Bhagavad Gita - Chapter 2 - Shloka (Verse) 21

व्याख्या-- वेदाविनाशिनम् ৷৷. घातयति हन्ति कम्-- इस शरीरीका कभी नाश नहीं होता इसमें कभी कोई परिवर्तन नहीं होता इसका कभी जन्म नहीं होता और इसमें कभी किसी तरहकी कोई कमी नहीं आती ऐसा जो ठीक अनुभव कर लेता है वह पुरुष कैसे किसको मारे और कैसे किसको मरवाये अर्थात् दूसरोंको मारने और मरवानेमें उस पुरुषकी प्रवृत्ति नहीं हो सकती। वह किसी क्रियाका न तो कर्ता बन सकता है और न कारयिता बन सकता है।
यहाँ भगवान्ने शरीरीको अविनाशी नित्य अज और अव्यय कहकर उसमें छहों विकारोंका निषेध किया है जैसे अविनाशी कहकर मृत्युरूप विकारका नित्य कहकर अवस्थान्तर होना और बढ़नारूप विकारका अज कहकर जन्म होना और जन्मके बाद होनेवाली सत्तारूप विकारका तथा अव्यय कहकर क्षयरूप विकारका निषेध किया गया है। शरीरीमें किसी भी क्रियासे किञ्चिन्मात्र भी कोई विकार नहीं होता।
अगर भगवान्को न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे और कं घातयति हन्ति कम् इन पदोंमें शरीरीके कर्ता और कर्म बननेका ही निषेध करना था तो फिर यहाँ करनेनकरनेकी बात न कहकर मरनेमारनेकी बात क्यों कही इसका उत्तर है कि युद्धका प्रसङ्ग होनेसे यहाँ यह कहना जरूरी है कि शरीरी युद्धमें मारनेवाला नहीं बनता क्योंकि इसमें

य एनं वेत्ति हन्तारम् इस मन्त्रसे आत्मा हननक्रियाका कर्ता और कर्म नहीं है यह प्रतिज्ञा करके तथा न जायते इस मन्त्रसे आत्माकी निर्विकारताके हेतुको बतलाकर अब प्रतिज्ञापूर्वक कहे हुए अर्थका उपसंहार करते हैं पूर्व मन्त्रमें कहे हुए लक्षणोंसे युक्त इस आत्माको जो अविनाशी अन्तिम भावविकाररूप मरणसे रहित नित्य रोगादिजनित दुर्बलता क्षीणता आदि विकारोंसे रहित अज जन्मरहित और अव्यय अपक्षयरूप विकारसे रहित जानता है। वह आत्मतत्त्वका ज्ञाताअधिकारी पुरुष कैसे ( किसको ) मारता है और कैसे ( किसको ) मरवाता है अर्थात् वह कैसे तो हननरूप क्रिया कर सकता और कैसे किसी मारनेवालेको नियुक्त कर सकता है अभिप्राय यह कि वह न किसीको किसी प्रकार भी मारता है और न किसीको किसी प्रकार भी मरवाता है। इन दोनों बातोंमे किम् और कथम् शब्द आक्षेपके बोधक हैं क्योंकि प्रश्नके अर्थमें यहाँ इनका प्रयोग सम्भव नहीं। निर्विकारतारूप हेतुका तात्पर्य सभी कर्मोंका प्रतिषेध करनेमें समान है इससे इस प्रकरणका अर्थ भगवान्को यही इष्ट है कि आत्मवेत्ता किसी भी कर्मका करने करवानेवाला नहीं होता। अकेली हननक्रियाके विषयमें आक्षेप करना उदाहरणके रूपमें है। पू0 कर्म न हो सकनेमें कौनसे खास हेतुको देखकर ज्ञानीके लिये भगवान् कथं स पुरुषः इस कथनसे कर्मविषयक आक्षेप करते हैं उ0 पहले ही कह आये हैं कि आत्माकी निर्विकारता ही ( ज्ञानीकर्तृक ) सम्पूर्ण कर्मोंके न होनेका खास हेतु है। पू0 कहा है सही परंतु अविक्रिय आत्मासे उसको जाननेवाला भिन्न है इसलिये ( यह ऊपर बतलाया हुआ ) खास कारण उपयुक्त नहीं है क्योंकि स्थाणुको अविक्रिय जाननेवालेसे कर्म नहीं होते ऐसा नहीं ऐसी शङ्का करें तो उ0 यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि आत्मा स्वयं ही जाननेवाला है। देह आदि संघातमें ( जड होनेके कारण ) ज्ञातापन नहीं हो सकता इसलिये अन्तमें देहादि संघातसे भिन्न आत्मा ही अविक्रिय ठहरता है और वही जाननेवाला है। ऐसे उस ज्ञानीसे कर्म होना असम्भव है अतः कथं स पुरुष यह आक्षेप उचित ही है। जैसे ( वास्तवमें ) निर्विकार होनेपर भी आत्मा बुद्धिवृत्ति और आत्माका भेदज्ञान न रहनेके कारण अविद्याके सम्बन्धसे बुद्धि आदि इन्द्रियोंद्वारा ग्रहण किये हुए शब्दादि विषयोंका ग्रहण करनेवाला मान लिया जाता है। ऐसे ही आत्मअनात्मविषयक विवेकज्ञानरूप जो बुद्धिवृत्ति है जिसे विद्या कहते हैं वह यद्यपि असत्रूप है तो भी उसके सम्बन्धसे वास्तव में जो अविकारी है ऐसा आत्मा ही विद्वान् कहा जाता है। ज्ञानीके लिये सभी कर्म असम्भव बतलाये हैं इस कारण भगवान्का यह निश्चय समझा जाता है कि शास्त्रद्वारा जिन कर्मोंका विधान किया गया है वे सब अज्ञानियोंके लिये ही विहित हैं। पू0 विद्या भी अज्ञानीके लिये ही विहित है क्योंकि जिसने विद्याको जान लिया उसके लिये पिसेको पीसनेकी भाँति विद्याका विधान व्यर्थ है। अतः अज्ञानीके लिये कर्म कहे गये हैं ज्ञानीके लिये नहीं इस प्रकार विभाग करना नहीं बन सकता। उ0 यह कहना ठीक नहीं क्योंकि कर्तव्यके भाव और अभावसे भिन्नता सिद्ध होती है अभिप्राय यह कि अग्निहोत्रादि कर्मोंका विधान करनेवाले विधिवाक्योंके अर्थको जान लेनेके बाद अनेक साधन और उपसंहारके सहित अमुक अग्निहोत्रादि कर्म अनुष्ठान करनेके योग्य है मैं कर्ता हूँ मेरा अमुक कर्तव्य है इस प्रकार जाननेवाले अज्ञानीके लिये जैसे कर्तव्य बना रहता है वैसे न जायते इत्यादि आत्मस्वरूपका विधान करनेवाले वाक्योंके अर्थको जान लेनेके बाद उस ज्ञानीके लिये कुछ कर्तव्य शेष नहीं रहता। क्योंकि ( ज्ञानीको ) मैं न कर्ता हूँ न भोक्ता हूँ इत्यादि जो आत्माके एकत्व और अकर्तृत्व आदिविषयक ज्ञान है इससे अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी प्रकारका भी ज्ञान नहीं होता। इस प्रकार यह ( ज्ञानी और अज्ञानीके कर्तव्यका ) विभाग सिद्ध होता है। जो अपनेको ऐसा समझता है कि मैं कर्ता हूँ उसकी यह बुद्धि अवश्य ही होगी कि मेरा अमुक कर्तव्य है उस बुद्धिकी अपेक्षासे वह कर्मोंका अधिकारी होता है इसीसे उसके लिये कर्म हैं। और उभौ तौ न विजानीतः इस वचनके अनुसार वही अज्ञानी है। क्योंकि पूर्वोक्त विशेषणोंद्वारा वर्णित ज्ञानीके लिये तो कथं स पुरुषः इस प्रकार कर्मोंका निषेध करनेवाले वचन हैं। सुतरां ( यह सिद्ध हुआ कि ) आत्माको निर्विकार जाननेवाले विशिष्ट विद्वान्का और मुमुक्षुका भी सर्वकर्मसंन्यासमें ही अधिकार है। इसीलिये भगवान् नारायण ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानां कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् इस कथनसे सांख्ययोगी ज्ञानियों और कर्मी अज्ञानियोंका विभाग करके अलगअलग दो निष्ठा ग्रहण करवाते हैं। ऐसे ही अपने पुत्रसे भगवान् वेदव्यासजी कहते हैं कि ये दो मार्ग हैं इत्यादि तथा यह भी कहते हैं कि पहले क्रियामार्ग और पीछे संन्यास। इसी विभागको बारंबार भगवान् दिखलायेंगे। जैसे अहंकारसे मोहित हुआ अज्ञानी मैं कर्ता हूँ ऐसे मानता है तत्त्ववेत्ता मैं नहीं करता ऐसे मानता है तथा सब कर्मोंका मनसे त्यागकर रहता है इत्यादि। इस विषयमें कितने ही अपनेको पण्डित समझनेवाले कहते हैं कि जन्मादि छः भावविकारोंसे रहित निर्विकार अकर्ता एक आत्मा मैं ही हूँ ऐसा ज्ञान किसीको होता ही नहीं कि जिसके होनेसे सर्वकर्मोंके संन्यासका उपदेश किया जा सके। यह कहना ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि ( ऐसा मान लेनेसे ) न जायते इत्यादि शास्त्रका उपदेश व्यर्थ होगा। उनसे यह पूछना चाहिये कि जैसे शास्त्रोपदेशकी सामर्थ्यसे कर्म करनेवाले मनुष्यको धर्मके अस्तित्वका ज्ञान और देहान्तरकी प्राप्तिका ज्ञान होता है उसी तरह उसी पुरुषको शास्त्रसे आत्माकी विर्विकारता अकर्तृत्व और एकत्व आदिका विज्ञान क्यों नहीं हो सकता यदि वे कहें कि ( मनबुद्धि आदि ) करणोंसे आत्मा अगोचर है इस कारण ( उसका ज्ञान नहीं हो सकता )। तो यह कहना ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि मनके द्वारा उस आत्माको देखना चाहिये यह श्रुति है अतः शास्त्र और आचार्यके उपदेशद्वारा एवं शम दम आदि साधनोंद्वारा शुद्ध किया हुआ मन आत्मदर्शनमें करण ( साधन ) है। इस प्रकार उस ज्ञानप्राप्तिके विषयमें अनुमान और आगमप्रमाणोंके रहते हुए भी यह कहना कि ज्ञान नहीं होता साहसमात्र है। यह तो मान ही लेना चाहिये कि उत्पन्न हुआ ज्ञान अपनेसे विपरीत अज्ञानको अवश्य नष्ट कर देता है। वह अज्ञान मैं मारनेवाला हूँ मैं मारा गया हूँ ऐसे मारनेवाले दोनों नहीं जानते इन वचनोंद्वारा पहले दिखलाया ही था फिर यहाँ भी यह बात दिखायी गयी है कि आत्मामें हननक्रियाका कर्तृत्व कर्मत्व और हेतुकर्तृत्व अज्ञानजनति है। आत्मा निर्विकार होनेके कारण कर्तृत्व आदि भावोंका अविद्यामूलक होना सभी क्रियाओंमे समान है। क्योंकि विकारवान् ही ( स्वयं ) कर्ता ( बनकर ) अपने कर्मरूप दूसरेको कर्ममें नियुक्त करता है कि तू अमुक कर्म कर। सुतरां ज्ञानीका कर्मोंमें अधिकार नहीं है यह दिखानेके लिये भगवान् वेदाविनाशिनम् कथं स पुरुषः इत्यादि वाक्योंसे सभी क्रियाओंमें समान भावसे विद्वान्के कर्ता और प्रयोजक कर्ता होनेका प्रतिषेध करते हैं। ज्ञानीका अधिकार किसमें है यह तो ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानाम् इत्यादि वचनोंद्वारा पहले ही बतलाया जा चुका है वैसे ही फिर भी सर्वकर्माणि मनसा इत्यादि वाक्योंसे सर्व कर्मोंका संन्यास ( भगवान् ) कहेंगे। पू0 ( उक्त श्लोकमें ) मनसा यह शब्द है इसलिये मानसिक कर्मोंका ही त्याग बतलाया है शरीर और वाणीसम्बन्धी कर्मोंका नहीं। उ0 यह कहना ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि सर्व कर्मोंको छोड़कर इस प्रकार कर्मोंके साथ सर्व विशेषण है। पू0 यदि मनसम्बन्धी सर्व कर्मोंका त्याग मान लिया जाय तो उ0 ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि वाणी और शरीरकी क्रिया मनोव्यापारपूर्वक ही होती है। मनोव्यापारके अभावमें उनकी क्रिया बन नहीं सकती। पू0 शास्त्रविहित कायिकवाचिक कर्मोंके कारणरूप मानसिक कर्मोंके सिवा अन्य सब कर्मोंका मनसे संन्यास करना चाहिये यह मान लिया जाय तो उ0 ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि न करता हुआ और न करवाता हुआ यह विशेषण साथमें है ( इसलिये तीनों तरह कर्मोंका संन्यास सिद्ध होता है। ) पू0 यह भगवान्द्वारा कहा हुआ सर्व कर्मोंका संन्यास तो मुमूर्षु के लिये है जीते हुएके लिये नहीं यह माना जाय तो उ0 ठीक नहीं। क्योंकि ऐसा मान लेनेसे नौ द्वारवाले शरीररूप पुरमें आत्मा रहता है इस विशेषणकी उपयोगिता नहीं रहती। कारण जो सर्वकर्मसंन्यास करके मर चुका है उसका न करते हुए और न करवाते हुए उस शरीरमें रहना सम्भव नहीं। पू0 उक्त वाक्यमें शरीरमें कर्मोंको रखकर इस तरह सम्बन्ध है शरीरमें रहता है इस प्रकार सम्बन्ध नहीं है ऐसा मानें तो उ0 ठीक नहीं है। क्योंकि सभी जगह आत्माको निर्विकार माना गया है। तथा आसन क्रियाको आधारकी अपेक्षा है और संन्यास को उसकी अपेक्षा नहीं है एवं स पूर्वक न्यास शब्दका अर्थ यहाँ त्यागना। है निक्षेप ( रख देना ) नहीं। सुतरां गीताशास्त्रमें आत्मज्ञानीका संन्यासमें ही अधिकार है कर्मोंमें नहीं। यही बात आगे चलकर आत्मज्ञानके प्रकरणमें हम जगहजगह दिखलायेंगे।

Suspecting repetition since the meaning of the previous verse appears in the subsequent one also, he introduces the next verse preceded by a translation of the previous context—'ya enam' (he who this), etc. Since the pride of doership etc. is contradictory, and by the power of the determination of the non-dual immutable Self, the Lord permits the renunciation obtained by the Knower for the maturation of knowledge—'veda' (knows), etc. Even though the repetition of the two words (kills and is killed) was avoided earlier itself, he states the non-repetition in another way—'avināśinam' (indestructible), etc. 'It is possible even in a question, so why is it explained with the mention of negation (na)?'—to this he says 'ubhayatra' (in both cases), etc. Since no reply is seen later, a question is not possible here—this is the meaning.

He deduces the intended contextual meaning—'hetvarthasya' (of the meaning of reason), etc. 'Immutability' is the meaning of the reason; because that is common (cause) in the prohibition of all actions for the Knower—this is the idea. If the prohibition of all actions for the Knower is intended, then why is the meaning of 'killing' alone objected to? To that he says—'hanteḥ' (of killing), etc. To object to the stated reason, he asks—'viduṣaḥ' (of the knower), etc. Not grasping the intention, he reminds of the specific reason mentioned before—'nanu' (indeed/but), etc. Accepting what was said, he objects—'satyam' (true), etc. Since the Knower—the individual self—and the Brahman to be known possess contradictory attributes and are distinct like fire and snow, this (distinctness) would be a specific cause for the abandonment of all actions by the Knower—he says 'anyatvāt' (due to otherness), etc. The break is 'avikriyatvāt' (due to immutability). (Objection): Still, for one attaining the immutable changeless Brahman, how can change be possible, since it is contradictory to the attainment of Brahman? Anticipating this, he says—'na hi' (not indeed), etc. He resolves it with the Shruti 'This Self is Brahman' etc.—'na viduṣa' (not for the knower), etc.

Moreover, does 'knowing-ness' belong to the qualified or the pure? Not the first; for in the knowing-ness of the qualified, the contingency of that (knowing) applies to the qualification also; nor is knowing-ness proper for the aggregate which has become the qualification, because it is insentient—he says 'na dehādi' (not body etc.), etc. In the second (case), the division between Jiva and Brahman is unestablished—he says 'asaṃhata' (uncombined), etc. Moreover, since real possession of contradictory attributes is unestablished, and since illusory (difference) is erratic in Bimba and Pratibimba (reflection), the inference of difference is invalid; thus the non-difference of Jiva and Brahman is established—intending this, he states the result—'iti tasya' (thus his), etc. Objection: If all actions are impossible for the immutable Self due to being of the nature of Brahman, how is even 'knowing-ness' possible for the Knower? For the change characterized by knowledge cannot be the own-action of the immutable Brahman? To that he says—'yathā' (just as), etc. The inner organ, assisted by adrishta (fate) and senses etc., transformed up to the object like the light of a lamp, is called 'mental modification' (buddhi-vritti). The consciousness reflected therein is treated as 'knowledge of object' due to non-discrimination from the revealing mental modification. By that, the Self is imagined as 'knower' (upalabdhā). And that is based on the false relation impelled by ignorance; similarly, by the superimposing relation, through the mental modification arising from the sentence revealing the unity of Brahman and Self, the Self is designated as 'Knower'; and by a false relation, there is no destruction of the absolute immutability—this is the meaning. (Objection): Suspecting the 'qualitativeness' (saviśeṣatva) of the Self because the mental modification 'I am Brahman' exists even in the state of liberation, he says that it (modification) exists only as long as the adjunct exists—'asatya' (unreal), etc.

Objection: Even if the immutable Self possesses false knowledge, upon the cessation of his qualification for action, for whom are actions enjoined? For there is no injunction for those without qualification. Anticipating this, he says—'viduṣa' (of the knower), etc. He objects to the specific statement 'Actions are enjoined for the non-knower'—'nanu' (but), etc. What is the harm in the division: 'injunction of action for the non-knower and injunction of knowledge for the knower'? Anticipating this, he says—'vidita' (known), etc. 'Viditatva' of knowledge means 'being obtained'. Upon the impossibility of the division 'action-injunction for non-knower, knowledge-injunction for knower', he states the result—'tatra' (there), etc. Because there is existence of 'to-be-performed' after knowledge of Dharma, and its absence after knowledge of Brahman, he resolves that the action-injunction is only for one devoid of Brahman-knowledge—'na anuṣṭheyasya' (not of the to-be-performed), etc. He expands on the specific reasoning itself—'agnihotrādi' (Agnihotra etc.), etc.

Objection: Since engagement in actions of the other world is impossible without knowledge of the Self distinct from body etc., action is to be performed by one possessing such knowledge? If this is said, to that he says—'kartāham' (I am doer), etc. Even possessing the knowledge 'I am doer, enjoyer' in the Self, due to being devoid of Brahman-knowledge, action is to be performed by the 'non-knower'—this is the meaning. Just like knowledge of distinction from body etc., Brahman-knowledge will also assist in engagement in action due to the non-difference in 'being knowledge'? Anticipating this, he says—'na tu' (but not), etc. Because knowledge of the immutable Self is opposed to what is to be performed—this is the remainder. Objection: Even after the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and Self, if knowledge like 'I am doer' arises, the action-injunction would have scope? He says 'no'—'na aham' (not I), etc. Due to the absence of cause—is the remainder. Knowledge of doership etc. is different—this is said. Due to the stated distinction between performance and non-performance, there is performance for the non-knower and not for the knower—he concludes—'iti eṣa' (thus this), etc.

Objection: If there is nothing to be performed for the Knower of Self, then how are actions enjoined for him by scriptures like 'The Knower should sacrifice'? To that he says—'yaḥ punaḥ' (who however), etc. Regarding the knowledge of being qualified for actions relative to the knowledge of doership etc. in the Self, actions are enjoined for such a person. And he is determined to be a 'non-knower' indeed from the previous statement. Indeed, for one possessing knowledge of non-doership etc., there is no engagement in actions through the contrary knowledge of doership etc.—this is the meaning. He states another reason for the Knower of Brahman regarding the impossibility of action—'viśeṣitasya' (of the qualified), etc. Qualified by 'veda avināśinam' etc.—is the remainder. Although there is no action for the Knower, still there might be for the 'desirer of knowledge' (vividiṣu)? Anticipating this, he says—'tasmāt' (therefore), etc. Because actions are opposed to knowledge and are opponents of the desired liberation—this is the meaning. Although Ashrama actions are expected for the seeker of liberation, they are accepted only as unopposed to Knowledge and its fruit; otherwise there would be contradiction with the injunction of renunciation for the desirer of knowledge—intending this, he states the Lord's permission in the stated meaning—'ataeva' (therefore indeed), etc. Because the division—right to renunciation for the Knower and Desirer of Knowledge, and to action for the Non-knower—is desired, this is the meaning. Lord Vedavyasa also showed two commitments based on the difference of qualified persons—he says 'tathā ca' (and thus), etc. After the engagement of the twice-born in the recitation of one's Veda by the injunction of study, there the path of action and the path of knowledge—these two paths are made known based on the difference of qualified persons—this is the meaning. By the word 'ādi', 'Where the Vedas are established' etc. is grasped. To remove the equality of the stated two paths, he gives another example—'tathā' (so), etc. Before the rise of dispassion towards action and its fruit through purification of mind, the 'path of action' is enjoined; for the dispassionate, again, the 'path of knowledge' preceded by renunciation is shown. And that (knowledge path) is superior to the other—such is the Shruti—this is the meaning.

In the stated division, he again shows the favorableness of the remainder of the sentence—'evameva' (thus indeed), etc. The explanation of 'ego-deluded self' is 'knower of non-truth'. Introducing the verse 'But the Knower of Truth', he summarizes the purport—'na aham' (not I), etc. The word 'iti' connects with the previous verb. Regarding the dispassionate, he recites another sentence (verse)—'tathā ca' (and thus), etc. The word 'ādi' is to include the remainder of that very verse. Since renunciation of action is shown from knowledge of the immutable Self, he raises the Mimamsaka view—'tatra' (there), etc. Since the Self is the locus of the power of knowledge and action, there is absence of immutability; so knowledge of immutable Self as the cause of renunciation is not possible—this is the meaning. Is the absence of the stated knowledge due to the absence of the object or due to the absence of proof? Vying this, he faults the first—with 'na' etc. First, there is no absence of the immutable Self; because without it, there is the impossibility of the futility of the cause (scripture), since the scripture 'is not born nor dies' etc. is proof due to being authoritative word—this is the meaning. He refutes the second—'yathā ca' (and as), etc. He cites the special knowledge established by the force of the injunction of other-worldly action—'kartuśca' (and of the doer), etc. Just as from the Karma-Kanda there is origin of special knowledge regarding the unknown Dharma etc., so from the Jnana-Kanda the origin of special knowledge regarding the unknown Brahman-Self is not contradictory, because there is no difference in authoritativeness—this is the meaning. (Objection): Since knowledge is generated by the contact of the mind, and since the Self's being an object of the mind is refuted by Shruti, there is no means for Self-knowledge? He doubts—'karaṇa' (instrument), etc. Relying on Shruti, he answers—'na. manasā' (No. By mind), etc. It is heard (in Shruti) that Reality is to be seen following the instruction of scripture and teacher only by the mental modification arising from sentences like 'That Thou Art'; the Brahman-Self object, though self-luminous by nature, becomes the support of determinate transaction when manifested by the mental modification arising from the sentence—thus due to the figurative usage of 'being object of mind', 'not being object of instrument' is unestablished—this is the meaning. (Objection): How then is there Shruti negating the Brahman-Self being an object of the mind? Anticipating this—thinking that it concerns the non-object-ness for an unpurified mental modification—he says 'śāstra' (scripture), etc.

(Objection): Even if Shruti etc. exist, due to the absence of reasoning favoring it, knowledge of immutable nature cannot arise for us? Anticipating this, he says—'tathā' (so), etc. For the understanding of that immutable Self—given the inference 'the disputed modification is not a property of the Self, because it is a modification, like the modification accepted by both,' and given the Agama in the form of previously mentioned Shruti and Smriti—to say 'knowledge does not arise in that' is mere rashness, like saying 'the object does not shine even when the proof exists'—this is the meaning. Objection: Even if the stated knowledge arises, it is not for abandoning or accepting, so whence is its fruitfulness? To that he says—'jñānaṃ ca' (and knowledge), etc. 'Avaśyam' (inevitably), etc. Like the impossibility of light's operation without the removal of darkness, there is impossibility of the rise of Self-knowledge without the removal of Self-ignorance—this is the meaning. Objection: Since ignorance is the prior-absence of knowledge, knowledge is its cessation itself, not its remover? To that he says—'tacca' (and that), etc. Again, how has the Lord also shown ignorance as distinct from absence of knowledge? Anticipating this, he says—'atra ca' (and here), etc. The disputed (ignorance) is not absence of knowledge, because it is a material cause, like clay etc.—this is the idea. Objection: Since the act of killing is prohibited by 'One should not harm', its doership etc. may be caused by ignorance, but the doership etc. of enjoined actions is not so? (Answer): 'No'—he says 'tacca' (and that), etc. First, doership etc. in the Self are not eternal, due to the contingency of non-liberation. Nor are they non-eternal and causeless, because there is a rule of a material cause for a positive effect. And the non-Self cannot be its material cause, because it appears in the Self. And the Self itself cannot be its material cause, because for the Immutable, that is impossible without Avidya. He says—'avikriyatvāt' (due to immutability), etc. (Objection): Even in the absence of doership, there could be causal agency (kārayitṛtva)? Anticipating this, he says—'vikriyāvān' (possessing change), etc. The beginningless indescribable Ignorance is the material cause of the appearance of doership etc. in the Self, and its cessation is by Knowledge of Truth—this has been said. Now he shows the Lord's permission regarding doership and causal agency being created by Avidya—'tadetat' (that this), etc.

(Objection): If the absence of qualification for action for the Knower is intended by the Lord, then where would be his qualification while living? He asks—'kva punaḥ' (where then), etc. 'In the commitment to knowledge'—this was said, he reminds—'uktam' (said), etc. And he has the right to renunciation of all actions which is subsidiary to that—he says 'tathā' (so), etc. (Objection): In the sentence to be stated (v. 2.21? or 5.13?), renunciation of 'all' actions does not appear, because abandonment of only 'mental' actions is understood by force of the qualification? He doubts—'nanu' (but), etc. Relying on another qualification (naiva kurvan - not doing at all), he faults—'na sarva' (not all), etc. By the qualification 'manasā' (by mind), the word 'all' would be restricted to mental actions only? He doubts—'mānasānām' (of mental), etc. Renunciation of all actions is established because upon the abandonment of mental activity in all ways, other activities (speech/body) are impossible—he refutes—'na' etc. (Objection): Even in the renunciation of mental actions, due to restriction, there is no impossibility of speech etc. activity? He doubts—'śāstrīyāṇām' (of scriptural), etc. 'Anyāni' (others), etc. Non-scriptural speech and body actions are causes of non-scriptural mental ones; and 'those' are 'all actions'—this is the meaning. Taking the remainder of the sentence, he faults—'na. naiva' (No. Not at all), etc. For it is not proper that one remains renouncing all non-scriptural actions by discriminating intellect; because the qualification 'not doing at all' and the cause of renunciation 'discriminating intellect' are equal (applicable to all actions)—this is the meaning. Showing the restriction of the renunciation of all actions intended by the Lord to a specific state (death), he doubts—'mariṣyataḥ' (of the dying), etc. Showing the sign here that 'renunciation is intended here only in the living state,' he answers—'na. nava' (No. Nine), etc. He illuminates the impossibility itself—'na hi' (not indeed), etc.

He raises an objection of unestablishment of the sign (linga) by the explanation of a specific syntax—'akurvataḥ' (of the non-doing), etc. By force of discrimination, placing all dharmas in the body—the stated (city)—the Knower remains not doing and not causing to do. And thus, since the connection 'Renouncing actions in the body, not doing and not causing to do, he sits happily' is possible; and since the qualification (renouncing) does not have the abandonment of action 'while the body exists' as its object; there is no abandonment of all actions for the living—this is the meaning. Or, 'kurvataḥ' etc. should be connected in the previous (hantāram...) itself; the objection of unestablishment of the sign should be deduced starting from 'dehe sannyasya'. Due to the determination of the Self's immutability everywhere, since doership and causal agency are not obtained without connection to the body, to avoid the contingency of 'prohibition of the unobtained', the connection stated by us is better—he resolves—'na sarvatra' (not everywhere), etc. In Shrutis and Smritis—this is the meaning. Moreover, since connection depends on expectancy, proximity, and compatibility, the connection intended by us is established by force of expectancy—he says 'āsana' (sitting), etc. But the connection desired by you is not established due to absence of expectancy—he says 'tadanapekṣatvācca' (and due to independence from that), etc. (Objection): Since the word 'sannyāsa' means 'depositing' (nikṣepa), and since that depends on a locus, the connection desired by us (depositing in the body) is established? Anticipating this, he says—'sampūrvastu' (but with 'sam' prefix), etc. Otherwise the prefix would be useless—this is the meaning. Considering the correctness of the connection 'Renouncing all actions by the mind, by discriminating knowledge, the Knower sits (in the body)'—he concludes—'tasmāt' (therefore), etc. Since renunciation of the nature of cessation of all activities is not opposed to the knowledge of the immutable Self, one possessing 'impelling knowledge' (seeker) has a right to legal (vaidha) renunciation; but one possessing right knowledge (Knower) has a right to illegal (non-injunctional), natural (renunciation) which is of the nature of the fruit—accepting this division, he shows the favorableness of the sentence-remainder in the stated meaning—'iti tatra' (thus there), etc.

Having substantiated the sages' proposition "na hanti na hanyate" (neither kills nor is killed) with the mantra "na jāyate..."—which is intent on stating the immutability of the Self—He (the Lord) Himself concludes with "veda" (he who knows - 2.21), etc. (Refutation): By this, the view is defeated that—"Of the proposition 'na hanti na hanyate', 'na hanyate' (is not killed) was substantiated (in verse 20), and now 'na hanti' (does not kill) is being substantiated (in verse 21)." (This view is incorrect). Because—"Why does this Self not become the agent or object of killing?" "Because of being immutable"—He answers this with the second mantra (verse 20)—this (interpretation) would contradict our previous text, and otherwise there would be a defect of incompleteness in the mantra. By this, the view is also defeated that—"Of the statement 'nāyaṃ hanti na hanyate', 'na hanyate' is substantiated by 'na jāyate' (20) and 'na hanti' is substantiated by 'veda' (21)."

(Meaning of Verse 21): "Enam"—the Self of the nature described in the previous mantra; which is devoid of the final modification (death) present in the perishable (body); "Nityam"; "Avipariṇāminam" (unchanging); "Avyayam"—devoid of decay; and the reason for that is "Ajam"—being devoid of birth, it is devoid of all modifications; "Yaḥ Veda"—he who knows this; that "Avikriya" (immutable) "Svātma-darśī" (seer of the Self), the wise one—"Kam" (whom) and "Katham" (how) does he "Ghātayati"—cause to kill (instigate a killer)? And "Kam Hanti"—whom does he kill? Meaning, in no way does he kill or cause to kill anyone. The purport is: "Similarly, you too, becoming wise, do not superimpose upon yourself the agency and instigation thinking 'I myself am the agent of killing and the instigator of Shikhandi etc.'"

(Explanation of terms): "Avināśinam"—That whose nature is not to perish; devoid of the final modification. The reason for that is "Avyayam"—that which has no "vyaya" (expenditure/loss); meaning, that which has no decay of parts or decay of qualities. Since destruction is seen through decay of parts or qualities, destruction is impossible for that which lacks both. Objection: "If it is created (janya), we can infer destructibility?" Answer: No, He says "Ajam". "Na jāyate"—so it is "Aja", devoid of the first modification (birth). The reason for that is "Nityam"—always existing. Birth is seen of that which was previously non-existent, not of that which always exists—this is the idea.

Alternatively—"Avināśinam" means "Abādhyam" (unsublatable), i.e., "Satyam" (Truth). "Nityam" means all-pervading. The reason is "Ajam, Avyayam"—devoid of birth and destruction. Because all-pervasiveness and truth cannot apply to that which is being born or dying.

Alternatively (Another meaning)—"Vināśi" means "that whose nature is to perish/disappear"—which refers to the "Upadhi-traya" (three adjuncts: gross, subtle, causal bodies) similar to the rope-snake; other than that is "Avināśinam". Therefore "Nityam" i.e., destruction-less. The reason is "Ajam". That which has birth is non-eternal, but this being unborn is eternal. Objection: "Being distinct from its effect, unbornness, and eternality exist even in the 'Pradhana' (Nature) of Sankhyas and 'Nabhas' (Space) of Logicians?" Hence He said "Avyayam". "Na vyeti"—it does not deviate from its former state, hence "Avyaya". The Pradhana of Sankhyas is mutable; according to the maxim "the nature of Gunas is unsteady," they accept that it exists always transforming even in the state of equilibrium. And regarding Akasha (Space), since its origination is heard in "From that Self, Akasha was born," it has "finitude" (antavattva), so it lacks Immutability (Avyayatva). (Objection): "Why did the Acharya (Shankara) not explain it this way?" (Answer): Since the sentence meaning "He who knows this (Self) as devoid of all modifications" is possible properly through the "straight path" following the context, He considered "strained imagination" to be unjustifiable—understand this. Thus—He who knows "Enam" (this) Eternal, Indestructible—always destruction-less (not just in usage like Space)—therefore "Aja" (birthless), "Nitya" (Constant). It is impossible for the Indestructible to be created, therefore "Avyaya"—always of one essence—he who knows this.

Or—"Enam Nityam" (This Eternal); reason is "Avināśinam". Reason for Indestructibility is "Ajam, Avyayam". Or—He who "Nityam" (always) knows this Indestructible, Unborn, Immutable one.

Or—The word split is "Veda Avināśinam". "Enam"—this Self which has gone to "complete invisibility" (asamantāt adarśanam) due to being covered by ignorance—which is "Nityam" (eternally) existing as Saccidananda; due to the covering of ignorance, like the piece of rope, it does not have "non-existence." And that which, though appearing "Jātaḥ" (born) and "Kṣīṇaḥ" (decayed) due to (false) knowledge, is actually "Aja" and "Avyaya"—he who knows this... (Commentator's Note): To imagine "something or other" is easy even for children and people like us; therefore, one should not point out "incompleteness" in the Omniscient Bhashyakara caused by his not using such (strained) imaginations—this should be noted.

(Refutation of another view): "Arjuna, superimposing agency on himself and instigation on the Lord, feared the sin of violence in both; the Lord, knowing his mind, refuted both 'kills' and 'causes to kill'. The meaning is 'Do not superimpose agency on yourself and instigation on Me and fear sin'"—this view stated by some is incorrect. Because—Arjuna, devoid of Self-knowledge, withdrew from his Svadharma of war due to fear of sin from violence; the Lord is instructing him with the entire Gita-shastra which is intent on teaching the "Nature of Self" and "Dharma" as the means to it—with this clear understanding he raised the doubt. The statement "Do not fear" would be purposeless (without removing ignorance); and the "impossibility" of this doubt raised by the mantra "Ya enam..." (19) has already been stated there.

(Principle): The negation of the act of killing is an indicator (upalakṣaṇa) for the negation of "action in general." Because action is impossible for the wise man who knows the "unconnected" (asaṃhata) nature of the Self, (even if action appears) it is due to the continuance of sublated appearance by powerful Prarabdha. And even if action is possible, due to the absence of the "pride of agency," actions do not generate fruit, so their "impossibility" is rightly said in reality. Therefore, the main eligibility for action belongs to the one who has desire for fruit and pride of agency.

(Objection): "But even in Knowledge (Vidya), only the ignorant one has eligibility?" (Answer): Thus says the Bhashya—"Placing this mutual superimposition of Self and Non-Self called Avidya in front, all transactions of proof and object... and all scriptures... proceed. (Q): How do perceptions and scriptures concern the ignorant? (A): Without the pride of 'I and Mine' in the body and senses, knovership (pramatritva) is not established, so the operation of proofs is not established..." The meaning is: Knower-ship is agency regarding knowledge; and that is "independence." Independence means prompting all factors without being prompted by other factors. By such a one, the proof must be employed, and without one's own operation/action, the instrument cannot be employed. The Immutable Eternal Conscious Self cannot inherently be mutable and active; therefore, by superimposition of identity with the active Intellect etc., becoming active, it becomes fit to superintend the proof—thus, proofs have the ignorant person as their subject and locus.

(Conclusion): "If so, it is true. However, just as after understanding the meaning of a ritual injunction, one who has the knowledge 'I am the doer, this is my duty' has to perform action gathering many means; it is NOT the case that after the knowledge of the meaning of the statement 'Na jāyate' etc. regarding the Self's nature, there remains 'something' to be performed. Rather, other than the knowledge 'I am not the doer, not the enjoyer'—the knowledge of the oneness, non-agency, and non-enjoyership of the Self—nothing else remains to be performed. This is the 'distinction'; and this is clear in the Bhashya.

"Ataḥ" (Therefore)—he who knows thus, "katham" (how) does he cause to kill or kill? "Avināśinam" (Indestructible) means devoid of occasional/conditional (naimittika) destruction.

"Nityam" (Eternal) means devoid of natural/inherent (svābhāvika) destruction. Alternatively—"Avināśinam" means devoid of connection with defects.

"Nityam" means existing always. This distinction applies everywhere, because the word "naṣṭa" (destroyed/ruined) is used for persons etc. who are possessed of defects.

He explains the statement "This (Self) does not kill" with the word "veda" (knows). "Vināśi" (Perishable) is that whose nature is to perish or become invisible—namely, the three adjuncts (upadhis) known as gross, subtle, and causal bodies, which are comparable to a snake (illusory appearance) on a rope; distinct from that is the "Avināśinam" (Indestructible). Therefore, it is "Nityam" (Eternal), meaning devoid of destruction. The reason for that is "Ajam" (Unborn). For one who has birth is non-eternal; but this one, due to being unborn, is eternal. This is the meaning.

(Objection): "But in the 'Pradhana' accepted by Sankhyas and the 'Nabhas' (Space) accepted by Logicians, there is eternality relative to their effects?" Therefore, He said "Avyayam" (Immutable). That which does not deviate ("na vyeti")—meaning does not abandon its previous state—is Avyayam, i.e., changeless. For Pradhana, according to the maxim "the nature of Gunas is unsteady," exists always undergoing transformation even in the state of equilibrium of Gunas—this is their acceptance. And regarding Akasha (Space), since its origination is heard in "From that very Self, Akasha was born," it lacks immutability precisely because it lacks unbornness.

He who "Veda"—directly realizes—such a Self, "Katham" (how/in what way) does that person "Ghātayati"—cause anyone else to be killed, i.e., engage in the act of killing? Or "Kam Hanti" (whom does he kill)? The meaning is: In no way does he cause anyone to be killed, nor does he kill. Because of the absence of duality. Similarly, the Shruti negates the operation of all factors of action in the state of Knowledge: "But where everything has become the Self for him, there by what means and whom would one see?" etc. And it shows the transaction of all factors only in the state of ignorance: "For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other," etc.

By this, the "combination" (samuccaya) of Knowledge (Vidya)—which destroys all factors of action—with Actions (Karma)—which depend on all factors—is refuted. Because, being of mutually contradictory natures like heat and cold, it is impossible for the two to function for a single result, like the logic of the chariot and the horse (pulling in opposite directions); this is detailed elsewhere.

For knowers "like me," even if there is a contingency of causing death etc. during the time of emerging from absorption (vyutthana) due to the persistence of a trace of ignorance, there is no defect/sin because it is sublated by Knowledge and because future actions do not cling. And thus it will be stated: "Even having killed these worlds, he does not kill, nor is he bound" (18.17).

Thus, the person who knows "Enam" (this) Self to be "Nityam" (Eternal)—due to being indestructible, unborn, and incapable of decay—regarding the selves situated in the bodies of gods, humans, animals, and stationary beings—"Katham" (how) does he "Ghātayati" (cause to kill) "Kam api" (any) self? Or "Katham" (how) does he "Hanti" (kill) "Kam" (whom)? Meaning: How does he destroy, or how does he become the instigator of that?

The implication is that the grieving "I am causing these selves to be killed, I am killing" is rooted solely in the ignorance of the true nature of the Self.

Although only the separation from the body is effected for the eternal selves, nevertheless, when the bodies which are the means of delightful enjoyments perish, there indeed exists a cause for grief in the form of separation from them; "Therefore, He says" (the next verse).

Ataeva (Therefore), the absence of agency in killing stated earlier is indeed well-known; this He states with "veda" (he who knows).

He who knows the Self to be "Nityam"—devoid of growth, "Avyayam"—devoid of decay, "Ajam" (Unborn), and "Avināśinam" (Indestructible)—whom does that person kill, or how does he kill? Meaning, he does not. Because there is an absence of means for killing one of such a nature.

Similarly, becoming a "prayojaka" (instigator) himself, whom does he cause to be killed by another? Meaning, no one at all and in no way whatsoever.

By this, it is implied: "Do not cast a view of fault/sin upon Me (Krishna) either for being the instigator."

In the verse "veda" etc., which concerns the opposite of the one described in "ya enam" (2.19) [i.e., the Knower], "Nityam" (Eternal) is an "anuvāda" (restatement) of the ultimate probandum (thing to be proved). And "Avināśinam" etc. serve as the reason for that—with this intention, (Ramanuja) says "Evam" (Thus).

By the word "Vyaya" (change/expenditure) here, modifications other than birth and destruction are intended. Or specifically "decay" (apakṣaya), or the separation of parts capable of being cut etc.

Regarding "Kam" (Whom)—since specification (nirdhāraṇa) depends on a multitude of unspecified individuals, (Ramanuja) says "gods, humans," etc.

Anticipating repetition (tautology) between "ghātayati" (causes to kill) and "hanti" (kills), he explains the meaning according to the logical order in the mind—"how does he destroy," etc.

(Objection): "It is not proper to negate agency in killing specifically for the 'knower' (vedituḥ); for if the Self is eternal, killing it is impossible/unfit even for the 'non-knower'?" To resolve this doubt, stating the resultant meaning (phalitārtha) and connecting it with the context, he says—"etān" (these [I am killing]).

The purport is: In this verse, not merely the agency of killing etc. is being negated, but rather the 'grieving' prompted by that; for the word "katham" (how) is used here precisely to negate the mode/manner that produces that (grief).

आत्मा की वर्णनात्मक परिभाषा नहीं दी जा सकती परन्तु उसका संकेत नित्य अविनाशी आदि शब्दों के द्वारा किया जा सकता है। यहाँ इस श्लोक में प्रश्नार्थक वाक्य के द्वारा पूर्व श्लोकों में प्रतिपादित सिद्धान्त की ही पुष्टि करते हैं कि जो पुरुष अविनाशी आत्मा को जानता है वह कभी जीवन की वास्तविकताओं का सामना करने में शोकाकुल नहीं होता।आत्मा के अव्ययअविनाशी अजन्मा और शाश्वत स्वरूप को जान लेने पर कौन पुरुष स्वयं पर कर्तृत्व का आरोप कर लेगा भगवान् कहते हैं कि ऐसा पुरुष न किसी को मारता है और न किसी के मरने का कारण बनता है। यहाँ ध्यान देने की बात यह है कि इस वाक्य का सम्बन्ध स्वयं भगवान् तथा अर्जुन दोनों से ही है। यदि अर्जुन इस तथ्य को स्वयं समझ लेता है तो उसे स्वयं को अजन्मा आत्मा का हत्यारा मानने का कोई प्रश्न नहीं रह जाता है।किस प्रकार आत्मा अविनाशी है अगले श्लोक में एक दृष्टांत के द्वारा इसे स्पष्ट करते हैं

He clarifies this very point with "na jāyate" (is not born) etc. Regarding "nāyaṃ bhūtvā" (not that having been...)

(The meaning is): It is not the case that this Self, "having not been," "will come to be" (bhavitā); rather, it (always) exists.

Therefore, it is not born. And it does not die, because it is not the case that "having been," it "will not be" (na bhavitā); rather, it will indeed be (continue to exist).

"Veda avināśinam" (He who knows the Indestructible), etc. Objection: "Why is the indestructibility etc. of the Self mentioned again?" Reply: Therefore, he states the purport of this with "Ataḥ" (Therefore). The meaning is: Based on the stated proofs, regarding the Self which is of such nature as indestructibility, whom and how does one cause to kill or kill—i.e., perform such an action?

It was stated (earlier) that one who considers the soul as non-eternal etc. does not know; now it is stated that the knower (Jnani) does not think so.

Anticipating a repetition between "avināśinam" (indestructible) and "nityam" (eternal), he states the difference in meaning in two ways—"avināśinam" etc. "Naimittika" (occasional/conditional) means caused by reasons like the destruction of the original object (Bimba) [causing destruction of reflection]. "Svābhāvika" (natural) means caused by Time.

By the phrase "devoid of connection with defects" (a second interpretation of avināśinam), a restatement is made of what was said in "mātrāsparśāḥ" (2.14)—that pain etc. of the Self is merely due to identification (abhimana) and not inherent.

He extends this method of explanation elsewhere too—with the word "iti". This is the distinction between word and meaning.

From where is the meaning "devoid of connection with defects" derived for "avināśinam"? To this, he says "doṣa" etc. The idea is that verbal roots have multiple meanings.

Having proposed "This (Self) neither kills nor is killed," and having substantiated "is not killed" (in verse 20), He now concludes by substantiating "does not kill." "Avināśinam"—That whose nature is not to perish; devoid of the final modification (death). The reason for that is "Avyayam"—that which has no "vyaya" (expenditure/loss); meaning, that which has no decay of parts or decay of qualities. Since destruction is seen through decay of parts or qualities, destruction is impossible for that which lacks both. This is the meaning. Objection: "But since it is created (janya), we can infer destructibility?" Answer: No, He says "Ajam". "Na jāyate"—so it is "Aja", devoid of the first modification (birth). The reason for that is "Nityam"—always existing. Birth is seen of that which was previously non-existent, not of that which always exists—this is the idea. Alternatively—"Avināśinam" means "Abādhyam" (unsublatable), i.e., "Satyam" (Truth). "Nityam" means all-pervading. The reason is "Ajam, Avyayam"—devoid of birth and destruction. Because all-pervasiveness and truth cannot apply to that which is being born or dying. Thus, regarding this embodied Self under discussion, which is devoid of all modifications—he who "Veda" (knows) his own Self, realizing it directly through the instruction of Scripture and the Teacher as "I am devoid of all modifications, the illuminator of all, devoid of all duality, of the nature of Supreme Bliss-Consciousness"—such a wise person, who is "Pūrṇa-rūpa" (fulfilled/complete), "Kam Hanti" (Whom does he kill)? "Katham Hanti" (How does he kill)? The word "Kim" implies objection/negation. Meaning: He kills no one, and in no way.

Similarly, "Kam Ghātayati" (Whom does he cause to kill)? "Katham Ghātayati" (How does he cause to kill)? Meaning: He causes no one to be killed, and in no way. For agency in the act of killing is impossible for the non-agent who is devoid of all modifications. And thus the Shruti says: "If a person knows the Self as 'This am I', then desiring what and for whose sake should he suffer along with the body?" (Brihadaranyaka Up. 4.4.12). The Lord shows that for the knower of the pure Self, upon the cessation of superimposition rooted in ignorance, there is an absence of agency and enjoyership due to the absence of their roots like attachment and aversion.

The intention of the Lord here is this: In reality, no one does anything nor causes anything to be done, because of the nature of being devoid of all modifications. However, like in a dream, the deluded one superimposes agency etc. on the Self due to Avidya. As stated: "Those two do not know" (2.19). And the Shruti: "It seems to meditate, it seems to move." Therefore, all scriptures are applicable to the ignorant (avidvat). The wise one, due to the sublation of superimposition along with its root, does not superimpose agency etc. on the Self, just as one who knows the nature of a post does not superimpose 'thief' on it. Therefore, due to being devoid of modifications and being non-dual, it is said that the wise one neither acts nor causes to act. And the Shruti says: "The wise one fears nothing."

Arjuna, superimposing agency on himself and instigation on the Lord, feared the sin of violence in both. The Lord, knowing his mind, refuted both 'kills' and 'causes to kill'. The meaning is: "Do not superimpose agency on yourself and instigation on Me and fear sin." Since the agency of the Self is negated by demonstrating its immutability, the negation of all actions is intended by the Lord here; "Hanti" (killing) is merely an "Upalakshana" (indicator/synecdoche). Because it (killing) is immediately present in the context, and since the reason for prohibition (non-agency) is equal for all actions, the permission for other actions (for the Knower) is untenable. And so He will say: "For him, there is no duty/action to be done" (3.17). Therefore, the prattle of the deluded that "Here, by negating only killing, the Lord is permitting other actions" is refuted. In "Tasmāt yudhyasva" (Therefore, fight), since the command to kill is given by the Lord (to the ignorant Arjuna), the absence of real agency etc. (for the Knower) applies equally to action in general—this is the direction/indication.

Furthermore—He states that ignorance alone is the cause for the perception of defects like killing regarding this (Self), with "veda avināśinam" etc.

"Avināśinam"—meaning devoid of specific modifications. "Nityam"—always of one form. "Ajam"—devoid of birth etc. (created/fashioned so by Me alone for the sake of sport/Lila). "Avyayam"—devoid of destruction etc. He who knows thus—"Katham" (by what means), "Kam" (whom)—does that person, becoming an instigator himself, "Ghātayati" (cause to be killed) by another? Meaning, no one at all.

And "Kam Hanti" (whom does he kill) himself? Meaning, no one.

"Veda"—meaning he knows. The connection is: He who knows the Self as "avināśinam"—devoid of the final modification of being (destruction), and "nityam"—devoid of transformation. "Enam"—the one characterized in the previous mantra (20) as "Ajam" (unborn/birthless) and "Avyayam" (devoid of decay). "Katham"—in what way—does "saḥ puruṣaḥ"—that wise person who was (previously considered) qualified for action—"hanti"—perform the act of killing? Or "katham ghātayati"—how does he instigate a killer? Meaning: In no way does he kill anyone, and in no way does he cause anyone to be killed. In both places, "ākṣepa" (objection/negation) is the meaning, because a literal question is impossible (for a knower). And since the reason of "immutability" (avikriyatva) is equal (for all actions), the "prohibition of all actions" for the wise one is the intended meaning of the context for the Lord. The objection regarding "killing" is stated merely as an example.

(Objection): "Seeing what 'specific reason' for the impossibility of actions in the wise one does the Lord negate actions by saying 'How does that person...'"? (Answer): Is not the "immutability" of the Self stated as the specific cause for the impossibility of all actions? (Opponent): "True, it is stated. But that specific cause is different from the wise one (knower), because the knower is different from the immutable Self?" (Implies: The Self is immutable, but the knower is a person, so why can't he act?) (Answer): No, because the wise one is the Self. "Wisdom" does not belong to the aggregate of the body etc. Therefore, by the logic of elimination (parishesha), the un-aggregated Self alone is the "wise one" and is immutable; therefore, since action is impossible for that wise one, the objection "How does that person..." is appropriate. Just as the Self, though immutable, is "imagined" to be the perceiver of sound etc. brought by the intellect, due to "avidya" (ignorance) which fails to discriminate it from the mental modification (buddhi-vritti); exactly in the same way, the Self is called "wise" (vidvan) due to "vidya" (knowledge) in the form of a mental modification arising from the discrimination of Self and non-Self—which (vidya) is essentially unreal in the absolute sense (as it is a modification)—while the Self remains absolutely immutable. From the statement of the impossibility of action for the wise, the Lord's determination is understood to be that the actions enjoined by scripture are prescribed for the "ignorant" (avidvan).

(Objection): "But knowledge (Vidya) is also enjoined only for the ignorant? Because enjoining knowledge for one who already knows is useless like grinding flour. Therefore, the distinction that 'actions are enjoined for the ignorant and not for the wise' is not tenable?" (Answer): No, because a distinction holds regarding the "existence and non-existence of something to be performed." After the knowledge of the meaning of the injunction for Agnihotra etc., the Agnihotra action is to be performed by gathering various means by the ignorant one who has the understanding "I am the doer, this is my duty." But it is not the case that after the knowledge of the meaning of the statement of the nature of the Self like "na jāyate" (is not born), there remains something to be performed. Rather, nothing else arises except the knowledge regarding the oneness, non-agency, etc. of the Self, such as "I am not the doer, I am not the enjoyer." Thus, this distinction is established. Furthermore, he who knows himself as "I am the doer" necessarily has the understanding "This is my duty"; relative to that, he is qualified, and actions are possible for him. And he is "ignorant" (avidvan) according to the statement "tau ubhau na vijānītaḥ" (those two do not know). And for the "wise one" (vidvan) distinguished (from the ignorant), there is the statement negating action: "How does that person...". Therefore, the "wise one" who sees the immutable Self and the seeker of liberation (mumukshu) are qualified only for "Renunciation of All Actions" (Sarva-Karma-Sannyasa). For this reason, Lord Narayana, distinguishing between the wise Sankhyas and the ignorant Karmis, taught two steadfast paths (nishthas): "The path of Knowledge for the Sankhyas, and the path of Action for the Yogis." And Lord Vyasa said to his son: "These two paths..." And: "The path of action is first, and renunciation is after." The Lord will show this division again and again: "The knower of untruth, deluded by ego, thinks 'I am the doer'; but the knower of Truth thinks 'I do not do anything'." And "Renouncing all actions mentally, he sits..."

(Refutation of some views): Here some "self-styled scholars" say: "The knowledge 'I am the Self, devoid of the six modifications, immutable, non-agent, one' does not arise in anyone, such that 'renunciation of all actions' could be taught based on it." (Answer): This is incorrect, for it would imply the futility of scriptural instructions like "na jāyate". And just as the knowledge of the existence of Dharma/Adharma and the knowledge of the agent's connection with another body arises from the power of scriptural instruction; why should the knowledge of the immutability, non-agency, oneness, etc., of that very Self not arise from scripture? This should be asked of them. If they say "Because it is not an object of the senses (karanas)?"—No, because the Shruti says "It is to be seen by the mind alone." The mind, purified by the instruction of scripture and the teacher and by control of senses (shama-dama), is the instrument for seeing the Self. And thus, when inference and scripture exist for its comprehension, to say "knowledge does not arise" is mere audacity. And it must be accepted that knowledge, when arising, necessarily sublates its opposite, ignorance. And that ignorance has been shown as "I am the killer," "I am killed"—"those two do not know." Here, the agency, object-hood, and instigator-ship of the Self regarding the act of killing are shown to be caused by ignorance. And this "being caused by Avidya" regarding agency etc. is common to all actions, because the Self is immutable. For only a mutable agent instigates another who is his object, saying "Do this." Therefore, prohibiting agency and instigator-ship in all actions for the wise one without distinction, Lord Vasudeva says "veda avināśinam... katham sa puruṣaḥ" to demonstrate the absence of eligibility for action in the wise one.

(Question): Where then is the eligibility of the wise one? (Answer): This has been stated earlier: "By the path of Knowledge for the Sankhyas." And He will state the renunciation of all actions with "Renouncing all actions mentally..." (Objection): "By saying 'mentally', renunciation of vocal and physical actions is not implied?" (Answer): No, because it is qualified by "sarva-karmāṇi" (all actions). (Objection): "All 'mental' actions only?" (Answer): No, because vocal and physical actions are preceded by mental operation; without mental operation, they are not possible. (Objection): "Excluding mental actions which are causes of scriptural vocal and physical actions, one should renounce all other actions mentally?" (Answer): No, because of the qualification "neither acting nor causing to act" (5.13). (Objection): "This renunciation of all actions is spoken by the Lord for the dying, not for the living?" (Answer): No, because the qualification "the embodied one sits/remains in the nine-gated city" would not fit. Sitting in that body is not possible for one who has died through total renunciation. (Objection): "The connection is: 'Renouncing in the body' while not acting or causing to act; not that 'he sits/remains in the body'?" (Answer): No, because the immutability of the Self is asserted everywhere (so 'renouncing in the body' is meaningless for the Self). And the act of 'sitting/remaining' requires a locus, whereas renunciation does not require one. And the word "Nyāsa" with the prefix "Sam" here means "abandonment" (tyāga), not "deposit" (nikṣepa). Therefore, in the Gita-shastra, the one possessing Self-knowledge has eligibility only for Sannyasa, not for Karma—this we shall show here and there later in the context of Self-knowledge. (Current context): We shall speak of the context at hand. There, the indestructibility of the Self was proposed. "What is that like?"—This is stated (in the next verse).

He states the "fruit" born of the knowledge of the immutable Self with—"veda avināśinam" etc.

By "Katham" (How), the "mode/manner" is negated.

By "Kam Hanti" (Whom does he kill), the "object" and "agency" are negated. By "Ghātayati" (Causes to kill), the "instigator-ship" is also negated.

वेद knows? अविनाशिनम् indestructible? नित्यम् eternal? यः who? एनम् this (Self)? अजम् unborn? अव्ययम् inexhaustible? कथम् how? सः he (that)? पुरुषः man? पार्थ O Partha (son of Pritha)? कम् whom? घातयति causes to be slain? हन्ति kills? कम् whom.Commentary The enlightened sage who knows the immutable and indestructible Self through direct cognition or spiritual Anubhava (experience) cannot do the act of slaying. He cannot cause another to slay also.

In the mantra, 'He who thinks of this One as the killer,' having declared that (the Self) does not become the agent or the object of the actof killing, and then in the mantra, 'Never is this One born,' etc., having stated the reasons for (Its) changelessness, the Lord sums up the purport of what was declared above: He who knows this One as indestructible, etc.
Yah, he who; veda, knows yah is to be thus connected with Veda ; enam, this One, possessing the characteristics stated in the earlier mantra; as avinasinam, indestructible, devoid of the final change of state; nityam, eternal, devoid of transformation; ajam, birthless; and avyayam, undecaying; katham, how, in what way; (and kam, whom;) does sah, that man of realization; purusah, the person who is himself an authority [i.e. above all injunctions and prohibitions. See 18.16.17.-Tr.]; hanti, kill, undertake the act of killing; or how ghatayati, does he cause (others) to be killed, (how does he) instigate a killer! The intention is to deny both (the acts) by saying, 'In no way does he kill any one, nor does he cause anyone to be killed', because an interrogative sense is absurd (here). Since the implication of the reason [The reason for the denial of killing etc. is the changelessness of the Self, and this reason holds good with regard to all actions of the man of realization.-Tr.], viz the immutability of the Self, [The A.A. omits 'viz the immutability of the Self'.-Tr.] is common (with regard to all actions), therefore the negation of all kinds of actions in the case of a man of realization is what the Lord conveys as the only purport of this context. But the denial of (the act of) killing has been cited by way of an example.
Objection: By noticing what special reason for the impossibility of actions in the case of the man of realization does the Lord deny all actions (in his case) by saying, 'How can that person,' etc.?
Vedantin: Has not the immutability of the Self been already stated as the reason [Some readings omit this word.-Tr.] , the specific ground for the impossibility of all actions?
Objection: It is true that it has been stated; but that is not a specific ground, for the man of realization is different from the immutable Self. Indeed, may it not be argued that action does not become impossible for one who has known as unchanging stump of a tree?!
Vedantin: No, because of man of Knowledge is one with the Self. Enlightenment does not belong to the aggregate of body and senses. Therefore, as the last laternative, the knower is the Immutable and is the Self which is not a part of the aggregate. Thus, action being impossible for that man of Knowledge, the denial in, 'How can that person৷৷.,' etc. is reasonable. As on account of the lack of knowledge of the distinction between the Self and the modifications of the intellect, the Self, though verily immutable, is imagined through ignorance to be the perceiver of objects like sound etc. presented by the intellect etc., in this very way, the Self, which in reality is immutable, is said to be the 'knower' because of Its association with the knowledge of the distinction between the Self and non-Self, which (knowledge) is a modification of the intellect [By buddhi-vrtti, modification of the intellect, is meant the transformation of the internal organ into the form of an extension upto an object, along with its past impressions, the senses concerned, etc., like the extension of the light of a lamp illuminating an object. Consciousness reflected on this transformation and remaining indistinguishable from that transformation revealing the object, is called objective knowledge. Thery, due to ignorance, the Self is imagined to be the perceiver because of Its connection with the vrtti, modification. (-A.G.)
The process is elsewhere described as follows:
The vrtti goes out through the sense-organ concerned, like the flash of a torchlight, and along with it goes the reflection of Consciousness. Both of them envelop the object, a pot for instance. The vrtti destroys the ignorance about the pot; and the reflection of Consciousness, becoming unified with only that portion of it which has been delimited by the pot, reveals the pot.
In the case of knowledge of Brahman, it is admitted that the vrtti in the form, 'I am Brahman', does reach Brahman and destroys ignorance about Brahman, but it is not admitted that Brahman is revealed like a 'pot', for Brahman is self-effulgent.-Tr.] and is unreal by nature. From the statement that action is impossible for man of realization it is understood that the conclusion of the Lord is that, actions enjoined by the scriptures are prescribed for the unenlightened.
Objection: Is not elightenment too enjoined for the ignorant? For, the injunction about enlightenment to one who has already achieved realization is useless, like grinding something that has already been ground! This being so, the distinction that rites and duties are enjoined for the unenlightened, and not for the enlightened one, does not stand to reason.
Vedantin: No. There can reasonable be a distinction between the existence or nonexistence of a thing to be performed. As after the knowledge of the meaning of the injunction for rites like Agnihotra etc. their performance becomes bligatory on the unenlightened one who thinks, 'Agnihotra etc. has to be performed by collecting various accessories; I am the agent, and this is my duty', unlike this, nothing remains later on to be performed as a duty after knowing the meaning of the injunction about the nature of the Self from such texts as, 'Never is this One born,' etc. But apart from the rise of knowledge regarding the unity of the Self, his non-agency, etc., in the form, 'I am not the agent, I am not the enjoyer', etc., no other idea arises. Thus, this distinction can be maintained.
Again, for anyone who knows himself as, 'I am the agent', there will necessarily arise the idea, 'This is my duty.' In relation to that he becomes eligible. In this way duties are (enjoined) [Ast. adds 'sambhavanti, become possible'.-Tr.] for him. And according to the text, 'both of them do not know' (19), he is an unenlightened man. And the text, 'How can that person,' etc. concerns the enlightened person distinguished above, becuase of the negation of action (in this text).
Therefore, the enlightened person distinguished above, who has realized the immutable Self, and the seeker of Liberation are alified only for renunciation of all rites and duties. Therefore, indeed, the Lord Narayana, making a distinction between the enlightened man of Knowledge and the unenlightened man of rites and duties, makes them take up the two kinds of adherences in the text, 'through the Yoga of Knowledge for the men of realization; through the Yoga of Action for the yogis' (3.3).
Similarly also, Vyasa said to his son, 'Now, there are these two paths,' etc. ['Now, there are these two paths on which the Vedas are based. They are thought of as the dharma characterized by engagement in duties, and that by renunciation of them' (Mbh. Sa. 241.6).-Tr.] So also (there is a Vedic text meaning): 'The path of rites and duties, indeed, is the earlier, and renunciation comes after that.' [Ast. says that this is not a otation, but only gives the purport of Tai, Ar. 10.62.12.-Tr.] The Lord will show again and again this very division: 'The unenlightened man who is deluded by egoism thinks thus: "I am the doer"; but the one who is a knower of the facts (about the varieties of the gunas) thinks, "I do not act"' (cf. 3.27,28). So also there is the text, '(The embodied man of selfcontrol,) having given up all actions mentally, continues (happily in the town of nine gates)' (5.13) etc.
With regard to this some wiseacres say: In no person does arise the idea, 'I am the changeless, actionless Self, which is One and devoid of the six kinds of changes beginning with birth to which all things are subject', on the occurrence of which (idea alone) can renunciation of all actions be enjoined. That is not correct, because it will lead to the needlessness of such scriptural instructions as, 'Never is this One born,' etc. (20). They should be asked: As on the authority of scripural instructions there arises the knowledge of the existence of virtue and vice and the knowledge regarding an agent who gets associated with successive bodies, similarly, why should not there arise from the scriptures the knowledge of unchangeability, non-agentship, oneness, etc. of that very Self?
Objection: If it be said that this is due to Its being beyond the scope of any means (of knowledge)?
Vedantin: No, because the Sruti says, 'It is to be realized through the mind alone, (following the instruction of the teacher)' (Br. 4.4.19). The mind that is purified by the instructions of the scriptures and the teacher, control of the body and organs, etc. becomes the instrument for realizing the Self. Again, since there exist inference and scriptures for Its realization, it is mere bravado to say that Knowledge does not arise. And it has to be granted that when knowledge arises, it surely eliminates ignorance, its opposite. And that ignorance has been shown in, 'I am the killer', 'I am killed', and 'both of them do not know' (see 2.19). And here also it is shown that the idea of the Self being an agent, the object of an action, or an indirect agent, is the result of ignorance. Also, the Self being changeless, the fact that such agentship etc. are cuased by ignorance is a common factor in all actions without exception, because only that agent who is subject to change instigates someone else who is different from himself and can be acted on, saying, 'Do this.'
Thus, with a view to pointing out the absence of fitness for rites and duties in the case of an enlightened person, the Lord [Ast, adds vasudeva after 'Lord'.-Tr.] says, 'He who knows this One as indestructible,' 'how can that person,' etc. thery denying this direct and indirect agentship of an enlightened person in respect of all actions without exception. As regards the estion, 'For what, again, is the man of enlightenment alified?', the answer has already been give earlier in, 'through the Yoga of Knowledge for the men of realization' (3.3). Similarly, the Lord will also speak of renunication of all actions in, 'having given up all actions mentally,' etc.(5.13).
Objection: May it not be argued that from the expression, 'mentally', (it follows that) oral and bodily actions are not to be renounced?
Vedantin: No, because of the categoric expression, 'all actions'.
Objection: May it not be argued that 'all actions' relates only to those of the mind?
Vedantin: No, because all oral and bodily actions are preceded by those of the mind, for those actions are impossible in the absence of mental activity.
Objection: May it not be said that one has to mentally renounce all other activities except the mental functions which are the causes of scriptural rites and duties performed through speech and body?
Vedantin: No, because it has been specifically expressed: 'without doing or causing (others) to do anything at all' (5.13).
Objection: May it not be that this renunciation of all actions, as stated by the Lord, is with regard to a dying man, not one living?
Vedantin: No, because (in that case) the specific statement, 'The embodied man৷৷.continues happily in the town of nine gates' (ibid.) will become illogical since it is not possible for a dead person, who neither acts nor makes others act, [The words 'akurvatah akarayatah, (of him) who neither acts nor makes others act', have been taken as a part of the Commentator's arguement. But A.G. points out that they can also form a part of the next Objection. In that, case, the translation of the Objection will be this: Can it not be that the construction of the sentence (under discussion) is Neither doing nor making others do, he rest by depositing (sannyasya, by renouncing) in the body', but not 'he rests in the body by renouncing৷৷.'?] to rest in that body after renouncing all actions.

Objection: Can it not be that the construction of the sentence (under discussion) is, '(he rests) by depositing (sannyasya, by renouncing) in the body', (but) not 'he rests in the body by renouncing৷৷.'?
Vedantin: No, because everywhere it is categorically asserted that the Self is changeless. Besides, the action of 'resting' reires a location, whereas renunciation is independent of this. The word nyasa preceded by sam here means 'renunciation', not 'depositing'. Therefore, according to this Scripture, viz the Gita, the man of realization is eligible for renunciation, alone, not for rites and duties. This we shall show in the relevant texts later on in the cotext of the knowledge of the Self.
And now we shall speak of the matter on hand: As to that, the indestructibility [Indestructibility suggests unchangeability as well.] of the Self, has been postulated. What is it like? That is being said in, 'As after rejecting wornout clothes,' etc.

He who knows the self to be eternal, as It is indestructible, unborn and changeless - how can that person be said to cause the death of the self, be it of the self existing in the bodies of gods or animals or immovables? Whom does he kill? The meaning is - how can he destroy any one or cause anyone to slay? How does he become an instrument for slaying? The meaning is this: the feeling of sorrow: 'I cause the slaying of these selves, I slay these,' has its basis solely in ignorance about the true nature of the self.
Let it be granted that what is done is only separation of the bodies from the eternal selves. Even then, when the bodies, which are instruments for the experience of agreeable pleasures, perish, there still exists reason for sorrow in their separation from the bodies. To this (Sri Krsna) replies: