुक्तः (गीता 12। 15)।ये चारों सहिष्णुताएँ सिद्धोंकी हैं। ये सहिष्णुताएँ जिसका लक्ष्य हों? वही तपस्वी है और जिसका लक्ष्य न हों? वही अतपस्वी है।ऐसे अतपस्वी अर्थात् असहिष्णु (टिप्पणी प0 987.2) को सर्वगुह्यतम रहस्य न सुनानेका मतलब है किसम्पूर्ण धर्मोंको मेरेमें अर्पण करके तू अनन्यभावसे मेरी शरण आ जा -- इस बात को सुनकर उसके मनमें कोई विपरीत भावना या दोष आ जाय? तो वह मेरी इस सर्वगुह्यतम बातको सह नहीं सकेगा और इसका निरादर करेगा? जिससे उसका पतन हो जायगा।दूसरा भाव यह है कि जिसका अपनी वृत्तियों? आचरणों? भावों आदिको शुद्ध करनेका उद्देश्य नहीं है? वह यदि मेरीतू मेरी शरणमें आ जा? तो मैं तुझे सम्पूर्ण पापोंसे मुक्त कर दूँगा? तू चिन्ता मत कर -- इन बातोंको सुनेगा तोमैं चिन्ता क्यों करूँ चिन्ता भगवान् करेंगे ऐसा उल्टा समझकर दुर्गणदुराचारोंमें लग जायगा और अपना अहित कर लेगा। इससे मेरी सर्वगुह्यतम् बातका दुरुपयोग होगा। अतः इसे कुपात्रको कभी मत सुनाना।नाभक्ताय कदाचन -- जो भक्तिसे रहित है? जिसका भगवान्पर भरोसा? श्रद्धाविश्वास और भक्ति न होनेसे उसकी यह विपरीत धारणा हो सकती है किभगवान् जो आत्मश्लाघी हैं? स्वार्थी हैं और दूसरोंको वशमें करना चाहते हैं। जो दूसरोंको अपनी आज्ञामें चलाना चाहता है? वह दूसरोंको क्या निहाल करेगा उसके शरण होनेसे क्या लाभ आदिआदि। इस प्रकार दुर्भाव करके वह अपना पतन कर लेगा। इसलिये ऐसे,अभक्तको कभी मत कहना।न चाशुश्रूषवे वाच्यम् -- जो इस रहस्यको सुनना नहीं चाहता? इसकी उपेक्षा करता है? उसको भी कभी मत सुनाना क्योंकि बिना रुचिके? जबर्दस्ती सुनानेसे वह इस बातका तिरस्कार करेगा? उसको सुनना अच्छा नहीं लगेगा? उसका मन इस बातको फेंकेगा। यह भी उसके द्वारा एक अपराध होगा। अपराध करनेवालेका भला नहीं होता। अतः जो सुनना नहीं चाहता? उसको मत सुनाना।न च मां योऽभ्यसूयति -- जो गुणोंमें दोषारोपण करता है? उसको भी मत सुनाना क्योंकि उसका अन्तःकरण अत्यधिक मलिन होनेके कारण वह भगवान्की बात सुनकर उलटे उनमें दोषारोपण ही करेगा।दोषदृष्टि रहनेसे मनुष्य महान् लाभसे वञ्चित हो जाता है और अपना पतन कर लेता है। अतः दोषदृष्टि करना बड़ा भारी दोष है। यह दोष श्रद्धालुओंमें भी रहता है। इसलिये साधकको सावधान होकर इस भयंकर दोषसे बचते रहना चाहिये। भगवान्ने भी (गीता 3। 31में) जहाँ अपना मत बताया? वहाँ श्रद्धावन्तः अनसूयन्तः पदोंसे यह बात कही कि श्रद्धायुक्त और दोषदृष्टिसे रहित मनुष्य कर्मोंसे छूट जाता है। ऐसे ही गीताके माहात्म्य (गीता 18। 71) में भी श्रद्धावाननसूयश्च पदोंसे यह बताया कि श्रद्धावान् और दोषदृष्टिसे रहित मनुष्य केवल गीताको सुननेमात्रसे वैकुण्ठ आदि लोकोंको चला जाता है।इस गोपनीय रहस्यको दूसरोंसे मत कहना -- यह कहनेका तात्पर्य दूसरोंको इस गोपनीय तत्त्वसे वञ्चित रखना नहीं है? प्रत्युत जिसकी भगवान् और उनके वचनोंपर श्रद्धाभक्ति नहीं है? वह भगवान्को स्वार्थी समझकर (जैसे साधारण मनुष्य अपने स्वार्थके लिये ही किसीको स्वीकार करते हैं)? भगवान्पर दोषारोपण करके महान् पतनकी तरफ न चला जाय? इसलिये उसको कहनेका निषेध किया है। सम्बन्ध -- गीताजीका यह प्रभाव है कि जो प्रचार करेगा? उससे बढ़कर मेरा प्यारा कोई नहीं होगा -- यह बात भगवान् आगेको दो श्लोकोंमें बताते हैं।

इस अठारहवें अध्यायमें समस्त गीताशास्त्रके अर्थका उपसंहार करके फिर विशेषरूपसे इस अन्तिम श्लोकमें शास्त्रके अभिप्रायको दृढ़ करनेके लिये संक्षेपसे उपसंहार करके? अब शास्त्रसम्प्रदायकी विधि बतलाते हैं। तेरे हितके लिये अर्थात् संसारका उच्छेद करनेके लिये? कहा हुआ यह शास्त्र? तपरहित मनुष्यको नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। इस प्रकार वाच्यम् इस व्यवधानयुक्त पदसे न का सम्बन्ध है। तपस्वी होनेपर भी जो अभक्त हो अर्थात् गुरु या देवतामें भक्ति रखनेवाला न हो उसे कभीकिसी अवस्थामें भी नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। भक्त और तपस्वी होकर भी जो शुश्रूषु ( सुननेका इच्छुक ) न हो उसे भी नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। तथा जो मुझ वासुदेवको प्राकृत मनुष्य मानकर? मुझमें दोषदृष्टि करता हो? मुझे ईश्वर न जाननेसे? मुझमें आत्मप्रशंसादि दोषोंका अध्यारोप करके? मेरे ईश्वरत्वको सहन न कर सकता हो वह भी अयोग्य है? उसे भी,( यह शास्त्र ) नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। अथपित्तिसे यह निश्चय होता है कि यह शास्त्र भगवान्में भक्ति रखनेवाले? तपस्वी? शुश्रूषायुक्त और दोषदृष्टिरहित पुरुषको ही सुनाना चाहिये। अन्य स्मृतियोंमें मेधावीको या तपस्वीको? इस प्रकार इन दोनोंका विकल्प देखा जाता है? इसलिये यह समझना चाहिये कि शुश्रूषा और भक्तियुक्त तपस्वीको अथवा इन तीनों गुणोंसे युक्त मेधावीको यह शास्त्र सुनाना चाहिये। शुश्रूषा और भक्तिसे रहित तपस्वी या मेधावी किसीको भी नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। भगवान्में दोषदृष्टि रखनेवाला तो यदि सर्वगुणसम्पन्न हो? तो भी उसे नहीं सुनाना चाहिये। गुरु शुश्रूषा और भक्तियुक्त पुरुषको ही सुनाना चाहिये। इस प्रकार यह शास्त्रसम्प्रदायकी विधि है।,

Having explained and concluded the Gita scripture by examining the preceding and succeeding [contexts], and even though its purport has been determined, he introduces an inquiry to determine it [again] through reasoning -- with the words 'Asmin' etc.

He divides the meaning of the word 'Kim' itself into three parts -- 'Jnanam' etc. Thinking that in the absence of a cause, doubt is merely an appearance and not to be refuted, he asks -- 'Kuta' (Why/From where). Seeing various sentences revealing those specific meanings is the cause, he says -- 'Yajjnatva'. Since actions are observed to be obligatory, the attainment of the highest good (Moksha) from them also seems apparent, he says -- 'Karmani eva'. Still, fearing there is no evidence establishing their combination, he says -- 'Evam'. Concluding that when the materials are present, the effect is inevitable, he says -- 'Iti bhavet' (So it would be).

Thinking that only a doubtful and fruitful subject is to be inquired into, and since there is no fruit, even a doubtful subject is not to be inquired into, he asks -- 'Kim punah' (What then). The ascertainment that Knowledge and Action individually, or combined, are the supreme means towards liberation is the fruit of the inquiry; he answers -- 'Nanu' etc. Since doubt and purpose (the motivators of inquiry) exist, the supreme means of liberation must be determined through inquiry; he concludes -- 'Atah' etc.

Having thus introduced the inquiry, he brings together the conclusion (Siddhanta) -- 'Atma' etc. While explaining the summary sentence, he first shows the ignorance (Avidya) to be removed by Self-knowledge -- 'Kriya' etc. By mentioning the locus, he speaks of its beginninglessness -- 'Atmani' etc. He elaborates on that very ignorance, which arises from beginningless ignorance and is of the nature of evil -- 'Mama' etc. Because it is the effect of beginningless ignorance, wishing to express its beginninglessness in the form of a flow, he qualifies it -- 'Anadi' etc. There, he proposes Self-knowledge as the remover of causal ignorance -- 'Asyah' etc.

Objection: Does this produced knowledge not remove it? Because it is produced without contradiction; nor is it unproduced, because what has not obtained its nature does not perform purposeful action? To this he says -- 'Utpadyamanam'. Doubt: How is it the remover of causal ignorance? Answer: Because it is seen to remove functional (effect) ignorance, he says -- 'Karma' etc.

In the summary sentence 'Atmajnanasy' etc., fearing meaninglessness due to the absence of a distinction indicated by the word 'Tu', he says -- 'Tu shabda'. It clarifies the exclusion of the two sides -- with 'Na' etc. And for this reason also, liberation is not achievable by action, he says -- 'Akaryatvat cha'. Since the Shruti says 'This is the eternal glory,' Moksha being eternal is not an effect, hence there is no need for a cause there; he explains -- 'Nahi' etc.

If Moksha is not created even by knowledge, then knowledge alone is also useless for liberation, so how can there be the idea of its being a cause there? He doubts -- 'Kevala' etc. He refutes the uselessness of knowledge -- 'Na' etc. He elaborates on that very point -- 'Avidya' etc. Regarding the statement that knowledge removing ignorance is seen to result in isolation (Kaivalya), he gives an example -- 'Rajjvadi' (Rope etc.). Regarding the mentioned subject, in what result does the light removing darkness culminate? To that he says -- 'Vinivritta' etc. Just as the light of a lamp culminates in the rope alone through the removal of the snake-delusion, so too Self-knowledge culminates in Isolation (Kaivalya) consisting of the removal of its ignorance; he states the illustrated truth -- 'Tatha' etc.

Since the knower and others, who are the causes of commitment to knowledge, can engage in other actions, that (knowledge-commitment) results in Kaivalya only when combined with action? If this is said, he answers -- 'Drishtarthayam'. While establishing the combination of action in commitment to knowledge through an example, he doubts -- 'Bhuji' etc. The meaning is: just as eating, a worldly action, and the Agnihotra, a Vedic action, are performed together, so too is the combination of Agnihotra action and commitment to knowledge. Even though the fruit of eating, satisfaction, is obtained, desire is seen for heaven etc. and for its cause Agnihotra etc., so combination is proper there; but in the attainment of commitment to knowledge which has liberation as its fruit, there is no desire for heaven etc. or action which is its cause, therefore there is no combination of commitment to knowledge and action; he refutes -- with 'Na' etc.

He explains the summary sentence -- 'Kaivalya' etc. When fruitful knowledge is obtained, there is no desire for another fruit and its cause; he gives an example here -- 'Sarvatah' etc. 'Water flooded everywhere' refers to the ocean; its fruit is bathing etc.; when that is obtained, no one has desire for the action of building a pond etc. or for bathing dependent on it; so it is in the present case, this is the meaning. When knowledge with unsurpassed fruit is obtained, there is no desire for action with surpassable fruit; he clarifies this with an example -- 'Nahi' etc. Relying on the statement that action has surpassable fruit, he states the result -- 'Tasmat na'. He concludes the previously mentioned impossibility of the combination of Knowledge and Action -- 'Na cha' etc. For there is no immediate combination of the two in one result, as they are mutually contradictory like light and darkness; this is the meaning.

Objection: Knowledge alone, accomplishing liberation, requires action as a help to itself, because an instrument requires auxiliary tools? To this he says -- 'Napi' (Nor also). Though knowledge requires sacrifices etc. in its origination, it does not require them in its fruit when produced, because liberation depends solely on it immediately after its origination; this is the meaning. As to what was said that knowledge requires action as an itikartavyata (procedure), he says -- 'Avidya' etc. Since knowledge is the remover of ignorance, action cannot be a helper there due to being contradictory (to knowledge), so there is no need for it in the fruit. Objection: If action is also the remover of ignorance like knowledge, why is there contradiction? To this doubt he says -- 'Nahi' etc. Since neither solitary nor combined action has a direct connection to liberation, he states the result -- 'Atah' etc.

'Only knowledge is the means to liberation' -- denying this statement, he raises a doubt -- with 'Na' etc. Translating the denial, he states the meaning of the negative particle -- 'Yat tavat' etc. 'From the non-performance of obligatory duties, sin arises' -- he elaborates on this cause -- 'Yatah' etc. Because the performance of obligatory duties is necessary even for the knower, only knowledge is not the cause of Kaivalya; this is the meaning. 'And because of the eternality of Kaivalya' -- he shows what is to be excluded by this -- 'Nanu' etc. If obligatory and occasional duties are heard in Shruti, cause sin if not performed, and are to be necessarily performed, then liberation is not from them (whether combined or uncombined), and since mere knowledge is not its cause, liberation without a cause would not be established; this is the meaning. Explaining 'Kaivalyasya cha' etc., he refutes the contingency of non-liberation -- 'Naisha doshah'. Since liberation is eternal, it is established without effort, so there is no doubt of its absence; he elaborates on this statement -- 'Nityanam' etc.

Suspecting the attainment of a desired body due to desire-prompted actions, he said -- 'Kamyanam cha'. Then due to Prarabdha (started) karma, there will not be another body? He says -- 'Vartamana' etc. Then another body will occur due to the remaining karma? Doubting this, he says it is not so because the store of karma is for a single birth -- 'Patite asmin' (When this falls). Due to attachment etc., another action and from that another body will occur? Doubting this, he says -- 'Ragadinam cha'. The abiding of the Self in its own nature -- this is the relation. Karma earned in countless past diverse births, having various fruits and not yet started, cannot act without enjoyment, and since another body starts from that, the idea of single-birth (Ekabhavika) is unproven, so liberation is not established without effort -- he objects -- 'Atikranta' etc. One should not suspect another body caused by the mentioned karma, he says -- 'Na' etc. Obligatory and occasional duties are Vedic and must be performed; there is great effort in their performance, from which suffering is experienced; by accepting that (suffering) as the enjoyment of the fruit of the said unstarted karma, there is no other body from it; he says -- 'Nitya' etc. Even if sin is removed by obligatory duties etc., since there is no contradiction, merit is not removed, so there will be another body? Doubting this -- Merit being different from obligatory duties etc. and if started (Prarabdha), it cannot be proven (to be removed) as it is against logic, so another body from it is not possible; and if it is not different from obligatory duties etc., it has no other fruit -- thinking thus, just as penance is for the destruction of acquired sin and does not expect another fruit, so too all this obligatory karma etc. is for the removal of acquired sin, and culminating in that, it is not the starter of another body; he states this alternative view -- 'Prayaschittavat'.

Still, another body is suspected due to Prarabdha alone, because they are possible as starters of various births by the maxim of 'as long as the mandate lasts'? Doubting this, he says -- 'Arabdhanam cha'. Even if previously earned karmas are exhausted in this way, some past karmas might start another body? Doubting this, he says -- 'Apurvanam cha'. He refutes the view that liberation is by karma alone without knowledge, relying on Shruti -- with 'Na' etc. The relation is with the Shruti 'Vidyate ayanaya'. Explaining the meaning of the word 'Eva', he explains the part 'Na' etc. -- 'Anya' etc. 'When men shall roll up the sky like a skin, then without knowing the Divine, there will be an end to sorrow' -- he translates this Shruti by meaning -- 'Charmavat' etc. He makes Smriti agree with the Shruti meaning -- 'Jnanat' etc.

Moreover, since your logic is devoid of valid support and is merely an appearance, and since there is no destruction of meritorious deeds whose fruits have not started, the start of another body is possible, so there is no liberation without knowledge; he says -- 'Anarabdha' etc. Suspecting there is no possibility of such actions, he says -- 'Yatha' etc. Even in the absence of meritorious actions with unstarted fruit, how is liberation inexplicable? To that he says -- 'Tesham cha'. And for this reason also, due to the impossibility of karma-exhaustion, liberation is inexplicable; to that he says -- 'Dharma' etc. Relying on the Shruti 'By action, the world of ancestors', he states another reason for the non-exhaustion of karma -- 'Nityanam'. He supports the stated meaning with Smriti also -- 'Varna' etc. Having experienced the fruit of action after death, then with the remainder they take birth attaining specific castes etc. -- this is the meaning of the word 'ityadi'. But as to the statement that the enjoyment of the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is the enjoyment of that (sin's) fruit, he now experiences -- 'Ye tu'. Obligatory duties being performed end in effort (fatigue), this is the remainder.

Still, suspecting a fruit other than the nature of obligatory duties like desire-prompted duties, he says it is not so because it is not heard in the injunction statement -- 'Na tu'. If fruit is not heard in the injunction statement, then in the absence of the cause which is the desire for it, obligatory duties would not be enjoined? Doubting this, he says -- 'Jivanadi'. The injunction of obligatory duties is not unestablished, this is the remainder. He refutes what was restated -- with 'Na' etc. Explaining the same, translating the negated object, he states the meaning of the negative particle -- 'Yaduktam'. He elaborates on the reason 'Apravrittanam' etc. -- 'Nahi'. Even in a body started by other karma, let the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance, which is the fruit of sin, be enjoyed; what is the impossibility? Doubting this, he says -- 'Anyatha'. Regarding the statement that there would be an impossibility of the specific fruit of suffering, he explains -- 'Tasya' etc. Accumulated sins are possible and infinite, and they have various fruits of suffering; if they are imagined to have only the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance as their fruit, then when they are imagined so, the specific suffering caused by sin that comes to one obtaining the effort of performing the obligatory duty is not its fruit, because the sufferings that are fruits of sins are many; therefore, it is said that obligatory duty has the specific suffering caused by sin according to the specific case; this is the meaning. Moreover, if sins are imagined to have only the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance as fruit, then the affliction of attachment etc. indicated by the word 'pairs' (Dvandva) and the affliction of disease etc. cannot be caused by sin, and cannot be caused by merit either, so there would be an impossibility of the mentioned affliction; he says -- 'Dvandva' etc.

And for this reason also, it is improper to say that the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is the fruit of sin, he says -- 'Nitya' etc. 'Suffering' cannot be imagined -- this relates to the earlier part. If that alone is its fruit, then the suffering of carrying stones on the head etc. is not caused by sin, nor is its cause merit because suffering is not its effect, so it would be accidental; this is the meaning. And to say that the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is the fruit of acquired sin is improper because it is out of context; he says -- 'Aprakritam cha'. To elaborate on that, he asks -- 'Katham' (How). There, first he states the context -- 'Aprasuta' etc. Still, how are we speakers of something out of context? To that he says -- 'Tatra' etc. By not accepting the distinction in ancient sins as having produced fruit or unproduced fruit, and by the entire (sin) indiscriminately having produced fruit, the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is possible as its fruit, so there is no speaking out of context; he doubts -- 'Atha' etc. If previously acquired sin indiscriminately has started fruit, the qualification is meaningless; he refutes -- 'Tatah' etc. Because if sin alone has started fruit, its mentioned specific fruit which has not started would be impossible; this is the meaning. If previously acquired sin has started fruit, its exhaustion is possible through enjoyment alone, so obligatory duty should not be enjoined for its removal; he states another fault -- 'Nitya' etc.

And for this reason also, the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is not the fruit of acquired sin, he says -- 'Kincha'. He clarifies that -- 'Shrutasya' etc. Just as suffering caused by exercise, walking etc. is not desired to be of another sin because it is possible to be the fruit of that (exercise), similarly, since the obligatory duty mentioned in Shruti involves effort when performed, if no other fruit is accepted, and if the suffering of the effort of performance is the fruit, then since it is seen from that itself, it should not be imagined as the fruit of sin, because it is possible to be the fruit of the obligatory duty; this is the meaning. If suffering is the fruit, non-performance of obligatory duties would be better? Doubting this, he says -- 'Jivanadi'. He states another reason for the impossibility of obligatory duties being the fruit of sin -- 'Prayaschittavat'. He elaborates on the example -- 'Yasmin' etc. Similarly, it is not established that obligatory duties enjoined for causes like life etc. are fruits of sin; this is the remainder. True, penance is not the fruit of the sin which is the cause, but the suffering of the effort of its performance is the fruit of that sin; he doubts -- 'Atha'. If the suffering of the effort of penance performance is the fruit of the sin which is the cause, then the suffering of the effort of performance of 'life etc. cause' would also be the fruit of life etc., not of acquired sin; he refutes -- 'Jivanadi' etc. Just as penance-suffering is the fruit of the sin which is its cause, suffering caused by karma occasioned by life etc. is also the fruit of life etc.; he states the reason here -- 'Nitya' etc.

And thinking that for this reason also, the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance is the fruit of acquired sin (is improper), to say this -- 'Kincha' etc. Suspecting that the context is desired by accepting that the suffering of the effort of desire-prompted performance is also the fruit of sin, he says -- 'Tatha cha'. Obligatory duties are enjoined, and no fruit is heard for them, and there is no injunction without fruit, so by implication (Arthapatti) it is imagined that obligatory duties are for the destruction of sin; and that is not proper because the removal of sin is possible even from the performance of desire-prompted duties; this is the meaning. Moreover, since obligatory duties have fruits other than the suffering of the effort of performance, because they are enjoined, like desire-prompted duties -- by this inference, they are not for the removal of sin; he says -- 'Evam'. 'Evam' was said to give the example of desire-prompted duties etc. And due to contradiction with your own statement, the statement of the enjoyment of sin's fruit from obligatory performance is improper; he says -- 'Virodhachcha'. He elaborates on that -- 'Viruddham cha'. He clarifies the meaning of the word 'Idam' -- 'Nitya' etc. Of another action, i.e., of sin; this is the meaning. 'Sa eva' (That alone) -- because of the rule that what happens immediately after something is its effect; this is the meaning.

And for this reason also, the enjoyment of sin's fruit in obligatory performance is not established, he says -- 'Kincha'. Because of the simultaneity of desire-prompted performance and obligatory performance, just like the enjoyment of sin's fruit through the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance, the fruit of desire-prompted duty could also be released (enjoyed); he states the reason -- 'Tattantratvat'. Suspecting that even if obligatory and desire-prompted performances are simultaneous, the fruit of desire-prompted performance is different from the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance because it is heard (in scripture) -- 'Atha'. If the fruit of desire-prompted performance is different from the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance, then the suffering of the effort of desire-prompted performance and the suffering of the effort of obligatory performance would be mutually different; he says -- 'Tadanushthana'. Suspecting the contingency is desired, he refutes -- 'Na cha'. He clarifies the visible contradiction -- 'Nahi'.

Just like the ignorance of the Self, there is another reason why Agnihotra etc. have no direct connection to liberation; he says -- 'Kinchanyat'. He explains that reason -- 'Avihitam'. The action which is rubbing, eating etc. is not enjoined or prohibited by scripture; its immediate fruit is experienced as such. But scriptural action does not have an immediate fruit because immediacy is not enjoined; therefore, does action with invisible fruit become a helper in knowledge which has visible fruit? Nor is action capable of engaging in liberation which is itself a visible fruit; intending this, he says -- 'Na tu'. If scriptural Agnihotra etc. also had immediate fruit, the non-perception of heaven etc. immediately would be contradictory; then even if there is invisible (merit) in them, there would be no engagement in Agnihotra etc. expecting such fruit; he says -- 'Tada'. And obligatory Agnihotra etc. do not have invisible fruit, while those same desire-prompted ones have such fruit, and this division cannot exist without a cause; he says -- 'Agnihotradinam'. 'Phalakamitvamatrena' -- 'would not happen' relates to the earlier part. Those obligatory Agnihotra etc. and those which are desire-prompted, even though there is no difference in the nature of action of both, the obligatory ones are exhausted merely by the suffering of the effort of their performance and have no other fruit? And those same desire-prompted ones, even without additional limbs etc., merely because the qualified person has desire for fruit, have great fruits like heaven etc. -- this division is not authoritative; this is the meaning. The stated division being impossible, he states the result -- 'Tasmat na'. Since obligatory duties also have invisible fruits like the world of ancestors like desire-prompted ones, they cannot be for the removal of sin, so for that purpose (liberation), Self-knowledge alone must be accepted; he says -- 'Atashcha'.

If all karma consisting of good and evil is entirely preceded by ignorance, then it is reasonable that knowledge is the cause of its destruction; but it is not established that all karma is preceded by ignorance? Doubting this, he says -- 'Avidya' etc. He shows the reasoning indicated by the word 'Hi' there -- 'Tatha'. And for this reason also, action is the province of the unwise; he says -- 'Avidvat'. There are two commitments based on the difference of the qualified person; favoring the opening of the sentence here -- saying that one imputing agency and object-ness to the Self does not know the Self -- it is shown that action is rooted in ignorance; he says -- 'Ubhaviti'. Saying that one knowing the Self in reality is devoid of agency etc., it is indicated that the knower is qualified for renunciation of action; he says -- 'Vedeti'. The two commitments should be understood by the difference of the qualified person; regarding this he quotes another sentence -- 'Jnaneti'. In 'Let him not generate a division of understanding', indicating that action is rooted in ignorance, commitment to action is approved for the object of the wise (i.e., for the ignorant); he says -- 'Ajnanam'. Regarding the statement that commitment to knowledge preceded by renunciation is the province of the knower, he cites the sentence 'Tattvavittu mahabaho gunakarmavibhagayoh' etc. -- 'Tattvavittu'. He recites another sentence there -- 'Sarva' etc. Regarding the commitment to knowledge of the knower, he cites another sentence from the fifth (chapter) -- 'Naiva' etc. He states the meaning established there -- 'Ajna' etc. 'Thinks' -- is the relation. Karma is for the purification of the mind of the ignorant, and renunciation of action of the pure-minded is the cause for attaining knowledge; regarding this he cites another sentence -- 'Arurukshoh'. He says the sentence from the seventh (chapter) agrees with the stated division -- 'Udara' etc. Thus he cites the sentence from the ninth (chapter) 'Trayidharma' etc. as proof that action is the province of the ignorant -- 'Ajna' etc. Regarding the knower having commitment to knowledge preceded by renunciation, he cites another sentence from the ninth -- 'Ananya' etc. He explains 'Mam' (Me) -- 'Yathoktam'. He cites the sentence from the tenth 'Tesham satatayuktanam' etc. there -- 'Dadami'. Since the attainment of the Lord is directed only for those with knowledge, the non-attainment of that by others is indicated; he states this established meaning -- 'Arthat'. Objection: Since those performing work for the Lord are the best yogis, do workers also not go to the Lord? Doubting this, he says -- 'Bhagavat'. By the maxim 'Ye matkarmakrit' etc., those who perform work for the Lord, although they are the best yogis, still, being ignorant workers, they are not fit to go to the Lord immediately; this is the meaning. They are shown to be ignorant -- 'Uttarottara'. From fixing the mind up to the renunciation of fruit, by the adoption of successively inferior means in the order of reading, since the performance of work for the Lord is mentioned for one unable to practice, the ignorance of those performing work for the Lord is known; this is the meaning.

But regarding those who determine that commitment to knowledge preceded by renunciation is the province of the knower, relying on sentences like 'Aksharam anirdeshyam' etc. -- 'Anirdeshya' etc. Possessed of the mentioned means, therefore they would be qualified for commitment to knowledge preceded by renunciation; this is the remainder. Moreover, the means mentioned in the thirteenth like humility etc., in the fourteenth like 'light and activity' etc., and in the fifteenth like non-attachment etc. -- possessed of all these means, they become worshippers of the Indefinable Imperishable, therefore also they are qualified only for commitment to knowledge; he says -- 'Kshetra' etc. Having established the two commitments by the difference of the qualified person, he concludes the intended division of the scripture's meaning: that for those committed to knowledge, there is no threefold fruit of action (disliked, liked, and mixed), but only liberation; and for those committed to action, there is the threefold fruit of action, not liberation -- 'Adhishthanadi'.

The statement that all action has ignorance and desire as its seed is not correct because action understood from scripture cannot be preceded by ignorance; he objects -- 'Avidya' etc. He solves it with an example -- 'Na'. There he divides the intended proposition -- 'Yadyapi'. He explains the stated example -- 'Yatha'. Regarding the fact that actions like killing a Brahmin belong to one with ignorance etc., he states the reason -- 'Anyatha'. He grasps the illustrated truth -- 'Tatha'. Those (scriptural actions) also belong to one with ignorance etc., so their being preceded by ignorance etc. must be accepted; this is the meaning. Suspecting that in actions concerning the next world, since engagement is impossible without knowledge of the Self distinct from the body etc., they are not preceded by ignorance -- 'Vyatirikta'. Even if there is knowledge of the distinct Self, due to the absence of knowledge of the supreme Self, engagement in obligatory duties etc. is only from false knowledge, so their being preceded by ignorance is unimpeded; he refutes -- with 'Na' etc. Since action consists of motion, it is not having the Self as agent because the Self is actionless; the aggregate of body etc. is active, so action having that as agent is proper; still, through the identification of 'I' in the aggregate, the engagement of the Self in action preceded by the false idea 'I do' is seen, so its being preceded by ignorance is proper; this is the meaning.

He objects to the statement that the identification of 'I' in the aggregate of body etc. is false knowledge -- 'Dehadi'. If the 'I-notion' is figurative (Gauna), then in actions preceded by it, there would be the contingency of figurativeness, and since there would be no evil (bondage) for the Self, there would be no search for a cause for its removal; he refutes -- 'Na'. Elaborating on this, he first elaborates on the objection -- 'Atmiya'. There, relying on Shruti, he gives an example -- 'Yatha'. According to the shown Shruti, the 'I-concept' in one's own son is figurative, just as the 'I-concept' in one's own aggregate is also proper (as figurative); this is the meaning. He says that figurative knowledge being preceded by knowledge of difference is well-known in the world -- 'Loke ch'. Following the world and Vedas, the 'I-thought' in one's own aggregate would also be figurative; he states the illustrated truth -- 'Tadvat'. Since false knowledge can also be preceded by knowledge of difference, why shouldn't the 'I-thought' in one's own aggregate be merely falseness? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Naivayam'. How does false knowledge arise in the absence of precedence by knowledge of difference? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Mithya'. Its origination is from the non-grasping of the distinction between the substrate and the superimposed; this is the meaning. The objection that 'I-thought' in the body etc. is figurative being explained, he explains the refutation 'Tat-karyeshu api' etc. -- with 'Na' etc. He divides the reason part -- 'Yatha'. The sentence 'Devadatta is a Lion' proceeds to praise Devadatta, the locus of cruelty etc., by the simile 'Devadatta is like a lion'; the sentence 'The boy is fire' is also for the praise of the boy, the locus of brilliance, by the simile 'The boy is like fire'; the sentence 'I am a man' does not similarly appear to have the purpose of praising the locus; this is the meaning. How is the locus-ness of Devadatta and the boy? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Kraurya'. Moreover, making the figurative word and its concept the cause, no action of a lion is accomplished in Devadatta, nor any action of fire in the boy; but the Self experiences the evil which is the effect of false knowledge, therefore the 'I-thought' in the body etc. is not figurative; he says -- 'Na tu'. For this reason also, the 'I-thought' in the body etc. is not figurative, he says -- 'Gauna'. He who knows Devadatta or the boy as the object of figurative knowledge knows 'This is not a lion', 'This is not fire'; the ignorant one does not similarly understand the non-Self-ness of the aggregate even though there is a difference between the Self and the aggregate; therefore the word and concept 'I' in the aggregate are not figurative; this is the meaning. He heaps another fault if those two were figurative in the aggregate -- 'Tatha'. In that case, the appearance of agency etc. in the Self would be unestablished; this is the remainder. 'What is done by the figurative is not done by the primary' -- he clarifies this with an example -- 'Nahi'. Although the work done by Devadatta and the boy is not done by the primary lion and fire, still, just as by the cruelty in Devadatta (there is work) of the primary lion and by the brilliance in the boy (there is work) of the primary fire, so too by the inertness in the aggregate, some work of the primary Self might be done? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Na cha'. He states another reason for the impossibility of the 'I-thought' in body etc. being figurative -- 'Stuyamana'. Just as there is knowledge of the absence of possession of the activities of lion and fire in Devadatta and the boy, preceded by the knowledge of difference (from them), so too the absence of His activities would be seen in the primary Self through the knowledge of difference from the aggregate; this is the meaning. He shows what is to be excluded -- 'Na punah'. Even if the 'I-thought' in the aggregate is false knowledge, the agency in the Self caused by it is not? But its agency is real through its own knowledge, desire, and efforts? He translates this view -- 'Yachcha'. Even agency caused by knowledge etc. is caused by false knowledge, because knowledge etc. are effects of false knowledge; he refutes -- 'Na tesham'. He elaborates on that -- 'Mithya'. Making false knowledge the cause, superimposing something desired and something undesired, performing action through the desire to obtain and desire to avoid in that (object) experienced through that, enjoying desired and undesired fruit by that, and by that impression, memory etc. preceded by that perform action in one's own Self -- thus the falseness of agency is proper; this is the meaning.

Suspecting the reality of the world of agency etc. in the present birth just as in past and future births, he says -- 'Yatha'. Disputed times possess the world created by ignorance because they are time, like the present time; this is the meaning. Upon the world being created by ignorance, he states the result -- 'Tatashcha'. He states another reason for its being removable by knowledge due to being ignorance -- 'Avidya' etc. How is it created by ignorance, since it is possible to be created by merit and demerit? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Dehadi'. Since the agency of merit etc. of the Self is of the nature of ignorance, body-identification of workers is not possible without ignorance, and therefore the 'I-identification' of the Self in the aggregate is the existence of ignorance; this is the meaning. Establishing the ignorant nature of the Self's identification with body etc. through Anvaya (concomitance) and Vyatireka (absence), he shows the Vyatireka -- 'Nahi'. Showing Anvaya, he translates the Vyatireka -- 'Ajanan'. He translates the statement that 'I-thought' in one's own body etc. is figurative like the father's 'I-thought' in the son -- 'Yastu'. There he accepts what was said about the example Shruti being about the figurative Self -- 'Sa tu'. Then, since the body etc. is also one's own, the 'I-thought' there would be figurative? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Gaunena'. Just as the action of eating etc. of the father is not performed by his own son, the figurative self; similarly, even if the body etc. were a figurative self, the action of agency etc. of the Self is not established as real by it; this is the meaning. Regarding the fact that there is no real action of the primary Self by the figurative self, he gives an example -- 'Gauna'. The action of the primary lion is not done by the figurative lion Devadatta, nor is the action of burning and cooking etc. of the primary fire done by the figurative fire, the boy; similarly, the real action of agency etc. of the primary Self cannot be done by the body etc., the figurative self; this is the meaning.

Through the authority of sentences like 'Desirous of heaven', from the knowledge of the Self as distinct from the body etc., and from the non-agency of that Kevala (absolute Self), its duty-bound action is accomplished only by the figurative selves like body etc.; for when there is knowledge of distinction from Shruti, the primary Self-hood of the Self in the body etc. is not proper -- he objects thus -- 'Adrishta'. The Self-hood of body etc. is not figurative, but since their Self-hood is of the nature of ignorance, it is primary (superimposed as real), therefore the duty-bound action of the Self is not done by figurative selves but by false selves; he refutes -- 'Na avidya'. Explaining the same, he clarifies the meaning of the negative particle -- 'Na gauna'. Then how is the prevalence of Self-hood regarding body etc.? Suspecting this, he divides the reason 'Avidyakrita' etc. -- 'Katham tarhi'. While body etc. are indeed non-Self, their Self-hood is caused by false perception; he cites Anvaya and Vyatireka here -- 'Tadbhava'. In the said Anvaya, he makes the experience of those devoid of scriptural impressions the proof -- 'Vivekinam'. While Vyatireka is also shown, he favors the experience of those who know the scripture -- 'Na tu'. He concludes the meaning established for those following experience through Anvaya and Vyatireka -- 'Tasmat'. The 'I-concept' in body etc. is caused by that alone -- this is the remainder.

Moreover, in the realm of worldly dealing, the grasping of difference is the concomitant of figurativeness; since that is absent in the present case, the word and concept 'I' in body etc. are not figurative; he says -- 'Prithak'. From the authority of the injunction concerning invisible objects, the distinction of the agent Self is determined, so his 'I-identification' in body etc. is figurativeness; he translates this statement -- 'Yattu'. Since the authority of Shruti concerns unknown objects, and since there is no authority of the injunction regarding the distinct Self which is established by other means of knowledge, the 'I-identification' in body etc. is not figurative based on that; he states the answer -- 'Na tat'. He clarifies that the authority of Shruti concerns invisible objects -- 'Pratyakshadi'. Since the rule is that a valid means of knowledge makes known the unknown object, Shruti has no authority in what is known; he says -- 'Adrishta'. Since the scripture, which teaches the unknown relation between end and means, is indifferent regarding the distinct Self, he states the result -- 'Tasmat'. The 'I-concept' is the aggregate of body etc. caused by false knowledge seen through Anvaya and Vyatireka; of that -- is the relation. Having said that the injunction does not concern the distinct Self because it concerns other objects, now even if it is accepted to concern that, it cannot be upheld because it contradicts perception; he says -- 'Nahi'. Intending that the authority of the Apaurusheya (uncreated) Shruti, which is free from potential defects, cannot be rejected even if it contradicts other proofs; he says -- 'Yadi'. Since Shruti teaching its meaning expects non-contradiction, if it speaks a contradictory meaning, one must accept another intended meaning which is non-contradictory to avoid it, because its authority would be untenable in case of contradiction; he says -- 'Tathapi'. That imagining the meaning of Shruti by determining non-contradiction is not proper -- he states this exclusion -- 'Na tu'.

By your acceptance that action has an agent with ignorance, when knowledge arises, ignorance is absent, so the agent dependent on it is absent; without an agent, performance is not established, so the Karma-kanda would be invalid, and thus there would be contradiction with the injunction of study? He doubts -- 'Karmana'. Since the practical (Vyavaharika) validity of Karma-kanda Shruti is possible before the rise of knowledge even in the absence of absolute (Tattvika) validity; and since the absolute validity of Brahma-kanda Shruti is reasonable as generating knowledge of Brahman, there is no contradiction with the injunction of study; he refutes -- 'Na Brahma'. In the absence of absolute validity of Karma-kanda Shruti, the non-establishment of that for Brahma-kanda Shruti is also the same? He doubts -- 'Karma'. Since produced Brahma-knowledge has validity due to the absence of a defeater, the Shruti which is its cause has absolute validity -- he refutes -- 'Na badhaka'. He establishes the impossibility of a defeater for Brahma-knowledge with an example -- 'Yatha'. 'Like the aggregate of body etc.' is the meaning of 'Api'. He clarifies with an example that knowledge of the Self, like worldly knowledge, has no separation from its fruit -- 'Yatha'. The fruit is the removal of ignorance. He dismantles the stated example 'Like the Karma-injunction Shruti' -- 'Na cha'. The Karma-kanda Shruti generates supernatural individual tendencies like sacrifices etc. by obstructing the natural individual tendencies operative from beginningless time; and that generation produces a tendency towards the Inner Self through purification of the mind; and thus, since Karma-injunction Shrutis are for the knowledge of the Inner Self continuously (traditionally/indirectly), their absolute validity is established; this is the meaning. Objection: Even so, since Shruti is false, it would be invalid like the appearance of smoke (mist)? If said, he says no -- 'Mithyatve api'. Even if untrue in nature, there is validity through the true goal; he gives an example here -- 'Yatha'. Just as Mantras, Arthavadas, history, and Puranas, even if lacking validity in the literal heard meaning, have validity in accordance with the primary injunction, similarly in the present case, the validity of Shruti, which is untrue in nature, regarding the truth of the object is not contradictory; this is the meaning. The validity of a sentence in accordance with the primary injunction is not supernatural; he says -- 'Loke api'. Suspecting that although Karma-kanda Shrutis have validity indirectly in the mentioned way, direct validity is neglected; he says -- 'Prakarantara'. The state before the rise of Self-knowledge is a different mode? For those situated there, Karma Shrutis are desired to have direct validity as they teach unknown relations; this is the meaning. He gives an example for the practical validity of Karma Shrutis before knowledge -- 'Pragi'.

It was said that the validity of Shruti is unimpeded even if apparent agency is of the nature of ignorance; now he raises the reality of agency in another way -- 'Yattu'. How can there be primary agency by mere proximity in the absence of one's own activity? Suspecting this, he gives an example -- 'Yatha'. How can he have the fruit of that without fighting himself? Suspecting this, he says due to fame -- 'Jita'. He gives an example of primary agency even in the absence of physical activity -- 'Senapati'. His possession of fruit is also same as the King; he says -- 'Kriya'. He gives a Vedic example for primary agency of another distinct person merely by proximity to another's action -- 'Yatha cha'. How is the action of priests that of the sacrificer? Suspecting this, he says -- 'Tatphalasya'. He gives another example for primary agency of the cause of another's activity merely by proximity without own activity -- 'Yatha cha'. This is not correct because it contradicts the acceptance that 'a factor (Karaka) is a cause performing action'; he refutes -- 'Tadasat'. Suspecting that the acceptance is reasonable regarding specific factors -- 'Karaka'. Without one's own activity, nothing is a factor; he refutes -- 'Na Raja'. He clarifies the example -- 'Raja'. Just as the King has primary agency in war by being the causer of fighting and by giving wealth, similarly in the enjoyment of fruit also his agency is primary; he says -- 'Tatha'. Regarding the statement that the priest's work belongs to the sacrificer, he says -- 'Yajamanasyapi'. Since primary agency is only from one's own activity, he states the result -- 'Yasmat'. He elaborates on that -- 'Yadi'. Then is the primary agency of the King etc. accepted merely by proximity? He says no -- 'N Tatha'. Since the King etc. possess their own activity, the aforesaid is established; he says -- 'Tasmat'. In the King etc. having agency merely by proximity being figurative, the possession of fruit like victory etc. is also established as figurative; he says -- 'Tatha cha'. There he recalls the aforesaid as the reason -- 'Na'. In the absence of primary agency of one by the activity of another, he concludes the result -- 'Tasmat'.

Then how is agency etc. accepted in the Self by you? For by the logic 'The desired agent of the intellect possesses scriptural import' (it is not)? To this he says -- 'Bhranti'. Agency etc. in the Self is illusory; he clarifies this with an example -- 'Yatha'. Regarding 'Agency etc. in the Self is caused by false knowledge', he shows the Vyatireka (absence) -- 'Na cha'. He states the fruit of the said Vyatireka -- 'Tasmat'. The illusion of Samsara being established as created by ignorance, he concludes the supreme context -- 'Iti samyak'.

Having determined the intended meaning of the scripture through inquiry, he introduces the subsequent verse -- 'Sarvam'. Indeed, in the present eighteenth chapter, having concluded the entire meaning of the Gita scripture for the ease of understanding, and having made a summary conclusion of the specific (teachings) at the end in 'Sarvadharman parityajya' etc., now that there is an occasion for the statement of the traditional rule -- this is the scheme. Why is the scripture's meaning, which was concluded in detail, being concluded in brief? To that he says -- 'Shastrartha'. The meaning stated by brevity and detail ascends firmly into the intellect of all; this is the meaning. He explains 'Hitaya' (For the benefit) -- 'Samsara'. 'Kadachana' (Ever) relates to everyone. He states the meaning established by the force of the prohibition -- 'Bhagavati'. Regarding the meaning established by implication, he includes intelligence (Medhavitva) by following another Smriti -- 'Tatra'. Since an option is seen, intelligence also enters among those mentioned qualifications; this is the meaning. In the side of option, how is the understanding of the qualified person? To that he says -- 'Shushrusha'. To one endowed with them, devoid of envy towards the Lord, and austere, it should be spoken; this is the relation. 'Tadyuktaya' -- to one with service, devotion, and non-envy; this is the meaning. He cuts down the doubt that austerity or intelligence are independent qualifications of the aspirant -- 'Shushrusha'. He indicates the purport in the absence of envy towards the Lord -- 'Bhagavati'. Then to whom should this be spoken? Suspecting this, he says to one endowed with all the aforesaid qualities -- 'Gurushushrusha'. The mention of both is to imply the other unmentioned qualifications. Intelligence does not require austerity very much, but everything else is required in the absence of a defeater; this is the idea.

Thus, having concluded in detail all the meaning of the Gita scripture up to the end of the seventeenth chapter in this chapter for the ease of understanding; and at the end, having again made a brief conclusion of it for the firmness of His scripture with the two [verses] beginning 'Be My-minded' (Manmana bhava); now, at this time, He states the rule for the tradition (transmission) of the scripture—with 'This' (idam).

This scripture, which is the cause of cutting off transmigratory existence (Samsara), has been spoken by Me for your welfare. 'To one without austerity' (atapaskaya)—to one devoid of the stated austerities of the body etc.—it 'should not be spoken' (na vachyam) 'ever' (kadachana)—in any condition whatsoever; this [prohibition] is connected with all [categories].

Even to an austere person, if he is 'a non-devotee' (abhakta)—devoid of devotion to the Guru and God—it should never be spoken. Even to one endowed with the two qualifications [austerity and devotion], if he is 'not desirous of service/listening' (ashushrushu)—devoid of the desire to serve/hear—it should never be spoken.

He who cavils (abhyasuyati) at Me, Vasudeva, considering Me a human, a common man—who, being ignorant of My true nature by superimposing faults like self-praise etc., does not tolerate My Lordship—to him who is intolerant of My Lordship, to the non-austere, to the non-devotee, and to the one devoid of service, it should never be spoken.

It is understood from the force of the prohibition that the scripture should be spoken to one who is austere, a devotee, desirous of service, and non-envious.

There, because an option between the intelligent and the austere is seen in another Smriti—'To the intelligent or the austere'—it should be spoken to the 'austere one' endowed with service and devotion and free from envy towards the Lord.

Or, it should be spoken to the 'intelligent one' endowed with service, devotion, and non-envy. To one devoid of service and devotion, even if he is austere or intelligent, it should not be spoken. To one filled with envy towards the Lord, even if he possesses all [other] qualities, it should not be spoken.

It should be spoken to the austere or the intelligent one who is endowed with service to the Guru, devotion, and non-envy—this is the rule of the tradition of the scripture.

Thus, by the two verses, having concluded Sankhya and Yoga which were shown in the second chapter as "by the Yoga of Knowledge for the Sankhyas and by the Yoga of Action for the Yogis," He states the rule for the tradition of knowledge—with "This" (idam).

"To one without austerity" (atapaskaya)—"Tapas" is reflection; to one devoid of that. Meaning, to one not given to effort. "To a non-devotee" (abhaktaya)—to one devoid of faith. "To one not desirous of service" (ashushrushave)—to one not performing service to the Guru. "Me"—the Supreme Self—"who cavils at"—(meaning) who, due to intolerance of My qualities, becomes intent on superimposing faults on Me; to him.

Since the negative particle ("not") is connected with each, even in the absence of any one of these qualifications, "ever"—i.e., even in a great crisis—this is not to be spoken, not to be taught.

Here [is the text]—"Knowledge indeed came to the Brahmana [saying]: Protect me, I am your treasure. Do not speak me to the envious, the crooked, or the uncontrolled, so that I may be powerful."

[And] "He who has supreme devotion to the Lord, and as to the Lord, so to the Guru; to that high-souled one, these truths which have been spoken reveal themselves" (Shvetashvatara Up. 6.23)—because of this Sruti text; this secret is to be given to one who is free from envy, endowed with straightforwardness, given to practice, and intent on the worship of the Guru and the Supreme Lord; not to another—this is the meaning.

'Idam' — this supreme secret scripture 'te' — to you told by Me; 'atapaskāya' — to one who has not performed austerity, by you 'na vācyam'; to one 'abhaktāya' — not devoted to you the speaker and to Me, never to be spoken.

Thus having taught the essence of Gita's meaning, He states the rule in propagating its tradition — 'Idam'.

'Idam' — the essence of Gita's meaning 'te' — by you 'atapaskāya' — to one devoid of performance of own duty 'na vācyam' (should not be spoken)?

And not 'abhaktāya' — to one devoid of devotion to Guru and God ever should be spoken?

And not 'aśuśrūṣave' — to one not doing service should be spoken?

'Mām' — the Supreme Lord who 'abhyasūyati' — reviles by attributing faults with human view, to him also not to be spoken.

Thus having firmly established knowledge of Truth and Benefit in Arjuna by His instruction, under the pretext of instructing specific duty, for establishing the rule of tradition, He first reveals those unqualified for this scripture — by the verse 'Idaṃ te'.

'Idam' — generally indicated thus is explained by words in preceding and succeeding text — 'Idaṃ te paramaṃ guhyaṃ śāstraṃ mayākhyātam'. Here the word 'te' is drawn from the verse 'Iti te jñānam ākhyātam' [18.63]; but the word 'te' in the verse is explained as 'tvayā' (by you).

By the word 'Atapaska', non-qualification for hearing is intended even if mere start of austerity is made, he says — 'Ataptatapase' (To one who has not performed austerity).

According to Shruti 'He who has supreme devotion in God, as in God so in Guru' [Shve. Up. 6.23; Subalo. 16.2; Yo. Shi. 2.22; Shatyaya. 37] he says — 'Tvayi vaktari mayi cābhaktāya' (To one devoid of devotion in you the speaker and in Me). Due to absence of specific constrictor in 'Abhaktatva'. And due to seeing regard for devotee immediately after in 'Madbhakteṣvabhidhāsyati' [18.68].

By 'Kadācana', [prohibition] is intended even if austerity is well performed, he says — 'Taptapase cābhaktāya' (Even to one who has performed austerity but is not devoted). Repetition of 'na' (not) is to show avoidability of each.

The specific order is with the intention of increasing intensity, with this idea he says — 'Bhaktāyāpyaśuśrūṣave' (Even to a devotee if not serving). Here also as before due to absence of cause for restriction.

By Shruti 'Tell that to me who am faithful' [Katha 1.1.13] also priority of service is understood? 'Mām abhyasūyati' — envies Me, this is the meaning. By 'Towards whom anger is directed for meanings of anger, injury, envy, calumny' [Ashta. 1.4.37], object-hood is also established, so accusative case is not removed here. 'Envies towards Me' is what is said.

He manifests envy by object and characteristic — 'Matsvarūpa' etc. 'Mām' — implies reference with mode, this is the idea.

In accordance with sequence 'Na cābhyasūyave' should have been said, with what intention is the sentence made irregular breaking the sequence? To this he says — 'Asamāna' (Dissimilar). By 'To the envious, the crooked' [Muktiko. 1.51], 'Do not give me to the envious' [Manu 2.114] etc. teaching to one having mere envy is prohibited. But to one envious of God teaching is extremely to be avoided, this is the idea.

By 'Na ca ... vācyam', sin in teaching the unqualified is indicated. Here 'to the wise or the ascetic', option of these two is seen elsewhere? But not so for devotee etc.; therefore to one devoid of devotion etc., neither to wise nor to ascetic should it be spoken. Even with connection of all qualities, to one envious of God it should not be spoken — this is what is said.

प्राय अध्यात्मशास्त्र के समस्त ग्रन्थों के अन्तिम भाग में शास्त्रसंप्रदाय की विधि अर्थात् ज्ञान के अधिकारी का वर्णन किया जाता है। इसी महान् परम्परा का अनुसरण करते हुए? इस श्लोक में? भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण बताते हैं कि यह ज्ञान किसे नहीं देना चाहिए। इसी के द्वारा यहाँ इसका भी बोध कराया गया है कि ज्ञान के योग्य अधिकारी में कौन से गुण होने चाहिए। इसका अर्थ यह नहीं हुआ कि इन गुणों के उल्लेख से गीता की ज्ञान निधि के चारों ओर प्राचीरें खड़ी की गई हैं। कोई यह न समझे कि कतिपय लोगों की स्वार्थसिद्धि के लिए और उन्हें इस ज्ञाननिधि के व्यापार का एकाधिकार प्रदान करने के लिए इस सम्प्रदाय विधि का निर्माण किया गया है।यहाँ उल्लिखित गुणों के अध्ययन से ज्ञात होगा कि साधक के आन्तरिक व्यक्तित्व के सुगठन के लिए इन गुणों का होना आवश्यक है। साधन सम्पन्न साधक ही इस ज्ञान का ग्रहण? धारण एवं स्मरण करने में समर्थ होता है। वही इस ज्ञानानन्द का अनुभव एवं अर्जन करके उसे अपने जीवन में प्रकट कर सकता है।यह ज्ञान ऐसे पुरुष को नहीं देना चाहिए जो (1) तपरहित है शरीर? वाणी और मन का संयम ही तप है जिसके द्वारा हम समस्त शक्तियों का संचय कर सकते हैं। संयमरूपी तप से रहित पुरुष में इस ज्ञान को ग्रहण करने की मानसिक और बौद्धिक क्षमता ही नहीं होती। इसलिए? तप रहित व्यक्ति से ज्ञान नहीं कहना चाहिए? क्योंकि इससे उस व्यक्ति को कोई लाभ नहीं होगा। इस कथन में रंचमात्र भी पूर्वाग्रह और दुराग्रह नहीं है। यह कथन इसी प्रकार का है कि? कृपया चट्टानों पर बीजारोपण मत करो। कारण यह है कि कृषक को इससे कोई फसल प्राप्त नहीं होगी।(2) जो अभक्त है तपयुक्त हो किन्तु भक्त न हो? तो उस पुरुष से भी यह ज्ञान नहीं कहना चाहिए। जो साधक अपने लक्ष्य के साथ तादात्म्य नहीं कर सकते? उससे प्रेम नहीं कर सकते? वे इस ज्ञान के अधिकारी नहीं हैं। प्रेम के अभाव में त्याग और उत्साह संभव नहीं है। प्रेमालिंगन में अपने आदर्श को बांध लेना ही भक्ति है।(3) जो अशुश्रुषु (सेवा में अतत्पर) है यदि कोई पुरुष तपस्वी और भक्त है? परन्तु गुरुसेवा और जनसेवा करने में संकोच करता है? तो वह भी योग्य विद्यार्थी नहीं कहा जा सकता। भगवान् श्रीकृष्ण ने सम्पूर्ण गीता में निस्वार्थ सेवा पर विशेष बल दिया है? क्योंकि चित्तशुद्धि का वही सर्वश्रेष्ठ साधन है। स्वार्थी लोग कभी भी इस ज्ञान को ग्रहण नहीं कर पाते हैं और न ही उसके आनन्द का अनुभव कर सकते हैं।(4) जो मुझे से असूया अर्थात् मुझमें दोष देखता है गुणों में दोष देखना असूया है? जो लोग ईश्वर? गुरु और शास्त्रप्रमाण में भी दोष देखते हैं? वे किस प्रकार आत्मज्ञान को प्राप्त कर सकते हैं मुझसे असूया का अर्थ परमात्मा से असूया है। उसी प्रकार? तत्त्वज्ञान का अनादर करने वाले लोग भी अभ्यसूयक कहलाते हैं। बल प्रयोग के द्वारा कराये गये धर्म परिवर्तन से उस मत के अनुयायियों का संख्याबल तो बढ़ाया जा सकता है? परन्तु? ऐसे प्रयोग से आत्मविकास नहीं कराया जा सकता। किसी के भी ऊपर धर्म को नहीं थोपना चाहिए। यदि तत्त्वज्ञान के प्रति मन में तिरस्कार का भाव है? तो बुद्धि से उसे समझने पर भी हम उसे अपने जीवन म्ों कार्यान्वित नहीं कर सकते हैं। इसलिए? असूया युक्त पुरुष इस ज्ञान का अधिकारी नहीं है।इस प्रकार के श्लोकों का प्रयोजन साधकों को साधन मार्ग दर्शाना होता है। गीता के अध्ययन से तत्काल ही किसी लाभ की अपेक्षा नहीं करनी चाहिए। रातोरात व्यक्तित्व का सुगठन नहीं किया जा सकता। गीता इस प्रकार के चमत्कार का आश्वासन नहीं देती।इस श्लोक का अभिप्राय यह हुआ कि तप? भक्ति? सेवाभाव और आदर से युक्त पुरुष ही आत्मज्ञान का उत्तम अधिकारी है। यदि हम शास्त्र के अध्ययन से अधिक लाभान्वित नहीं होते हैं? तो? निश्चय ही हममें किसी आवश्यक गुण का अभाव होना चाहिए। उस स्थिति में आत्मनिरीक्षण के द्वारा हम आत्मशोधन करें। जैसे? दर्पण पर जमी धूल को स्वच्छ कर देने से प्रतिबिम्ब स्पष्ट दिखाई देता है? उसी प्रकार अन्तकरण के शुद्ध और स्थिर होने पर आत्मानुभव स्पष्ट होता है।अब? संप्रदाय के प्रवर्तक एवं प्रचारक को प्राप्त होने वाले फल को बताते हैं

'Idam'. The secrecy of this knowledge is success-bestowing? Because of not being an object for all people.

By austerity first, when the knot of sin is shattered, there is readiness for ripening of merit? Therefore first 'Tapa'; from Tapa 'Shraddha' (faith) (is born, is added)? That itself is 'Bhakti'.

Faith also, having arisen, sometimes does not sprout? Like lightning due to being seen and lost in a moment (or seen for a moment). Then upon its sprouting, desire to hear arises.

Even this much happens for someone in godless, insubstantial dry Sankhya etc. knowledge. Or even in that with God, for someone due to desiring fruit, making fruit alone principal, and making God and oneself subordinate by making them instruments for that. As said — 'And Person because of being for the sake of action' [J.S. 3.1.6], 'Actions also because of being for the sake of fruit' [J.S. 3.1.4]. Thus in both ways there is envy — disrespect — towards God indeed, this is the meaning.

The meaning of scripture is completed.

Now He states the rule of transmission of scripture — 'Idam'. 'Idam' — named Gita, secret of all scriptural meanings, 'te' — to you for cutting off Samsara spoken by Me; not 'atapaskāya' — to one of uncontrolled senses — not to be spoken.

'Kadācana' — in any condition — connects with all three alternatives. Even to an ascetic 'abhaktāya' — devoid of devotion to Guru and God — never to be spoken; even to ascetic and devotee 'aśuśrūṣave' — not doing service, attendance — and not to be spoken.

'Kadācana' and 'ca' word are for dragging the two words 'vācyaṃ kadācana'. And not 'māṃ yaḥ abhyasūyati' — thinking Me Lord Vasudeva as human with qualities like non-omniscience etc. envies, by superimposition of faults like self-praise etc. not tolerating Lordship hates who, to that one intolerant of Sri Krishna's excellence; to non-ascetic, devotee, non-serving also not to be spoken ever — for dragging this is 'ca'.

To ascetic, devotee, serving, and attached to Sri Krishna it is to be spoken, this is the meaning. Four negatives are to establish unfitness even in absence of a single qualification. 'To the wise or to the ascetic' — seeing option elsewhere.

To ascetic endowed with service, Guru-bhakti, attachment to God, or to wise endowed with that, it is to be spoken; even if wisdom and austerity are optional, attachment to God, Guru-bhakti, service are indeed the rule, thus the Commentator (Shankara) [says].

Thus having taught the essence of the meaning of all scriptures and Gita, for the redemption of the world, to establish the path by teaching this, He states the qualified person — 'Idaṃ te'.

'Idam' — secret of all scriptures 'te' — by you 'atapaskāya' — to one devoid of own conduct — not to be spoken. And not 'abhaktāya' — to one devoid of devotion to Me — ever to be spoken.

By the word 'kadācana', it is indicated that even to a devotee associating with non-devotees it is not to be spoken. And not again 'aśuśrūṣave' — to one devoid of desire to hear? To the unattached, this is the meaning. Or to one devoid of My service also not to be spoken.

Who 'mām' — Purushottama — by outward-facedness? — 'abhyasūyati' — reviles with crookedness preceded by attributing faults, to him also not to be spoken.

'Idam' scripture 'te' — for your benefit spoken by Me for cutting off Samsara; 'atapaskāya' — to one devoid of austerity not to be spoken — connects with this separated [word].

Even to ascetic 'abhaktāya' — devoid of devotion to Guru and God 'kadācana' — in any condition — not to be spoken.

Being devotee, ascetic also, he who is non-serving, to him also not to be spoken.

And not he who 'mām' — Vasudeva thinking as natural human 'abhyasūyati' — by superimposition of faults like self-praise etc. not knowing My Lordship does not tolerate? He is also unfit? To him also not to be spoken.

To one free from envy towards God, ascetic, devotee, serving, scripture is to be spoken — this is understood by implication.

There 'to the wise or to the ascetic' — since option of these two is seen, to ascetic endowed with service and devotion, or to wise endowed with that, it is to be spoken.

Devoid of service and devotion, neither to ascetic nor to wise is it to be spoken.

To one having envy towards God, even if possessing all qualities, not to be spoken.

To one having Guru-service and devotion and [it is] to be spoken — this is the rule of transmission of scripture.

The fruit of the transmitter of the tradition is now stated —

Thus teaching the meaning of His Gita, He regulates the propagation of its tradition — 'Idam'.

The sung knowledge 'te' — by you 'atapaskāya' (to non-ascetic) not to be spoken.

Similarly the rest is clear.

इदम् this? ते by thee? न not? अतपस्काय to one who is devoid of austerity? न not? अभक्ताय to one who is not devoted? कदाचन never? न not? च and? अशुश्रूषवे to one who does not render service or who does not desire to listen? वाच्यम् to be spoken? न not? च and? माम् Me? यः who? अभ्यसूयति cavils at.Commentary This The scripture which has been taught to you.Service To the Guru.The scripture can be taught to him who does not speak ill of the Lord? who is a man of austerities? who is devoted? who is thirsting to hear and who renders service to his Guru.One who cavils at Me He who disregards Me taking Me for an ordinary man? who does not like to be told that I am the Lord.

Idam, this Scripture; which has been taught by Me te, to you, for your good, for terminating mundane existence; an vacyam, should not be taught (-na is connected with the remote word vacyam-); atapaskaya, to one who is devoid of austerities. It should kadacana, never, under any condition whatsoever; be taught abhaktaya, to one who is not a devotee, who is devoid of devotion to his teacher and God, even if he be a man of austerity. Neither should it be taught even asurusave, to one who does not redner service-even though he may be a devotee and a man of austerity. Na ca, nor as well; to him yah, who; abhyasuyati, cavils; mam, at Me, at Vasudeva-thinking that I am an ordinary person; to him who, not knowing My Godhood, imputes self-adulation etc. to Me and cannot tolerate Me. He too is unfit; to him also it should not be imparted.
From the force of the context it is understood that the Scripture should be taught to one who has devotion to the Lord, is austere, renders service, and does not cavil. As to that, since it is seen (in a Smrti)-'to one who is intelligent or to one who is austere'-that there is an option between the two, it follows that this should be imparted either to an austere person given to service and devotion, or to an intelligent person endowed with them. It should not be imparted to an austere or even an intelligent person if he lacks service and devotion. It should not be taught to one who cavils at the Lord, even though he be possessed of all the good alities. And it should be taught to one whoserves his teacher and is devout. This is the rule for transmitting the Scripture.
Now the Lord states the fruit derived by one who transmits the Scripture:

I have taught you this most secret doctrine. This should not be imparted by you to someone who has not practised austere disciplines. Never should this be taught to someone who is not devoted to Me and to you, the teacher (i.e., when you have to play the role of a teacher of this doctrine). The meaning is that it should not be taught by you to someone who, though practising austerities, is not a devotee and does not serve Me. It is also never to be taught to one who has no wish to listen, even though he is a devotee. Nor should it be imparted to one who traduces Me, that is, who - when My nature, glories and attributes are described - discovers defects in them. The differences of case (from ablative to nominative form) is to teach that the last one is the most despicable character.